The CJEU as a 'laboratory' of comparative analysis : a theoretical and case-based study of the Europeanisation of private law by LAW, Stephanie
 	  
The CJEU as a “Laboratory” of 
Comparative Analysis 
A Theoretical and Case-Based Study of the 
Europeanisation of Private Law 
Stephanie Law 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining 
the degree of Doctor of Laws of the European University Institute 
Florence, September 2014 (Defence) 

 European	  University	  Institute	  
Department	  of	  Law	  
The CJEU as a “Laboratory” of Comparative Analysis 










Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining 
the degree of Doctor of Laws of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Professor Fabrizio Cafaggi, EUI (Supervisor) 
Professor Hans-W. Micklitz, EUI 
Professor Geneviève Saumier, McGill University 







© Stephanie Law, 2014  
 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
 
 




This thesis seeks to determine whether, and if so, in what form, comparative analysis 
constitutes a theoretical and methodological component of the Europeanisation of private law; 
following a review of legislative efforts at harmonisation, the thesis evaluates the CJEU as a 
“comparative laboratory”.  It begins with an exploration of the nature of Europeanisation and 
integration, which highlights the significance of the political, economic and legal as well as 
social and cultural contexts in which these processes occur.  In light of this initial analysis, 
from which the significance of the national foundations of private law also comes to the fore, 
the European space is advanced as one of commonality and diversity of legal cultures and 
traditions.  Recognising the unlikelihood of the codification of private law, the thesis makes a 
plea for the recognition of a shift in the perspective of legal development, to one which 
acknowledges the dynamic nature of private law as it emerges within a pluralist, multi-level 
construct of regulation.  Against this background and in light of the contextual perspective to 
which it gives rise, the thesis argues that comparative analysis might facilitate the 
development of such a perspective, particularly in light of the role of the courts, both national 
and European.  Notwithstanding this potential, a critical assessment of contemporary 
comparative law reveals its theoretical and methodological poverty and illustrates the need for 
a developed understanding of “complex” comparison, engaging this aforementioned shift in 
perspective.  The foundations of the evaluation of the CJEU as a “comparative laboratory” are 
brought to light via a socio-legal assessment of its constitution and jurisdiction; the evaluation 
thereafter intertwines the theoretical and case-based analyses, engaging the preliminary 
reference procedure as a fundamental epistemological standpoint and concretising the 
discourse with three case examples of CJEU jurisprudence, in which conflicts of a private law 
nature arise.  These case analyses provide the foundations for the construction of two 
classifications, namely of the sources of comparison in the CJEU and of the context and 
purposes for which comparison is engaged, both of which illustrate the existence of 
comparative analysis as a tool of interpretation.  A second round of evaluation advances and 
facilitates the understanding of the relevance of comparative analysis not only as a tool of 
interpretation but also as a second-order device, in respect of the CJEU’s development of its 
“meta-mechanisms” of Europeanisation and integration, essentially building on the analysis 
undertaken to ask why comparative analysis should be engaged by the Luxembourg Court.   
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1 Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the term Court of Justice of the CJEU has been employed; for consistency 
purposes, the term CJEU is used throughout this thesis to refer to the Luxembourg Court, even in reference to 
cases heard before the Treaty entered into Force in December 2009.    
2 For the same reason, namely consistency, the term “Union law” or “EU law” is employed throughout, 
regardless of whether the law referred to came into force prior or subsequent to the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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I. Outlining the Research Question and Setting the Scene of the Research 
 
Against the background of a review of legislative efforts at harmonisation, and the increasing 
scope for interactions between courts, this thesis aims to determine whether, and if so, in what 
form, comparative analysis can be understood to constitute a methodological component of 
the Europeanisation of private law, by evaluating the CJEU as a “comparative laboratory”3. 
 
The thesis has two key dimensions.  The first constitutes the foundations of the study, in light 
of which it is recognised that as the codification of private law is unlikely in the future, a plea 
for a shift in the perspective of legal development must be advanced.  At the outset, the thesis 
therefore aims to explore the nature of Europeanisation and integration so as to emphasise the 
relevant legal, political, cultural and socio-economic contexts in which these processes occur.  
Against this background and in light of the origins of private law in the national legal cultures 
and traditions, one can begin to uncover the foundations of the Europeanisation of private law 
as it occurs in the context of integration and in light of the interdependencies of the national, 
European and transnational orders to which these processes have given rise4.  The second 
dimension of the thesis seeks to uncover the assertion – recognising the limits of legislative 
development – that the engagement of comparative analysis5 by the courts might facilitate the 
aforementioned shift in perspective, from one focused on harmonisation via legislation to one 
which acknowledges both the scope for the dynamic nature of private law as it emerges 
within a multi-level construct of regulation and the significance of the pluralism which 
defines the European space.  While the thesis thus engages the methodological discourses 
shaping the Europeanisation of private law, it intends neither to provide a general overview of 
the methodologies engaged by the legislature, nor of the interpretative methodologies of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The notion of “comparative laboratory” is derived from M. Hilf, ‘The Role of Comparative Law in the 
Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ in A.L.C. De Mestral et al (eds.), The 
Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Les éditions Tvon Blais, Cowansville; 1986), 
pp.549-574, p.550. 
4 The legal orders are understood to be interdependent, where “[I]nterdependency does not require unifying our 
different systems, nor dissipating every understanding as to the meaning of common principles”; M. Delmas-
Marty, ‘Comparative Law and International Law:  Methods for Ordering Pluralism’, p.13 (<http://w7.ens-
lyon.fr/amrieu/IMG/pdf/Delmas-M_Comp_Int_Law_10-05-2.pdf>; Last Accessed: 27.10.2011). 
5  The terms comparative “methodology” and “analysis” are used interchangeably throughout the thesis; 
“comparative law” is used only in the context of its critique to describe the broader discourse.   
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the CJEU6.  Rather, it essentially begs the question of why the CJEU should engage 
comparative analysis as a tool of the Europeanisation of private law.  This question is 
embedded in a preliminary critical assessment of contemporary comparative law in light of 
which an understanding of the potentialities of “complex”7 comparison is advanced.  This part 
of the thesis firstly purports to determine whether, and in what form, comparative analysis can 
be identified as a component of the methodological framework of Europeanisation; this 
discourse is concretised via an evaluation of three case examples relevant to private law 
development, which allows for conclusions to be drawn as to the existence and nature of 
comparative legal reasoning in the CJEU.  Thereafter, this case-based analysis provides the 
foundations for a second round of evaluation, exploring further the question of why the CJEU 
should engage comparative analysis, in respect of which it is advanced that it might be 
understood not only as a tool of interpretation but also as a “second order” device of 
Europeanisation. 
 
The question of “why comparative analysis” arises throughout the thesis; at the outset, it is 
worthwhile to provide a brief outline of the rationales underpinning the focus, at this specific 
time, on the putative relevance of comparative analysis, in particular, as a dimension of the 
CJEU’s Europeanisation of private law.  There have arguably been assumptions, within and 
outwith legal scholarship, as to the “obvious” relevance of the engagement of comparative 
analysis by national, European and international courts; however, it is not satisfactory to rest 
on these laurels.  The following paragraph therefore outlines diverse factors shaping the 
context of European private law development and responding to the question of “why 
comparative analysis”.  Conflicts of a private law nature, as will be seen in Chapter 1, emerge 
increasingly within national legal orders, perhaps revealing the limits of European legislative 
efforts, and are reflected in the proliferation in the number of requests for preliminary rulings 
with a private law dimension; this echoes, as will become evident in Chapter 3, in the 
expansion, not only of the CJEU’s jurisdiction and role, but also of the scope for its 
interaction with national courts.  Moreover, the CJEU must render interpretations that are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Such a task extends far beyond the scope of this thesis; further, there exist already a number of excellent 
contributions to this effort including most recently, G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the 
European Court of Justice (CUP, Cambridge; 2012) and G. Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of 
the EU (OUP, Oxford; 2012). 
7 The engagement of the characterisation of “complex comparison” derives from V. Gessner et al, ‘Introduction 
to the Patchwork of Legal Cultures in Europe’ in V. Gessner et al (eds.), European Legal Cultures (Dartmouth, 
Aldershot; 1996), pp.245-269 and M. Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in M. Van Hoecke (ed.) 
Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart, Oxford; 2004), pp.165-195. 
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deemed applicable not only within the courts of the referring legal tradition or culture but 
across the Member States, shaped by the need for the legitimacy and effectiveness of Union 
(private) law.  Against this background, one can identify reference to diverse sources of law 
and mechanisms of legal development, including principles of law, transfer and judicial 
dialogue, notwithstanding the almost scant explication of their foundations.  Furthermore, the 
hypothesis posited broadly advances that the engagement and analysis of (one of a number of) 
putatively relevant methodological discourses8 allows for the identification evolution of a 
necessarily normative approach to legal development, one which, in the context of this thesis, 
emerges in light of the legal and economic but also the – rarely fully explored – diverse 
social, political and cultural contexts of integration, and thus might facilitate the identification 
of a balance between Europeanisation, on the one hand, and respect for the diversity that 
permeates the European space, on the other.  It is trite to proclaim that the European space 
and European legal development are characterised by a dichotomy of commonality and 
diversity; this is identifiable not only in respect of legal norms but also of values, identities, 
experiences and “ways of life”.  The focus on commonality underpins the scope for economic 
cooperation, that is, the facilitation of the internal market, while the recognition of diversity 
reflects the breadth of national and potentially transnational, legal orders, cultures and 
traditions.  The former is arguably quelled and the latter simultaneously engendered, by the 
diminishing significance of national boundaries and thus of territorially defined units of 
(legal) analysis.  
 
It is submitted that the commonality/diversity dichotomy thus permeates the scope for the 
Europeanisation of private law.  The nature of European private law development and the 
purpose for which it has been engaged, that is, the facilitation of the internal market, dictates 
that the discourse has long focused on the construction of a “new” ius commune, that is, on 
the legislative development and implementation of a uniform body of norms via a harmonised 
civil code.  Similarly, calls have long been made for the development of a distinct European 
(legal) culture as a prerequisite to legal development.  This focus on commonality finds its 
foundations in the very roots of the European order, that is, the existence of diversity that was, 
and still is, understood to undermine the development of the common market.  The existence 
of diversity, whether legal, cultural, political or socio-economic, national, European, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A broad conceptualisation of methodological framework is adopted, reflecting the understanding that the 
methodologies underpinning and shaping legal development are comprised of multiple processes, not only of a 
practical but also a theoretical character. 
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international or transnational, and the recognition of the need for respect thereof, is often 
positioned in contrast to harmonisation, which is advanced as a means by which diversity 
might be eliminated, and thus the obstacles that it poses, overcome.  That is to say, diversity is 
frequently conceived as undesirable, breeding uncertainty, incoherence and messiness; 
harmonisation, reflected in the convergence/divergence discourse9, attempts to counter this.  It 
therefore aims to eliminate differences, and to create a more blank canvas (assuming that a 
blank canvas can never truly be realised10) via the promulgation and application of Union 
norms, on the basis of which the internal market can be facilitated, where otherwise its 
functioning would be undermined by the diversity - particularly that of national norms – 
existing across the European space11.  Furthermore, the relevance of the commonality and 
diversity discourse also extends to the cultures and traditions12 permeating the European and 
global sphere, and thus to the interdependency of the national, Union and international 
institutions.  It is therefore reflected in structural and institutional concerns, and particularly - 
for the purposes of this thesis – the legislative and judicial approaches to European legal 
development.  With regard to the former, the focus on harmonisation has generally fallen on 
the shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation, with an apparent settling, at least for the 
time being, on ”targeted” maximum harmonisation.  However, it is submitted that legal 
development can be ensured only via the CJEU and the national courts, and not by the Union 
or national legislatures alone.  While national legislatures are obliged to transpose EU 
legislation or risk liability, they remain free – within the bounds of primary Union law – to 
choose the form and method of transposition; the CJEU plays an interpretative role arising via 
the preliminary reference procedure, the fruits of which the domestic courts are expected to 
apply in a uniform manner across the Member States.  Notwithstanding this framework, 
aiming at uniformity and thus commonality, the diversities that continue to exist dictate that 
the uniform implementation, interpretation and application of Union norms across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 U. Mattei and L.G. Pes, 'Civil Law and Common Law:  Toward Convergence?' in K.E. Whittington, R.D. 
Kelemen and G.A. Caldeira (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP, Oxford; 2008), pp.267-
280; R.B Schlesinger, ‘The Past and Future of Comparative Law’ (1995) 43 AJCL 477, p.477. 
10 Consider the discussion in respect of the influence of the background of legal culture on legal actors in 
Chapter 4. 
11 See, G. de Búrca and J. Scott, ‘Introduction’ in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the 
EU:  From Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart, Oxford 2000), pp.1-8, p.2. 
12 It is on this basis that the idea of a threat to diversity, resulting from the emergence of the European legal 
order, and the focus on uniformity and commonality therein, arises.  The notion of a “threat” is often adopted in 
the context of EU constitutional law, the aim of which is often billed at the national level as a discourse which 
aims to draw attention to the “destruction” or “disintegration” of nation state sovereignty, resulting from the 
“intrusion” arising from the implementation, interpretation and application of European law, not only via the 
legislatures but also via the courts.  This idea of a threat permeates the three case examples explored below.   
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European space might never constitute a reality.  Thus, while the Union legislature 
increasingly legislates on matters affecting private law, it nevertheless finds its foundations 
and continues to develop within the national legal orders; private law development is, it is 
submitted, necessarily embedded within particular historical, social, cultural, political and 
economic parameters, at both the national and European levels, shaped by the courts.  It is for 
this reason that the analysis initially engages the legislative development of Union law, and 
subsequently shifts to the CJEU’s jurisprudence. 
 
In the context of the Europeanisation of private law, and the implementation, interpretation 
and application of norms contributing thereto, it is the existence of a plurality of sources of 
norms and dispute resolution bodies, between and amongst national, European and global 
societies, that establishes the link between diversity and pluralism, the existence of the former 
invoking the characterisation of the latter.  Like diversity, pluralism is descriptive and also 
potentially normative13.  Thus, it is not simply of abstract concern but rather finds its 
foundations in empirically verifiable fact.  To take a fundamental example, one can refer to 
the increasingly broad body of actors engaged in the EU’s evolving governance role resulting 
from the expansion of its functional competences; perhaps more immediately evident is the 
enlargement of the EU itself, a process which results in an increasingly broad (geographically, 
most evidently) body of Member States.  It is submitted that pluralism allows for the adoption 
of a perspective whereby it is recognised that while diversity must be managed in some way, 
the European legal space need not be understood as one in which diversity must necessarily 
be quashed in favour of commonality or uniformity14.  The different attitudes towards the 
manner and extent to which the respect for and protection of diversity should be afforded 
reflect the often-conflicting ideological underpinnings shaping and framing the 
Europeanisation of private law.  As noted, the focus has fallen on the elimination of diversity 
and the promotion of commonality, fostered by the harmonisation efforts of the Union 
legislature and the (principally) integration-orientated interpretative approach of the CJEU.  
Within this thesis, the scope for an alternative is advanced, which adheres neither to the focus 
on commonality nor necessarily to that on diversity.  Pluralism is engaged as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Following Schiff Berman (P. Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1237), Tuori 
engages with legal pluralism as both a descriptive and normative understanding, “purportedly able to tack 
between the shoals of old-time state sovereigntism and potentially difference-levelling universalism”; K. Tuori, 
‘Towards a Theory of Transnational Law:  A Very First Draft’ (2010) (on file with the author), p.17. 
14 Indeed, the notion of “managing” requires comparative law is not understood as apolitical, per D. Kennedy, 
‘The Methods and the Politics of Comparative Law’ in M. Bussani and U. Mattei (eds.), The Common Core of 
European Private Law: Essays on the Project (Kluwer, The Hague; 2003), pp.345-433, pp.409 et seq. 
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epistemological footing of the research project, broadly shaping the perspective adopted and 
supporting the understanding that legal analysis and development should avoid rigid 
adherence to orthodox parameters, and be bound neither by fixed conceptualisations nor static 
assumptions.  This consideration thus rejects the confines that might limit the analysis to that 
which is purely legal to the exclusion of an interdisciplinary approach; more specifically, it 
engages the focus, in the postnational context, on the nation state, the adherence to which 
results in methodologies which are predominantly tied to Western legal, political and socio-
economic orders and out-dated understandings of legal (and human) development15.  It is 
therefore advanced that the EU order rests at the centre of a pluralist, multi-level system, and 
atop diverse national orders, cultures and traditions.  The considerations outlining the 
background and setting the scene of the research suggest that that a contextual framework is 
required, one which permits consideration of the legal, cultural, political and socio-economic 
parameters within which the Europeanisation of private law occurs.   
 
Against this background, the thesis seeks to uncover the relevance and use of comparative 
analysis, as part of a broader resurrection of the methodological discourse, in light of the 
understanding that “there is a structural factor in the EU which supports the necessity to 
compare: the complexity of the EU legal order”16.  From a first order perspective, the research 
examines and evaluates the theoretical and methodological dimensions of comparative 
analysis as it has evolved, in general, and specifically in light of the emergence of 
Europeanisation.  Notwithstanding the apparent suitability of the comparative methodology, 
the appropriateness of the comparative framework as it currently exists is not taken for 
granted; rather, the thesis engages a critical approach.  This analysis calls into question the 
appropriateness of comparative analysis as it is currently conceived, particularly as to the 
extent to which it propagates the predominance of the nation state and the significance of 
territorial, that is, national, boundaries delineating the legal order, determinations which shape 
not only the identification of what is compared but also the context in which the comparative 
analysis is undertaken.  Thereafter, in light of the identification of the locus in which 
Europeanisation and integration occurs and of the shifting nature of private law therein, the 
thesis advances a developed, complex conceptualisation of comparison, which purports to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 R. Vogler, ‘Making International Criminal Procedure Work:  From Theory to Practice’ in R. Henham and M. 
Findlay (eds.), Exploring the Boundaries of International Criminal Justice (Ashgate, Farnham; 2011), pp.105-
127, p.112. 
16 G. Martinico, ‘Comparative Legal Studies and European Integration: Looking at the Origins of the Debate’ 
(2008) 122 Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado 859, p.879. 
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facilitate the analysis of legal development beyond the state.  Thereafter, the thesis aims to 
identify, via an analysis of key case examples fundamental to Union law, whether – and if so, 
the way in which – comparative analysis is employed in the CJEU.  This permits an 
examination of the CJEU as a “comparative laboratory”, that is, comparative analysis and the 
role and jurisdiction of the CJEU as tools of Europeanisation and integration.  Before 
outlining the structure of the thesis, it is necessary firstly to examine its methodological 
approach.   
 
II. Summarising the Methodology and the Structure of the Thesis 
 
While the thesis cannot claim to be truly interdisciplinary, the focus on the methodological 
discourse underpinning Europeanisation permits an approach which engages the experiences 
and insights of other disciplines17 and in particular, a critical “law and…”18 evaluation of 
European private law development.  The thesis aims to adopt a critical approach in light of the 
exponential expansion of the analysis of European private law development in recent years19, 
which has fuelled the debate and given rise to calls for a second-generation of legal 
scholarship20.  Yet it is submitted that legal scholarship alone struggles to attribute sufficient 
consideration to the context in which the Europeanisation of private law emerges; rather, a 
necessarily interdisciplinary perspective should be adopted, permitting the further elaboration 
of this context and of the interactions between the different legal orders arising therefrom.  
Furthermore, it is considered that the better understanding of this context would be facilitated 
by an initial re-evaluation of the traditional doctrinal, theoretical and conceptual premises 
upon which the Europeanisation endeavour is founded, revealing and divulging the 
assumptions and biases underlying its evolution21.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Following the understanding of interdisciplinarity set out by de Búrca, in G. de Búrca, 'Rethinking Law in 
Neofunctionalist Theory' (2005) 12 J.Eur.Pub.Pol. 310.  Indeed, the methodological concerns associated with 
legal scholarship therein, at p.314, are also borne in mind here. 
18  R. Van Gestel and H-W. Micklitz, ‘Revitalising Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About 
Methodology?’ in U. Neergaard et al (eds.), European Legal Method: Paradoxes and Revitalisation (Djøf 
Publishing, Copenhagen; 2012), pp.25-74.  
19 Recent developments, including the publication of the Draft Common Frame of Reference, the drafting and 
implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive and the drafting of the proposal for a Common European 
Sales Law, hereinafter, the DCFR, CRD and pCESL, respectively. 
20 F. Cafaggi and H-W. Micklitz, (eds.), European Private Law After the Common Frame of Reference (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham; 2010), pr.ix. 
21 This line of thinking has been facilitated by the series of ‘Why… ‘ seminars at the EUI, in Florence. 
 	  	  	   8 
Thus, the lines of analysis that emerge from the exploration of the nature of integration and 
Europeanisation in Part I advocate a socio-legal approach to the analysis of European legal 
development.  It transpires that this approach is relevant not only in respect of the 
acknowledgement of the context of integration and Europeanisation, in light of the pluralism 
that permeates the European space but also for the understanding of complex comparison 
advanced, and the assessment of the constitution and jurisdiction of the CJEU.  The thesis 
therefore aims to further develop the contextual perspective and in doing so, makes the 
argument for the adoption of a more open yet necessarily more complex understanding of 
comparison – than those outlined and critiqued in the first section of Chapter 3 - in order to 
better understand the Europeanisation of private law and the context, not only in which it 
occurs but in which comparative analysis might be engaged in its development.  Explored in 
more detail below22, the legal cultural perspective is advanced as an alternative point of 
reference both in respect of the determination of what is being compared and the way in 
which it is compared, and the perspective adopted in respect of legal development, more 
broadly.  For these purposes, the exploration of the conceptualisations of culture – general 
and legal – and tradition is deemed to be relevant; this is particularly true in respect of two 
dimensions of the comparative methodology – namely, the unit of analysis (that is, what is 
being compared), and the way, or context, in which comparison is undertaken – but also 
permeates the thesis as a whole, reflecting the need for a contextual framework, as outlined 
above.  The terms of culture, legal culture and tradition are frequently used interchangeably; 
thus, it seems necessary to provide some clarification as to the way in which they will be 
employed for the purposes of the thesis. 
 
As has been outlined above and as will become clear from Parts I and II, the nation state has 
long constituted the predominant reference point in both private and comparative law; that is 
to say, for the purposes of micro-comparative legal analysis, the focus has been on the 
component parts of the national legal system, namely doctrinal legal rules, concepts, decisions 
and institutions.  These legal systems have been classified – by virtue of divergent factors23 - 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See Chapter 2. 
23 Most significantly, R. David and J.E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems of the World Today:  An Introduction 
to the Comparative Study of Law (The Legal Classics Library, Delran; 3rd edn., 2000), (considering the “parent” 
tradition of the legal system); and thereafter, K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (T. 
Weir trans.) (OUP, Oxford; 3rd edn., 1998), pp.66-68 (employing the notion of “legal style” to characterise 
systems).  See, more recently, J.M. Smits, 'Law Making in the European Union - On Globalization and Contract 
Law in Divergent Legal Cultures' (2007) 67 La.L.Rev 1181, p.1183, who looks to “common history, their 
sources of law and their predominant mode of legal thought”. 
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as legal families via macro-comparative analysis.  While it is recognised that the legal 
families approach attributes consideration to the scope for the increasing interdependence of 
legal orders, cultures and traditions, defining one legal order in terms of the other, it is not 
adopted as a point of reference herein24; rather, the disadvantages of classification in general, 
and of the legal families taxonomy in particular - namely their Eurocentric, reductivist, 
overly-positivist and generalising nature - as epistemological tools 25  are recognised.  
Furthermore, it is considered that the notion of legal system or order alone fails to provide for 
an appreciation of legal development in context; this is reflected in Merryman’s distinction 
between system, understood as “an operating set of legal institutions, procedures and rules” 
and tradition, as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes, about the nature of 
law, about the role of law in society and the polity, about the proper organisation and 
operation of a legal system…the legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which 
it is a partial expression.  It puts the development of the legal system in cultural 
perspective”26.  In particular, it is submitted that the reference to legal system or order alone 
fails to bring to the fore the significance of shifting conceptualisations of (private) law as they 
emerge in the socio-economic, political and cultural, as well as legal, contexts of 
Europeanisation.   
 
Legal culture and tradition are often employed interchangeably; thus, at the outset, it seems 
worthwhile to consider the way in which both are understood.  Patrick Glenn’s insightful text 
on legal traditions forms the basis for the distinction engaged for the purposes of this thesis.  
He rejects, in favour of legal tradition, both legal system and legal culture as points of 
reference, predominantly on the basis of the vagueness and ambiguity inherent in culture and 
the understanding that both culture and system are “eminently reifiable concept[s]”27.  Patrick 
Glenn advances that tradition encompasses four dimensions, namely its core, its rationale, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Merely as one of the “broad epistemic matrix of macro-comparative law” that exist; J. Husa, 'Legal Families' 
in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2006), pp.382-392, 
p.384. 
25 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions’ in M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford; 2006), pp.421-440. 
26 J.H. Merryman and R. Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Europe and Latin America (Stanford University Press, Stanford; 3rd edn., 2007), p.2.  See also, significantly, H. 
Patrick Glen, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (OUP, Oxford; 4th edn., 2010). 
27 Patrick Glenn defines culture and tradition as “contrasting concept[s]” with “important epistemological 
differences” and tradition as “captured information”; H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions’ in 
M. Van Hoecke (ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford; 2004), 
pp.7-20, p.10. 
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way in which it understands change, and the manner in which it relates to other traditions28; 
similarity and commonality, in terms of processes, are deemed to be identifiable between 
legal traditions, particularly in respect of their institutions, principles and rules, features and 
historical development29.  Historical development is of particular significance, in light of its 
connection – in terms of continuity – with the past30.  That is to say, it is via the 
communication of ideas and “normative information”31 that the past can be connected to the 
present and from which tradition derives its dynamic nature; underscoring this link, Patrick 
Glenn identifies tradition in “the content and flow of large bodies of normative information 
over time and over space”32.  It is on this basis that tradition must be understood to extend 
beyond the state and the focus on the norms derived therefrom33; broadly, it shapes societies 
and identities34, which evidently might exist beyond the state.  Notwithstanding, one key 
difficulty is identifiable, which would limit the engagement of tradition for the purpose of this 
thesis, in respect of the Europeanisation of private law broadly, and the development of the 
comparative methodology in particular; that is to say, and as Patrick Glenn recognises, while 
tradition does extend beyond the “facts” of which the system is constituted, it does not 
encompass the entirety of normative content35.  The focus on the flow of information and 
ideas is maintained to the disregard of “law in action” and the significance of behaviour more 
broadly.  Thus, to the extent that the thesis aims to “open up” comparative analysis as part of 
the methodology of European legal development - and particularly in respect of judicial 
development as it occurs within a broader global context - it is submitted that the notion of 
tradition is too narrow to be engaged alone.  
 
From a methodological perspective, and particularly that of comparative analysis, the 
significance attributed to culture will shape the context in which the analysis is undertaken, 
highlighting the scope for an analysis beyond legal rules and on “law in context”.  It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (n.26), pr.xxxvi. 
29 Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (n.26), p.12. 
30 Not in the negative, static sense in which it might have come to be used; i.e. in light of colonisation. Patrick 
Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (n.26), p.12, and M. Krygier, ‘Law as Tradition’  (1986) 5 Law and 
Philosophy 237. 
31 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘A Western Legal Tradition?’ International Association of Procedural Law 2009, p.7; 
Patrick Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (n.25), notably at p.438 for the “monothetic” nature of the 
taxonomic process, or “limited feature classification”. 
32 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘A Concept of Legal Tradition’ (2008) 34 Queens.L.J. 427, p.431. 
33 Patrick Glenn, ‘A Concept of Legal Tradition’ (n.32), pp.438-440. 
34 Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (n.26), pp.33-38. 
35 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Com-paring’ in E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart, 
Oxford; 2007), pp.91-108, p.104. 
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therefore submitted that culture, tradition and identity should be deemed relevant to the 
identification of what is being compared; for the purposes of highlighting the perspective of 
the contextual framework within which legal orders interact, reference is also made to the 
notion of culture.  Notwithstanding, it is recognised that general culture is notoriously 
difficult to define and brings to the fore various conceptual difficulties; this is evidently clear 
from, for example, the attempts of the United Nations’ committees to define and 
conceptualise culture36.  Broadly, it has been conceived as a “way of life”37 or as “a context, 
something within which [events, behaviors, institutions and processes can be intelligibly] – 
that is, thickly – described”38.  As culture is employed as a tool to explain the shaping of 
political and ideological aims, it is distinguished from that which is determined biologically; 
it is understood as “those aspects of human activity, which are socially rather than genetically 
transmitted”39.  It is a difficult concept to “pin down” given that it has developed over a 
number of years and has come to escape concrete definition40.  The problematics of culture 
arise from its lack of clarity and the context in which it has predominantly been conceived.  In 
respect of its potential to provide a contextual perspective of legal development, it has been 
asserted on the one hand that the notion of (legal) culture is too vague to be of any 
satisfactory use41, and on the other that “it is as good as any other”42.  With regard to the 
context in which it has evolved, the problematic dimension of engaging culture for the 
purpose of the thesis arises from the inherent, mutual connection between culture and the 
emergence of the nation state; one function of culture has been, and continues to be, the 
propagation of commonality, reflected in the notion of the unity of the group which is 
ultimately conceived – within the state – as nationality.  It is on this basis that the potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  For example, UNCHR, ‘General Comment 23’ on the Rights of Minorities (08.04.1994), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5: “culture manifests itself in many forms”. 
37  The UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO General Conference, 31st Session, 02.11.2001, 
the Preamble of which defines culture as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material; intellectual and emotional 
features of society or a social group…in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, values 
systems, traditions and beliefs”, existing “at the heart of contemporary debates about identity, social cohesion, 
and the development of a knowledge-based economy”.  See also, UNCESCR, ‘General Discussion’ on the Right 
to Take Part in Cultural Life, 7th Session, UN Doc E/C.12/1992/2, para.213 and Art.15 International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16.12.1966) A/RES/21/2200 in respect of “culture as a way of life”. 
38 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (Basic Books, NY; 1973), p.14. 
39 A. O’Hear, ‘Culture’ in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, London; 1998), 
pp.185-186, p.185. 
40 Patrick Glenn, ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of 
Comparative Law (n.27), pp.8-10. 
41 Patrick Glenn, ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of 
Comparative Law (n.27), p.11. 
42 L.M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice – Law, Authority and Culture (HUP, Cambridge; 1990), p.213; see 
also, J. Bell, ‘English Law and French Law – Not So Different?’ (1995) 48 Current Legal Problems 63, p.64. 
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reification of culture arises, that is, as static, caught in its 19th century conceptualisations43.     
 
Legal culture is conceived as merely one dimension of a broader understanding of culture.  By 
invoking the notion of legal culture, culture can be understood as being “conditioned” within 
a particular context; that is to say, it is contextualised in order to understand “how individual 
decision-making is conditioned by the language of normative discussion, the set of historical 
reference points, the range of solutions proposed in the past, the institutional norms taken for 
granted, given a particular context of repeated social interaction”44.  It is submitted that both 
culture and legal culture are constantly changing and dynamic; as such, neither need be 
conceived within national confines 45  as European law emerges within an increasingly 
globalised context and as boundaries and territorial lines become increasingly blurred.  
Culture is therefore advanced as a perspective, open to the socio-economic, political, legal 
and cultural dimensions of law, having the broader potential of uncovering “law in context”, 
“law in action” or ‘living law”46; it is therefore engaged as a flexible reference point, 
reflecting cultural prejudices that exist, which are inherently connected to the dominant 
understandings and interpretations of society47.   
 
Moreover, different “societal cultures” exist, accounting for “the full range of human 
activities, encompassing both public and private life.  These societal cultures are typically 
associated with national groups”48.  At the national level, societal culture invokes notions of 
citizenship; however, as noted, the focus need not be on the national.  Rather, culture can be 
bound in the values of the individual or group of individuals, which make up the “collective”: 
“culture…is always a collective phenomenon, because it is at least partly shared with people 
who live or lived within the same social environment where it was learned”49.  When social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Patrick Glenn, ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of 
Comparative Law (n.27), p.10. 
44 J. Webber, ‘Culture, Legal Culture and Legal Reasoning: A Comment on Nelken’ (2004) 29 Aus.J.Leg.Phil. 
25, p.32. 
45 Freidman, drawing a distinction between internal, the legal culture of the specialised, and external, the legal 
culture of the general, rejects any assertion of the strict autonomy of law, to the extent that law need not be 
specifically tied to the nation state; Friedman, The Republic of Choice (n.42), pp.3-4. 
46 D. Nelken, ‘Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology of Law’ (1984) 4 Legal 
Studies 157, pp.169 et seq. 
47 A. Watson, ‘Legal Culture v. Legal Tradition’ in M. van Hoecke (ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of 
Comparative Law (Hart, Oxford; 2004), pp.1-6. 
48 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (OUP, Oxford; 1995), p.75.  
49 G. Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations - Software of the Mind (Profile Books, London; 1991), p.5.  It is 
worth noting that Patrick Glenn’s understanding of tradition find connections with the notion of localised or 
contextualised culture, to the extent that it must be consistently felt in a particular context; further, the notion of 
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relations are considered, there is greater scope for understanding the way in which culture is 
shaped by local practices undertaken in everyday life and the way in which individuals, 
forming part of certain groups whether national or otherwise, might affect the development of 
the law, not only in relation to the formation and promulgation of norms but in respect of their 
interpretation and application, that is, law in practice.  Thus, it is possible to identify contexts, 
with varying rationales (political, social, economic), in which (legal and other) actors and 
private citizens can come together to influence and shape legal development; these groups 
might arise in legal practice, or might include civil society groups, and public and private 
organisations, for example, consumer organisations and trade unions50.  These groups need 
not necessarily exist within the nation state; rather, their constitution, membership and 
operation might cut across national boundaries, attributing a regional or transnational 
character thereto.  Indeed, general culture has been invoked as knowledge or as “mental 
software”51 following Hofstede’s concept of culture, encompassing that which has been 
learned52 through thinking and acting53 and is subsequently reflected in “the integrated system 
of learned behaviour patterns which are characteristic of the members of a society”54.  
Legrand’s elaboration on the notion of mentalité, per Hoebel, is developed below55; it is 
engaged in the analysis of the constitution and composition of the CJEU – encompassing the 
backgrounds and experiences of the judges and AGs, the référendaires, the lawyers appearing 
before the CJEU, the members of the Council and the Commission, the national judges who 
refer and the private parties who bring actions before national courts – as a space for 
comparative analysis, in Chapter 4.   
 
Given that culture has a breadth of objectives, which might differ depending on the purpose 
for which it is engaged, it is submitted that it is sufficiently flexible to be instrumentalised for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“consistency” allows for a connection to be drawn with Hofstede’s understanding of culture as a learned 
phenomenon. 
50 R. Sefton-Green, ‘The European Union, Law and Society: Making the Societal-Cultural Difference’ in T. 
Wilhelmsson et al (eds.), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, The Hague; 2007), pp.37-55, 
p.38, referencing the French strikes against le droit, 2006-296, 31.03.2006, on “contrats première embauche” 
and “contrats nouvelle embauche” (labour contracts of an indeterminate period).  
51 This is also true in legal scholarship: J. Smits, ‘Legal Culture as Mental Software: Or, How to Overcome 
National Legal Culture?’ in T. Wilhelmsson et al (eds.), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, 
The Hague; 2007), pp.141-151. 
52 Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations (n.49), p.5. 
53 Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations (n.49). 
54 E.A. Hoebel, Anthropology:  The Study of Man (McGraw-Hill, NY; 3rd edn., 1966), p.5. 
55 P. Legrand, 'Antiqui Juris Civilis Fabulas' (1995) 45 Univ.T.L.J. 311, p.317, following the work of Lévy-
Brühl; M. Vovelle, Idéologies et Mentalités (Galimard, Paris; 1982), p.22. 
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the purposes of the analysis undertaken in the thesis56.  As Hendry highlights, for example, 
culture might facilitate unity on the one hand, and diversity on the other; this can be derived 
from one communication of the Commission in which it provides that the EU has not only the 
goal of “preserv[ing] the specific aspects of Europe’s many cultures” but “develop[ing] a 
feeling of belonging to a shared culture”57.  Herein, culture is also invoked with identity and 
the (subjective, objective58 or “intersubjective”) notion of “belonging”.  For the purposes of 
the demand advanced for a developed understanding of complex comparison in respect of the 
Europeanisation of private law, the concept of culture is engaged in two respects: on the one 
hand, as a putative component part of the identification of what is being compared, and on the 
other, as a perspective allowing for the determination of the context in which comparison is 
and should be undertaken, against the background of the European space as a construct of 
commonality and diversity.  The legal-cultural perspective to which reference is made 
throughout therefore forms part of the outcome, as well as part of the starting point of the 
analysis; the understanding of comparison advanced in Chapter 3 engages the cultural 
perspective as a component part, yet its evaluation also affords scope for this perspective to be 
developed.  Thus, throughout the thesis, an attempt is made to integrate the two dimensions of 
analysis, and to draw distinctions where relevant. 
 
The analysis is theoretical and case-based; this explains the structure of the thesis, and the 
“two rounds” of analysis undertaken.  In light of the background advanced in Part I, 
comparative analysis is engaged as a potential tool of legal development, that is, of 
Europeanisation (of private law in particular) and integration; comparative analysis, as it is 
currently conceived is evaluated in Chapter 3, following which a developed understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For example, Ewick and Silbey engage culture as a means of paving roads into research on institutional and 
social change (P. Ewick and S.S. Silbey, ‘The Structure of Legality – The Cultural Contradictions of Social 
Institutions’ in R.A. Kagan, M. Krygier and K. Winston (eds.), Legality and Community – On the Intellectual 
Legacy of Philip Selznick (U.Cal. Press, Berkeley; 2002), pp.149-165); similarly, the World Bank, engages 
culture as a means of determining the extent to which “people’s attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions determine 
their social environment, and how much does the social environment determine their attitude, beliefs, and 
assumptions?” (World Bank, ‘Legal Culture and Judicial Reform’ 
(<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:23115500~
menuPK:2035153~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062~isCURL:Y,00.html>; Last Accessed: 
14.08.2013); its understanding of the putative influence and impact of culture lacks clarity (or is very flexible): it 
makes reference to the notion that “cultural inertia will always inhibit rapid change”, yet on the other hand, 
asserts that “culture is quite malleable”. 
57  European Commission, ‘A Community of Cultures: The European Union and the Arts’ (European 
Commission, Brussels; 2002) , p.5 and J. Hendry, Unitas in Diversitate? On Legal Cultures and the 
Europeanisation of Law, PhD Thesis (EUI, Florence; 2009), p.18.  
58 J. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Even-Handedness 
(OUP, Oxford; 2000), p.15. 
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complex comparison is advanced.  Following the case-based analysis, a second round of 
analysis, wherein the CJEU is evaluated as a “comparative laboratory”, is undertaken.   
 
The first part of the thesis therefore locates the Europeanisation of national private law in the 
context of European integration and an initial attempt is made to uncover the various 
dimensions of integration – including those of a legal, economic, social, political and cultural 
nature – relevant to its Europeanisation.  The nation state foundations of private law are 
explored, embedding private law development in the national orders, cultures and traditions.  
The legislative construction of European private law, in the acquis and as part of the 
framework of PIL rules, is outlined, and its limitations set out.  The commonality and 
diversity that permeates the European space is recognised, which gives rise to the exploration 
of the need for a single and distinct European culture or tradition as a prerequisite to European 
legal development.  A pluralist perspective, one which engages the multi-level structure of 
private law and which aims to avoid methodological nationalism, is instead advanced.  This 
background provides the foundations for a preliminary exploration of the shifting 
understandings of private law.  It is in this context that an initial evaluation of the use of 
comparative analysis as a tool of Europeanisation and integration is undertaken.  An outline is 
then provided of the development of approaches to comparative analysis; their broad 
theoretical and methodological merits and deficits are analysed, both in general, and as these 
appertain to European private law development.  While it is recognised that these approaches 
have been studied, critiqued and refined over time, it is submitted that the current 
conceptualisations of comparative analysis retain certain problematics – particularly in respect 
of the identification of what is compared and the context in which comparison is undertaken – 
which undermine its potential as a tool of legal development.  Thus, a developed approach of 
complex comparison is advanced; this approach does not constitute a model but rather, a 
framework.  At this stage, it is recognised that the role of the legislature must be 
complemented by the roles adopted by other actors, including the courts, academics, private 
parties and increasingly, civil society bodies.  Thus, the focus shifts to the scope for the 
judicial development of private law, beginning with an outline of the jurisdiction and role, as 
well as structure and constitution, of the CJEU.  European private law has been described as 
“a stipulative not a legislative definition”59; that is to say, the manner in which private law is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 F. Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law:  Governance Design’ in F. Cafaggi and H. Muir-Watt 
(eds.), Making European Private Law:  Governance Design (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2008), pp.289-351, 
p.289. 
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understood, conceptualised and evolves, is largely dependent on the interpretation of norms 
by the CJEU and their application and enforcement in the national courts, as well as scholarly 
analysis and evaluation.  The preliminary reference procedure is engaged as a context in 
which the interactions between the national and EU levels can be identified and analysed, the 
CJEU providing a forum for dispute resolution beyond the nation state60; the rationale 
underlying this choice is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.  The “spaces” of interaction to 
which the preliminary reference procedure gives rise are explored via three case examples (on 
state liability, consumer contract law and fundamental rights).  Each case example is situated 
at the crossroads of national private and European law, and at the crossroads of law, politics, 
culture and society61.  The case examples provide the basis for analysis and beg the question 
of whether the Europeanisation of private law via the CJEU provides for an appropriate, 
epistemological lens through which such development can be evaluated and on the basis of 
which the most appropriate manner for its evolution can be developed62.  Against the 
background of the analysis of the case examples, the legal sources of comparative analysis are 
outlined, the rationales underpinning its engagement identified and the relevance of 
comparison to the CJEU’s engagement with its “meta-mechanisms” of private law 
development evaluated.  Essentially, this analysis constitutes a second round of evaluation, 
that is, of the CJEU as a “comparative laboratory”63, which returns the focus to the question 
of “why comparative analysis” and facilitates the understanding of comparison as a 
component theoretical and methodological device of the Europeanisation of private law.  The 
concluding chapter aims to bring together the various dimensions of analysis, allowing for 
conclusions to be drawn as to the engagement with comparison, particularly as it is employed 
by the CJEU, as a tool of Europeanisation and integration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 S. Sassen, ‘The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance’ (2003) 10 Ind.J.Glob.Leg.Stud 5, 
p.12; R.S. Wai, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 
107, p.119. 
61 See for example, A. Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, ‘Institutional Theories, EU Law and the Role of Courts for 
Developing a European Social Model’ in U. Neergaard et al (eds.), The Role of Courts in Developing a 
European Social Model: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives (Djøf Publishing, Copenhagen; 
2010), pp.299-351, pp.319-320.  The identification of the “crossroads” dimension is perhaps not obvious at first 
glance, and more easily identifiable in certain areas than in others; the relationship between the (private) 
individual, the state and the market permeates. 
62 R. Zimmermann, ‘Europeanization of Private Law’ in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford; 2006), pp.539-578, p.545 
63 “Comparative laboratory” is engaged from Hilf ‘The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities’ in De Mestral et al, The Limitation of Human Rights in 
Comparative Constitutional Law (n.3); see also, Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law’ in Cafaggi and 
Muir Watt, The Making of European Private Law (n.59), p.291. 
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PART ONE: LOCATING THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
Chapter 1. Articulating the Europeanisation of Private Law in the Context of the 
Integration Endeavour 
 
In light of the changes substantiated in the Lisbon Treaty, it is now timely to undertake an 
evaluation of the evolution of the Europeanisation of private law, and elaborate on the 
foundations and normative perspective underpinning its legislative construction and judicial 
elaboration, in the context of the form and substance of European integration. 
 
Integration and Europeanisation should be distinguished, as they are by no means analogous; 
notwithstanding, there exists no coherent or settled understanding of either.  It is submitted 
that both must be construed as interdisciplinary, embedded in the contexts – political, cultural, 
socio-economic and legal – of the Member States.  Integration is economic64, political65, 
social66 and legal67 and cultural; these dimensions are potentially conflicting on the one hand, 
and increasingly intertwined and interdependent on the other.  A (necessarily 
incomprehensive) outline of the primary theories of European integration will be provided 
immediately below, integrating these dimensions; the aims of integration are multiple, and 
cannot be said to be only economic or legal or political, or some combination thereof.  
Thereafter, the nation state foundations of private law are explored, and the understanding of 
the embeddedness of private law in the nation state is uncovered.  Against this background, 
the legislative basis of the European private law project is set out, engaging this 
embeddedness, and in particular, the commonality and diversity discourse outlined in the 
introduction, the limitations of the former and the existence of the latter, reflecting key 
rationales for the initial engagement of the relevance of comparative analysis.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (R.D. Irwin, Homewood; 1961). 
65 E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press, Stanford; 1958). 
66 É. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (W.D. Halls trans.) (Free Press, NY; 1984). 
67 P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration: Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International Relations Based on 
the Experience of the European Communities (Sijthoff, Leiden; 1974), published in French in 1972 and re-
published with preface in 2005 as P. Pescatore, Le droit de l’intégration: Emergence d’un phénomène nouveau 
dans les relations internationales selon l’expérience des Communautés Européennes (Bruylant, Bruxelles; 
2005). 
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I. From National Foundations: The Evolution of European Integration and the 
Europeanisation of Private Law 
 
i. From Paris With…?   
 
The roots upon which European integration is founded, the aims and objective underlying and 
the mechanisms by which it is promoted, have been transformed and reformed in the past 
sixty years.  Multiple and divergent theories of integration have been advanced, and from the 
outset, the incomplete and contested nature of the integration project has been highlighted68.  
This section briefly outlines these orthodox theories to highlight the diverse dimensions – 
legal, political, cultural and socio-economic – of integration, for the purposes of establishing 
the pertinent context of Europeanisation and illustrating the changing character of the 
European private law project.   
 
The Treaty of Paris69, signed in 1951 by the six founding Member States of what is now the 
EU namely France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, came into force in July 1952 and established the European Coal and Steel 
Community.  By bringing the states together functionally and economically in “a large and 
dynamic common market”70 – Schuman having advocated the creation of a Europe at the 
heart of which was the construction of political and economic ties71 – the Treaty purported to 
facilitate a shift in the relationship between the previously isolated nation states, undercutting 
nationalist tendencies; states were forced to cooperate in a shared political discourse to ensure 
that there would never again be war within Europe72: “L'Europe n'a pas été faite, nous avons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Z. Bañkowski and E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Union as an Essentially Contested Project’ in Z. 
Bañkowski and A. Scott (eds.), The European Union and its Order: The Legal Theory of European Integration 
(Blackwell, London; 2000), pp.17-30. 
69 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18.04.1951 (hereinafter, ECSC Treaty). 
70 J. Monnet, ‘A Ferment of Change’ (1962) 1 J.Com.Mar.Stud. 203, p.205. 
71 “Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole place under a common High Authority, within the 
framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe”; Déclaration Schuman 
du 9 mai 1950, (<http://www.robert-schuman.eu/pdf/Declaration_du_9_mai_1950.pdf>; Last Accessed: 
18.01.2013); One of the founding documents of the EU, alongside the ‘Political Resolution’ of the Hague 
Congress of May 1948. 
72 See D. Mitrany, ‘Working Peace System’ (The Fabian Society, London; 1943), on the one hand, on avoiding 
war, not through federation but through the diminishing of the significance of nationalism via the non-political 
transfer of powers, and the creation of various and diverse international organisations with functional purpose, 
including shipping, aviation and rail; this approach can be compared with the federalists, with their roots earlier 
but rising again from resistance movements (see the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941), who were also functional, 
but who advocated the transfer of political power from the nation state to establish, post-WWII, a break from the 
previous order of nation states. Mitrany deemed Monnet a “federal functionalist” D. Mitrany, ‘Working Peace 
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eu la guerre”73.  This purported “ideal” vision of Europe reflects one dimension of Weiler’s 
“political messianism” legitimising European integration (in addition to input and output 
legitimacy) 74 .  The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and that 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, were signed in Rome in March 
195775.  The Treaties of 1957 (in force 1958)76 and 1965 (in force 1967)77 merged the 
institutions of these three communities; the European Economic Community became the 
European Community in 1993 per the Treaty on the European Union.   
 
The consequent (necessary) interaction between states required their surrender of national 
sovereignty in certain policy areas.  It became clear that existing international relations 
theories were inadequate to explain European integration; since the outset, neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism have been engaged.  Neofunctionalist approaches were developed 
by Haas in the 1950s, and subsequently, by Stone Sweet and others in the 1990s.  Hass 
understood European integration to reflect the construction of the EU polity, by virtue of 
which “political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre…the end result of a 
process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-
existing ones”78; Lindberg developed a similar “political” understanding, stopping short of 
reference to an “end result”79.  Neofunctionalism predominantly sought to uncover the 
rationale and manner of interaction between states80; engaging the critique of the realism – the 
focus on the security of the state – of IR scholarship of the 1950s81, it was considered that the 
construction of greater economic interdependence amongst states, as well as increased social, 
and political interdependence (in respect of the free movement of goods, services, capital and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
System’ (The Fabian Society, London; 1943), to the extent that he aimed similarly at placing control in the High 
Authority of the ECSC, later to become the Commission.  
73 “A united Europe was not made and we had war”; Déclaration Schuman du 9 mai 1950, (<http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/pdf/Declaration_du_9_mai_1950.pdf>; Last Accessed: 18.01.2013). 
74 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay’ (2011) 9 
Int.J.Const.Law 678.  See also, G. de Búrca, ‘Europe’s Raison d’être?’ (2011) 18 Maas.J.Eur.Comp.Law 418. 
75 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, 25.03.1957 (hereinafter, EEC Treaty and Euratom Treaty). 
76 Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, 25.03.1957. 
77 Treaty Establishing a Single Council and Single Commission of the European Communities, 08.04.1965. 
78 Haas, The Uniting of Europe (n.65), p.16. 
79 L. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford University Press, Stanford; 
1963), p.149. 
80 E. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’ (1970) 24 
International Organization 606, p.610. 
81 R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (OUP, Oxford; 
3rd edn., 2007), p.39. 
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labour) would generate further integration through “spillover” effects, both political and 
functional in their nature82.  Spillovers of transnational activities of supranational actors 
seemingly promotes further integration eventually leading to increased centralisation83, and 
thereafter, the gradual emergence of the EU as an independent, self-interested84 and self-
sustaining, supranational political body.  Reconceptualisations of neofunctionalism in the 
1980s and 1990s highlighted the legal dimension of integration, with key European legal 
principles “penetrating” or “overlaying” national norms, shaping the interrelation between the 
national and EU legal orders85.     
 
Neofunctionalism attributed little significance to the power of the state; it has typically been 
contrasted with intergovernmentalist theories, developed primarily by Hoffman in the 
1960s86.  The political context of the 1960s was relevant, as a period during which the 
Member States realised they could exercise “resistance” in respect of transfers of sovereignty.  
Intergovernmentalism therefore engaged with integration’s reliance on nation state 
“preferences”, the state being “obstinate” not “obsolete”87.  Like neofunctionalism, it emerged 
from political science and specifically, realist IR accounts, but with a different focus, namely 
one that highlighted the self-interested and rational behaviour of nation states, and their role 
in controlling the international political order (as opposed to the dominance of international 
organisations).  In the 1990s, Moravcsik revisited the theory of intergovernmentalism in his 
explication of liberal intergovernmentalism, where integration  “can best be explained as a 
series of rational choices made by national leaders” 88 , determined predominantly by 
(diverging) economic considerations.  These preferences reveal policy discourses (reflecting 
“societal objectives”) arising in and between the Member States, reflecting the spread of 
power in intergovernmental bargaining, concretised initially in the treaties89.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (n.79), p.10. 
83 R. Dehousse and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Legal Dimension’ in W. Wallace (ed.) The Dynamics of European 
Integration (Pinter, London; 1990), pp.242-260, pp.243-246. 
84 I. Bache et al, Politics in the European Union (OUP, Oxford; 3rd edn., 2011), p.10. 
85 A-M. Burley and W. Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 47 
International Organizations 41, p.43. 
86 S. Hoffman, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe’ (1966) 95 
Daedalus 862. 
87 Hoffman, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete?’ (n.86). 
88 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca; 1998), p18.  It is worth noting that Moravcsik rather attempted to develop Hoffmann’s 
theory, by recognising and dealing with the criticisms advanced against neofunctionalism; A. Moravcsik, 
‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’ (1993) 31 
J.Com.Mar.Stud. 473; his theory is rather characterised as “liberal intergovernmentalism”.   
89 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (n.88), pp.18 et seq. 
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Supranational governance scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s, which revisited 
neofunctionalism90 (and attempted to cut through the dichotomy of intergovernmentalism91), 
identified three component parts: “(1) actors and groups with transnational goals and interests 
(which we label “transnational society), (2) supranational organizations with autonomous 
capacity to resolve disputes and to make rules, and (3) the rule system (or normative 
structure) that defines the polity”92. Transnational society encompasses actors engaging in 
transnational activity, for which European rules are necessary; trade is of particular 
significance.  The EU constitutes a set of functionally differentiated regimes within which 
different degrees of supranationalism exist as transnational society emerges at different 
speeds in different policy areas.  The role of institutions is highlighted; thus, through 
empirical analysis, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet examined the role of the CJEU and the 
Commission, considering how integration facilitated therein differs that to which the Member 
States alone would necessarily facilitate, these institutions being understood “not [as] simple 
agents of the Member States, but trustees exercising fiduciary responsibilities under the 
treaties”93.  Institutionalism, developed initially in the US, whereby institutions are conceived 
as sets or systems of rules94, highlights the importance of institutions and their influence on 
political outcomes95 and further the manner in which multiple institutional membership 
affects substance and participation in decision making, interests and identity96.  Over time, the 
role attributed to the nation state decreases: “integration is the process by which the EC 
gradually but comprehensively replaces the nation state in all its functions”97.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The key pieces being, Burley and Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ 
(n.85); W. Mattli and A-M. Slaughter, ‘Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett’ (1995) 49 
International Organization 183 and W. Mattli and A-M. Slaughter, ‘Revisiting the European Court of Justice’ 
(1998) 52 International Organization 177. 
91 With liberal intergovernmentalism understood as the key “rival” to supranational governance; W. Sandholtz 
and A. Stone Sweet, ‘Neo-Functionalism and Supranational Governance’ in S. Weatherill et al (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.18-33, p.28. 
92 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, ‘Neo-Functionalism and Supranational Governance’ in Weatherill et al, The 
Oxford Handbook of the European Union (n.91), p.20.  
93 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, ‘Neo-Functionalism and Supranational Governance’ in Weatherill et al, The 
Oxford Handbook of the European Union (n.91), p.22. 
94 D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP, Cambridge; 1991), p.3.  
95 B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (MacMillan, Houndsmills; 2000), p.113. 
96 T. Christiansen et al, ‘The Social Construction of Europe’ (1999) Journal of European Public Policy 528, 
p.529. 
97 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’ (1997) Journal of 
European Public Policy 297, p.299. 
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The focus now turns to the theorising of legal integration.  In the early 1970s European law 
was initially conceptualised as “le droit de l’intégration”98 following which the “integration 
through law” school emerged at the European University Institute in Florence.  Weiler et al 
highlighted, in the context of the existing neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist and 
supranationalist scholarship, the “dual character of supranationalism”, namely, the 
intertwinement of legal and political processes99; law is understood as “both the object and 
agent of integration”, (that is, integration of law, and integration through law, respectively100) 
and as “one of many social instruments harnessed to achieve a wider societal objective”, 
highlighting the need to understand “the relationship between law and society in the 
understanding of the instrumental character of law in ordering and reacting to societal 
experiences”101.  The social and cultural dimensions of legal integration are often neglected, 
owing to (and resulting in) the focus on facilitation of the internal market, via negative and 
positive integration.  The hierarchical and federalist nature of the “integration through law” 
project is identifiable in the legislative and judicial institutions through the focus on 
centralised government, and consequently, the aim of imposing, in the national systems, a 
uniform European law.  Weiler and Dehousse subsequently began to identify different 
“parameters of integration”102, based on diverging degrees of centralisation, hierarchy and 
uniformity.  While “politics” has been advanced as the “dependent variable”103 in integration, 
law is understood as the “independent variable”, shaping the context in which various actors 
(legal, political and social) act, the effect of this conduct, and the way in which such conduct 
is relevant to law as social ordering.  Thus while the “law and integration” discourse finds its 
foundations in positivism (also true of neofunctionalism), it highlights the need to understand 
better the relationship between law, politics and society.   
 
Stone Sweet, engaging the import of the CJEU, conceives of European integration in three 
stages104.  From the Treaty of Rome, the period of 1958-1970 reflects the undertaking of 
structure and institution building, and the emergence of constitutionalisation as a process 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Pescatore, Le Droit de l’intégration (n.67). 
99 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) Y.Eur.Law 267. 
100 Dehousse and Weiler, ‘The Legal Dimension’ in Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (n.83), 
pp.243-246. 
101 M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American 
Federal Experience (de Gruyer, Berlin; 1985), p.42 and p.50, respectively.   
102 Dehousse and Weiler, ‘The Legal Dimension’ in Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (n.83), 
pp.243-246. 
103 de Búrca, ‘Rethinking Law’ (n.17), p.314. 
104 A. Stone Sweet, 'Integration and the Europeanisation of Law', Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No 
2/2002, pp.3-5. 
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through the construction of the principles of supremacy and direct effect.  Thereafter, until the 
mid-1980s, the development of the internal market was facilitated through negative 
integration, that is, by a number of CJEU judgements enforcing the prohibition of 
“quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect”105 in the 
Treaty of Rome and removing national barriers to trade106.  The passing of the Single 
European Act in 1986, introducing Art.100A107 into the Treaty of Rome and providing for a 
shift from unanimity to qualified majority in legislative activity, reflected the emergence of 
positive integration.  Stone Sweet et al attempted to illustrate the significance of the activist 
CJEU in the construction and shaping of supranational governance, and thereafter the 
influence of judicial power on markets and politics in promoting further economic activity 
and leading to ever-deeper integration108.  Placing this discussion in the context of EU law, 
Stone Sweet conceptualises integration as “a self-reinforcing, causal system that has driven 
integration and given the EU its fundamentally expansionary character”109.  Increased trade 
leads to a higher number of preliminary references, through which the litigants in the case can 
challenge national compliance with EU law, with the expectation that the CJEU will require 
compliance, or remove barriers, thus increasing the potential for trade; the process is then 
circular or “self-sustaining”110.  The extent to which law and politics are satisfactorily 
understood in neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist and supranational governance discourses 
has been challenged111 (considering in particular, the predominant focus has been on the 
CJEU, perhaps at the expense of other actors, including the EU legislature)112.  The “activist” 
CJEU has long been relevant113, increasingly in respect of the construction of an area of 
freedom, security and justice.  The reciprocal nature of CJEU activities, via the preliminary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Art.30 EEC, (and exports, in Art.34 EEC); now Art.34 and 35 TFEU, respectively. 
106 Measures having equivalent effect as quantitative restrictions - C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] 
ECR 837; Discussing of justified restrictions - C-120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
107 Art.100A EEC subsequently became Art.95 EC and is now Art.114 TFEU. 
108 A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP, Oxford; 2004), and the chapters therein, with 
Brunell on ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution’, and thereafter on the trade, sex equality and 
environmental protection. 
109 Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (n.108), p.14. 
110 Stone Sweet, 'Integration and the Europeanisation of Law' (n.104), pp.7-12. 
111 In addition, there is no clear understanding of the conception of law with which there is engagement, although 
it seems to be largely positivist; de Búrca, ‘Rethinking Law’ (n.17), p.318.   
112 Although, see G. Tsebelis and G. Garrett, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and 
Supranationalism in the European Union’ (2001) 55 International Organization 357, which focuses on the 
CJEU, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, in respect of their interactions and the changing 
significance of their roles, and the developing Treaty foundations of the EU. 
113 L. Azoulai and R. Dehousse, ‘The ECJ and the Legal Dynamics of Integration’ in S. Weatherill et al (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.350-364. 
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reference in Art.267 TFEU114, creates a particular incentive relationship on both the European 
court and the national courts to develop EU law, simultaneously justifying politically the 
actions of each.  The jurisdiction and role of the CJEU is further explored in Part II. 
 
This brief outline of integration theories can be developed to encompass those in which 
weightier significance is attributed to the social and cultural dimensions of the European 
project, broadly understood.   Constructivism – while also subject to critique from sociology 
itself115 – highlights the “social construction” of Europe; “simply put, constructivism claims 
that social ideas and discourses matter for European integration”116.  Thus, these “social 
discourses” which underpin national and European identities, render the social embeddedness 
of actors and institutions relevant as dependent variables.  The social and cultural perspectives 
are reflected in institutionalist theories117, in respect of which the focus on the development of 
Europeanised bodies of rules via transnational societies brings to the fore questions 
concerning the relationship between these actors and networks118.  Notwithstanding the 
assertion that the EU is “the most densely institutionalized international organization in the 
world”119, its formally institutionalised nature is rarely deemed wholly satisfactory from a 
sociological perspective.  Moreover multi-level governance is one of the more recent theories 
that purport to engage with the significance of relevant actors and institutions 120.  Broadly, its 
proponents argue that no single theory comprehensively explains integration, but that its 
complexity and dynamic nature can only be contemplated in respect of the (non-hierarchical) 
engagement with and exercise of power and authority121.  The EU is understood as a space in 
which various actors and institutions are engaged in a diverse range of policy-processes at 
multiple levels; as such, it is unsatisfactory to consider only the national and supranational 
levels at the expense of sub-national and regional governance spaces.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012 (hereinafter, TFEU). 
115  See S. Saurugger and F. Mérand, ‘Does European Integration Theory Need Sociology?’ (2010) 8 
Comparative European Politics 1, p.5. 
116 F. Schimmelfennig, ‘Constructivist Approaches’ in S. Weatherill et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.34-47, p.35 
117 In particular, broad reference can be made to the rational choice, sociological and historical aspects of “new 
institutionalism”. 
118 Saurugger and Mérand, ‘Does European Integration Theory Need Sociology?’ (n.115), p.7. 
119 M. Pollack, ‘New Institutionalism’ in A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (OUP, 
Oxford; 2004), pp.125-143, p.137.  
120 G. Marks et al, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance', (1996) 34 
J.Com.Mark.Stud. 341. 
121 A. Héritier, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe (CUP, Cambridge; 1999). 
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While it has been criticised as “always out of step with society”122, law promotes social 
change and itself can be changed, reflecting social development.  The same is true of society; 
it not also promotes legal change but changes itself with legal developments.  This 
interdependence is diverse and concerns not only the relationship between law and society, 
and the acceptance of each in both, but also more specifically, the interrelation of the national 
and the European in the formation, interpretation and application of Union law.  It has been 
recognised that “integration through law in the European Union will only be effective if 
positive legal rules connect with a socio-cultural environment that can bolster their claim to 
social validity”123.  Thus, Bohannan claims that for law to be socially valid, it must be 
“doubly institutionalised”, as legal and social norms124, existing within a particular political 
context, namely that of the nation state, which constitutes the relevant “cultural unit” as the 
authoritative figure facilitating the institutionalisation125.  Beyond the state, this “unitary” 
cultural dimension cannot be said to exist in the same form.  The interaction of the national 
and supranational reflects the continuing existence of a diverse body of legal cultures and 
traditions126.  The national socio-economic and cultural context, beyond a “positivistic” legal 
perspective127, must be recognised as relevant in the context of the Europeanisation of private 
law, and the methodologies of legal development, particularly in respect of ensuring the 
effective implementation of EU (private) law in the national systems.  
 
Shifts in the understanding of integration over the past fifty years are clearly identifiable, 
from the theorising of European integration in international relations scholarship to the 
subsequent engagement of the legal dimension of integration in the supranational governance 
theories of Stone Sweet et al and the “integration through law” framework of the Florence 
School.  The economic, political and legal dimensions are evident in and transcend these 
shifts, arguably expected, given the context in which they were developed and linked, both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 P. Bohannan, ‘The Differing Realms of Law’ (1965) 67 American Anthropologist 33, p.37. 
123 D. Augenstein, ‘Identifying the European Union: Legal Integration and European Communities’ in D. 
Augenstein (ed.), ‘Integration Through Law’ Revisited: The Making of the European Polity (Ashgate, London; 
2012), pp.99-112, p.102. 
124 Bohannan, ‘The Differing Realms of Law’ (n.122). 
125 Bohannan, ‘The Differing Realms of Law’ (n.122), p.38. 
126 However it should be noted that Bohannan, writing in relation to the ‘treble institutionalisation’ of 
international law in the mid-1960s, still advances a dualist conception of international law, which is subject to 
much critique today. 
127 The focus on positivism is reflected in the dominance of convergence in European private law development, 
although it can similarly be reflected in the notion of the EU as an independent, functionalist order; as expressed 
unforgettably in C-6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 585, Judgement, para.593; “…the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system which, on entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member 
States, which their courts are bound to apply…[as an] independent source of law”. 
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temporally, and disciplinary.  It is clear that the other dimensions of integration, namely the 
legal, social and cultural perspectives128 must be considered, particularly in respect of the 
scope for a common identity, underpinning which is the (arguable) need for the existence of a 
European culture, as a putative precondition of integration129.   
 
In both respects, the breadth of the legal, political, cultural and socio-economic diversities of 
the legal cultures and traditions is relevant.  Herein, enlargement, discussed where relevant 
throughout the thesis, is significant.  The Fifth Enlargement, the largest in its history, saw the 
ten countries joining the EU in 2004130, followed by two more in 2007131; in July 2013, 
Croatia became the 28th state to accede132.  The political dimensions of each stage of 
enlargement are clear; enlargement constitutes a period of transition and transformation for 
both the new and “old” Member States.  Democratic change, particularly relevant in the most 
recent phase, often precedes and underpins enlargement 133 ; the recently transitioned 
democracies of the former Communist states were brought into the European order within the 
context of the peace-building function of the Union, and the broader aim of creating greater 
democratic stability and improving the relationship between the former Eastern bloc and the 
West.  From an economic perspective, enlargement (constituting a reciprocal opening up of 
markets) aims to engender trade (the Fifth Enlargement increased the EU’s population of 
consumers and traders by more than 100 million).  However these dimensions are not only 
political and economic; agreement to contribute and develop a European identity constitutes 
one of the basic conditions of membership, alongside demonstration of democratic status and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Thus, for example, Hooghe and Marks, who, in arguing that there is a need to move beyond the economic 
dimensions of integration, on which neo-institutionalists and intergovernmentalists seem to focus, attempt to 
engage with the political, social and cultural dimensions of integration, and in particular, the significance of 
community and identity; L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘A Post-Functionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’ (2008) 39 Brit.J.Pol.Sci. 1. 
129 The scope for the dialogue discourse, discussed in detail in Chapter 9, to be engaged arises with regard to the 
focus on interaction, interdependence and impact, i.e. spillovers.  It has therefore been advanced that dialogue 
reflects neofunctionalist – and particularly, revised legal-orientated – understandings of integration.  Thus, for 
example, the idea of a European identity, and the values underlying, is relevant to neofunctionalist accounts of 
integration; the existence of distinct national identities – and the desire to preserve these – is reflected in 
intergovernmentalism (in respect of delineating integration); furthermore, the idea of the “socialisation” of actors 
constituting the transnational community is of inherent relevance to supranational governance, building on 
neofunctionalism. 
130 Namely, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. 
131 Namely, Romania and Bulgaria, according to the Commission, these countries constitute part of the Fifth 
(2004) Enlargement (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5th_enlargement/index_en.htm; Last Accessed: 
18.04.2013). 
132 Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the EU, OJ L 112, 24.04.2012. 
133 This can be identified in the candidate states: Turkey, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and those 
recognised as potential candidates, including Kosovo.  
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illustration of respect for human rights134.  The satisfaction of such values is deemed 
necessary as “the new Member States will defend their national values not necessarily as an 
attempt to promote protectionist aims, as sometimes still happens in the former Member 
States, and will likewise occur in these new countries, but rather in order to make the 
Community rules workable in the context of their different market conditions, and in the 
context of their social, legal, and cultural values”135.  In this respect, enlargement as a process 
might operate to highlight considerations – including diversities in rules, policies and values 
between national traditions and the EU – which might otherwise have been dismissed given 
the dominant focus on economic integration, facilitated by the construction of a uniform body 
of EU norms136.  The significance of these considerations are brought to the fore in light of 
the shift in understanding of the EU from that of a purely economic order to a public one in 
which fundamental rights are key137, reflecting hand-in-hand the realities of EU legal 
development, namely the rise of rights, values and constitutional pluralism and the 
Europeanisation of private law.  
 
The following section takes one step back and explores the nation state foundations of private 
law, which allows for the clarification of the link between the development of the nation state, 
the emergence of national culture and tradition and the evolution of private law.  The 
multiplicity of Member States in the European space dictates that this embeddedness is 
multiplied.  The European space comes to constitute one of conflict (reflected in the 
foundations and rationale of the commonality/diversity discourse outlined in the 
introduction), not only of legal orders (and the norms applicable therefrom) but also of 
cultures and traditions more broadly.  The nature of these conflicts is set out, with references 
to examples arising from the Europeanisation of private law; the way in which conflicts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Conditionality for EU membership includes Copenhagen Criteria and the implementation of the acquis 
(European Commission, ‘Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration 
into the Internal Market of the Union – White Paper’ COM(1995) 163 final, 3.05.1995) with the EU being in a 
predominantly dominant position, having the political power and establishing the necessary requirements to be 
satisfied.  The key dimensions of the Copenhagen Criteria include stability of institutions: guarantee of 
democracy, of the rule of law and of human rights; a market economy, encompassing “destatization” and 
ensuring the existence of privately-owned enterprises; ability to cope with competition and market forces of the 
Union; ability to engage membership obligations (the acquis communautaire), ensuring satisfaction of the aims 
of EMU (economic and monetary union) and political union. 
135 M Józon, ‘The Enlarged EU and Mandatory Requirements’ (2005) 11 ELJ 549, p.549. 
136 G. de Búrca and J. Scott, Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart, Oxford; 
2000). 
137 Azoulai and Dehousse, ‘The ECJ and the Legal Dynamics of Integration’ in Weatherill et al, The Oxford 
Handbook of the European Union, (n.113). 
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applicable law and jurisdiction are normally resolved – that is, via private international law138 
norms – is explored in light of Europeanisation.  This brings the discussion to the legislative 
foundations of European private law development in Chapter 1, following which the thesis 
aims to bring the recognition of the – legal, political, cultural and socio-economic – 
embeddedness, not only of national private law but also of the Europeanisation of national 
private law, to the fore.  
 
ii. Recalling the Nation State at the Core of Private Law  
 
This section engages with the national foundations of private law, identifying its significance 
in contemporary private law development.  The nation state may be understood as a relatively 
recent (and for some, relatively short-lived) phenomenon; “proto-states” (city states and 
multi-ethnic states) existed prior to the emergence of the “nation states” of the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  The political, cultural and socio-economic context shaping the emergence of the 
nation state has significantly influenced the way in which law has been understood and 
developed within territorial confines.  Of particular relevance in the context of private law 
was the significance of the ius commune, which emerged from the evolution of legal thought 
throughout the late 11th and early 12th centuries, following the rediscovery of the Corpus Juris 
Civilis.  Bologna, boasting the first modern university 139 , reigned as the centre of 
“transnational” legal education140 and facilitated the dissemination of knowledge and legal 
reasoning skills (of the styles of the Glossators and Commentators) by lawyers in their native 
environments141.  The authority of this education and the common body of law that emerged 
(of common legal language and style of thought), together with the breadth of its influence 
across Europe, provided the foundations for the development of the ius commune 142 .  
Subsequent to the demise of the Holy Roman Empire, the subsequent emergence of the state-
nation from the city-state and thereafter the rise of the nation state and national law, paralleled 
the demise of the ius commune.  Particular geographical areas experienced the “reception” of 
Roman law.  Merrryman notes that this process was “formal” in some environments with 
Roman law forming part of domestic law as binding law; in others, it was informal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Hereinafter PIL. 
139 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford University Press, Stanford; 2nd edn., 1985), p.9. 
140 P.G. Stein, Roman Law in European History (CUP, Cambridge; 2005), pp.53-54.  
141 P.G. Stein, Roman Law in European History (CUP, Cambridge; 2005), pp.53-54; Merryman, The Civil Law 
Tradition (n.139), p.9. 
142 Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (n.139), p.9. 
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received via education on the basis of its “intellectual superiority”143.  Nationalistic tendencies 
engendered the entrenchment of national law; the 19th century saw a wave of successful 
codification movements across the continent.  The significance of the ius commune has 
generated support both for the construction of a new ius commune144 and assertions that what 
can be identified as “law beyond the state” is really nothing new but reflects what previously 
existed, e.g. the lex mercatoria.  The nation state came to signify a jurisdiction delineated by 
national borders, the authority within which identifies itself – by virtue of its sovereignty – as 
having exclusive control over the exercise and enforcement of their power within this 
territory.  It is a two-fold concept, the geopolitical dimension of which is reflected in the 
territorially defined notion of state, and the cultural or ethnic145 dimension in that of nation, 
both of which are understood to coincide146.   
 
Within this context, the relevant concept of law, of legal “system”147, of authority, legality148 
and normativity149, comes to the fore.  Authority has been attributed to the nation state in 
various guises and rationales since its emergence.  For Kelsen, the sovereign state was 
authoritative; “law” was understood to find its validity in a single basic norm (Grundnorm), 
which derived its validity from the sovereignty of the state.  Law making was therefore 
limited to the state, its legislature and administrators; the courts could act, where so 
authorised, in their capacity as state institutions, to attribute legal recognition to custom150.  
Hart understood authority in terms of primary and secondary rules of recognition attributed to 
the state151 but did not explicitly base his conception of law on the state.  He also conceived of 
norms existing prior to the emergence of the state as law, attributing a rule of recognition to 
legal texts.  Indeed, for Alexy, doctrinal legal writing and scholarship – if authoritative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (n.139), p.9. 
144 R. Zimmerman, ‘Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law and the Emergence of a European 
Legal Science’ (1996) 112 LQR 576. 
145 In reality, these terms should not be mixed; for purposes of brevity, the distinctions are not explored.  
146 J. Dhanapala, ‘Globalization and the Nation State’, University of Colorado at Boulder, Colorado, 07.03.2001 
(<http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2001/2001Apr07_Colorado.pdf>; Last Accessed: 
14.04.2012). 
147 M. Hesselink, 'A European Legal Method?' (2009) 15 ELJ 20, p.42.  The CJEU nevertheless highlights the 
significance of the concept of legal system: “…an international agreement cannot affect…the autonomy of the 
Community legal system, observance of which is ensured by the Court…”; Joined Cases C-402-415/05 Kadi 
[2008] ECR I-6351, Judgement, para.282. 
148 Pescatore considers that primary and secondary Union law must exist within a broader context of a 
“Community legality”: Pescatore, The Law of Integration (n.67), p.75. 
149 H. Kelsen The Pure Theory of Law (M. Knight trans.) (U.Cal. Press, Berkeley: 2nd edn., 1967), chps.V-VII, 
esp. pp.214-217. 
150 N. Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority: Non-Legislative Codifications in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective (OUP, Oxford; 2010), p.2. 
151 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford; 2nd edn., 1994), pp.79 et seq. 
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imperio rationis – is relevant, even if only persuasive, where there are gaps in the legislative 
text152.  Hart engaged the notion of a hierarchy of norms, where one norm or set of norms 
must be deemed supreme; the basic rule of recognition was intended to unify (a plurality of) 
legal systems.  Such unification was only possible in the state context, prior to which a 
plurality of sets of norms existed but could not be so ordered due to the absence of 
hierarchy153.  As the power and significance of the legislature increased with the emergence 
of the state and contemporaneous codification movements, it was the existence of gaps in 
legislation that determined the role of institutions, and particularly that of the courts (which, 
at the time, differed across legal systems154) in law-making155.  
 
The emergence of the unified nation state brings to the fore the significance of coherence and 
systemisation in (private) law.  The 19th century saw the emergence of codification in 
continental European legal orders; while aiming to promote systemisation and coherence, the 
codification process operated to indirectly emphasise existing divergences (in substance and 
procedure), both within and between national legal systems.  The “era of codification” 
emerged contemporaneously to the nation state; its strength throughout the 20th century has 
provided the predominant basis for the maintenance of these distinctions and for the divergent 
appreciations of (private) law at the national level; a circular reasoning exists: the “state-
making” role of private law156 on the one hand, and state instrumentalism157, on the other.  
The Code civil of 1804 constituted an important dimension of Napoleon’s state-making 
process and further entrenched the relationship between the state and private law158 via the 
promotion of private activities supported by private law principles (including individual 
freedom and private property).  Germany should be considered as a special case, owing to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin; 1983), pp.334 et seq. 
153 Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority (n.150), p.3. 
154 For example, following the French Revolution, the dominance of the judge (and particular, the community 
from which the judge derived), was challenged.  This led to a destruction of the previously strong role of the 
judge; even today, jurisprudence is not officially acknowledged as an authorised source of law (Merryman, The 
Civil Law Tradition (n.139), pp.36-43; cf. M. de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, ‘The European Pasteurization of French Law’ 
(2005) 90 Cornell.L.Rev. 995).  The English state experienced no analogous revolutionary period; rather the 
judiciary retained and developed its law-making power. 
155 Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority (n.150), pp.1-2. 
156 See Caruso who makes reference to “State-making” (development of postnational institutions) and state-
making (re the nation state); D. Caruso, 'Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalisation' (2006) 39 
NYU.J.Int.Law.Pol. 1. 
157  R. Michaels and N. Jansen, 'Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization' 
(2006) 54 AJCL 843; furthermore, states could use their law for the goals they identified as relevant, the 
determination of which also came to shape private law: T. Wilhelmsson, 'Varieties of Welfarism in Contract 
Law' (2004) 10 ELJ 712. 
158 J. Gordley, ‘Myths of the French Civil Code’ (1994) 42 AJCL 459. 
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fact that its civil code, the BGB, was developed several decades after German unification159.  
Unity and coherence, of particular significance in the German legal system, given the 
dominance of Pandectism, which embraced “the ethics of autonomy with which Kant 
endowed the renaissant legal science around 1800”160 could not be said to derive from the 
BGB (itself a product of legal scholarship) but rather from the evolution of German legal 
scholarship throughout the 19th century.  Codification allowed disputes to be categorised, 
engendering greater predictability and certainty in dispute resolution and ultimately 
promoting knowledge of the law and its dissemination161.  The understanding of the civil code 
as a fundamental structural characteristic of any civilian tradition reflects a broad 
generalisation.  While the continental traditions were, and often continue to be, defined by 
practices of deduction and analogical reasoning from the text of their civil codes, the common 
law is described as an “organic creature”, rejecting codified law162 - and its accompanying 
certainty and predictability – in favour of gradual, case-by-case development163.  Yet these 
features cannot definitively distinguish the civilian system from the common law.  Nor is it 
true that the sole source of the civilian law is the legislature, and that of the common law, the 
judiciary164; if such a claim could ever be verified, it must now be understood as a fallacy.  It 
was anticipated that the civil code would provide a coherent, systematised and comprehensive 
account of the law165; it is questionable whether this expectation has been realised166.  The 
manner in which one understands the aspirations of codification depends on the significance 
one attributes to the potentially unrestrained, “exaggerated and unrealistic expectations”167 of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 C. Joerges, ‘The Science of Private Law and the Nation State’ in F. Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law 
– The Legal Effects of European Integration (Hart, Oxford; 2000), pp.47-82, pp.47-48. 
160 F. Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany (T. Weir trans.) 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1995), pp.341-349 and p.484. 
161 Caruso highlights, that via this reference to “organising categories…codification allowed the incipient state to 
perform an allegedly essential function of government”; Caruso, 'Private Law and State-Making in the Age of 
Globalisation' (n.156), p.25. 
162 The efforts of Bentham being ultimately unsuccessful; see J. Bentham, Legislator of the World: Writings on 
Codification, Law and Education, (P. Scholfield and J. Harris, eds.) (Clarendon, Oxford; 1998). 
163 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty:  Rules and Order (U.Chicago Press, Chicago; 1973), pp.134-136. 
164 For example, Zweigert and Kötz’s discussion on the sources of law is based on the supposed common 
law/case law and civil law/legislation distinction: see, Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law 
(n.23), p.71. 
165  The idea that national legislation is authoritative “rationae imperii” (provided legislated for by an 
authoritative body, and the proclamation of Ulpian that that which is explicated by the emperor has legal force: 
“quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem” (Ulpian, D.I.4.I., pr.); R. Alexy et al, Begriff und Geltung des 
Rechts (Karl, Berlin; 2002), pp.142 et seq. 
166 For reference to this notion, see arguments cited within R. Zimmermann, ‘Codification:  History and Present 
Significance of an Idea’ (1995) 3 ERPL 95, pp.103-105.  Zimmermann, referring to Eastern European 
codification, highlights the continuing relevance of codification, appertaining to the understanding of law’s 
“systematic whole”.   
167 Zimmermann, ‘Codification’ (n.166), pp.109-110. 
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the postmodern context.   
 
The focus on coherence and systemisation constitutes one reflection of the conception of the 
technical, that is, apolitical, nature of private law norms.  Yet, law making within the state is 
neither merely technical nor apolitical but encompasses political, socio-economic and cultural 
dimensions.  A circularity also exists between the development and concretisation of the 
nation state, the identity that arises therein, the significance of culture and legal development. 
The interdependence between law, culture and the unity of the state has been highlighted by 
different means and in divergent political, socio-economic and cultural contexts168, both in 
France by Montesquieu, as the product of the spirit of the people, cultural and political 
environment169, and in Germany by Savigny, in respect of the Volksgeist.  Different attributes 
of general culture (and legal culture, as a localised understanding) have been invoked in state-
building processes.  That which was deemed common within the delineated space of the 
nation state was invoked as “legal culture”, utilised and concretised through codification (the 
civil codes having “cultural status”170) or through practice (in the English courts), further 
consolidating the identity of nation and therein, its power, lending legitimacy and promoting 
coherence in the identifiable, national, bounded space171.   
 
With reference to identity, Hardt and Negri engage with the construction of the people, 
grouped on the basis of race, that is, the imposition of the identity “representative” of the 
whole as “a hegemonic group, race or class”172, not only as allowing for the extinguishing of 
divergences within the nation, but for the construction of identity, to be distinguished from 
“the other”.  Thus, the notion of “us” as an identity became inherently important for the 
construction of the nation state, for the distinction between “us” and the “other” allowed for 
the distinction between nations.  Identity, conceived with regard to otherness (as the opposite 
of same), is necessarily defined in terms of what constitutes the self.  It allows for boundaries 
to be established, including those delineating national identity; thus, self need not be 
understood in terms of the individual but can constitute a collective unit.  Identity is deemed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 H. Dedek, ‘Law as Culture/Rights as Culture: Some Historical Thoughts on the 'Western' Legal Tradition’, 
Paper Presented at Conference on European Legal Culture, University of Oxford, (16.12. 2011) (on file with 
author). 
169 C. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Livre IX, Chapitre VI, (Barrillot, Paris; 1750). 
170 Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (n.139), pp.31-32. 
171 D. Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ EUI WP 
2010/10, p.4. 
172 M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (HUP, Cambridge; 2000), pp.103-104.  
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to derive from shared culture; “nationhood, especially as conceived by the nationalists of 
early-nineteenth-century Europe, was explicitly cultural”173.  Exploring this circularity begs a 
number of questions.  The first is structural: what are the component parts of shared culture? 
Arendt identifies shared culture as that “which makes it bearable to live with other people, 
strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for them to live with us”174.  The 
criteria for the identification of that which is shared is unclear175.  For Arendt, it is necessary 
to have more than mere knowledge of the other, and more than “direct experience”.  The 
second question is related, and is contextual and temporal: when is a shared culture 
recognised as such?  Arguably, that which is shared is only identifiable in context: “[p]eople 
who belong to the same place, profession or generation do not thereby form a culture; they do 
so only when they begin to share…”176.  Law (and private law in particular) must be 
conceived as embedded in the plural political, historical, cultural and economic diversities of 
the Member States.  The existence of these divergences cannot be said to be all-encompassing 
or perpetual; indeed, as Habermas has asserted “[o]ld loyalties fade, new loyalties develop, 
traditions change and nations, like all other comparable referents, are not natural givens 
either”177.  Yet the need to attribute greater recognition to “the deeply political, sociological 
and cultural dimensions of law”178 is relevant throughout the thesis both in respect of the 
normative perspective of legal development and particularly, the theoretical and 
methodological foundations of comparative analysis.  This reflects another rationale 
responding to the question of “why comparative analysis”.  Indeed, it has been considered 
that the notion of “‘unité dans la diversité’ s’imposant, le judge a dû trouver un équilibre 
entre le processus d’intégration et le respect des identités nationales…la méthode 
comparative lui a permis de contribuer à trouver cet équilibre”179.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 M. Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State (Routledge, NY; 2nd edn., 2005), p.75.  
174 H. Arendt, ‘Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties in Understanding)’ in H. Arendt, Essays in 
Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism (J. Kohn ed.) (Schocken Books, NY; 1994), 
pp.307-327. 
175 P. Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (CUP, Cambridge; 
2012), p.144. 
176 T. Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Blackwell, Oxford; 2000), p.37.  
177  J. Habermas, ‘Europe’s Post-Democratic Era’, The Guardian, Thursday 10.11.2011 
(<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/10/jurgen-habermas-europe-post-democratic>; Last 
Accessed: 19.09.2012). 
178 P. Zumbansen, ‘The Future of Legal Theory’ [2010] 6 CLPE Research Paper Series 3, p.8. 
179 J-D. Mouton, ‘Preface’ in R. Titigira, La comparaison, technique essentielle du juge européen (l’Harmattan, 
Paris; 2011), pr.9.  
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The existence of a multiplicity of legal orders within the European legal space provides that 
the relevant national, European and transnational institutions work within a context defined 
by the existence of cultures and traditions which continue to exist within the territorial 
boundaries of the nation state but which increasingly emerge beyond such confines.  The 
normative perspective adopted throughout this thesis, and constructed in the preliminary 
chapters, asserts that the integration and legal development is not merely legal but also social, 
economic, political and cultural.  The Europeanisation of private law is understood to emerge 
in a multi-level, pluralistic space (the understanding of which is explored in the following 
chapter), within which the scope for conflict arises180.  
 
These conflicts might arise within and between legal systems (“systemic conflicts”181), 
cultures and traditions, and between sources of law in respect of their diverse interpretations 
and applications in a multiplicity of dispute resolution bodies.  Within legal systems, vertical 
conflicts182 can be identified at the national level, between lower and supreme courts; these 
become relevant to the development of Union law where the matter concerns Union law, and 
particularly where a reference is made to the CJEU.  The conflict itself might shape the basis 
upon which the reference is made.  This will be discussed in more detail below with regard to 
the empowering of the national court183; reference can be made to the scope for “pitting” 
lower and supreme courts against each other (where, for example, lower courts are required to 
rule on the liability of the latter)184.  Within national systems, conflicts might also arise 
between the courts and the legislature; the obligation of the national court to ensure 
compliance with Union law might give rise to a conflict with that provided in domestic law 
by the national legislature.  Reference can be made to the CJEU’s development of the national 
courts’ obligations to review contract terms ex officio, which might conflict with national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Augenstein has highlighted that “[r]egarding law as an agent of integration, conflicts between national legal 
systems often reflect deeper tensions among their respective conceptions of society that European law seems 
unable to reconcile”, in Augenstein, ‘Identifying the European Union’ in Augenstein, ‘Integration Through Law’ 
Revisited (n.123), p.102.  See also N. Walker, ‘Legal Theory and the EU – A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 
OJLS 581.  
181 Conflicts which eventually contribute to the development of the system, as “positive and natural” conflicts: 
D. Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: the Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United 
States’ in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance (CUP, Cambridge; 2009), pp.326-355. 
182 Deemed vertical because of the hierarchy existing, ultimately depending on the judicial structure within the 
national system. 
183 For example, the national court (i.e. the lower court) might anticipate and facilitate change in the domestic 
order, “jumping over” the Supreme Court. 
184 Reference is made below to the consequences of the Köbler case in the state liability case example; C-224/01 
Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239. 
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procedural law, and public policy.  Conflicting interpretations of national and EU law might 
also arise and invoke the jurisdiction of the CJEU.  The national courts will be obliged under 
certain circumstances to refer to the CJEU under Art.267 TFEU, and on the basis of 
consistent interpretation, to set aside national norms conflicting with the interpretation of EU 
law and to adapt national law to ensure compliance185.  “Vertical” conflicts might also arise 
between the national orders and the ECHR (e.g. conflicts between national rules and 
fundamental rights); this is outwith the scope of the thesis.  However, the scope for 
“horizontal” conflicts at the supranational level, that is, between the ECHR and the EU, is 
especially relevant following the EU’s accession to the ECHR and the ECtHR’s extended 
scope for review.  The case examples below further illustrate the scope for such conflicts; in 
the state liability cases, this is identified in the conflict between national norms, EU norms, 
and fundamental rights186, and in the fundamental rights cases, between fundamental rights 
and freedoms.  
 
These types of conflicts are uncovered in more detail throughout the thesis.  At this stage, it is 
necessary firstly to consider the way in which the scope for conflict has traditionally been 
dealt with in the European context.  It is in the area of PIL that conflicts of jurisdiction and of 
applicable laws have traditionally arisen and been resolved.  The existence of a plurality of 
jurisdictions and applicable laws has therefore long been referred to PIL; thus for the conflicts 
lawyer, the scope for conflict is “nothing new”.  However, as the Europeanisation of law 
continues, and as a plurality of norms continue to emerge, it is not clear that PIL can 
adequately deal with the breadth and nature of conflicts arising.   
 
The limitation of the perspective derives from the orthodox understanding of PIL.  On the one 
hand, it has long been conceived as national international private law187; that is to say, while 
the discipline is one in which the interactions between different legal orders has been 
recognised, not only have these orders found their origins in the state but the rules regulating 
their potential conflict have also derived from the state.  Furthermore, the interrelationship 
between PIL and politics has given rise to challenges.  In the “European” context, Savigny 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 For example, in Brasserie and Factortame neither under German (Art.839 BGB/Art.34 Grundgesetz) nor 
English law were the parties claiming to have suffered harm able to claim a right to reparation.  Thus, at the 
national level, no remedy existed; consequently, the case is deemed to introduce a new remedy to national law. 
186 Joined Cases C-46-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.49 
(hereinafter, Brassserie); Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.67. 
187 At least until the Amsterdam Treaty (Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ C 340, 02.10.1997); now Title V, TFEU. 
 	  	  	   36 
claimed to rationalise and neutralise PIL by virtue of “technical” rules; this precluded the 
necessity of reference to power in favour of a logical approach to the resolution of conflicts.  
For the purposes of highlighting the scope for the shift in understanding of PIL from apolitical 
to political, it is worth noting that the nature of PIL in Europe and the conflicts of laws in the 
US have diverged since the American conflicts of law revolution of the mid-1900s.  While 
European private international law remained “in the closet” 188, technical and ultimately, 
neutral, US conflict of laws was infiltrated by public and political interests, the functional 
dimension becoming evident with the emphasis on its regulatory character189.  The political 
dimension, condensed in the notion of power, and encompassing notions of public policy, 
private authority and indigenous elements (including other cultural dimensions within the 
national system itself), is excluded when PIL closes (the closet) on itself.  In this sense, PIL 
constitutes a tool of the state, like private law itself.  
 
Increasingly, PIL rules are emerging beyond the state, either in conventions (particularly 
those deriving from the Hague Conferences) and via the Europeanisation of PIL rules 
legislated at the Union level.  The European acquis and European PIL rules reflect two key 
foundational elements of the legislative Europeanisation of law.  It has been suggested that a 
shift in the approach of the EU legislature can be identified, in light of the Commission’s 
adoption of Option Four of the 2010 Green Paper190, from one based on the codification of 
private law rules, to an emerging European private law based on the one hand, on the 
continual construction of the acquis, and on the other, on the notion of “optionality” as it 
exists in the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law191.  PIL has long allowed parties to 
choose the law applicable to govern their relationship, a source of pluralism in addition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 H. Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law as Global Governance: Beyond the Schism, from Closet to Planet’ 
(<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=horatia_muir-watt>; Last Accessed: 
13.05.2013). 
189 Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law as Global Governance’ (n.188). 
190 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law for 
Consumers and Businesses’, COM(2010) 348, Option Four.  Considered in more detail at the end of this 
Chapter. 
191 Hereinafter, pCESL.  If the parties agree to use the CESL, the choice must be one made pursuant to the within 
the scope of the respective national law which is applicable pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 or, in 
relation to pre-contractual information duties, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 864/2007; Preamble (10) to the 
‘Proposal on a Common European Sales Law’, COM(2011) 635 final.  The CESL is intended to cover the entire 
life-cycle of a contract; on this basis, it will also govern pre-contractual information duties (Preamble (26) to the 
Proposal on a Common European Sales Law).  Further, Art.11 of the Proposal for a Regulation on a CESL 
provides that a choice of the CESL as the applicable law will cover compliance with and the remedies arising 
from failure to comply with pre-contractual information duties.   
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national, European and private regulation192.  The application of the pCESL relies on the 
framework of PIL rules; the parties must choose the pCESL as the law applicable to govern 
their relationship193.  Thus, in the context of a multi-level private law, the pCESL adds 
another level of complexity and of necessary interrelation between with the European acquis 
and national law.  For example, the Commission has stipulated that the connection between 
European consumer protection law and the pCESL must be maintained, arguing for their 
contemporaneous development194.  The pCESL has, in February 2014, been adopted by the 
European Parliament, and will pass to the Council of Ministers, in line with the co-decision 
procedure195.  The pCESL, which is based on Art.114 TFEU and recognises the cultural 
divergences existing between the national systems as “obstacles to cross-border trade”, 
derived from the sales component of the DCFR, which was itself based on a comprehensive 
and comparative academic analysis of national rules, encompassing extensive comparative 
notes, released post-publication.  Yet the need to protect the diversities between the national 
systems is also recognised; it is considered that the pCESL’s optionality might allow for this.  
Indeed, the Communication accompanying the proposal provides: “[i]t is also an innovative 
approach because, in line with the principle of proportionality, it preserves Member States’ 
legal traditions and cultures whilst giving the choice to businesses to use it”196.  Herein, the 
significance attached to legal culture provides an alternative point of reference, distinct from 
the economic rationale underlying the European integration project; the “deeply embedded” 
cultural dimension of national contract law is thus brought to the fore197, which seems to 
envisage a balancing between legal and economic, and political, social and cultural interests. 
 
Having introduced the foundations of the legislative harmonisation of PIL norms, the next 
section examines the role of private law in European integration more generally, and sets out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 J. Smits, ‘Plurality of Sources in European Private Law, or:  How to Live With Legal Diversity?’ in R. 
Brownsword et al (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart, Oxford; 2011), pp.323-336. 
193 In relation to the way in which the CESL might be engaged by the exercise of choice, two approaches were 
initially advanced: one, where by CESL would be understood as a regime which exists in addition to the sales 
laws available throughout the EU (i.e. as a (now, including Croatia) 29th regime) and another – which is the one 
which seems to have been followed, per recital 9 of the proposal – is based on the notion that the CESL 
constitutes a lex specialis, that is, a second regime within each national legal system. For a more detailed 
discussion, see G. Rühl, ‘The Common European Sales Law: 28th Regime, 2nd Regime or 1st Regime?’ (2012) 19 
Maas.J.Eur.Comp.L. 148. 
194 European Commission, ‘A CESL to Facilitate Cross-Border Transactions in the Single Market’ COM(2011) 
636 final, para.2.3. 
195Text adopted available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2014-0159+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>; Last Accessed: 02.03.2014. 
196 European Commission, ‘A CESL to Facilitate Cross-Border Transactions in the Single Market’ COM(2011) 
636 final. 
197 European Commission, ‘Common European Sales Law’, Brussels, 11.10.2011 COM(2011) 636 final, p.9. 
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the foundations of European private law development via the Union legislature before 
exploring the reach – and limitations – of these efforts; this analysis subsequently engages the 
role of the CJEU in Europeanisation in Chapter 4.   
 
II. The Role of Private Law in European Integration 
 
i. The Foundations of European Legislative Development  
 
European integration finds its basis in the Union Treaty198 and is facilitated via the Union’s 
legislative acts, which encompasses the Europeanisation of law.  The Treaty of Rome initially 
referenced the notion of a “Citizens’ Europe”, understood to encompass a focus on health and 
safety, and environmental and consumer protection.  There exists no explicit private law 
legitimacy basis; the principle of subsidiarity199, establishing that the EU can only act on the 
basis that regulation is more appropriate at the EU level than the national one, shapes EU 
competence200.  Thus, private law initially developed outwith the established and explicit 
competences of the Union201; the legislature has focused on general contract law (and 
increasingly, areas characterised as "regulatory" private law, including consumer protection).  
Building on Art.153 EC, and Art.3 of the Maastricht Treaty, Art.2C TEU and Art.4(2)(f) 
TFEU now provide that consumer protection is a matter of shared competence between the 
Member States and the Union202.  The integration of consumer protection into the Treaties has 
remained significant203; the provisions (with the exception perhaps of Art.38 CFR204) all 
reflect the functional connection, long drawn between consumer protection and the facilitation 
of the internal market205.  The volume of secondary “private law” legislation has significantly 
increased since the 1990s.  Building on Art.100A, EEC Treaty, the EC Treaty provided, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 For a comprehensive overview, see P.P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 
Oxford; 2nd edn., 2011). 
199 Art.5(1) TFEU provides that the principle of conferral shall govern the limits of the competences of the EU 
(limited by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality), under which, as provided by Art.5(2) TFEU, the 
EU is competent to act only within the limits of the competences conferred on it by the Member States in the 
Treaties for the purpose of achieving particular aims and objectives.  See also, C-376/98 Germany v Parliament 
and Council [2000] ECR I-08419, para.84:  private law directives should aim “to contribute to the proper 
functioning of the internal market and achieve a high level of consumer protection by approximating laws”. 
200 Art.5, TFEU. 
201 See amongst others, S. Weatherill, EC Consumer Law and Policy (Longmann, London; 1997). 
202 Art.2C(2)(f) Treaty of Lisbon, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007. 
203 Consider Art.12 TFEU, Art.1114 TFEU and Art.169 TFEU. 
204 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 
205 EEC, ‘Preliminary Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and 
Information Policy’, OJ C 92/2, 25.04.1975, II.B.19(a)(i), providing that ‘purchasers of good or services should 
be protected against the abuse of power by the seller...”. 
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respect of Arts.94 and 95 EC, for the approximation of laws for the promotion of the internal 
market (now, Art.114 TFEU).  Most “private law” legislation now finds its basis in the 
facilitation of the internal market, via Art.114 TFEU.  The drafting of European legislation 
involves a multiplicity of participants; the three main institutions of the EU - the Commission, 
Parliament and Council – prepare and agree upon legislative norms via the ordinary 
legislative (previously co-decision) procedure206, while the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions provide consultative opinions throughout the 
drafting process.  Fundamentally, the Commission proposes draft laws, which are negotiated 
and thereafter adopted by the Council of the EU and Parliament.  The Commission promotes 
the interests of the EU broadly207, while the Council promotes its political priorities.  The 
Parliament and Council (comprised of national heads of state and allowing national 
governments to set out their own interests) review drafts, propose amendments and adopt 
proposals; adopted laws are then implemented at the national level, and the Commission, 
together with the CJEU via the infringement procedure, ensures that laws are satisfactorily 
implemented and compliance is satisfied.  Primary law, establishing the framework of the 
Union Treaty structure, provides the legitimacy basis for secondary EU legislation; the latter 
body, constituting regulations, directives and decisions, must therefore reflect the principles 
and aims of the EU as set out in the Treaty structure.  Evidently, many of the issues arising 
are inherently related to EU competences in the area of private law; this is an issue extending 
far beyond the boundaries of this part, however it is worth providing a rudimentary outline of 
Union competence in this context.  
 
The EU legal order, with its own sources of law, is intended to be autonomous in its nature, 
distinct from international and national law and yet forms a key part of each.  With the 
removal of the pillar structure, the Union acquired international legal personality, it having 
previously been reserved under the first pillar.  Post-Lisbon, Art.288 TFEU establishes the 
"legal acts" of the Union, namely, regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions, adopted by virtue of the "Community method" (on the basis of the same procedure 
within the Council upon which internal legislative action is adopted; that is, the ordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 The “co-decision” procedure was introduced in 1993, following the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the EU – 
Maastricht Treaty, OJ C 191, 29.07.1992) in Art.251 EC.  The legislative areas in relation to which the ordinary 
legislative procedure must be followed have been extended in the Lisbon Treaty, giving the Parliament and 
Council greater powers in the drafting process and for the purposes of facilitating greater transparency; see Rules 
of Procedure: Rules 37, 38a, 41, 43, and 53-74, and Art.289 and 294 TFEU on the ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
207 Art.17 TEU (Treaty on the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, hereinafter TEU). 
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legislative procedure, via qualified majority voting), and removing the other instruments 
which previously existed under the pillar structure, excluding those concerning foreign, 
security and defence policies (in respect of which the intergovernmental decision-making 
procedure remains applicable).  Regulations, aiming to ensure the uniform application of 
Union law across the Member States by replacing incompatible national laws, are generally 
applicable, binding and of direct effect against private individuals, Union institutions and the 
Member States from the date on which they enter into force.  There is no need for their 
transposition via national law.  Directives are binding, not as regulations, but as to the result 
to be achieved; thus, the national legislatures enjoy a degree of flexibility in terms of the 
transposing legislation, but must effect this transposition within the time period established 
therein, and in line with the obligation of sincere cooperation in Art.4(3) TEU.  Generally, 
directives are not directly applicable - this will be the case only of certain provisions which 
satisfy the CJEU's criteria208.  The second case example on the UCTD focuses on directives.  
While decisions are fully binding in respect of those to whom they are addressed (Member 
States, legal persons or private individuals; in respect of the latter, the Member State must 
have transposed the decision into national law), recommendations and opinions are not 
binding and confer neither rights nor obligations.  
  
The determination of the preferred legislative act, from those identified in Art.288 TFEU, is 
for the Union institutions on a case-by-case basis per Art.296(1) TFEU.  The scope held by 
the Union in respect of any of these acts is defined by the Treaty structure, and in particular, 
the division of competences - exclusive, shared and supporting (per Arts.3, 4 and 6 TFEU, 
respectively) - between the Union and the Member States and the principle of referral in 
Art.5(1) TEU.  Art.5 TEU sets out the basis of the Union’s legislative powers, that is, of 
attributed competency, which dictates that the Union has competence only in so far as the 
Treaties provide.  The exercise of Union competences is shaped by the principles established 
therein: 1) the principle of conferral (the Union only enjoys the competences conferred upon 
it by the Treaties); 2) the principle of proportionality (the exercise of competences must not 
exceed that which is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties) and 3) the principle 
of subsidiarity, which provides that in respect of shared competences, the EU can intervene 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 The CJEU has been reluctant to engage with the horizontal direct effect of the directives: C-91/92 Faccini 
Dori [1994] ECR I-3325, Judgement, para.25.  Further consideration is given to state liability in the case 
example below, developed to promote the effectiveness of EU law, ensure the legal protection of individuals and 
preclude the violation of Union law. 
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only where it is capable of acting more effectively than the Member States209; these principles 
fit with the notion of a multi-level system of Union (private) law, aiming to ensure that the 
lowest level of governance is engaged.  The extent to which this limited competence can be 
employed to develop a coherent body of law via harmonisation has been called into question 
and is explored further below210.   
 
The absence of uniformity, or the existence of divergences, between Member States’ norms 
neither invokes Art.114 TFEU nor constitutes a legislative basis in itself; this has been 
confirmed by the CJEU in Tobacco Advertising211, in which the Court held that “a mere 
finding of disparities between national rules and the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition liable to result there from, [is not] 
sufficient to justify the choice of [then] Art.100a as a legal basis as a legal basis...The 
measure must actually contribute to the improvement of the internal market”.  It has become 
clear that neither the legislature nor the CJEU will exercise the self-restraint to operate within 
such limits, leading to what has been termed the "competency creep" in EU law212.   Yet the 
competency creep can only extend so far: the national legislatures must transpose and 
implement Union law and the national courts must enforce it, as the EU’s enforcement 
powers are evidently limited.  The Member States are bound by Art.291(1) TFEU to adopt all 
necessary measures in national law in order to implement binding Union legislation.  The 
breadth and relevance of this obligation of compatibility stretches beyond the mere 
transposition of EU law; it must be done in line with EU law213.  In enforcement, the national 
courts – and particularly, constitutional courts, where they exist – constitute a kind of 
checkpoint for transfers of competences via national constitutional law and the Treaty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 For example, in respect of the CRD, it is considered that these principles are protected in respect of recitals 4 
- “The harmonisation of certain aspects of consumer distance and off-premises contracts is necessary for the 
promotion of a real consumer internal market striking the right balance between a high level of consumer 
protection and the competitiveness of enterprises, while ensuring respect for the principle of subsidiarity”- and 
65 - “Since the objective of this Directive, namely, through the achievement of a high level of consumer 
protection, to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Art.5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance 
with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve that objective”.  From the CJEU case law, it is clear that the Court will only 
consider EU legislation to violate these principles when it is “manifestly inappropriate” in respect of its aims: C-
344/04 IATA and ELFAA v Department for Transport [2006] ECR I-403, Judgement, para.80. 
210 Consider Van Gerven, and compare with J. Basedow, ‘A Common Contract Law for the Common Market’ 
(1996) 33 CMLR 1169, pp.1186 et seq. 
211 C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council 2000 [ECR] I–8419, Judgement, para.23. 
212 P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (OUP, Oxford; 5th edn., 2011), p.92. 
213 Including fundamental rights - at the narrowest, the Member State must ensure compliance in respect of the 
CFR, in "implementing EU law" (per Art.51(1) CFR) - to interpretation, explored in more detail below. 
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structure.  It is in this context that a key scope for conflict arises; the principle of supremacy 
of EU law in shaping the relationship between the national and Union orders is largely 
accepted but the national courts nevertheless consider that they “retain a power of 
constitutional review over measures of EC law”214.  
 
Directives have been characterised as sui generis in their character215 and are significant in 
shaping the nature of the interactions between the national and Union orders, being firstly 
drafted and enacted at the EU level, and subsequently transposed and applied in the national 
jurisdictions by the relevant national bodies, per Art.288 TFEU.  The characterisation of this 
relationship might diverge, shaping the manner in which the national legal systems will 
engage with the EU in this context.  In transposing directives, the national legislatures have 
scope to modify what emerges initially as an EU norm; Dickson argues that “…directives are 
norms coming from outwith the national legal system intended to guide the development of 
norms within that distinct system” such that these directives can arguably be understood as 
being part of the EU legal system (that is to say, it is not the directive itself which becomes 
part of the national system but that amended version, as it is transposed by the national 
bodies)216.  She develops her categorisation, articulating three types of relationship between 
national and EU law: 1) the “27 plus 1” model; 2) the EU law as part of Member State legal 
system”; and 3)  “one legal system”.  Dickson argues that it is the second model which best 
reflects the nature of the interaction, with “distinct but interacting systems model of 
relations”217.  This also reflects Lenaerts and Corthaut’s understanding, in respect of which 
directives constitute norms external to the national legal system which might nevertheless be 
enforceable therein and thus have an impact on the system itself; this effect is nonetheless 
subject to certain restrictions of both an internal (i.e. norms must be clear, precise and 
unconditional) and external character (concerning the nature of the legal instrument having 
such an effect)218.  Of course, this relationship is also shaped by the jurisprudence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (n.212), p.344.   
215 S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd edn., 2005), p.1.  
216 J. Dickson, ‘Directives in EU Legal Systems: Whose Norms Are They Anyway?’ (2011) 17 ELJ 190, pp.194-
195. 
217 Dickson, ‘Directives in EU Legal Systems’ (n.216), pp.193 and 211. 
218 K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’ 
(2006) 31 ELJ 287.  See also, M. Dougan, ‘When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship 
Between Direct Effect and Supremacy” (2007) 44 CMLR 931, p.934, who understands there is a need for a 
“trigger” before the supremacy doctrine applies “conflict resolution tool in situations of conflicts between EU 
law and national law, and which operates when, “…Community law has been rendered cognizable before the 
domestic courts, by satisfying the threshold criteria for enjoying direct effect”, facilitating the “distinct legal 
systems” understanding. 
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CJEU.  Prechal argues that, on the basis of the CJEU jurisprudence (including Costa, Van 
Gend en Loos, and Francovich219, and the jurisprudence establishing the principle of direct 
effect), EU law should be understood to form part of national law; thus Prechal argues that 
from their enactment, directives automatically become part of the national system220.  Raz 
further highlights the significance of the courts.  For Raz, the norms that actually form part of 
a legal system are determined by reference to what the “primary norm-applying organs” (that 
is courts and other judicial bodies) of that system, are bound to apply221, drawing a distinction 
between what is actually part of the legal system and what is binding, according to that legal 
system222.   
 
To return to enlargement and the potential significance of cultures and traditions, it is worth 
noting that prior to accession, candidate states are required to implement the entire acquis, an 
approach which differs to that required of existing Member States; the difference is 
essentially between a voluntary and mandatory approach.  It has been questioned whether the 
latter reflects an appropriate foundation for the relationship between the national and 
European orders, to the extent that it reflects hierarchy and coercion as opposed to “tolerance” 
and coordination223.  One study – undertaken by Faulkner and Treib – has identified, in 
contrast to the expectations of the researchers, no kind of “revenge” on the part of the new 
Member States in respect of this Union-imposed conditionality224.  Rather, they determined 
that the difficulties for these “new” Member States arise in respect of the application of EU 
norms and not in the transposition of the acquis itself225.  This seems to reinforce the 
significance of a “law in context” approach to legal scholarship, as opposed to one merely 
focusing on legal rules. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 C-6/64 Costa [1964] ECR I-1141, C-32/84 Van Gend en Loos [1985] ECR I-0779 and C-6-9/90 Francovich 
and Bonifaci and Others v Italy [1991] I-5357 (hereinafter, Francovich). 
220 Prechal, Directives in EC Law (n.215), pp.92 et seq. 
221 While Raz also highlights that: “Quite often the courts have an obligation to apply laws of other legal 
systems, rules of private associations and so on, although these were not and do not become part of the legal 
system”; J. Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd edn., 2009), p.109. 
222 Raz, The Authority of Law (n.221), pp.109 et seq. 
223 O. Pollicino, ‘The New Relationship between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of 
Europe: Towards a Unitary Theory of Jurisprudential Supranational Law?’ (2010) 29 Y.Eur.Law 65, p.71. 
224 They looked at Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and the Working Time Directive, 
2003/88/EC, the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC, amended by 2002/73/EC) and the Employment 
Framework Directive (2000/ 78/EC). 
225 G. Faulkner and O. Treib, ‘Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New Member 
States’ (2008) 46 JCMS 293, pp.307-308. 
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Where it does not have the competence to harmonise (where harmonisation is deemed to lead 
to uniformity of national rules), or where it might want to be seen to limit itself to operating 
within the restraints established by the Treaty structure and the CJEU, other avenues are open 
to the Union legislature.  It might, instead of or in addition to harmonisation, look to measures 
of "better regulation" to generate convergence as opposed to engaging only in 
harmonisation226.  The open method of coordination227 finds its basis in the Lisbon Treaty as 
the paradigm of a "new mode of governance", based on the notion of cooperation between 
actors and institutions operating at different levels.  The OMC purports to facilitate the 
development of voluntary, non-binding norms via processes of policy negotiation between the 
Commission, the Council of the EU and the Member States, facilitating an approach which 
permits not only the emergence of solutions that can be adapted to the different Member 
States but further promotes “learning from experiences” between states228.  This trend might 
be more reflective of a more general shift in perspectives of legal development, proposed at 
the outset of the thesis. 
  
The Commission, prior to communicating a proposal, initially engages with interested bodies 
(including national parliaments and civil society groups amongst others), in drafting “impact 
assessments” 229  in order to determine the possible economic, social and political 
consequences230 of legislation.  As part of the “better regulation” approach, it aims to legislate 
on the basis of “transparent, comprehensive and balanced evidence”231.  At the impact 
assessment stage, a determination as to the necessity of Union legislation and the satisfaction 
of the subsidiarity principle must be made232.  The proposal as drafted by the Commission, the 
Commission having the “right of initiative”, is then communicated233 to the Council and 
Parliament, who undertake a review; a second reading is undertaken if both fail to agree on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 W. van Gerven, 'The Open Method of Convergence' (2008) 13 Juridica International 32, pp.33-34. 
227 Hereinafter, OMC. 
228 See W. van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’ in F. Cafaggi 
(ed.), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, Oxford; 2009), pp.37-78, p.60. 
229 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Guidelines’, SEC(2009) 92. 
230 Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council, 15 and 16.06.2001, SN 200/1/01 REV 1, para.35. 
231 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Guidelines’ (n.229), p.4; see also, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, ‘A Strategic Review of Better Regulation in the European Union’, 14.11.2006, COM(2006) 689 final; 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Second Strategic Review of Better Regulation in the 
European Union’, 30.01.2008, COM(2008) 32 final. 
232 Thus, Impact Assessments will also be relevant to the determination of the most appropriate avenue 
(European Commission: Impact Assessment, COM(2002) 276 final; Impact Assessment—Next Steps, 
SEC(2004) 1377; Better Regulation and Enhanced Impact Assessment, SEC(2007) 926. 
233 Providing it has the support of at least 14 of the 28 Commissioners. 
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the amendments proposed.  Further disagreement will lead to the establishment of a 
conciliation committee, which will be asked to provide a resolution; at this stage, the Council 
and the Parliament can block the proposal.  The European Parliament has been attributed 
an increased role, post-Lisbon, in European law-making, with the Treaty's extension of the 
application of the co-decision procedure to a number of policy areas; essentially, co-decision 
is now the ordinary legislative procedure.  It works via committees and on the basis of reports 
prepared therein, at which stage comparative analysis might become relevant.  Where 
legislation is based on the existence of divergences between the laws of the Member States, 
which is understood to undermine the functioning of the internal market, such a justification 
seemingly requires a comparative assessment of the different norms in the given area.  This 
analysis must transcend a consideration of rules and encompass an assessment of policy 
considerations.  Furthermore, comparative analysis seems to be necessary to the extent that 
the Commissioners must be independent of their Member States in the undertaking of their 
tasks234; that is to say, the Commission cannot simply follow the approach of one Member 
State.  Given their composition, the committees can be understood to provide a context in 
which comparison of the existing EU acquis and national law can be undertaken.  This is 
particularly important given that the Council is composed of representatives of each of the 
Member States who then assess the proposal, employing the Commission’s reports235; the 
national perspective is therefore deemed to be of relevance at this stage, with the Council 
providing a context in which the scope for conflicts between national legal orders can be dealt 
with.  The Council employs questionnaires, which allow for explanations of the divergent 
norms of the Member States.  For example, in relation to the proposed Consumer Credit 
Directive, the Council issued a questionnaire in order to identify the controversial dimensions 
of the proposal and allow Member States to set out their own positions236.  In particular, such 
an activity permits a preliminary identification of those areas in which the national and 
European norms might conflict, in their textual construction, interpretation and application.  It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Art.245 TEU. 
235 Art.16 TEU. 
236  European Credit Research Institute, Newsletter 13, Third Quarter, 2004.  
(<www.ecri.eu/new/system/files/Commentary_13.pdf>; Last Accessed:  21.10.2012).  The Council also issued a 
questionnaire in respect of the DCFR; see Council of the European Union, ‘Note from the General Secretariat to 
the Committee on Civil Law Matters (Contract Law)’, Draft Report to the Council on the Setting Up of a 
Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law - Compilation of the Comments from Delegations, 
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is important to note that the interests of the legislative making bodies are not limited to the 
rules themselves; language and translation are also significant at this stage.  Following the 
agreement of the Parliament and Council, the proposal can be adopted.  The process of 
drafting EU legislation is therefore a complex one; the parties involved dictate this to be the 
case.  The interests of the Member States are broad and potentially diverge between the 
national orders; the various stages of negotiation highlight the “compromise” nature of the 
legislative process.  In particular, as will be discussed in more detail below, not all parties 
attribute the same significance to ensuring the development of a coherent system of law, at 
least at the stage of drafting.  Rather, the emphasis on coherence seems to derive from the 
Commission237.  
 
Against this background, the Commission has been engaged for more than ten years in a 
review and appraisal of the contract law acquis and in the development of a Common Frame 
of Reference238, with the aim of promoting a “significantly higher degree of coherence in 
European contract law”239.  This has been paralleled by the shift in the scope and reach of 
legislation, the programme of maximum harmonisation having been set out in the 2007 Green 
Paper240 for the very purpose of promoting coherence241.  
 
ii. The Reach of Harmonisation Efforts: A Stretch Too Far or Not Far Enough?   
 
The shifts in the reach of harmonisation are reflected in the focus on minimum, maximum and 
subsequently, targeted maximum harmonisation.  Minimum harmonisation establishes a 
minimum level of protection with which the Member States must comply, without precluding 
the introduction of more restrictive norms at the national level.  Both the minimum rules and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on a More Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan' COM(2003) 68. 
238 Initiated by the European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on European Contract Law’ COM(2001) 398. 
239 D. Staudenmayer, ‘The Place of Consumer Contract Law Within the Process on European Contract Law’ 
(2004) 27 J.Con.Pol. 269, p.277.   
240 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis’ COM(2006) 744. 
241 The desire – in the legislature and CJEU – for coherence at the EU level arguably may come at the expense of 
national coherence; Weatherill references the CJEU’s “adventurous reading of EU measures” in this respect: S. 
Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’ in P.P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford; 
2nd edn., 2011), pp.837-868, p.865 citing C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I-10421; C-404/06 Quelle [2008] 
ECR I-2685; C-183/00 Gonzalez Sanchez [2002] ECR I-3901.  Consider V. Mak, 'A Systemisation of European 
Private Law Through EU Law' (2011) 17 ELJ 403, who considers that there should be a shift in focus from the 
national to the EU level, and in particular, that principles of Union law could facilitate coherence.  This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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those which go beyond the protection established via European legislation are subject to 
Treaty requirements.  The scope of Union legislation is established with reference to its 
provisions; for example, Art.8(1) and Art.8(2) CSD – the ‘minimum harmonisation’ provision 
– provide that national legal orders can legislate for rules which generate a higher degree of 
protection for the consumer.  The primary problematic of minimum harmonisation is thus the 
absence of uniformity, to which EU legislation generally aims to give rise.  In particular 
therefore, with regard to remedies, these CSD provisions provide that consumers can choose 
to seek a remedy in national contract law, without making reference to the directive itself.  
Furthermore, minimum harmonisation dictates that while a minimum standard of protection 
must be established, the Member States continue to have scope to engage in a “race to the 
bottom”, in terms of the level of protection offered.    
 
Maximum harmonisation essentially removes the discretion of the Member States and 
expands that of the Union.  Legislation of a maximum nature purports to establish a set of 
rules uniformly applicable across the Member States; there exists no freedom for divergent 
norms of either a more or less stringent standard, such that the Member States cannot avoid 
the reach of European legislation 242 .  National legislatures and courts must therefore 
understand the scope of the directive before it is implemented in order to identify the national 
rules that need to be repealed and to ensure compliant and effective implementation.  The 
processes of implementation and transposition must be closely monitored by the Union 
institutions, a requirement which potentially creates pragmatic problems therein, both where 
the level of Union protection is higher and lower than that established in the national context.   
 
A number of shifts in the EU’s legislative approach are identifiable.  As it was promulgating 
minimum harmonisation, the Commission also sought to develop a civil code, the realisation 
of which aimed at the abolition of diversity in favour of uniformity and unification via the 
harmonisation of private law norms.  It was at this stage that uniformity and unity became 
confused; unification will not arise from the construction of a uniform body of norms via 
harmonisation.  It was subsequently recognised that as the notion of uniformity came to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 For example, increased consumer protection is not a sufficient justification – consider the infringement 
procedure in C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827; see, however Art.114(4) and (5) TFEU which 
make reference to national rules to be introduced in relation to “major needs referred to in Art.36, or relating to 
the protection of the environment or the working environment”; rather, depending on their intentions, Member 
States might be able to circumvent the maximum harmonisation provisions of European directives, for example, 
if national legislation is developed, intending to overlap with European legislation, but on a different basis; V. 
Mak, ‘Review of the Consumer Acquis:  Towards Maximum Harmonisation’ (2009) 17 ERPL 55, pp.58-61. 
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constitute something like a constitutional principle, creating resistance and conflict, a 
harmonised, coherent system of private law applicable in a uniform manner in all states could 
not be achieved by virtue of a civil code243.  As it became clear that the civil code would no 
longer be feasible, the Commission’s preference for a maximum harmonisation approach 
emerged; in the early 2000s, the Commission’s harmonisation policy thus shifted from 
minimum to maximum harmonisation, reflected in its consumer policy programme of 2002-
2006244 , and legislatively enshrined in the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EC, the 
Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive 2002/65/EC and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive 2005/29/EC.  Thereafter, a shift from maximum to targeted maximum 
harmonisation became identifiable, reflected concretely in the Consumer Rights Directive245.  
The CRD initially intended to provide for full harmonisation, as is clear from its initial draft 
published in 2008, which provided for regulation “in a systematic fashion, simplifying and 
updating the existing rules, removing inconsistencies and closing gaps”246.  Much of the 
criticism surrounding the pCRD concerned its reach247, and in particular the envisaged lack of 
flexibility in respect of its transposition and consequent application in the Member States248.  
“Targeted” full harmonisation was then identified as an alternative to blanket maximum 
harmonisation by the authors of the Consumer Law Compendium, who advocated the 
preliminary identification of the key areas in which barriers to trade have arisen consequent to 
minimum harmonisation and the imposition of fully harmonised norms and standards of 
protection therein249.  These areas included “pre-contractual information duties…and the 
information of the consumer about his right of withdrawal”250.  Similarly, the Schwab Report 
and Wallis Opinion highlighted the need for the harmonisation of information requirements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Indeed, Caruso advances the notion that the reluctance of the Member States to harmonisation, that is, the 
“guard[ing] [of private law] in the jealous hands of national institutions”…“is a key factor which is making 
possible the States’ ultimate acceptance of Brussels rule”; D. Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral: The 
Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration’ (1997) 3 ELJ 3, p.4. 
244 European Commission, ‘EC Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006’ COM(2002) 208, para.3.1.2.1. 
245 Hereinafter, CRD. 
246 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’, COM(2008) 614 final. 
247 The criticism of maximum harmonisation approaches in various pieces of legislation has arisen from 
academia and the judiciary; in particular, reference can be made to the Opinion of AG Geelhoed in a number of 
cases, including Commission v. France (n.242); C-154/00 Commission v Greece [2002] I-3879 and Case C-
183/00 González Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901. 
248 A. Johnston and H. Unberath, ‘European Private Law by Directives:  Approach and Challenges’ in C. Twigg-
Flesner (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (CUP, Cambridge; 2011), pp.85-100, 
p.89. 
249 H. Schulte-Nölke et al (eds.), EC Consumer Law Compendium: Comparative Analysis (Sellier, München; 
2008), p.797. 
250 Schulte-Nölke et al, EC Consumer Law Compendium (n.249), p.797. 
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for distance and off-premises contracts; the Wallis Opinion 251  favoured minimum 
harmonisation except for withdrawal rights while the Schwab Report252 favoured maximum 
harmonisation of withdrawal rights and general information duties but with regard to the 
latter, only in respect of distance and off-premises contracts and with a substantial number of 
exceptions253.  The final CRD thus provides for “targeted” full harmonisation254.  The shift 
from minimum to maximum to targeted maximum harmonisation is now reflected in the 
Commission’s policy; previously, it had arisen in the arguably political judgements as to 
Union competence rendered by the CJEU, discussed below255.   
 
A multiplicity of potential effects arises from the choice of reach of harmonisation.  It is often 
assumed that the drafting of a uniform body of norms at the EU level decrees the uniform 
implementation and application of the same norms at the national level; consequently, 
maximum harmonisation should “accelerate integration through the adoption of common 
rules"256.  The shift in the approach of the Commission is one reflection of Schmid’s (over-
)“instrumentalisation” of private law for integration purposes, where the focus is not 
necessarily on the balance between the protection of the interests of parties but predominantly 
on the facilitation of the market via the establishment of a uniform regime of norms and the 
satisfaction of the needs of the bigger market players257.  Maximum harmonisation dictates 
that the level of consumer protection “takes a hit” because the Member States are precluded 
from introducing or maintaining higher degrees of protection.  Thus, the determination of the 
reach of legislation “also […] require[s] that the EU choose the quality of that common 
(re)regulatory regime [which] forces choices to be made about the EU’s view of the function 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 The Draft Opinion of the Legal Committee submitted by Mrs. Diane Wallis, MEP of 24.8.2010 (the Wallis 
Opinion). 
252 The Draft Report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection submitted by Mr. 
Andreas Schwab, MEP of 9.6.2010 (the ‘Schwab Report’). 
253 See the DG for Internal Policies, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, ‘Note: Extent of Harmonisation 
in Consumer Contract Law’ (2010), PE 432.728, pp.19-22 for more information. 
254 The shift to targeted full harmonisation can be identified in the amended Art.4 of the pCRD: “1. Save as 
otherwise provided by this Directive, Member States may not maintain or introduce, in their national law, 
provisions diverging from those laid down in this Directive, including more or less stringent provisions to ensure 
a different level of consumer protection. Member States shall forward the text of diverging provisions of national 
law to the Commission” and the final version, “Member States shall not maintain or introduce, in their national 
law, provisions diverging from those laid down in this Directive, including more or less stringent provisions to 
ensure a different level of consumer protection, unless otherwise provided for in this Directive”. 
255 C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419. 
256 Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’ in Craig and de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (n.241), p.848. 
257 C. Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union (Nomos, Baden-Baden; 
2010), and specifically C. Schmid, ‘The Thesis of the Instrumentalisation of Private Law by the EU in a 
Nutshell’ in C. Joerges and T. Ralli (eds.), European Constitutionalism Without Private Law:  Private Law 
Without Democracy, Recon Report No.14 (Arena, 2011), pp.17-36, p.18. 
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of consumer law”258.  Furthermore, the level at which such choices are made is significant, 
reflecting “a debate about the redistribution of regulatory competence ‘upwards’ in favour of 
the EU…[reflecting] a preference for centralization and uniformity and the dilution of local 
autonomy and diversity”259.  To the extent that the determination of the reach of legislative 
efforts “defin[es] the outer EU constitutional limits”260 of Union competences, the discourse 
is clearly of a “constitutional” nature. 
 
Another set of consequences can be said to reflect the constitutional dimension of legislative 
harmonisation efforts, to the extent that they create a pre-emptive effective in respect of 
which a shift of powers from the Member States to the Union transpires, and on the basis of 
which, the CJEU acquires significant jurisdiction and power in the interpretation of EU 
law261.  The reach of legislation will shape the interpretative approach adopted by the CJEU, 
which will not hesitate to find national law incompatible with Union law262.  Where the 
directive provides for full harmonisation, the CJEU will assess national legislation only in 
light of the relevant directive and not in light of primary law263.  However where the CJEU 
assesses domestic law in light of an applicable minimum directive, the CJEU will also look to 
determine if the national legislation complies with primary EU law (including free 
movements)264.  Furthermore, the reach of legislation will also shape the relationship between 
the national and Luxembourg courts as it arises per Art.267 TFEU.  There might be a greater 
incentive for national courts to refer to the CJEU where the relevant Union legislation is of a 
maximum nature however, in respect of minimum harmonisation, the national courts might 
refer only where domestic law tethers on the line of the minimum Union standard, and not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’ in Craig and de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (n.241), p.848. 
259 L. Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law:  Exploring Europeanization (OUP, Oxford; 2011), p.81.  See 
also Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’ in Craig and de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (n.241), p.851:  “a priority 
for market-making to the exclusion of local regulatory autonomy”. 
260 C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart, Oxford; 2009). 
261 H-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a “Directive 
on Consumer Rights”’ (2009) 46 CMLR 471, pp.478-479. 
262 See for example, Joined Cases C-261-299/07 VTB [2009] ECR I‑12949.  In VTB, while the relevant directive 
had the aim of full harmonisation, concerns were raised by Member States, in the period before the Directive 
came into force, in respect of its coverage of sales promotions measures.  As such, the Directive did not 
comprehensively deal with such measures.  The Court nevertheless based its decision on a maximum 
harmonisation approach and held that national prohibitions on sales promotions measures went beyond the 
liberal approach of the directives.   
263 C-495/10 Dutrueux nyr, Judgement, para.22. 
264 C-205/07 Gysbrechts [2008] ECR I-9947, Judgement, para.33, citing C‑322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband 
[2003] ECR I‑14887, Judgement, para.64. 
 	  	  	   51 
where a higher level of consumer protection is established in the national system265.  The 
shifting policy approach of the Commission is perhaps therefore responsible for the trends 
that can be identified in preliminary references in recent years, that is, an increase in those 
having a private law dimension. 
 
The CJEU judgement in Tobacco Advertising266 is well known and has been afforded a 
number of divergent academic interpretations, particularly in respect of the compatibility of 
the minimum harmonisation approach with legislative measures adopted under Art.114.  The 
Commission seemed to argue that maximum harmonisation is the only approach available and 
justifiable under Art.114, in line with the country of origin principle267.  It is generally 
understood that the judgement condemns EU legislation of a minimum harmonisation nature, 
which lacks a market access clause.  Higher or stricter standards should be applicable only by 
virtue of Art.114(4-9).  It was the notion that Member States might impose higher standards 
in respect of goods entering domestic markets, thereby restricting the circulation of products 
and services that established the rationale for the interpretation.  The divergent interpretations 
following Tobacco Advertising have thus given rise to uncertainty as to the “constitutional 
status” of minimum harmonisation per Art.114; this is evident in private law legislation.  
With regard to the UCTD, and in respect of the Spanish government’s non-implementation of 
Art.4(2) UCTD, the CJEU seemed to (although by no means clearly) support minimum 
harmonisation legislation adopted on the basis of Art.114268.  In Gysbrechts, the CJEU 
appeared to draw the same conclusion269, notwithstanding that the Tobacco Advertising case 
was not cited. 
 
Furthermore, the determination of the reach of legislation, and the shift from minimum to 
(targeted) maximum harmonisation, also potentially reflects a preference for uniformity over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 P. Rott, 'What is the Role of the CJEU in EC Private Law? - A Comment on the CJEU judgements in Océano 
Grupo, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, Leitner and Veedfald' (2005) 1 Hanse.L.R. 6, p.15; C-237/02 Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I‑3403, Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed, para.19. 
266 C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, Judgement, para.84. 
267 H-W. Micklitz, ‘Social Justice and Access Justice’ EUI WP 2011/02, p.34. 
268 C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros [2010] ECR I-4785, discussed in more detail in the case examples.  In not 
implementing this provision, the Spanish government was intending to provide greater consumer protection 
since it would mean that all “core terms” would be subject to review and could be struck down.  The directive 
takes a minimum harmonisation approach (Art.8); the CJEU held that Art.4(2) does not relate to the ratione 
materiae of the UCTD and as such Art.8 could be applied to Art.4(2). 
269 C-205/07 Gysbrechts [2008] ECR I-9947. 
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respect for “Europe’s cherished diversity” 270.  Diversity constitutes a matter of constitutional 
significance within the Union, given that unitas in diversitate subsists as its de facto motto, 
despite having been written out of the Lisbon Treaty following its inclusion in the ill-fated 
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.  The choice of legislative approach not 
only affects those issues which are more evidently constitutional, for example, as Miller 
suggests, the allocation of power enshrined in the autonomy of the national legislatures and 
moreover, in the structure of private law, resulting in “a more hierarchical, less cooperative 
pattern”271 but also shapes the significance attached to the diversity of policy decisions 
inherently tied to regulatory decision-making within the different Member States; in 
particular, maximum harmonisation might undermine attempts to create a dynamic, multi-
level private law, capable of developing in line with shifting societal, political, economic and 
technological positions by “freez[ing]” protection, particularly, for example, in the domain of 
consumer law272. 
 
Moving beyond the reach of harmonisation via directives, the other mechanisms of 
Europeanisation engaged by the Union legislature should be set out.  In 2008, the 
Commission published its Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive, constituting the 
outcome of its acquis review, which found its legal basis in Art.95 EC (now Art.114 
TFEU)273.  The final version was adopted in October 2011, in a vastly reduced form of the 
original proposal.  The Draft Common Frame of Reference274 was published in its outline 
edition in 2008 and in its full edition in 2009275, building on the Principles of European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 S. Weatherill, ‘Interpretation of the Directives: The Role of the Court’ in A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), Towards 
a European Civil Code (Kluwer, The Hague; 4th edn., 2011), pp.185-203, p.187, that is, “pointless bureaucratic 
exercise in seeking to bring together what is irretrievably culturally separate”, p.187. 
271 Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law (n.259), p.81; H. Collins, The European Civil Code:  The Way 
Forward (CUP, Cambridge; 2008), citing S. Weatherill, ‘The Constitutional Competence of the EU to Deliver 
Social Justice’ (2006) 2 ERCL 136, p.156. 
272 H. Beale and G. Howells, ‘Pre-Contractual Information Duties in the Optional Instrument’ in R. Schulze and 
J. Stuyck (eds.), Towards a European Contract Law (Sellier, München; 2011), pp.49-64, p.51. 
273 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive’ COM(2008) 614. 
274 The Common Frame of Reference has its roots in the aspirations of the European Parliament ((1989) OJ C 
158/400 and again in (1994) OJ C 205/518), and the Commission (European Commission, 'Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law' COM(2001) 398; 
Commission, 'Communication on a More Coherent European Contract Law’ (n.237); European Commission, 
'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law 
and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward' COM(2004) 651; European Commission, 'Call for 
Expression of Interest with a View to Setting Up a Network of Stakeholder Experts on the Common Frame of 
Reference in the Areas of European Contract Law' (2004) OJ S 148). 
275 C. Von Bar et al (eds.), Principles, Definition and Model Rules of European Private Law:  Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR, Outline Edition) (Sellier, München; 2009). 
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Contract Law developed by Ole Lando in the 1990s276.  Thereafter, the European Commission 
published its ‘Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law 
for Consumers and Businesses’, setting out possible approaches to the development of private 
law, establishing a consultation period and inviting public response277.  The Expert Group, 
established by the Commission in April 2010278, published its ‘Feasibility Study on European 
Contract Law’279 in May 2011.  Building on Option Four of the 2010 Green Paper280 and 
engaging PIL, the Commission advanced a Proposal for a Common European Sales Law in 
October 2011281, outlined above, as an optional instrument applicable only when chosen by 
the contracting parties.   
 
Until recently, the development of a civil code still seemed like a possibility, if no longer a 
likely probability.  The different mechanisms engaged by the Union legislature seem to 
confirm the absence of an urgent drive towards codification, allowing rather for the 
understanding of a fragmented, Union private law as an archipelago, or a “European law 
continent surrounded by an ever smaller sea of national contract law”282.  Thus the prospect of 
codification has been all but extinguished with merely the embers of desire emanating from a 
few camps.  It must be assumed that the acquis will continue to develop – within the context 
of the minimum/maximum harmonisation discourse, which remains as ambiguous as ever  – 
and exist alongside the pCESL (which brings into consideration the application of PIL rules, 
potentially pulling the perspective back to that formed in the national orders). 
 
Chapter 1. Concluding Remarks 
 
This preliminary chapter has had three broad aims: to draw and uncover the connection 
between national private law development, the state and the context in which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 O. Lando and H. Beale (eds.), The Principles of European Contract Law:  Parts One and Two (Kluwer; The 
Hague; 2000) and The Principles of European Contract Law:  Part Three (Kluwer; The Hague; 2003). 
277 Commission, ‘Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law’ (n.190). 
278 Commission Decision 2010/233/EU of 26.04.2010, ‘Setting Up the Expert Group on a Common Frame of 
Reference in the Area of European Contract Law’, OJ L 105, 27.4.2010, pp.109-111. 
279 IP/11/523, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/consumer/policies_consumer_intro_en.htm>; Last Accessed: 
01.03.2012. 
280 Option Four, Commission, ‘Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law’ 
(n.190). 
281 European Commission, ‘Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Common European Sales Law’ COM(2011) 635 final. 
282  C. Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union: Privatrecht und 
Privatrechtskonzeptionen in der Entwicklung der Europäischen Integrationsverfassung (Nomos, Baden-Baden; 
2010), p.212. 
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Europeanisation of private law and European integration occurs, to engage these connections 
to establish the significance of the perspective of culture and tradition in the Europeanisation 
of private law and to explicate the legislative foundations of European legal development.  
These dimensions of analysis have aimed to establish the grounds upon which the 
Europeanisation of private law and European integration can be understood as sets of 
processes, and in respect of which, the relevance of comparative analysis can be uncovered 
and evaluated in the next chapters.   
 
The first section of the chapter has briefly outlined the relevant theories of integration and has 
tracked their emergence from IR to legal scholarship.  It has begun with those of IR, 
attributing particular attention to the understanding of the close relationship between the state 
and the evolving Union order; from the realist theories of the 1950s and the neofunctionalism 
of the 1960s, following which emerged intergovernmentalism (the latter two having been 
revisited in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively) and supranationalism, it has become clear that 
the focus of the exploration of these relationships has shifted from the security of the state, to 
the centralisation of state loyalties and the emergence of greater interdependence, to the 
power of the state, its preferences and its potential exercise of resistance to such transfer, and 
subsequently, to the understanding of the EU as a set of functionally-differentiated regimes 
from which divergent transnational societies emerge.  Thereafter, the analysis has focused on 
the theorising of legal integration, in respect of which, in the context of existing IR theories, 
the intertwinement of legal and political processes is advanced by virtue of the integration 
through law approach of Weiler et al; against this background, it is considered that the 
functionalist role of law in integration is deemed to demand consideration of the connection 
between legal development and integration in its socio-economic, cultural and political 
context.  A similar acknowledgment is also identifiable in the supranationalist theories of 
Stone Sweet et al, developed via the analysis of the Union institutions, and especially the 
CJEU, and furthermore in the (diverse) constructivist, institutionalist and multi-level 
governance theories, which aim to bring to the fore the social construction of Europe and the 
emergence of transnational networks of actors and societies.   
 
Thereafter, the chapter has aimed to place the theoretical discussion in the context of the 
thesis; it has taken one step back and explored the nation state foundations of private law, an 
analysis which reinforces the significance of the distinct legal, political, cultural and socio-
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economic contexts of the diverse nation states, and establishes the foundations for the 
explication of the socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions of Union legal 
development, and particularly, the Europeanisation of private law.  The embeddedness – 
evident in the mutual influences between the emergence of the nation state, the emergence of 
national culture and the emergence of national private law – exists, more or less, in each 
Member State; against this background, the European sphere is advanced as a context of 
commonality and diversity of legal orders, as has been outlined in the introduction.  The 
European space has therefore been conceived as one ripe for conflict; the nature of the 
conflicts arising at the national and European levels have briefly been set out with particular 
reference to those of a private law character.  This has allowed for a preliminary engagement 
with PIL norms, which are normally deemed applicable for the resolution of conflicts – 
predominantly of jurisdiction and applicable law – in the European space.  The limited 
potential for PIL norms to resolve the breath of conflicts arising within the context of the 
Europeanisation of private law is considered to be a consequence of its national foundations 
and the attribution within this context of a neutral character to such rules; the emergence of 
PIL rules “beyond the state”, as a fundamental (initial) component of harmonisation, has 
brought to the fore the foundations of the legislative Europeanisation of private law. 
 
The exploration in the second section of the chapter of the rationales underpinning, as well as 
the processes constituting, the legislative development of European private law has allowed 
for consideration of the breadth of actors, and thus, the diversity of interests and preferences, 
that shape the determination of the legislative route eventually adopted.  These determinations 
necessarily delineate the reach of harmonisation efforts and their potential impact in the 
national legal orders, not only on the substance of national legal norms but also on the 
diversity of cultures and traditions existing across the European space.  From this analysis, it 
has been advanced that legislative legal development can only go so far; while the Union 
legislature drafts and adopts legislation which the national legislatures are bound to 
implement, the interpretation and application of Union norms is dependent on the CJEU and 
the national courts.  These lines of analysis – particularly, in respect of the focus on the 
harmonisation of national private law norms for the purposes of the facilitation of the internal 
market via the Union acquis and PIL rules – have highlighted two interrelated lines of 
discourse: the evolving nature of the relationship between the national and Union legal orders 
and the institutions operating therein, and furthermore, the putative need for the emergence of 
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a single or distinct European culture283 as a prerequisite to legal development, to the extent 
that this is deemed to lend justification (somewhat circularly284, legally, politically, socially 
and culturally) to the emergence of a body or system of European private law.  
 
In the following chapter, the preparation of the groundwork leading to the demand for a 
developed understanding of comparison as part of the methodology of the Europeanisation of 
private law is undertaken; as noted, it requires a critical approach, which in turn demands an 
understanding of the context in which Europeanisation occurs.  The analysis in Chapter 1 has 
aimed to establish these preliminary foundations.  Chapter 2 purports to uncover the relevant 
dimensions of the Union’s apparent motto of unitas in diversitate and furthermore, the 
significance of culture, tradition and identity to the Europeanisation of private law.  On the 
basis of this analysis, the need for a single European legal culture – one which is necessarily 
common - as a prerequisite of Europeanisation, is called into question. 
 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 On the notion of the re-emergence of a European culture from that existing in Roman law and subsequently, 
the ius commune, and the continuing significance of this “common heritage” on civil law, see the writings of 
Zimmermann; and most recently, R. Zimmermann, ‘Derecho Romano y Cultura Europea’ (2010) 18 Revista de 
Derecho Privado 5. 
284 The circularity to which Hesselink alludes where he noted that European law might operate to “‘thicken[…]’ 
the moral dimension of European identity”; M.W. Hesselink, ‘The Case for a Common European Sales Law in 
an Age of Rising Nationalism’, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No 2012-
01 (<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1998174##>; Last Accessed: 14.12.2012). 
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Chapter 2. Absorbing the Legal, Political, Cultural and Socio-economic Dimensions 
of the Europeanisation of Private Law 
 
Building on the outline of the legislative process, and the reach of European legislation, this 
chapter explores the harmonisation effort from the perspective of unitas in diversitate and 
aims to uncover the relevant dimensions of this “motto”.  Thereafter, the focus shifts to the 
consideration of the need for a European (legal) culture, which engages also the construction 
of a European identity, as a precondition to the Europeanisation of private law285.  The scope 
for the emergence of private law within a multi-level, pluralist space is then analysed, and the 
recognition of potentially shifting conceptualisations of private law are explored.  In this 
context, the hazards – in theory and practice – of methodological nationalism in the 
Europeanisation of private law discourse, are uncovered.  
 
I. Via Unitas in Diversitate to a Europeanised (Legal) Culture 
 
i. The Harmonisation of Private Law and Unitas in Diversitate: Revisiting Culture 
and Identity in Europeanisation  
 
This section aims to uncover the relevant dimensions of the notion of unitas in diversitate, 
pertinent to integration in general and the Europeanisation of private law in particular, with 
reference to the discourse explored above on the reciprocal influences of culture, state-
building and legal development.  Indeed, the significance of commonality and diversity 
permeates the development of national and European legal culture, reflected in the notion of 
unitas in diversitate286, which provides the basis for the respect, protection and maintenance 
of the traditions, customs, cultures and languages of Member States.  Building on the outline 
in the introduction, two dimensions of culture can be identified in the Treaties, in its 
substantive form, and with regard to the foundations of respect for the diversities of the 
cultures of the Member States in legal development (broadly encompassing norm formation, 
interpretation, application and enforcement).  While Treaty structure provides for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Thus, as noted, in respect of enlargement, the acceptance of European identity is one of the fundamental 
requirements of EU membership application. 
286 The catchphrase of the ill-fated European constitution, Art.I-8, Draft European Constitutional Treaty, OJ C 
310/1, 16.12.2004.  See further, J. Hendry, ‘“Unity in Diversity”: Questions of (Legal) Culture in the European 
Union’ (2008) 3 Journal of Comparative Law 289.  Joerges has argued that the notion of unitas in diversitate 
can be maintained by virtue of engagement with the notion of understanding European private law as a type of 
conflicts law:  C. Joerges, ‘Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts Law as Europe’s 
Constitutional Form’ (2010) LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Series, LEQS, 2010/28, p.1. 
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construction of a European cultural policy287, the focus herein falls on the latter.  The Treaties 
also aim to promote the protection of the Member States’ cultures via the notion of unitas in 
diversitate.  The focus therefore extends to the protection of diversities shaping the legal, 
economic, political and social dynamics of European integration.  The Preamble to the TEU 
provides that the Treaties have the aim, “drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the 
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy equality and the 
rule of law”…“to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, 
their culture and their traditions”.  These provisions seem to provide not only the foundations 
for the respect for these diversities on the part of the Union institutions, including the 
legislature and the CJEU but also for more overtly positive action on the part of the same 
institutions.  In particular, Art.3 TEU requires the institutions facilitate the “promotion of 
peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”, the construction of an internal market and 
the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, the promotion of social justice 
and protection, solidarity and “economic, social and territorial cohesion”, within the context 
of the respect of cultural and linguistic diversity, “ensur[ing] that Europe’s cultural heritage is 
safeguarded and enhanced”.  Thus, there is recognition not only of the cultural but also of the 
economic, in terms of the construction of the internal market and the promotion of social 
cohesion, the political, with reference to the promotion of peace and territorial cohesion, the 
social, in respect of the promotion of social justice, and protection, solidarity, and social 
cohesion and the legal, with reference to the area of freedom, security and justice.  
Furthermore, Art.67(1) TFEU provides that “[t]he Union shall constitute an area of freedom, 
security and justice, with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and 
traditions of the Member States”.  The individuality/commonality “balance” became 
identifiable in (then) Art.6 TEU; while Art.6(3) explicitly stated that “the Union shall respect 
the national identities of its Member States”, Art.6(1) provided that “the Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”.  The national identities of 
Member States are recognised as being worthy of protection under Art.167 TFEU, which 
following Art.151 EC, obliges the EU to “contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 R. Crauford-Smith, ‘Cultural Policy’ in P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca, (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 
Oxford; 2nd edn., 2011), pp.869-894.  Notwithstanding the absence (until the early 1990s) of a European cultural 
policy, alongside the broad division of competences between the EU and Member States, it has become a matter 
of increasing significance at both the EU and national levels.  The Maastricht Treaty (Art.151(1) EC) initially 
introduced the notion of a European cultural policy into the Treaty structure.   
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Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time 
bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”. 
 
It is submitted that the two dimensions overlap in the following way: reference is made to the 
protection of the diverse, predominantly national cultures in the communications of the Union 
institutions while at the same time, that which is common has been advanced via the 
promotion of the “common heritage” of the Member States288.  Clearly, these considerations 
are not limited to the notion of the development of a cultural policy (the competence of which 
is established in Art.6 TEU) but extend across processes of integration, and therefore the 
formation, interpretation and application of EU law; this is clear from Art.167(4) and (5)289.  
Following the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty structure continues to promotion 
the respect and maintenance of diversity between Member States.  This suggests that the 
European project should not be conceived as promoting commonality, neither via the 
development of a European cultural policy nor via a uniform body of norms, at the expense of 
all other virtues of the European order.  This, according to Hendry, reflects the unitas in 
diversitate paradox290.  The divergent attitudes towards the manner in which these two 
dimensions should be engaged reflect the different ideological underpinnings framing 
European integration and the Europeanisation of law, one promoting a discretion on the part 
of the Member States allowing for the preservation of the diversities existing between legal 
cultures and tradition, and the other removing all discretion via the harmonisation of uniform 
norms and thus, much of the scope for the preservation of diversities.  One reflection of this is 
identifiable in the reach of harmonisation – whether minimum, or maximum, or targeted 
maximum – explicated above.   
 
Building on the discussion above, the following paragraphs attempt to concretise the 
discourse with reference to an example, namely, the evolution of one key concept of 
European private law: the consumer.  Fundamentally, the European concept of the consumer 
introduced in Union legislation, and putatively clarified in the CRD, allows for the 
minimum/maximum harmonisation discourse to be linked with the principle of unitas in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Declaration on European Identity, 1973 (12 Bull. EC 118).  
289 Art.167(4) and (5) TEU, which provide “4.  The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its 
cultures…and “5. …to contribute…the Council.. shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States”. 
290 See Hendry, ‘”Unity in Diversity”’ (n.286) and J. Hendry, Unitas in Diversitate? On Legal Cultures and the 
Europeanisation of Law, PhD Thesis (EUI, Florence; 2009), p.18. 
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diversitate.  Moreover, it engages the scope for the emergence of a European culture; the 
exploration of the concept of consumer also brings to the fore membership of identity and 
group (or rather, a multiplicity of groups) as it exists within the nation state and beyond.  The 
notion of consumer emerged initially within the context of the state; consequently, it 
encompassed determinations of local preference, and came to reflect a national 
conceptualisation deriving from “consumer culture” and general culture.  This embeddedness 
suggests that an attempt to transfer the concept beyond the national context to, for example, 
the Union level, necessarily brings cultural diversities to the fore. 
 
The nature of contract and the appreciation of the role of law, related more generally to the 
liberal conception of the nation state and the market, dictated a rather delayed explicit 
recognition that particular contracting parties required specific protection.  Where previously 
there existed little scope for the characterisation of a particular individual as a “consumer”, 
the shift in paradigm from status to contract291 further ensured that in light of contract law 
development, there emerged little scope for consideration of divergent standards of protection 
for different contracting parties.  The strict adherence to the ideal of contractual equality, 
enshrined in the formal understanding (contrasted against the later materialisation292) of 
contract law, rejected the notion that contracting parties be identified as belonging to certain 
groups requiring different levels of protection.  Inherent in this understanding, reflected in 
freedom of contract, is the conceptualisation of a technical, apolitical private law, understood 
to have little or no social function.  With the materialisation of contract, mechanisms for the 
protection of contracting parties evolved in national legal orders; a nationally-embedded 
concept of consumer existing alongside “notions of national citizenship”, emerged within 
divergent national markets, “whereby national regulation and law would dictate the mode of 
national production, the extent and character of goods and services on offer within that 
market, as well as the terms and conditions under which such goods and services might or 
might not be purchased”293.  Consequently, divergent conceptions of the consumer and 
consumer culture more broadly, became identifiable across national cultures and traditions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 H.S. Maine, ‘From Status to Contract’ in Ancient Law (Murray, London; 1861). 
292 Trends of materialisation of law were discussed in Weber’s analysis of legal systems M. Weber, Economic 
and Sociology, Vol.II (G. Roth and C. Wittig edn.) (Berkeley Press, Berkeley; 1969); notwithstanding, the 
development of the discourse, between the formalists, promoting the maintenance of the autonomy of law, in 
respect of political and social concerns, and those promoting an understanding of law, incorporating concerns as 
to social justice arising in modern society, really came to the fore with critical legal scholarship. 
293 M. Everson, ‘Legal Constructions of the Consumer’ in F. Trentmann (ed.), The Making of the Consumer: 
Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World (Berg, Oxford; 2006), pp.99-121, p.107. 
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Furthermore, it has been asserted that “…the consumer role model of a particular legal system 
can be seen as a mirror of this society’s vision of its market and social system”294.  Not only 
might the consumer be formally conceptualised differently across national legal systems, but 
cultural divergences are also reflected in the way in which consumers tend to respond to the 
information with which they are provided295.  Empirical research supports such an assertion 
and indicates that “national cultural variation”296 may have an impact on consumer culture 
generally, and on the manner in which consumers behave; these divergences might relate, for 
example, to the approach of consumers to certain communications, to their ability to trust and 
their exercise of rationality in their decision-making processes297.  From this perspective, two 
primary views on the relationship between law and society can be identified.  The first, 
elaborating on the scholarship from Durkheim to Luhmann298, posits that law plays a key role 
in devising a solution to the problems associated with complexity in society.  Law provides a 
particular framework, established at the level of society, on the basis of which people can 
determine their own behaviour299.  Society is deemed to be “without centre or apex”300 while  
the position that the state has come to hold in society is “historically embedded and 
contingent”.  When the ties between law and the state are so understood, law can be 
conceived as reflection of the changing nature of society301.  The second understanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 B. Lurger, ‘Old and New Insights for the Protection of Consumers in European Private Law in the Wake of 
the Global Economic Crisis’ in R. Brownsword et al (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart, 
Oxford; 2011), pp.89-113, p.106. 
295 In the case law of the CJEU, it is provided that the consumer is defined with reference to the “social, cultural 
and linguistic factors” which are relevant.  Wilhelmsson has made an argument for greater consideration of the 
cultural dimension:  T. Wilhelmsson, ‘The European Average Consumer – a Legal Fiction?’ in T. Wilhelmsson 
et al (eds.), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, The Hague; 2007), pp.243-268. 
296 Often in cross-cultural analysis, Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture are employed:  a) power distance 
(the manner in which inequality is dealt with); b) uncertainty avoidance (how uncertainty is dealt with); c) 
individualism and collectivism (the individual/collective relationship); d) masculinity and femininity and e) 
long-term versus short-term orientation: G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, 
Institutions and Organizations Across Nations (Sage Publications, London; 2nd edn., 2001).  It has also been 
recognised that this framework for analysis might be useful in the European context:  M. de Mooij, Consumer 
Behaviour and Culture:  Consequences for Global Marketing and Advertising (Sage Publications, London; 
2004), p.36. 
297 T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Harmonizing Unfair Commercial Practices Law:  The Cultural and Social Dimensions’ 
(2006) 44 Os.Hall.L.J. 461.  Wilhelmsson also makes reference to M. Solomon, G. Bamossy and S. Askegaard 
(eds.), Consumer Behaviour, A European Perspective (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle Hall; 1999), noting also the 
global perspective. 
298 That is, in terms of the concept of functional differentiation: the demand for law from the social, Durkheim, 
The Division of Labor in Society (n.66); “What is, then, the practical cause of the genesis of law? It is, replies the 
author, the need to guarantee the conditions of existence of society”: É Durkheim, ‘La science positive de la 
morale en Allemagne’, (1887) 24 Extrait de la Revue philosophique, pp.33-142; 275-284 (English translation, 
‘Jurists?’ (1986) 15 Economy and Society 346, pp.348-349); N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 
(Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin; 1997). 
299 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge, London; 1985), p.105. 
300 N. Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State (J. Bednarz Jr. trans.) (de Gruyter, Berlin; 1990). 
301 P. Zumbansen, 'Transnational Comparative Theory and Practice', Osgoode Hall Working Paper 1-2012, p.12. 
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reflects a certain cynicism with regard to the role of law, advancing the notion that it operates 
in the background of society, without necessarily playing a prominent role in the way in 
which people organise and live their lives302. 
 
Difficulties might arise for the Member States in the delineation of the scope of the CRD, and 
furthermore, with regard to the changes required in national law to ensure satisfactory 
implementation and compliance with Union norms303.  At the European level, the focus on the 
removal of national barriers to trade and the promotion of the internal market sets a high 
threshold for national provisions, which at once constitute barriers to trade and promote the 
protection of consumer interests.  Two considerations arise, concerning the reach of European 
legislation and the level of protection afforded to consumers in a multi-level construct, shaped 
by the values discussion underlying the market and the social.  On the one hand, one might 
consider that the level of consumer protection and the rationale underpinning, might diverge 
across the Member States, shaped by social and justice considerations therein; on the other 
hand, the emergence of the consumer group and consumer culture existing beyond the state 
underpins the idea of a European consumer.  The very existence of divergent standards of 
protection across the Member States begs the question of whether a European understanding 
of consumer is even identifiable 304.  Wilhelmsson rather considers that the divergent 
understandings of consumer culture permeating the national orders requires not only 
recognition of different standards of protection but also a broader and more transparent 
appreciation of the significance of national “social, cultural or linguistic factors”305 at the 
European level.  As the textual construction of the legislative provision of consumer must be 
read in light of the interpretations rendered by the CJEU306, its interpretative approach is 
significant.  It seems that the AGs will more readily engage the existence of linguistic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 In the context of business contract relations, see S. Macauley, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business’ (1963) 
28 Am.Soc.Rev. 55. 
303 DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, ‘The Potential 
Impact of the Consumer Rights Directive on Member States’ Contract Law’ (n.253), p.14. 
304 Wilhelmsson questions to what extent it is appropriate that these notions be “Europeanised”: Wilhelmsson, 
‘The European Average Consumer – a Legal Fiction?’ in Wilhelmsson et al, Private Law and the Many Cultures 
of Europe (n.295), p.245, and whether, in reality, it might be the case that such differences exist between 
national notions of (average) consumer that it is useless to make reference to a European notion. 
305 T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Introduction:  Harmonization and National Cultures’ in T. Wilhelmsson, E. Paunio and A. 
Pohjolainen (eds.), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, The Hague; 2007), pp.3-20, pp.15-
16.  The “social, cultural or linguistic factors” as highlighted in C-220/98 Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co 
OHG v Lancaster Group GmbH [2000] ECR I-117, para.29. 
306 S.2(1), as “any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are 
outside his trade, business, craft or profession”, CRD. 
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cultural and social diversities in the development of a European notion of consumer307.  This 
might suggest that in rendering interpretations of such concepts, the Court is more reluctant 
than the AG to make reference to the building blocks from which divergent national cultures 
traditions have been constructed, and which underpin concepts which might be transferred 
beyond the nation state.  However, this understanding is too simple; indeed, implicit 
references to the relevance of “social, cultural or linguistic factors” in the interpretation of the 
consumer acquis can be identified in the Court’s judgements308.  The scope for taking cultural 
diversities into account in developing the understanding of the European consumer must be 
acknowledged as being shaped by the broader context of the intended reach of European 
legislation.  Minimum harmonisation allows Member States to extend the concept of 
consumer beyond that provided in the directive; essentially, this allows for different levels of 
consumer protection (above a minimum).  The maximum harmonisation approach, strictly 
understood, removes the latitude permitting the Member States to establish or maintain a 
more stringent level of protection.  Thus, the maximum harmonisation approach itself 
undermines the scope for the consideration of relevant national divergences within the CJEU.  
Notwithstanding, even where European legislation provides for maximum harmonisation, the 
CJEU has held that “a margin for manoeuvre” exists which “authorises [Member States] to 
maintain or introduce particular rules for specific situations”309. 
 
With regard to the CRD, which provides for “targeted full harmonisation”310, there is a lack of 
clarity as to whether the CJEU’s interpretation should provide for a common, Europeanised311 
notion of consumer at the expense of the social, cultural and linguistic considerations of 
national legal orders.  While the CJEU has arguably fostered divergence in the national 
systems by allowing for interpretations of “consumer” dependent on the context of the 
particular case heard before the national court312, it is likely that, as with maximum 
harmonisation in general, the CJEU will have to provide for a Europeanised understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Clinique Laboratoires and Estée Lauder Cosmetics [1994] ECR 
I-317, Opinion of AG Gulmann, para.18. 
308 Estée Lauder Cosmetics (n.305), Judgement, para.29: “…in particular, it must be determined whether social, 
cultural or linguistic factors may justify the term `lifting', used in connection with a firming cream, meaning 
something different to the German consumer as opposed to consumers in other Member States…”.  As noted 
above, reference is made to the notion in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, at Recital 18. 
309 C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971, Judgement, para.98. 
310 Per Art.4 CRD. 
311 Wilhelmsson, ‘The European Average Consumer – a Legal Fiction?’ in Wilhelmsson et al, Private Law and 
the Many Cultures of Europe (n.295). 
312 V. Mak, ‘Standards of Protection:  In Search of the “Average Consumer” of EU Law in the Proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive’ (2011) 19 ERPL 25, p.29. 
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consumer, applicable across the Member States.  Furthermore, the CJEU’s scope for engaging 
in comparative, “cross-directive” reasoning313 in which it has aimed to achieve coherence 
between the various consumer directives, would dictate that this Europeanised approach is 
soon extended across the Union acquis.  This would seem to be the case against the 
background of the broader balancing exercise of consumer protection and market facilitation 
undertaken within the jurisdiction of the CJEU and the national courts314.  It has been said that 
the CRD “unlike the CFR and all other national private-law instruments…deviate[s] from the 
classic ethical concept of private law, which pursues justice between parties in the individual 
case (normally communicative, sometimes also distributive justice) as the highest objective.  
Instead, the CRD sacrifices justice between the parties in favour of providing European 
businesses with a basic, but uniform, regulatory framework for market transactions with 
consumers”315.  Thus, as noted above, the issue is a constitutional one; as Schmid understands 
it, the instrumentalisation of private law316 dictates that the significance attributed to social 
justice and the “the immaterial interests of consumers” (deriving from the national 
traditions)317, on the one hand, and the promotion of the internal market, on the other, will 
never be equal, as preference is necessarily attributed to the facilitation of the internal market 
as the effet utile of European law via the EU legislature and the CJEU’s “one-sided 
teleological” approach318.  As such, while it might be expected that consumer protection 
might be understood as an “overarching interpretative meta-principle”319, Schmid rejects the 
notion that the CJEU “pursue[s] a coherent consumer model”.  The interpretation of consumer 
in the CRD will therefore be key320; as noted, it is not clear whether a restrictive interpretation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 V. Mak, 'Harmonisation through ‘Directive-Related’ and ‘ Cross-Directive’ Interpretation- the Role of the 
ECJ in the Development of European Consumer Law' Tilburg.WP 2008/08, pp.19 et seq. 
314 This is explored in greater detail in the case example below, especially in respect of the conflict between 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
315 C. Joerges and C. Schmid, ‘Towards Proceduralization of Private Law in the European Multi-Level System’ 
in A. Hartkamp et al (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code (Kluwer, The Hague; 4th edn., 2011), pp.277-309, 
p.280. 
316 Schmid, ‘The Thesis of the Instrumentalisation of Private Law by the EU in a Nutshell’ in Joerges and Ralli, 
European Constitutionalism Without Private Law (n.257), pp.26-27. 
317 Lurger, ‘Old and New Insights for the Protection of Consumers’ in Brownsword et al, The Foundations of 
European Private Law (n.294), p.107. 
318 C. Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court- A Methodological Comparison’, (2006) 4 
ZERP Diskussionspapier, pp.11-12. 
319 Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court’ (n.318), p.22. 
320 It is submitted that a connection can be drawn between this consideration and Unberath and Johnston’s 
analysis of the CJEU’s “double-headed” approach: while in cases of negative harmonisation the Court has 
elucidated its reluctance to allow for national provisions based on standards of consumer protection (which 
might also constitute a restriction to free movement, and ultimately, free trade), in relation to positive European 
harmonisation, the CJEU has sought to ensure a wide application:  H. Unberath and A. Johnston, ‘The Double-
Headed Approach of the ECJ Concerning Consumer Protection’ (2007) 44 CMLR 1237, pp.1281-1282. 
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will dictate that the national conceptualisations necessarily fall foul of the European notion321.  
Notwithstanding, even the recognition of the promise of a European concept of consumer 
need not exclude all reference to consumer culture as it continues to exist within the state (or 
beyond, outwith even the European space); such a pluralist perspective rather suggests that 
national conceptualisations of consumer might shape (that is, as opposed to be merely 
transferred to the European level) consumer culture, as it emerges beyond the nation and even 
beyond Europe.  Furthermore, neither the national nor the European consumer constitutes a 
mere legal concept but also a dimension of identity deriving from culture and tradition, in the 
context of cross-border consumerism. 
 
This section has provided an outline of unitas in diversitate and has attempted to concretise 
this discourse with reference to the emergence and conceptualisation of the consumer, key to 
the Europeanisation of private law.  The notion of unitas in diversitate engages the 
institutionalisation of the protection of diversities existing within Member States in the 
context of the construction of a uniform body of Union norms via harmonisation.  With 
regard to Europeanisation, it should allow for consideration of the reciprocal influences of 
culture and tradition, the evolution of the nation state, and the legal development occurring 
within and beyond these territorial boundaries; this can be engaged via comparative analysis, 
as will be explored below.  Moreover, the reference to the evolution of the concept of the 
consumer allows for the engagement of a broader culture within which the development of an 
identity and membership of a group (or rather, a multiplicity of identifications) can be 
uncovered.  Against this background, the following section explores the need for the 
emergence of a European (legal) culture as a precondition to integration and Europeanisation. 
 
ii. Questioning the Need for a European (Legal) Culture as a Prerequisite to the 
Europeanisation of Law 
 
While this discussion of culture, tradition, and therein identity, might seem to be beyond the 
scope of the research, it is submitted that it is vital, in terms of the perspective adopted, the 
methodology and the substantive focus of the thesis.  As noted above, the rationales, 
manifestations and contexts of Union legislative activities have shifted, reflected in the 
policies of the Commission, both in terms of the declining focus on codification, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Mak sets out the difficulties that might be faced in national system should any attempt to lower consumer 
protection become necessary: Mak, ‘Standards of Protection’ (n.312), pp.37-38. 
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reach of harmonisation.  Private law development has been inherently tied to that of the state, 
and thus, to the cultures and traditions that have evolved within the context of the nation (in 
respect of which, as discussed, the notions of “self” and “other” have been of vital 
significance).  As considered above, the significance of these cultures and traditions and the 
respect of the commonality and diversity thereof, are reflected in the acceptance of the 
plurality of the European space.  On the one hand, the manifestations of diversity are deemed 
worthy of protection, and on the other, are deemed to undermine, principally, the functioning 
of the market; in legal terms, harmonisation aims to eliminate – to differing degrees, 
depending on its reach – these diversities.  The recognition and acceptance of pluralism is 
reflected, and its significance amplified, by the absence of an explicit European (legal) 
culture.  This section aims to uncover whether a single (and necessarily common) European 
(legal) culture – one which purports to facilitate the unification of private law – should 
constitute a precondition to European legal development, or whether the pluralist perspective 
(which might putatively encompass a common or shared culture at the European level) is not 
more favourable in light of the context of Europeanisation and the dynamic evolution of 
private law.   
 
While the significance of actual divergences is often negated, the need for the “bridging” of 
gaps between national legal cultures322 and traditions has long been a lingering concern in 
private law scholarship323.  This bridging is arguably facilitated by the contemporary 
emergence of a type of European (or transnational) culture; two possibilities have been 
advanced.  On the one hand, reference is made to the need for a single European culture 
(deriving from the commonality that seemingly subsists from the ius commune and providing 
the foundations for the unification of private law) as a prerequisite of European legal 
development.  On the other, it is considered that the existence of a plurality of legal cultures 
within and beyond the European sphere324 (and the scope for maintenance of the diversity to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 For the purposes of this thesis, legal culture is understood to constitute a localised understanding of culture: 
thus, the connection of legal culture with a particular community can be used in order to forge an understanding 
of collective identity; R. Michaels, ‘Legal Culture’ in J. Basedow et al (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
European Private Law (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.1059-1063, p.1060. 
323 R. Zimmermann, ‘The Present State of European Private Law’ (2009) 57 AJCL 479.  More recently, see the 
speech of Commission Reding at the Opening of the European Law Institute: V. Reding, ‘The European Law 
Institute: Tracing the Path Towards a European Legal Culture’, Speech 11/764; Vienna, 17.11.2011. 
324 For example, there is an interesting body of literature on the diversity of legal cultures in relation to the 
development of international law, and particularly, international criminal law.  Indeed, the clash of legal cultures 
was something, which, while of course not at the forefront of the proceedings at Nuremberg, was particularly 
relevant.  See ‘The “Flick” Case’, Nazi War Crime Trials: Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Green Series, 
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which this perspective gives rise) should be recognised as forming part of any emerging 
European culture.  For the purposes of this thesis, legal culture is engaged as an alternative 
point of reference, at once distinct from and inherently related to the rationale[s] underlying 
the European integration project325.  Thus, as Micklitz has asserted, “[t]he point is rather 
[instead of highlighting the idea that the EU is the product of law, governed through law] to 
redefine the role of European law, in light of economisation and politicisation, thereby taking 
into consideration different legal and cultural traditions”326.   
 
The emergence of the European construct is conceived not as a single process but rather as a 
number of reflexive processes shaped by determinations of, amongst others, “identity, power, 
will, order, and becoming”327.  The difficulties in coherently defining and conceptualising 
culture and tradition, and furthermore, identity and community, have been explored in the 
introduction and Part I328.  With the creation of a community of European states, the idea of a 
“whole” European identity, either conflicting with or existing alongside a plurality of – not 
necessarily national or territorial329 – identities, has emerged but has been difficult to 
conceive, initially and also following enlargement.  Indeed, the EU itself has been described 
as an “unimagined community”, a reflection of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, 
the result of an “inadequately imagined…half revolution”330.  Allott has argued for the 
“public mind of Europe, of a collective consciousness which can process the concepts, the 
ideals, the values, the purposes, the policies, the priorities, the hopes and fears of the people 
and peoples of Europe”331.  On the one hand, the European identity, existing within that 
community, is formed from the multiplicity of identities existing within the Member States, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Vol.VI, p.119 and ‘The “Justice” Case’, Nazi War Crime Trials: Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Green 
Series, Vol.III, p.108. 
325 On the notion of “integration through law” generally, see Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler, Integration 
Through Law (n.101). 
326 H.W. Micklitz, 'The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law', EUI WP 2008/14, p.15. 
327 P. Allott, 'The Concept of European Union' (1999) 2 Cam.YB.Eur.Leg.Stud. 31, p.49. 
328 For this purpose, the thesis has looked to the emergence of the European from its post-War foundations, and 
attempted to integrate this analysis in the specific context of private law, with reference to the development of 
the latter in the nation states.  There is a body of literature – summarised in R. Swedberg, ‘The Idea of ‘Europe’ 
and the Origin of the European Union – A Sociological Approach’ (1994) 23 Zeitschrift für Soziologie 378 – 
which looks to the notion of the “European idea”, with its origins in “a very much more distant past – often 
stretching as far back as the Middle Ages or even to Antiquity”, p.378.  Analogies can be drawn in this respect 
with the notion of the development of a common legal culture from the lex mercatoria, see Zimmermann, 
‘Derecho Romano y Cultura Europea’ (n.283). 
329 At least within Europe, where both the jurisdiction of Europe, and the EU exist. 
330 Allott, 'The Concept of European Union' (n.327), pp.31-32, citing B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, London; 1991). p.224. 
331 P. Allott, ‘The Crisis of European Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Revolution in Europe’ (1997) 34 
CMLR 439, p.489. 
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each of which is understood as “self” and “other” within the European space.  However, the 
European identity also constitutes a “self”, in itself332; thus, not only has the European 
identity been shaped by the “other” from within (that is, the diversities existing between the 
Member States) but also, in the context of globalisation, it increasingly interacts with the 
external “other”.  Consequently, where European identity is set against the external “other”, it 
might potentially follow the pattern within the nation state: with “nationality as referent for 
interpersonal relations and the human alienating effect of us and them are brought back again, 
simply transferred from their previous intra-Community context to a new inter-Community 
one”333.  If, as considered above, it is the existence of a shared culture in the nation state 
context that founds the construction of national identity, these cultures must be understood to 
belong to modernity, suggesting that – despite apparent divergences – national legal cultures 
nevertheless share similar features.  Clearly, neither culture nor identity is tied solely to the 
nation; that is to say, the recognition of the existence of a plurality of cultures (and identities) 
within one territorial space removes the precondition of a specific connection between culture 
(or identity) and state334, bringing to the fore the scope for European and transnational 
understandings.  Thus, if ever a European identity or culture could be said to exist, it is 
unlikely that it would entirely replace affiliation with national identity; individual, group and 
community identity must be distinguished, allowing individuals (or the “European man” to 
which Collins refers335) to establish and maintain close ties to a number of different 
communities and thus adopt the identity of divergent social constructions.  Moreover, like 
identities in general, identities within the European context could be conceived as multiple 
and plural, depending on perception336; any European identity would therefore form part of 
the notion of a shared European culture, existing alongside the national.  This understanding 
brings to the fore the question of how this multiplicity of identities and belonging to 
communities might be organised within the European context also comes to the fore.  Indeed, 
while Sen engages the notion of membership in his work on identity and the scope for 
plurality thereof, he highlights the need to provide for a hierarchical organisation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Allott, 'The Concept of European Union' (n.327), p.32. 
333 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the 
New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ And Other Essays on European Integration (CUP, Cambridge; 1999), pp.10-
101, p.95. 
334 Friedman, The Republic of Choice (n.42), pp.3-4. 
335 H. Collins, 'European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States' (1995) 3 ERPL 353, p.357. 
336 It has been asserted that culture is formed on the basis of what is perceived – “the identity…of any culture is 
thus aspectival rather than essential”, such that identity, therefrom deriving can be plural: J. Tully, Strange 
Multiplicity – Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (CUP, Cambridge; 1995), p.10.  
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divergent conceptions of identity in respect of those of one particular individual337.  In the 
European context, Bañkowski has rejected reference to a vertical, “Russian Doll-type” 
interaction of identities, whereby each would exist within the other; rather, he supports the 
notion of a dynamic, “horizontal interlocking” where the “larger” does not necessarily 
subsume the smaller338.  This supports the understanding of the European space as multi-level 
in its nature339, and refutes the need for a single common identity, or more broadly, culture. 
 
As discussed above, the state has reflected the core of national private law; while the 
nineteenth century development of private law within particular nation states might be 
considered to have been abstracted from society and its culture, with reference to scope for 
apolitical, universalist principles (facilitating the dominance of the autonomous private law 
system), this abstractedness has fallen away from the development of private law in recent 
years.  Private law norms have come to represent “local society”, shaping behaviour and 
shaped itself by the social, moral, political as well as economic values underlying340; in 
particular, reference can be made to the potentially diverse understandings of social justice, 
which necessarily influence national as well as European private law341.  As Collins has 
asserted, private law as “the constitution of civil society…often displays the bright colours 
and markings of a national flag: an affirmation of national identity, solidarity, and civility”342.  
This “local society” might therefore reflect the national context, a more local context within 
the national, or exist beyond the state; to the extent that individuals connect their identity to 
these moral bases, a focus on uniformity or commonality – whether of norms or cultures – 
might potentially undermine these foundations and consequently, the means by which 
individuals construct one dimension of their identity.  The difficulty with facilitating the 
potential replacement of this locality with a single European one is that it might potentially 
negate the diversity of values underlying; this difficulty, particularly in light of the dominance 
of European market-orientated values, is reflected in the assertion of Sefton-Green, who 
endeavours to highlight that private law cannot only be concerned with economic matters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 A. Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (W.W. Norton & Co., NY; 2006), pp.18 et seq. 
338 Z. Bañkowski, ‘The Journey of the European Ideal’ in A. Morton and J. Francis (eds.), A Europe of 
Neighbours?  Religious Social Thought and the Reshaping of a Pluralist Europe (The University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh; 1999), pp.149-172, p.167. 
339 Collins, 'European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States' (n. 335), pp.358-359; for example, it is not 
clear that what is for Europe (predominantly, the market) can necessarily be disentangled from what is for the 
local - it cannot be said that the market is for the European while the social is for the local, nor can it be said that 
culture can be concerned only with the non-economic; this is too simplistic. 
340 N. Fraser, Qu’est-ce que la justice sociale? (E. Ferrarese trans.) (La Découverte, Paris; 2005). 
341 Study Group, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: a Manifesto’ (2004) 10 ELJ 653. 
342 H. Collins, 'Cosmopolitanism and Transnational Private Law' (2012) 8 ERCL 311, p.312. 
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(namely, the facilitation of the internal market) but must also engage social and moral 
considerations, as “both a vehicle for our values and a means of implementing economic 
arrangements”343. 
 
It is worth considering how culture has been conceived and structured within and beyond the 
state.  Tuori advances a three-level analysis of legal culture: the surface level (legislation and 
case law), the middle level (methodology and techniques of adjudication) and the deep 
structure (fundamental normative principles of law) of legal culture, at which Vorverständnis 
exists 344 .  He argues that “epistemic communities”, reflected in “transnational” legal 
communities, are identifiable at the “micro level”; thus, for example, reference can be made 
to epistemic communities and “third” legal cultures, including international trade345, civil 
society and the legal profession.  For Tuori, EU legislation and case law reflects European 
legal culture existing at the surface and perhaps the middle level346, having a “general 
role…in legal practices, of the functioning of legal concepts, principles and theories as a filter 
through which surface-level legal material is cognized and interpreted”347.  Arguably, legal 
culture is facilitated primarily through such institutional interaction and the professional elite 
of legal practice348, that is, through cooperative networks of legal scholars and legal 
professionals, including those of lawyers and judges.  These interactions – the sharing of 
knowledge and experiences349 - are necessarily influenced by the legal cultural backgrounds 
of the relevant actors operating in the relevant fora, whether at the national or European level, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 R. Sefton-Green, ‘Social Justice and European Identity in European Contract Law' (2006) ERCL 275, p.285. 
344 K. Tuori, ‘EC Law:  An Independent Legal Order or a Post-Modern Jack-in-the-Box?’ in L.D. Eriksson and 
S. Hurri (eds.), Dialectic of Law and Reality:  Readings in Finnish Legal Theory (Helsinki Faculty of Law, 
Helsinki; 1999), pp.359-415. 
345 F. Snyder, ‘Governing Economic Globalisation – Global Legal Pluralism and European Law’ (1999) 5 ELJ 
334. 
346 For an elaboration of this view, see T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Private Law in the EU:  Harmonised or Fragmentised 
Europeanisation?’ (2002) 10 ERPL 77. 
347 K. Tuori, ‘Towards a Theory of Transnational Law:  A Very First Draft’ (2010) (on file with the author), 
p.23. 
348 Wilhelmsson, ‘Introduction’ in Wilhelmsson et al, Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (n.305), 
pp.6-7.  See especially, K. Tuori, ‘Legal Culture and General Societal Culture’ in T. Wilhelmsson et al (eds.), 
Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, The Hague; 2007), pp.23-35, p.26, on the basis of the 
notion of law as Volksrecht developed by Savigny; F.K. Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts I 
(Neudruck der Ausgabe, 1840; Scientia Verlag, 1981); Tuori asserts that the “fast-moving” nature of legal 
practice generates a gap between legal culture and general societal culture. 
349 This development and exchange of knowledge and information is vital; reference is made by Commissioner 
Reding (below) to the flagship initiative of the “innovation union” under Europe 2020, which looks to establish 
“knowledge alliances”; European Commission, ‘Communication, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, 
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’ COM(2010) 2020 final, 03.03.2010, pp.12-13 for a summary. 
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including the CJEU, the ECtHR, the national courts, scholars, private individuals and civil 
society bodies - 350.   
 
In respect of the substantive development of Union law, Kennedy, for example, has 
highlighted the significance of the identity and rights discourses across almost the entire 
breadth of law351.  It has long been recognised that the people of Europe are “interested 
parties” in the construction of an EU legal order; in Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU highlights 
that the “Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between 
the Contracting States…confirmed by the Preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to 
governments but to peoples... the nationals of the States brought together in the Community 
are called upon to”352.  Individuals enjoy rights as European citizens, expressly through the 
Treaty and via the obligations imposed on individuals, Member States and EU institutions353.  
On this basis, individuals might organise themselves (or be organised), from which an identity 
is derived or provided.  This is particularly clear in relation to contract; distinctions are made 
between workers354, consumers, and tenants, amongst others inherently connected to the 
(either local, national or transnational) community; in the consumer contract case example, it 
is the “identity” of the consumer which gives rise to the protection via the engagement of 
UCTD norms.  In the CJEU jurisprudence discussed below, the significance of the 
individual’s rights in the cross-border facilitation of the European market can be identified, on 
the one hand, within the nation state, and on the other, where the individual is freed from the 
ties binding him to his nationally-constructed identity355.  This notion of the “freeing” of the 
individual has also been highlighted by Patterson et al, in respect of the development of the 
“market state” which “allows us also to cope with European pluralism as a main feature of 
EU law: As the ‘market-state’ is process-orientated…it is also in principle accessible to all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Further consideration is made of the socio-legal, cultural constitution of the CJEU in Chapter 4; however, this 
analytical dimension does not constitute the focus of the thesis.  Rather, reference can be made to T. Lundmark, 
Charting the Divide Between Common and Civil Law (OUP, Oxford; 2012), especially Chapter 4 et seq.   
351 D. Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000’ in D.M. Trubek and A. Santos 
(eds.), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP, Cambridge; 2006), pp.19-73, 
p.63. 
352 Van Gend en Loos (n.219), Judgement, para.12. 
353 Van Gend en Loos (n.219), Judgement, para.112. 
354 Case 75/63 Hoekstra [1964] ECR 177. 
355 Micklitz, in respect of Viking and Laval, ties this to Durkheim’s “cult of the individual”. H-W. Micklitz, 
‘Three Questions to the Opponents of the Viking and Laval Judgements’ Opinion Paper, Observatoire social 
européen 2012-08. (C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 and C-438/05 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779). 
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societies which has the consequence of disregarding the concept of the individual as state-
national”356.  
 
For Patterson et al, the “market state” culture therefore constitutes one significant reflection 
of culture deriving from European integration and the tension arising between European 
legislation and Member State sovereignty, reflected in the significance attached to “market-
state features in EU law” 357, the shift from welfare to market (as embodied in the GATT, and 
in notions of “embedded liberalism”), and the increasing interdependence of the markets and 
states, particularly in light of the Eurozone crisis.  The notion of European culture as “market 
culture” not only reflects the significance attached to transnationalism and that which exists, 
decentralised358 beyond the state, but also the significance of the diversity of the heritages of 
the nation states: “This ‘market state’ faces a diffuse, interdependent and intertwined larger 
market that cuts across boundaries and while formally sovereign to establish their welfare 
systems, those states are in practice required to coordinate entitlements and regulation with 
other market states”359.  The focus in this understanding of culture is not on identity as 
conceived above but rather on “whether they function to create and govern markets”, using 
“market-mechanisms to influence behaviour”360.  This conception clearly has links with the 
initial construction of the ECSC, namely the function of creating economic union and a “pro-
trade” culture361, the fundamental “commonality” shared by the relevant nation states being 
the development of the common market; it is now clear that other considerations 
encompassing the social, cultural, political and legal dimensions of integration should be 
engaged to reflect its whole.  
 
The significance of culture, tradition, identity and community are also identifiable in the case 
law of the national courts on Europeanisation of law and integration.  Culture is explicitly 
linked to identity in the Lisbon Treaty judgement of the German BVerfG362, in which it 
asserted that the national political determination as to economic, social and cultural standards 
within the Member States should be respected in the context of European integration, in those 
“areas which shape the citizens’ living conditions, in particular the private sphere of their own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), p.16. 
357 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), p.1. 
358 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), p.18. 
359 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), p.3. 
360 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), pp.2-3. 
361 As is clear also from the jurisprudence of the CJEU, including Dassonville (n.106). 
362 Also in the Maastricht decision: BVerfG 89, 155; 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92; 12.10.1993. 
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responsibility and of political and social security, protected by fundamental rights, as well as 
in respect of political decisions that rely especially on cultural, historical and linguistic 
perceptions”363.  The BVerfG highlights that “essential areas of formative action” encompass 
various cultural dimensions, including language, family and education, freedom of opinion, of 
the press, of association, and of religion.  It is the reference to the protection of the 
constitutional identities of the Member States per Art.4(2) TEU364 that engages national 
culture and identity, invoking Art.79(3) Grundgesetz, and delineating the potential reach of 
European integration365.  These discourses, on the plurality of cultures and identities existing 
in the European space, have been relevant to the supremacy and primacy discourses at the 
national level, shaping the responses and reactions of the national courts to the reach of 
integration366. 
 
This brief outline has aimed to emphasise that culture and its component parts are clearly 
pertinent to Europeanisation and integration, and take a breadth of forms, existing within and 
beyond the state at the European and transnational levels.  Notwithstanding, it is not evident 
that a single European culture necessarily constitutes a prerequisite to the Europeanisation of 
law.  Instead, the next section explores the conception of the Europeanisation of private law 
as a pluralist, multi-level construct, wherein it is suggested that the pluralism necessarily 
characterising the European space can be engaged not as a hurdle of legal development but as 
a key characteristic thereof.  A strict adherence to the identification of a single perspective is 
rejected in favour of recognition of the scope for pluralism, which is understood to 
“facilitate[…] analysis of both interdependence with other systems and the self-identity of a 
particular system”367. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 With reference to the notion of the “democratic formative action”, derived from the principle of democracy, 
encompassed in the rule of law principles, set out in Art.1 and 20 of the Basic Law, to be protected in line with 
the eternity clause in Art.79(3), even where constitutional changes are made, for example, in respect of 
Germany’s membership of the EU; BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.06.2009, para.249. 
364 BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.06.2009, paras.240-241. 
365 H-W. Micklitz, ‘German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfG) 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009 – 
Organstreit Proceedings Between Members of the German Parliament and the Federal Government’ (2011) 7 
ERCL 528. 
366 See recently, a particularly interesting article dealing with the cases discussed: A. von Bogdandy and S. 
Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CMLR 
1. 
367 M. Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in P. Cane and H.M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal 
Research (OUP, Oxford; 2010), pp.805-827, p.814. 
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II. The Europeanisation of Private Law in a Pluralist, Multi-Level Space: A Plea for 
An Evolving Paradigm of Legal Development 
 
This section aims to ascertain a normative and conceptual space within which it is submitted 
that private law might evolve.  Reference has been made above to the notion of multi-level 
structure; it derives from the recognition – initially within the social sciences368 – of the need 
for an appropriate framework in which governance, and policy coordination (where states 
cannot establish their own policy on sovereign state authority but engage in a coordinative 
effort), exists at different levels within a given space.  European private law can be 
understood as a multi-level system, which not only demands analysis beyond the national 
confines of its origins, but also therein, to the extent that it remains reliant on the “local” or 
national level for its application and enforcement369 as will be illustrated in greater detail 
below.  As problems tend to be conceptualised functionally, they consequently cut across 
different levels including national, European, international and transnational orders, within 
which different (legal) actors, including legislatures, courts, agencies, regulators, civil society 
bodies, scholars and private individuals, operate.   
 
i. The Engagement and Development of the Pluralist Perspective of 
Europeanisation 
 
The pluralist perspective is adopted at the outset, maintained and promoted throughout this 
thesis.  The adoption of the pluralist perspective and the understanding of pluralism both 
reflect a normative choice.  The intention here is to set out the basis of the pluralist 
perspective, both methodological and theoretical, in the context of private law.  Pluralism is a 
matter of structure and shapes the relevant regime; legal pluralism is broadly understood as 
the existence of more than one “law” within a territorially-defined space370 and dictates that 
authority is not centralised in a single authority but is found in diverse authoritative spaces.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 The notion was devised by G. Marks, ‘Structural Policy in the European Community’ in A. Sbragia (ed.), 
Europolitics, Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community (The Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC; 1992), pp.191-225 and G. Marks, ‘Structural Policy and Multi-level Governance in the EC’ in 
A. Cafurny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community:  The Maastricht Debate and Beyond 
(Lynne Rienner Publications, Boulder; 1993), pp.391-411. 
369 That is to say, as Sassen has advanced with regard to global governance, private law, and European private 
law, necessitates the local and national levels; it is dependent on them.  See S. Sassen, ‘Globalization or 
Denationalization?’ (2003) 10 Rev.Int.Pol.Econ. 1. 
370 Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Cane and Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (n.367), 
p.805.  
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The degree of pluralism in any given environment arises with the rejection of the strict 
dichotomy of centralism and pluralism371.  It finds its foundations in the interaction between 
“Western” systems of norms and “indigenous” systems of norms, and in particular, in the 
colonial and post-colonial spaces; the imposition of the external system on the existing system 
of “law” (whether customary, or religious or another form of indigenous) gave rise to 
interactions and interdependences, which continue to this day.  Legal pluralism reflects an 
empirical determination, often asserted to be a matter of fact to the extent that the absence of 
plurality reflects a “myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion”372; it thus arguably characterises any 
context in which there is a multiplicity of norms373. 
 
The ties between law, positivism and the significance of the role of the state, engender the 
difficulty in conceptualising the European space as a pluralistic one374, because of the strong 
ties between the state and law, even if these are disintegrating.  Yet putative pluralities can be 
identified as existing within the European space; these encompass legal orders, cultures and 
traditions375, sources of law and their natures (national, supranational, transnational, public, 
private or a combination thereof), dispute resolution bodies376, and legal actors377 (and the 
identities they hold).  Furthermore, consideration must also be attributed to private law 
making and regulation - including self-regulation, co-regulation, the development of codes of 
conduct, and the standardisation of contracts - against the background of the declining and 
diminishing state378.  National, state-made norms, norm-production at the European and 
international levels, and “private global norm-production”379 - including “non-legislative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Arguably reflected in an understanding of state versus non-state: B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal 
Common Sense (Butterworths, London; 2nd edn., 2002), p.156. 
372 J. Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’(1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1, p.4. 
373 S. Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869, p.873-874; Engle Merry 
distinguishes the different contexts in which legal pluralism might arise, with reference to different challenges 
and different scholarly foundations.  Thus, pluralism might also arise within national – and it is submitted – 
postnational contexts.  The national contexts typically explored include Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
374 B.Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’ (2008) 30 Syd.Law.Rev. 
375, pp.377-386, looking at legal pluralism in medieval Europe and in respect of colonisation. 
375 G. Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law 
Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot; 1997), pp.3-28. 
376 B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (Butterworths, London; 2nd edn., 2002), pp.200 et 
seq. 
377 R.A. McDonald and D. Sandomierski, ‘Against Nomopolies’ (2006) 57 North.Ireland.Leg.Q. 610, p.614. 
378 “Already at first glance it becomes clear that many examples of a ‘global law without a state’ do not in fact 
contain a flat-out rejection of state-based official law”:  G-P. Calliess and P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and 
Running Code:  A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart, Oxford; 2010), p.19 (footnotes omitted). 
379 For the use of this term, see G. Teubner, ‘Breaking Frames:  The Global Interplay of Legal and Social 
Systems’ (1997) 45 AJCL 149, p.157. 
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codification” 380 (legal rules, values and principles drafted by academics and other bodies 
acting “in pursuit of what they perceive as the common good”381), the “old” and “new” lex 
mercatoria (supplemented by the lex laboris and lex sportiva), the self-and co-regulatory 
standards of international organisations and multi-national corporations, (for example, the 
WTO, World Bank and the IMF382) - must be considered in the context of the plurality of 
cultures, legal actors, norm-formation and dispute resolution383.  The very emergence of these 
norm-generating orders in general, and particularly within the context of European law 
making, extends beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, it is worth noting that it might 
reflect Joerges’ assertion that European integration “can be understood and re-constructed as a 
response to the failures of the Weberian nation state”384.  In any case, it is submitted that this 
plurality must be considered in light of the significance of the role of the state. 
 
Thus, to the extent that the Europeanisation of private law within a pluralist, multi-level order 
requires recognition of the idea that “[t]he overlapping spheres of competence among the 
supranational, national and subnational levels of governance, produce plural sites of norm 
creation, operation and enforcement, resulting in what has been described as an entity of 
‘interlocking normative spheres’ where no particular one is privileged”385, pluralism has the 
potential to undermine the connection between normativity and the state.  In particular, it 
questions the engagement with the state as the pertinent reference point, particularly with 
regard to authority and legitimacy, as generally – to avoid becoming embroiled in broader 
constitutional discourses which extend beyond the thesis – European law is understood to be 
authoritative and have normative force, without existing or operating within specific territorial 
boundaries.  While the focus remains on the Member States, enduring as the “masters of the 
Treaties”, pluralism rather promotes the notion of interdependence in respect of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority (n.150), p.7, instead of applying the term “private actor“ to describe, 
for example, academics. 
381 For example, of UNDROIT, the Lando Commission, and the Acquis Group (Acquis Group (eds.), Contract I: 
Pre-Contractual Obligations, Conclusion of Contract, Unfair Terms (Sellier, München; 2007); Acquis Group 
(eds.), Contract II:  General Provisions, Delivery of Goods, Package Travel and Payment Services (Sellier, 
München; 2009)).   
382 A-M. Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 EJIL 503, p.518 
383 The majority of this scholarship having been driven by Cafaggi.  See, for example, F. Cafaggi, ‘Private 
Regulation in European Private Law’ EUI WP RSCAS 2009/31 and F. Cafaggi, ‘Private Law-Making and 
European Integration: Where Do They Meet, When Do They Conflict?’ in D. Oliver, T. Prosser and R. Rawlings 
(eds.), The Regulatory State (OUP, Oxford; 2010), pp.201-228. 
384 Joerges, ‘Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation’ (n.286), p.6. 
385 Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law (n.259), p.155, citing N. MacCormick, ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity 
and Citizenship in the European Commonwealth’ (1997) 16 Law and Philosophy 331. 
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relationship of legal orders, these being not “mutually exclusive but intertwined, with no legal 
system being especially privileged”386.   
 
Yet legal pluralism is by no means unproblematic as a perspective for legal development; not 
only does it give rise to concerns with regard to fragmentation and coherence but until 
recently, there had been little development of a plausible theory of (the management of) legal 
pluralism387.  Fragmentation has come back to the fore time and again since the publication of 
Koskenniemi’s ILC Report in 2006388.  The discourse is significant to the Europeanisation of 
private law, the national model of private law having reflected one governed by hierarchy and 
unity, order and coherence, which has subsequently begun to fragment within389 and beyond 
the nation state.  For example, the justification for European legislative action, especially in 
the case of the CRD, often derives from the need to establish coherence and certainty and to 
overcome fragmentation390 on the basis that what exists across the national and European 
levels is “a fragmented regulatory framework across the Community which causes significant 
compliance costs for businesses wishing to trade cross-border”391 that cannot be managed via 
orthodox mechanisms of conflict resolution (that is, primarily PIL rules)392.  Pluralism as 
empirical fact is further reflected – in the private law context – in the scope for conflict – of a 
vertical and horizontal nature – outlined in Chapter 1; this also reveals the absence of 
hierarchy in the regulation of conflicts, which arise as a result of the multiplicity of legal 
sources and of the claims of dispute resolution bodies to decide and regulate.  The desire for 
coherence between EU and national law is reflected in the principle of primacy, and the 
precedence of Union law over national law, an understanding which provided for the notion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Augenstein, ‘Identifying the European Union’ in Augenstein, ‘Integration Through Law’ Revisited (n.123), 
p.108. 
387 Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (n.175). 
388 In 2005, Koskenniemi set out his normative concerns with the notion of global legal pluralism, and in 
particular, increasing fragmentation in M. Koskenniemi, ‘Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and 
Multiple Modes of Thought’, Harvard University, Keynote Speech, 05.03.2005; 
<http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d[1].pdf>; Last Accessed: 
10.04.2012); see also, M. Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (2006) UN.A/CN.4/L.682. 
389 The impact of fragmentation will also diverge across the Member States; prima facie, if coherence and 
systemisation is more important in civil law countries, based on the almost-complete private codifications where 
gaps filled by the relevant (generally legislative) authorities, arguably they will be more affected than the 
common law systems by the fragmentation engendered by the Europeanisation of private law. 
390 CRD, 2011/83/EU, Recitals 6 and 7. 
391 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ COM(2008) 614, p.2. 
392 F. Cafaggi, ‘Introduction’ in F. Cafaggi (ed.), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 
Oxford; 2006), p.6.  Other means of conflict resolution would include, for example, the open method of 
coordination as a means of governance; van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the 
European Level’ in Cafaggi, The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (n.228), p.60. 
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of conform interpretation, initially developed in relation to conformity of specific legal rules 
between national and Union law in Marleasing393 and extended in later case law to cover the 
entire system, for the purposes of promoting consistency.  The doctrine, initially developed in 
relation to the (then) first pillar of EU law (subsequently extended to the third pillar394) 
requires that the national judge must consider the national legal system in its entirety so as to 
render it compatible with Union law395: “the obligation of ‘conform’ interpretation is no 
longer seen as an application of the principle of primacy, but has been gradually transformed 
into a holistic principle of ‘consistent’ (or ‘harmonious’) interpretation of the whole legal 
order at all levels; and secondly, that the emphasis is no longer – or no longer merely – on the 
‘hierarchy’ of legal norms, or legal orders but rather on consistency between levels of 
regulation”396.  Thus, the acceptance of pluralism – and constitutional pluralism397 in 
particular – calls into question whether an attempt should be made to promote European 
private law as a coherent and ordered “system” of law and otherwise, how this fragmentation 
and lack of coherence might be managed.   
 
Having attempted to set out the pluralist, multi-level structure within which European private 
law emerges and exists, the next section aims to identify its shifting conceptualisations in the 
context of European integration. 
 
ii. The Shifting Conceptualisations of Private Law and the Dangers of 
“Methodological Nationalism” 
 
The connection between the emergence of private law and the emergence of the nation state 
has been explored in Chapter 1; the evolution of private law beyond the nation state is 
reflected in the following statement of Caruso:   
In a purely intranational, self-referential setting, legal actors usually perceive their 
municipal private law as an ideologically neutral set of adjudicatory rules and 
principles, so much so that even very dramatic changes in political regimes may 
leave civil codes and private law doctrines fundamentally untouched. On an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135. 
394 C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
395 Joined Cases C-397-401/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835. 
396 W. van Gerven, ‘Private Law in a Federal Perspective’ in R. Brownsword et al (eds.), The Foundations of 
European Private Law (Hart, Oxford; 2011), pp.337-351, pp.345-346. 
397 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’  (2002) 65 MLR 317; M.P. Maduro, ‘Interpreting European 
Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2007) 1 EJLS. 
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international stage, by contrast, a State’s control over its private law is laden with 
ideological significance and tied historically to the very notion of sovereignty398. 
 
As the Europeanisation of private law occurs within the context of integration, it becomes 
increasingly necessary to take into account the intertwining of these two considerations, 
which results in a shift in the way in which private law might be understood in the national, as 
well as European and international contexts399.  At the Union level, private law has initially 
been predominantly functional, engaged for the purposes of the facilitation of the internal 
market.  On this basis, the EU legislature initially focused predominantly400 on codification, 
making the assumption that the construction of a European ius commune or a legislative 
European civil code would facilitate the emergence of a uniform (and as mistakenly 
understood, unified) European private law, and thus, the operation of the market.  Not only is 
such a deduction highly dubious but furthermore, the focus on codification efforts in the 
Union legislature has provided little scope for developing the understanding of private law in 
its entirety401.  
 
Essentially, the Europeanisation of private law is understood to provide for integration via the 
functioning of transnational market, dissolving the links between the state and private law402.  
The changing nature of private law is reflected in its constitutionalisation, materialisation403 
and regulation.  The constitutionalisation of private law reflects the notion that, with regard to 
fundamental rights constituting limitations on private autonomy and freedom of contract in 
particular, private laws can no longer be understood as distinct or “self-standing legal orders 
but are rather embedded in a higher legal order, the national constitution, against which the 
values underpinning private law can be measured”404, rendering private law more “just” as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral’ (n.243), p.5. 
399 Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral’ (n.243), p.5. 
400 The focus on codification has been largely dominant until recently.  That is to say, both the Parliament and 
the Commission have adopted a considerably more sedate tone in recent years; see, European Commission, 
‘Green Paper from the Commission on Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law for 
Consumers and Businesses of 1.07.2010’, COM(2010) 348 final. 
401 Cafaggi, ‘Private Law-Making and European Integration’ in Oliver et al, The Regulatory State (n.383), 
especially, p.205.  The notion that law operating within a multi-level, pluralist context and the scope for the 
engagement of comparative analysis therein – for these purposes - cannot be understood comprehensively in the 
context of a discourse in which law is conceived within the boundaries of the state resonates in the discourse on 
the emergence of “new” legal orders (including the lex mercatoria, regimes of self-regulation, ICANN and so 
on). 
402 Joerges and Schmid, ‘Towards Proceduralization’ in Hartkamp et al, Towards a European Civil Code 
(n.315), p.288. 
403 Materialisation is understood broadly to reflect the drafting of norms for a particular purpose.   
404 H-W. Micklitz (ed.), The Constitutionalization of Private Law (OUP, Oxford; 2014), p.1. 
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result of this integration.  While the civil codes were developed within the national context for 
the purposes of giving effect to individual freedom and private autonomy, the constitutions 
were intended to guarantee and protect the fundamental rights of individuals, predominantly 
against the state405.  The notion that states should be obliged, positively, to protect its citizens 
from each other began to emerge and take shape via ECHR case law406.  Moreover, from the 
CJEU’s interpretation of Union law, in the context of the construction of an “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice” post-Lisbon407, the stretch of Union law beyond the economic 
heart of the Union, into areas traditionally regulated by the nation state can be identified408, 
bearing in mind the lack of constitution at the Union level.  This phenomenon will be 
explored in more depth by virtue of the case examples of Part III.  For the purposes of this 
section, it is worth noting that national courts have gradually been empowered by the CJEU to 
balance different freedoms and rights409, bringing a necessarily political dimension to private 
law410.  As private law has taken an interest in, for example, anti-discrimination, regulated 
markets, product and food safety, as well as consumer protection, it has become less technical 
and increasingly regulatory.  As a result, it has made “incursions into the classical territory of 
private law”, leading to the “disintegration” of the latter411 and underpinning the coherence 
that has been engaged and advanced as a key characterisation within and across the national 
contexts.  European integration and Europeanisation together constitute a “transformative 
process”412, or rather, sets of processes, occurring within an increasingly globalised space413, 
challenging the unity that has seemingly been concretised therein and bringing to the fore the 
divergences between the legal, cultural and economic dynamics in the nation states and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 Private autonomy needs to be limited in respect of fundamental rights, including, predominantly, those that 
generally formally fell within constitutionally-protected considerations.  This understanding can allow for a 
connection to be drawn within consumer law to the extent that an analogy might be drawn between the parties 
traditionally protected by the constitution (the weak citizens, in respect of the stronger state) and those protected 
by consumer law (the weak consumer, in respect of the stronger seller/supplier).  
406 Reference can be made, for example, to the Art.8 right to privacy: Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2004] UKHL 22. 
407 P.P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, Oxford; 2011), and in particular, 
Chapter 5 on competences, pp.155-192. 
408 Now, increasingly, the phenomenon of private regulation is becoming increasingly significant.  To the extent 
that private law making is relevant to European private law, this will be highlighted throughout the thesis. 
409 F. Werro (ed.), Droit civil et convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Schulthess, Zurich; 2006), 
pp.135 et seq. 
410 See Part I above. 
411 Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe (n.160), pp.434-438. 
412 Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law (n.259), p.3.  
413 H. Peterson et al (eds.), Paradoxes of European Legal Integration (Ashgate, London; 2008), p.4, making 
reference to four paradoxes of European integration namely, constitutionalisation and democratisation, 
institution-building and market-making, language as a source of legal understanding and misunderstanding and 
exceptionalism and normalisation. 
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beyond.  The potential impact of the Europeanisation of private law dictates that private law 
must be understood as flexible and dynamic.   
 
As private law has developed beyond the market, and as it has “opened itself up” to social 
values via the socialisation of private law414, it becomes clear that its developing role also 
shapes the types of conflicts that might arise.  Indeed, as Kennedy notes, the notion of 
“social” lacks “proper system and conceptual clarity” in terms of its application and use415.  In 
each of the Member States, different understandings of social justice have developed, based 
on “different conceptions of the social or welfare state, the different attitudes towards social 
ideals and, in turn, the degree of distrust regarding state intervention”416.  As Micklitz sets 
out, initially there were attempts to identify and coordinate different national social policy 
programmes, highlighting the implementation of what were, and still remain, divergent 
national conceptions of social justice, and the significance of national social values in the 
emerging European law417.  However, as the focus fell predominantly on the internal market, 
policy conflicts were perhaps initially less frequent in private law than in other areas of EU 
law, to the extent that within the national systems the need for shared (at least economic) 
policy was recognised for the purposes of market construction. Thus, until recently, when the 
private law indeed begun to “open itself up”, there had been little significance attributed to the 
emergence of a new, or at least distinct, value order in European private law418, given the 
focus on “EU consumer law [as] market behaviour law”419, that is, as fundamentally 
instrumental420.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414  M. Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
Constitutionalisation of Private Law’ (2006) 7 GLJ 341.  It is worth noting that, with regard to Kumm’s broader 
thesis, this thesis, having set out the nation state foundations of private law, does not really adhere to the view 
that private law can exist entirely in its constitutional construction alone. 
415 D. Kennedy, 'Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private Law' in M. Hesselink 
(ed.), The Politics of a European Civil Code (Kluwer, The Hague; 2006), pp.9-31, p.9. 
416 H. Rösler, ‘The Transformation of Contractual Justice: A Historical and Comparative Account of the Impact 
of Consumption’ in H-W. Micklitz (ed.), The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2011), pp.327-358. 
417 H-W. Micklitz, 'Judicial Activism of the European Court of Justice and the Development of the European 
Social Model in Anti-Discrimination and Consumer Law' EUI WP 2009/19, p.8. 
418 H-W. Micklitz, 'European Private Regulatory Law: A Plea for New Thinking', pp.15 et seq (on file with 
author). 
419 J.G.I. Rinkes, ‘European Consumer Law:  Making Sense’ in C. Twigg-Flesner et al (eds.), The Yearbook of 
Consumer Law 2008 (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007), pp.3-18, p.3:  “The question, however, is whether consumer 
law is market behaviour law, or law for the benefit of the consumer?” 
420 C. Schmid, 'The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its 
Implications on a European Contract Law Code' (2005) 1 ERCL 211; C. Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des 
Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union: Privatrecht und Privatrechtskonzeptionen in der Entwicklung der 
Europäischen Integrationsverfassung (Nomos, Baden Baden; 2010). 
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As Collins has asserted, “private law has become a synthesis that combines both its traditional 
concerns about corrective justice between individuals and instrumental concerns about 
steering markets towards distributive justice” 421 .  On this basis, he argues that the 
“interlegality or intertextuality” of private law must be considered.  The notion of the 
interlegality422 of legal orders brings to the fore the determination of their autonomous nature.  
As Amstutz notes, European private law cannot be understood as an entirely autonomous 
order; while it is sui generis in its nature, the EU order – and private law in particular, in 
respect of its development of rights and obligations affecting private relationships - is 
dependent on the national legal systems for its effect423.  Essentially, this dictates the need for 
the analysis of the interaction between the national, European and potentially, international 
legal orders, which forms a broader consideration of this thesis, with a particular focus on the 
courts via the preliminary reference procedure. 
 
The thesis explores these interactions, against the background of the shifting nature of private 
law, as part of the rationale underpinning the need for the casting of an analytical eye on the 
appreciation (or lack thereof) of methodology.  There is a need to ensure that as European 
private law develops – in the Union legislature and via the interpretation of Union norms in 
the CJEU – there exists a way to understand and appreciate the potential for these 
interrelations and this plurality of norms and dispute resolution bodies, and consequently, to 
engage a “epistemology of conciliation”424 in respect of the conflict putatively arising.  The 
focus herein lies on the engagement of one distinct methodology, namely comparative 
analysis, which is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.  It is submitted that the comparative 
methodology might reflect one way in which the dynamic nature of private law can be 
understood, and in which its evolution can be facilitated in this multi-level context to the 
extent that it can, in a developed form, allow not only for the understanding of legal norms as 
they appear to exist but an understanding of the way in which they have developed, the values 
attached thereto, the relevant policy considerations, and the potential impact of one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 H. Collins, ‘Governance Implications for the European Union of the Changing Nature of Private Law’ in F. 
Cafaggi and H. Muir Watt (eds.), Making European Private Law:  Governance Design (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham; 2008), pp.269-286, pp.278-279. 
422  B. de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense:  Law, Globalization and Emancipation 
(Butterworths, London; 2nd edn., 2002), pp.436-437. 
423 M. Amstutz, ‘Interlegality in European Private Law:  A Question of Method?’ in C. Joerges and T. Ralli 
(eds.), European Constitutionalism Without Private Law:  Private Law Without Democracy, Recon Report 
No.14 (Arena, Oslo; 2011), pp.55-69. 
424 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Com-paring’ in E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart, 
Oxford; 2007), pp.91-108, p.98.  
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interpretation over another.  However, as will become clear below – the theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of comparison, as well as the critique of its current 
conceptualisations are explored in Chapter 3 - comparison as it exists, is lacking in its 
provision of an appropriate framework for European legal development.  Thus, the thesis aims 
to cast a critical eye on the theoretical and methodological dimensions of comparative 
analysis as it is engaged by the CJEU in the Europeanisation of private law, explored via case 
examples in Part III.  The analytical focus has two dimensions: 1) the better understanding of 
the role of the CJEU in the Europeanisation of private law and integration, via the use of 
comparative analysis, and 2) the better understanding of comparative analysis as a “second 
order” tool to enhance the Europeanisation of private law and European legal integration.  
 
For the moment, it is necessary to consider one methodological and theoretical concern that 
must be highlighted from the outset as it is fundamental to the consideration of the 
methodological discourse and the substantive topic of the thesis.  The theoretical perspective 
of methodological nationalism affects the understanding of the relationship between national 
law, the development of European law via harmonisation and the concept of the state and 
shapes the context in which these relationships arise; its impact in two contexts are outlined, 
intertwining its theoretical and methodological conceptualisations, namely, integration and 
Europeanisation, and the foundations of the methodological framework of the 
Europeanisation of private law.  As to the former, methodological nationalism has dominated 
the understanding of European integration, and the Europeanisation of law.  State legal 
systems are territorially and nationally defined; EU law is functionally differentiated and 
delineated.  In the 1980s, the EU was conceptualised neither as a state nor an international 
organisation425, neither as a federation nor a regime426.  This understanding continues to exist 
despite attempts at federalisation; moreover, as attempts at fiscal union continue to falter, it is 
evident that, like the European civil code, there remains little prospect of the “United States of 
Europe”, despite there being scope for true political union427.  Yet the embers of the state’s 
dominance continue to burn much more brightly than those of the code.  Globalisation and the 
apparent decline of the Westphalian state model, and the recognition of European integration 
in the context of the former, as well as the surge in respect for pluralism and diversity, has of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 N. MacCormick, Constructing Legal Systems:  ‘European Union’ in Legal Theory (Springer, Berlin; 1997) 
and Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ in Weiler (ed.), The Constitution of Europe (n.333). 
426 W. Wallace, ‘Less Than a Federation. More Than a Regime: The Community as a Political System’ in H. 
Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Community (OUP, Oxford; 1983), pp.403-436. 
427 See V. Reding, ‘2014: Time to Make a Choice’, KPN New Year’s Reception, Brussels, 07.01.2014.  
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course stifled these vestiges.  Yet methodologically, the consistent focus on the state and the 
methodological nationalism to which this gives rise, as a consequence of the failure of law 
and other disciplines ensures that potentially progressive considerations come to shape the 
orthodox understanding of integration.   
 
Integration and the Europeanisation of law have led to assertions of the EU as a “post-national 
constellation”428 or transnational construct, existing in a “post-democratic era”429.  It is clear 
that the recognition and acceptance of pluralism has not resulted in the decline of political or 
legal nationalism430 but rather, it has been argued that the “pluralism of Europe and its 
cultures have become a shield to protect nationalistic thinking”431.  There thus exists a danger 
in invoking notions of culture and tradition, and more specifically, identity, as such 
considerations might be conceived merely as permitting recourse to nationalistic tendencies; it 
must be highlighted that this perspective is not adopted herein432.  As noted above, a 
pluralistic space will always rouse scope for conflict; divergences between (legal) cultures 
and traditions come to constitute kindling and spark the fires of conflict.  Furthermore, the 
meaning of postnational and transnational are unclear; Schaffer referring to “transnational 
legal ordering”433 and by highlighting the “considerable variation within national contexts in 
light of different institutional and socio-cultural legacies and configurations of power”, 
conveys a preference for the “transnational”434.  Yet the notion of transnational itself lacks 
clarity; it has been considered that it reflects “neither national nor international nor public nor 
private at the same time as being both national and international, as well as public and 
private” 435 .  For Zumbansen, transnational law rather reflects one perspective, “a 
methodological lens” which allows for the analysis of legal institutions and legal development 
in a multi-level space436.  This “methodological lens” reveals certain assumptions about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 The term was originally expressed by Habermas, J. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation und die 
Zukunft der Demokratie (Grin Verlag, Berlin; 2003). 
429 Habermas, ‘Europe’s Post-Democratic Era’ (n.177). 
430 In the context of the economic crisis, in particular, increasing nationalist tendencies can be identified, not 
only in law but elsewhere.  For example, consider the surge of Euroscepticism in the UK in recent months, and 
in those countries affected directly by austerity measures imposed at the EU level, including Spain and Greece. 
431 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), p.1. 
432  Consider for example, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Lisbon judgement, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 
30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (260), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html., discussed 
in more detail below. 
433 One of his key criticisms of Krisch is that his analysis is focused on the European system; this criticism, 
given the nature of the research, is obviously also applicable here.  Consider the Schaffer piece, cited below. 
434 G. Schaffer, ‘A Transnational Take on Krisch’s Pluralist Postnational Law’ (2012) EJIL 565, p.579. 
435 C. Scott, ‘“Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions’ (2009) GLJ 859, pp.870 and 873. 
436 P. Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’ (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141, p.150. 
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way in which law is understood; these assumptions, depending on their nature, might derive 
from individual (or group) understandings of law, shaped by the Vorverständnis of a 
particular legal culture or tradition, distinct from any exclusively national understanding.  
Indeed, they might be reflective of a broader set of understandings which, cutting across 
national cultures or traditions 437 , are particularly prevalent in certain social, cultural, 
economic and (territorially-defined) geographical contexts. 
 
In respect of the latter – the methodological framework - the nationalist focus constitutes a 
key dimension of the critique advanced against the theoretical and methodological approach 
to legal development, and of the conceptualisation of comparison generally, the identification 
of what is being compared and the nature of the outcomes of comparative analysis.  As the 
case examples below illustrate, there have been transfers in legal institutions and ideas, 
unintentional or the result of sociological and legal engineering, via copying, borrowing or 
imposition, which transcend a methodological nationalist approach, and which will have an 
impact within and beyond the state.  For Joerges, the dominance of comparative analysis in 
emphasising that which is similar or that which is different, or equivalents in a functionalist 
approach, has “cultivated traditions of ‘methodological nationalism’ which are not well 
prepared to understand denationalization processes, the interaction between the formerly more 
autonomous legal systems and their links to transnational levels of governance”438.  Within 
the European context, methodological nationalism also informs the dominance of the Western 
legal culture and tradition (and Eurocentricism, as the European order emerges in an 
increasingly globalised context); as is evident from the case examples, the scope for 
“East/West conflicts” should not be underestimated, especially in the context of enlargement.  
 
Chapter 2. Concluding Remarks 
 
Chapter 2 has initially aimed to uncover the meaning of the notion of unitas in diversitate and 
to examine the dimensions relevant to the Europeanisation of private law; in light of the 
Treaty provisions, this analysis has allowed for the exploration of that which Hendry has 
deemed the paradox of unitas in diversitate, that is, the promotion of respect for and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 K. Tuori, ‘Towards a Theory of Transnational Law:  A Very First Draft’ (2010) (on file with the author). 
438 C. Joerges, ‘The Challenges of Europeanisation in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal 
Discipline’ (2004) 14 Duke.J.Int.Comp.L 155, p.160; similarly, the necessary boundedness of private 
international law by methodological nationalism is highlighted. 
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protection of diversities on the one hand, and the promotion of that which is common (and 
which potentially leads to unification) on the other.  This chapter has located this paradox in 
light of the reach of Union private law harmonisation, which illustrates – with specific 
reference to the concept of the consumer – the ideological underpinnings of these approaches 
and their reflection in private law development.  The exploration of the scope for the 
emergence of a single European concept of the consumer – via legislative provision and 
judicial interpretation – has confirmed, building on the outline in the introduction, the 
influence of national (but also European and transnational) culture and tradition on the 
development and evolution of a plurality thereof (and more specifically, identities) that exist 
beyond the nation state.  The focus of the analysis on one specific private law concept has 
bridged the discussion of unitas in diversitate with that in the second section of the chapter, 
which engages and examines the notion of whether a single European culture (and therein, 
identity) should constitute a prerequisite for the Europeanisation of private law in the broader 
context of integration.   
 
The European space has been advanced as one within which a plurality of cultures and 
traditions (and thus, identities) exist, and within which these can be established as “self” and 
interact with the “other”, increasingly within a globalised space439.  The understanding that 
has been advanced in light of the analysis undertaken suggests that neither culture nor identity 
requires, as a prerequisite for its formation, a connection with the state.  It similarly confirms 
that, given the interactions arising, both within and beyond the European space, neither 
culture nor identity should be understood as single but rather as multiple; this is the first 
consideration that calls into question the need for one European identity or culture and 
particularly, the notion that this conceptualisation should be single and distinct.  The 
refutation of this need has been advanced in two respects.  On the one hand, the potential 
breadth of conceptions of European (legal) culture has been recognised; reference is made to 
just two key dimensions of the potential content of a European culture.  Similarly, it has been 
acknowledged that a plurality of conceptualisations of culture and identity exist in the 
national contexts, underpinning which are diverse values, which – it has increasingly come to 
be recognised - shape private law development at the national and Union levels, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 In respect of the significance of boundaries, reference can be made to Lindahl, who conceives of a legal 
regime as one necessarily defined by its borders but in respect of which there is a “permeability”, such that what 
is excluded is necessarily also included; H. Lindahl, 'A-Legality- Postnationalism and the Question of Legal 
Boundaries' (2010) 73 MLR 30, p.55.  
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potentially beyond, and the protection of which might be undermined if a sufficiently high 
standard is not established at the Union level.  These preliminary conclusions neither suggest 
that the building blocks of a European (legal) culture cannot be identified, nor that there exists 
no scope for them to emerge and be refined.  Rather, these conclusions are engaged and 
advanced to support the argument that there does not exist a basis upon which a single legal 
culture or identity should be advanced as a prerequisite of legal development, to the exclusion 
of those existing within the European space.  
 
Instead of aiming to identify a single concept of culture at the European level, which 
permeates the national, Union and potentially international levels of regulation, it has rather 
been suggested that the plurality of cultures and identities should be engaged as a defining 
characteristic of European legal development as opposed to a hurdle to its evolution.  A 
common culture might nevertheless develop at the Union level, and influence the others 
existing.  The pluralist perspective is understood to underpin the scope for the private law 
development within a multi-level structure; its foundations are reflected empirically in the 
multiplicity of orders, cultures and traditions, sources of law, dispute resolution bodies and 
legal actors.  It has been recognised that as a perspective of legal development, pluralism is 
not unproblematic; rather, it reflects and promotes vertical and horizontal conflicts of the 
nature set out in Chapter 1, and furthermore gives rise to concerns of fragmentation arising 
from a lack of coherence, both of which are deemed to be particularly problematic beyond the 
nation state, that is, given the absence of a grounded framework lending a degree of 
systemisation.   
 
This understanding of the European space characterises the context in which the shifting 
conceptualisations of private law can be explored.  It is submitted that in the absence of this 
pluralist perspective – reflected in the focus on the promotion of uniformity (and thus 
commonality) via the harmonisation, and previously codification, of legal norms – the 
potential to appreciate the dynamic nature and shifting conceptualisations of private law is 
undermined, even to the extent that such developments have emerged as result of Union 
legislation and its subsequent interpretation in the CJEU.  These changing conceptualisations 
of private law have therefore been deemed to be consequent to its constitutionalisation, 
materialisation and regulation, the processes of which might also give rise to conflicts of the 
nature outlined in Chapter 1 and to the fragmentation and disintegration of classical (national) 
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private law, as detailed above.  The key consideration that has been advanced is that private 
law has developed beyond its role in regulating private relationships and in facilitating the 
functioning of the internal market; it has “opened itself up” to the social, which requires that 
its social, cultural and political dimensions be acknowledged and appreciated in its 
development.  Notwithstanding, as it emerges at the European level via Union legislation, its 
interpretation in the CJEU and application in the national courts, private law also continues to 
exist and develop within the Member States via the national legislature and national courts, 
giving rise to the significance of the multi-level interdependency of the relations between 
legal orders.  This understanding gives rise to a preliminary consideration of the dangers of 
methodological nationalism as these considerations permeate the thesis as a whole, and the 
methodological discourse in particular.  The analysis in this chapter has therefore aimed to 
develop the perspective adopted for the understanding and reconsideration of the 
methodological discourse advanced, and particularly the focus on comparison.  While 
comparative analysis is indeed advanced as a possible tool of Europeanisation, as a 
fundamental dimension of its methodological framework, its conceptualisation is not taken 
for granted; in the next chapter, a critical assessment of comparison as it is currently 
understood is undertaken and an understanding of complex comparison is advanced, which 
provides the basis for the assessment its use by virtue of the case examples. 
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PART TWO: UNCOVERING THE SCOPE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN 
THE JUDICIAL EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
 
The first chapter reviews the development of approaches to comparison by virtue of which the 
theoretical and methodological poverty of mainstream comparative law is uncovered and 
scrutinised; this critique is further refined in light of the evolution of comparison in respect of 
European private law development.  It is submitted that while comparative analysis has 
certainly developed, and while it is recognised that it evidences potential as a tool of 
Europeanisation and integration, it retains key problematics as it is currently conceived.  The 
second section of Chapter 3 outlines the normative scope for the development of complex 
comparative analysis, in light of the evaluation of its current conceptualisations.  Chapter 4 
summarises the role of the CJEU in the Europeanisation of private law, that is, in respect of 
its development of a body of European private law via the interpretation of Union norms and 
their application in the national courts.  The structure and composition of the CJEU are set 
out, which allows for a socio-legal understanding of the constitution of the CJEU.  Thereafter, 
its evolving private law jurisdiction is identified; this constitutes the basis for the examination 
of the preliminary reference procedure as a space for the evaluation of the CJEU’s 
contribution to European integration, and the broad proposal advanced within the thesis, 
namely that comparative analysis constitutes a tool of Europeanisation and integration. 
 
Chapter 3. Introducing Comparative Analysis as a Tool of the Europeanisation of 
Law 
 
Chapter 3 initially takes one step back and looks to identify the foundations and critique of 
comparative law; this critique is of a theoretical and methodological nature and is 
fundamental to the reconceptualisation and evolution of comparison.  
 
While comparison as a process has existed for as long as the study and analysis of law has 
been undertaken, the emergence of comparative law as it exists, evolves and is criticised 
today, is generally said to parallel the nationalisation of law at the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th centuries, having enjoyed its “inauguration” at the 1900 Paris Congress 
of the Societé de législation comparée.  Notwithstanding this apparently limited existence, its 
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deep and considerable history, which stretches far beyond the past one hundred years, has 
generated a breadth of divergent conceptualisations, processes and practices to which 
reference will be made in this analysis.  As a methodology, comparative analysis has grown 
from the seeds of comparison; its aims and objectives are scattered across disciplines relevant 
to law, including that underpinning Aristotle's study of the different constitutions of the world 
in his quest for “perfection”, and that engaged in Machiavelli’s foundations of modern 
political science.  Furthermore, reference can be made to Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois.  
At the time of the lex mercatoria, the reference to foreign law was made merely as another 
source of law forming part of the broader ius commune.  References to foreign law were 
frequently made in the construction and drafting of national constitutions and civil codes440; 
indeed, in its contemporary academic incarnation, comparison is understood to have emerged 
as “a response to the fragmentation of European laws following the 19th century 
codifications”441.  Comparative law also evolved with a focus on historical development 
(located firmly within the German historical school), finding its roots in local traditions and in 
the beliefs of a people442.  This understanding supported the strengthening of national laws 
and the contemporaneous emergence of the nation state443; in particular, this was true for 
those countries “with Western legal heritage [that] shared the Roman legacy along with 
Savigny’s Germans”444.  The engagement with foreign law was also relevant to processes of 
colonisation when attempts were made to impose settler legal orders on the indigenous 
normative orders of the colonised.  Post-1900, and during the period of “the social”, 
characterised by Kennedy as the ”second globalization”, comparison gave rise to challenges 
to law’s autonomy, by making clear the putative connections between law, politics and 
society445.  The “socialisation” of private law emerges in the case examples, shaping the 
relationships between the courts.  Salleilles in particular looked to identify a “droit commun a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 The interest in comparison, broadly, and in particular relation to law, flourished with the drafting of national 
constitutions.  Eventually, the existence of positive national constitutions rendered reference to foreign law less 
significant: A. von Bogdandy, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law: A Contested Domain’ in M. Rosenfeld and A. 
Sajo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.25-53, pp.27 et 
al. 
441 H. Patrick Glenn, 'Aims of Comparative Law' in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2006), pp.57-65, p.58.  See also David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems of the 
World Today (n.23), p.2.  
442 See W. Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What was it Like to Try a Rat?’ (1995) 143 U.Penn.L.Rev. 
1189, p.2012 on the role of Savigny: K. von Savigny, Ueberden Zweckdieser Zeitschrift, Zt.ges. Rw. 1815, 6. 
443 Explored in Part I. 
444 Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought’ in Trubek and Santos, The New Law and 
Economic Development, (n.351), p.31. 
445  G. Marini, ‘Taking Comparative Law Lightly: On Some Uses of Comparative Law in the Third 
Globalization’ (2012) 3 Comp.L.Rev. 1, p.13. 
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l’humanité civilisée”, on the basis of which law could be developed with a social form446.  At 
Kennedy’s “third globalization”, comparative law took what is arguably an epistemological 
turn, focusing on what comparative analysis is and how it should be done447.   
 
I. The Prevailing Trends in Comparative Law Scholarship: A Critical Evaluation 
 
The critique of comparative law is epistemological and methodological, theoretical and 
practical; it is the “lack of methodological reflection and theoretical foundation”448 that 
continues to permeate the roots of many problems of contemporary comparative analysis.  
 
i. An Outline of the Current Conceptualisations of Comparison  
 
This long history has engendered inconsistent, staggered and often incoherent development, 
which dictates that the theoretical and methodological dimensions of comparative analysis are 
varied, diverse and complex; it is the uncertainty surrounding the conceptualisation of 
comparison which provides an entrance point for the critique.  The rationales of comparative 
analysis are varied and detailed in the first section of this chapter, and explored following the 
case examples in Chapter 8.  The initial allocation of aims of comparison promoted the notion 
that comparative law might be a discipline distinct from law itself.  Comparison has the 
potential to allow for the aggregation of knowledge that can be used in different ways.  It also 
potentially allows for the identification of similarities and differences, and thus for the 
identification of that which is common, and that which is general; furthermore, it underpins 
the identification of “best solutions”.  Moreover, comparison putatively facilitates an 
exploration of the ways in which different orders interact in a multi-level context; this 
understanding substantiates the ties between comparative and private law, and the 
Europeanisation of the national by the national and European courts in the context of 
European integration. 
 
This section provides a short overview of the doctrinal and functional approaches, which, 
deriving from the practice and scholarship of comparison, have emerged as predominant in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 R. Salleilles, ‘Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé’ (1900) Bull.leg.comp. 383. 
447 Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought’ in Trubek and Santos, The New Law and 
Economic Development, (n.351), pp.19-73. 
448  U. Mattei and M. Reimann, ‘Introduction’ (1998) 46 AJCL 597, p.597. 
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the course of the past century.  The doctrinal approach is considered because it necessarily 
underpins almost every approach to comparison, and indeed, almost any approach to legal 
scholarship.  Similarly, functionalism has come to constitute “the focal point of almost all 
discussions about the field of comparative law as a whole”449; this is also true in relation to 
private and European law.  Notwithstanding, it is clear that both approaches have evolved, 
and can no longer be understood in their orthodox conceptualisations.  Thereafter, in the first 
section of the next chapter, an outline is provided of those approaches advanced which 
attempt to develop comparative analysis as it is relevant to the Europeanisation of private law; 
reference will be made to concrete examples to illustrate the effects that different approaches 
might have on Europeanisation and integration.  While recognising that these approaches 
emerged and developed as part of the critique of orthodox comparison, it is submitted that, for 
the purpose of this thesis, they are still lacking; the focus then shifts to the poverty of the 
methodological and theoretical dimensions of comparative analysis, for the purposes of 
facilitating its further evolution.   
 
a) The Legal Doctrinal Approach to Comparative Analysis 
 
It has generally been understood that doctrinal comparative analysis encompasses the 
identification and comparison of legal rules at the national level.  Despite the scope for the 
development and rethinking of comparison in recent decades, the doctrinal focus has 
constantly continued to dominate.  In particular, the focus in traditional comparative law has 
been (although not exclusively) on the identification and accentuation of similarities (and of 
differences, but only for the purpose of their repression) existing between national legal 
systems, predominantly with a view to reform within one national system itself.  The 
pragmatic and utilitarian aims of comparative analysis are especially clear when it is 
examined through the “national law prism”, which came to dominate with nationalism.  
Subsequently, with the emergence of European integration, the focus partially shifted to the 
promotion of the Europeanisation project450; however, the national law prism continues to 
dominate in this light, particularly considering the focus on harmonisation.  It is on this basis 
that comparison focused on the construction or elimination of similarities and differences 
between norms, as opposed to consideration of the relevant social or cultural context in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 R. Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford; 2008), pp.339-382, p.340. 
450  ‘Il circolo di Trento; Initial Thesis’ (Universita degli studi di Trento, Trento; 1987). 
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these norms emerge, are interpreted and applied.  This conceptualisation, of the technical and 
rationale character of comparison, (mutually) reinforces also the conceptualisation of (private) 
law as a body of technical and rationale rules, left wanting for an ideological foundation; both 
conceptualisations are reinforced further via the functional approach to comparative analysis, 
discussed in more detail below.  
 
Essentially concerned with the analysis of legal rules for the purposes of devising legal 
concepts and doctrine451, doctrinal scholarship encapsulates an essential part of any legal 
system, and allows for the establishment of a framework within which the law can be 
structured452.  It encompasses consideration of the content of law, as identified from primary 
sources, including case law, statute and custom, and reflects the positivist notion of “law as 
rules”453.  The positivist character of the legal doctrinal approach is often taken for granted.  
Notwithstanding, one might ask whether doctrinal analysis can also be considered to be 
normative454; depending on its aims, it must be understood as such.  Doctrinal legal 
scholarship is not limited to the analysis of “law as rules”; rather, as Van Hoecke asserts, it 
encompasses normative dimensions, including the description and systemisation of the law, 
that is, the identification of the content of the various rules found in legal sources (and the 
choice as to the systems and particular norms to be analysed) and the subsequent 
categorisation by virtue of theories and doctrine455.  Fundamentally, a rule which is deemed to 
be legally valid, gives rise to an enforceable obligation and thus prescribes particular 
behaviour; thus, the very subject of the analysis – the rule itself – encompasses some degree 
of normativity456 .  The normativity permeating the analysis is also evident from the 
perspective adopted by the researcher; Dworkin distinguishes between “inside out” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451  P. Chynoweth, ‘Legal Scholarship in the Built Environment:  Epistemological Considerations and Cultural 
Challenges’ (Annual Research Conference of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, September 2006), 
p.5. 
452  M. Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine:  Towards a New 
Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 71 ICLQ 495, p.522. 
453  J.N. Adams and R. Brownsword, Understanding the Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London; 4th edn., 2006), 
pp.2-5. 
454 Chynoweth, ‘Legal Scholarship in the Built Environment:  Epistemological Considerations and Cultural 
Challenges’ (n.451), p.6.  However this notion of normativity does not negate the positivist distinction between 
law and morals; see M.D.A. Freedman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet and Maxwell, London; 7th 
edn., 2001), pp.47-48. 
455 Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative 
Law (n.7), pp.172-174, p.166. 
456  D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, ‘Normative Positivism: The Mirage of the Middle-Way’ (1989) 9 OJLS 
463, p.463. 
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“outside in” critique457.  An “inside out” approach requires that the researcher adopt a position 
“within” the legal system: the critique is made of the relevant doctrine or concept against the 
background of the values espoused in that particular jurisdiction, namely consideration of the 
law from the perspective of legal actors (or legal officials) within the system.  Brownsword 
asserts that different areas of the law are based on different ideological considerations458, 
which the researcher, taking an internal point of view, might try to identify or exploit in order 
to ascertain underlying patterns maintained by those within the system.  An “outside in” 
approach entails that a position outwith the legal system is adopted.  The viewpoint adopted 
will differ, depending on the context of the research and the rule (or more broadly, doctrine) 
under consideration and might include, a rights-based perspective might be taken459 or a 
utilitarian approach adopted460, for example.  If one seeks to identify and facilitate an 
understanding of legal doctrine – adopting what Chynoweth considers an “expository 
tradition in legal research”461 – an inside-out or internal, arguably neutral approach is 
adopted462.  In reality, the approach, deemed to be black-letter, cannot be truly neutral because 
the researcher’s analysis (even of his own legal system) is inherently skewed by his own 
background assumptions and prejudices.  These considerations are particularly relevant to the 
position of the national and European judge explored in Chapter 4. 
 
b) The Functional Approaches to Comparison 
 
The foundations of the functional approach, developed initially by Rabel463, subsequently by 
Rheinstein464, and thereafter predominantly by Zweigert and Kötz, is based on the notion of 
praesumptio similitudinis.  It is the apparent coincidence of function and problem – functional 
equivalence – that underpins comparison, facilitates its practice and the satisfaction of its key 
aim, that is, the identification of a solution to a given problem.  The way in which the relevant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457  R.M. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (Harper Collins, London; 1993), p.29. 
458 R. Brownsword, An Introduction to Legal Research (2006), p.14 
(<www.wellcome.ac.uk/assets/wtx030897.pdf>; Last Accessed: 12.08.2013). 
459 See for example, J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, Oxford; 1972). 
460  See for example, J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J.H. Burns and 
H.L.A. Hart, eds.) (University of London Press, London; 1970). 
461 Chynoweth, ‘Legal Scholarship in the Built Environment:  Epistemological Considerations and Cultural 
Challenges’ (n.451), p.7. 
462  See also Hart, The Concept of Law (n.151), pp.89-90. 
463   E. Rabel, The Law of the Sale of Goods:  A Comparative Study, Vol.I. (Gruyter & Co., Berlin; 1936-58), 
p.67. 
464  M. Rheinstein, ‘Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany’ (1934) 2 Univ.Chic.L.Rev. 232, p.258-
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rules are applied in order to solve the given problems might diverge and thus give rise to 
similar or different results465; this dictates that functionalism concerns fact, which arises when 
rules are applied, and recognises the connection between law and the role it plays in society.  
Functionalism assumes that social problems arising in liberal legal systems are similar.  It is 
the existence of the similarity as to problem which gives rise to the scope for comparison466; 
thereafter, the function of different rules and concepts must be identified to ensure that 
equivalents are being compared467.  Rabel’s conception of functionalism – the comparison of 
the resolution of practical disputes in different legal orders – is intended to leave little scope 
for a normative discourse on domestic law468; this suggests that only the practical application 
of the rules are compared while even doctrinal and conceptual considerations are 
disregarded 469 .  Yet functional comparison must rely on doctrinal scholarship: the 
identification of the way in which a specific problem might be resolved in the system under 
consideration can only be identified via an examination of the relevant rule as it is 
promulgated via legislation, as it is analysed in black-letter scholarship and as it is interpreted 
and applied in courts and by private parties.  
 
At its foundations, functionalism is therefore inherently concerned with similarity and 
difference: it reveals similarities between legal orders as to the problems arising therein, and 
differences as to the solutions identifiable across (national) legal orders.  The focus on 
similarities and differences necessitates that similarities are highlighted and differences 
eliminated470, based on the early twentieth century notion of universality, which advanced the 
notion that comparisons of the rules and concepts of different legal systems will ultimately 
disclose universal legal principles; this was advanced in private law with the focus on 
unification via harmonisation.  Thus, within functionalism there is always an assumption of 
some similarity between legal systems, even if rules appear to diverge on the surface.  The 
development of functionalism does not stop at the identification of similarity and difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 In opposition to Legrand: P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maas.J.Eur.Comp.L. 
111, p.123; see also P. Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now?’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 232. 
466 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), pp.33-34. 
467  Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), pp.33-34. 
468  R. Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’ in D. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory (Blackwell, Cambridge; 1996), pp.184-199,, p.187. 
469 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), p.44. 
470  Consider C. von Bar et al (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft 
Common Frame of Reference: Outline Edition (Seller, München; 2009). 
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but it is clear that, not only are there various functional approaches in various disciplines471 
(this outline will not deal with all) but the function itself means different things, which 
explains why the notion of function can be engaged to explain a breadth of comparative 
analyses.  Thus, the function can be the understanding of law, the development of coherence, 
the determination of commonality, and thus of harmonisation (where this constitutes a 
broader purpose of comparative analysis), as well, arguably, of the determination of that 
which is “best”472.  These functions are identifiable in the CJEU and explored in Chapter 8.   
 
From Schlesinger’s engagement with functionalism, in respect of which he identified fact 
patterns or problems within one system, and compared the reactions within different legal 
systems as part of the “living law” therein473, Sacco developed his legal formants approach 
under the banner of structuralism.  The comparatist must identify the specific tools 
(formants474) of a legal system, which include its practices, the rules shaping judicial 
decisions, arguments and justifications, and the discourse in which lawyers engage, in order 
to explain and analyse how they fit with the legal system as a whole.  Sacco understands that 
the past (and also future) development of the law can be explained via an uncovering of the 
interaction between these formants; they cannot be understood separately but only as part of 
the system’s broader structure475.  These are to be examined within a single country, and one 
rule is to be derived from a process of interpretation: however, there is neither an assumption 
that one single rule exists nor that one interpretation exists (in this sense, Sacco engages with 
the potential for difference476) nor that this process of interpretation removes the scope for 
conflict477.  Structuralism aims to promote, via scientific method, the understanding of the 
legal system by uncovering the way in which the structures from which it is made interrelate.  
While the approach is one which focuses on the “elements at work” within a legal system478, 
it is intended to be scientific, that is to say, it aims, like positivism to draw a distinction 
between “is” and “ought”; thus, while the context in which the system of law is placed is 
deemed to be pertinent, structural analysis does not engage with the relationships between law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 Rather, see Michaels, ‘The Functional Method’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (n.449), pp.345-363. 
472 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), p.47. 
473 Schlesinger, ‘The Past and Future of Comparative Law’ (n.9). 
474 Structuralism and the notion of formant, find their foundations outside of law, in the theory of learning and 
language. 
475 R. Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment I of II)’ (1991) 39 AJCL 1 
and ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment II of II)’ (1991) 39 AJCL 343. 
476 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants (Instalment I of II)’ (n.475), p.21. 
477 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants (Instalment I of II)’ (n.475), p.22-23. 
478 Sacco, ‘Legal Formants (Instalment II of II)’ (n.475), p.343. 
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and this political, cultural or socio-economic context479.  By highlighting the “elements at 
work” dimension of functionalism, Sacco highlighted one of the fundamental shortcomings of 
comparison, that is, the absence of a perspective which allows for the dynamic nature of law 
to be understood.  In the context of this thesis, this emerges in respect of the lack of scope for 
the dynamic nature of private law to be fully appreciated by current conceptualisations of 
comparison.  A similar understanding forms the foundation of the Common Core of Private 
Law project480.  While there are broader goals underpinning the project – including the 
promotion of a common culture – the predominant aim is the identification of the common 
core of European private law for the purposes of identifying a “map of the law of Europe”.   
While they recognise that the project might have other consequences, including its use as a 
tool of harmonisation481, Mattei and Bussani highlight that “[w]hile we believe that cultural 
diversity is an asset, we do not wish to take a preservationist approach. Nor do we wish to 
push in the direction of uniformity”482.  In this sense, while the Trento project consider 
difference, they do not look for difference; rather, they look – factually, via questionnaires - to 
identify commonality and unity, regardless – as we will see below – of its use beyond 
scholarship.  This type of assumption depoliticises comparative law (and private law) and 
attributes to the methodology and the relevant norms an apparently technical, apolitical 
character.  
 
The similarities and differences identified might constitute the foundation of the recognition 
of principles of Union law by the CJEU.   Furthermore, similarity and difference might be 
engaged as the basis of, and further even shaping, the normative determination as to the “best 
solution”483; this identification is often engaged as the basis of an ideal law484.  These 
considerations are explored in Chapter 9.  In respect of the latter two considerations, 
functionalism gives rise to the understanding of law as instrumental, and to the “social 
engineering” role that law might play, either where there exists a determination of what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 However, neither Schlesinger, nor Sacco, adhered to the positivist, nation-state based understanding of law.   
480 M. Bussani and U. Mattei (eds.), Making European Law. Essays on the Common Core Project (Quaderni del 
Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, Trento; 2000); A. Peters and H. Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law Beyond 
Post-Modernism’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 800, pp.809-810. 
481 M. Bussani and U. Mattei, ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’ (1997-1998) 3 
Col.J.Eur.L. 339, pp.339-341. 
482 Bussani and Mattei, Making European Law (n.480), pp.1-2. 
483 W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context (CUP, Cambridge; 2nd edn., 2006), p.46. 
484 Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’ in Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (n.468), 
pp.185-187. 
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purpose to be achieved or not485.  Comparison might therefore often be used in processes of 
harmonisation, for the purposes of promoting similarity, overcoming difference or identifying 
“best solutions”486; however, as will be explored below, comparison – as it currently exists – 
does not provide the tools to make such a determination. The pinnacle of these combined 
approaches is the DCFR.  This normativity might also be engaged in the judiciary.  Functional 
comparative analysis is not just about description but about identifying and determining the 
arguments for and against the recognition of or following of specific rules, principles, values, 
or ideologies. These determinations are shaped by factors which extend far beyond positivist 
understandings underlying legal doctrine; indeed, as to the latter, Brownsword and Adams 
highlight the fundamental distinction in adjudicative ideologies, namely between a formalist 
ideology, whereby the judiciary strives to uphold the law as expressed in statute and 
precedent, and a realist ideology, on the basis of which the courts seek to achieve the 
“correct” (or “best”) result487.  Thus, functionalism neither merely concerned with the 
practical application of rules nor is it merely doctrinal.  It promotes the positivist distinction 
between descriptive and normative comparison, between the “is” (the apolitical) and the 
“ought” (the political)488.  Functionalism itself must therefore necessarily be understood as 
necessary political, finding its origins in a particular understanding of justice established on 
the basis of natural law489.   
 
c) Shifts in Comparative Legal Scholarship  
 
The critique of comparative methodology and theory is developed in the following section, in 
respect of the theoretical and methodological deficits of comparison.  Firstly, the above 
evaluation is placed in a context which allows for the integration of the evolution of 
comparative analysis in consideration of broader shifting critique in scholarship, particularly 
to the extent that these discourses call into question the predominance of doctrinal and 
functional comparison.  Critical legal studies490  as it originates in the USA, finds its 
foundations in progressive “leftist” political thinking and legal realism, wherein law is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485 Michaels, ‘The Functional Method’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(n.449), p.351. 
486 Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context (n.483), p.46. 
487  Adams and Brownsword, Understanding the Law (n.453), pp.142-147. 
488  U. Mattei, 'The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship. Postmodernism and International Style in the Legal 
Architecture of Europe' (2001) 75 Tul.L.Rev. 1053, p.1082. 
489 J. Hill, ‘Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory’ (1989) OJLS 101, p.103. 
490 Hereinafter, “CLS”; G. Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison:  Re-Thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 
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understood to form part of a “complex normative system”.  A distinction must be drawn 
between the US and Europe, as the danger of “importing” US ideology generates assertions 
concerning the Americanisation of Europe.   As Mattei notes, critical scholarship is not new 
to European scholars; notwithstanding, European scholarship has largely confined itself to the 
mainstream, politically-speaking.  In Europe, CLS finds connections in postmodernism, 
which has not been “leftist” as such.  The understanding of the postmodern and the “political 
implications of the postmodern condition in the making of European law”491 continue to lack 
clarity492.  The postmodern critique of functional and doctrinal comparison is based on the 
rejection of a politically neutral, universalist approach and calls for the analysis to take 
account of its necessarily political, socio-economic and cultural background493.  It is only on 
such a basis that comparative analysis can be engaged, its subject deconstructed and 
reconstructed and its processes and mechanisms examined.  Furthermore, the hermeneutic 
dimension of postmodernism underpins the understanding of comparison as subjective, 
entirely uprooted from any scientific foundations.  The engagement and analysis is 
necessarily subjective, formed through discourse between the relevant institutions; this will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 9 with regard to the emergence and evolution of judicial 
dialogue.   
 
Both CLS and postmodernism reject the focus on universalism and the idea of neutrality.  
From the CLS perspective, comparative analysis must move beyond the focus on positivism, 
functionalism and structuralism494; it must transcend the predominant (albeit not exclusive, as 
noted) focus on similarity (or the mere consideration of difference for the purposes of its 
repression). Thus, the putative – yet unclear - legal, political, socio-economic and cultural 
consequences of postmodernism are of considerable significance where legal scholars are 
considered as “actors in a political game”495.  From this perspective, the connection between 
CLS and new legal realism can be drawn; the latter is concerned with the transformation of 
the state and state-focused law, and thus promotes the need for the engagement of 
sociological and empirical assessment and the analysis of the pluralist characters of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 Mattei, 'The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship’ (n.488), p.1055. 
492 To the extent that postmodern scholarship broadly constitutes a challenge to the certainty of pre-existing 
understandings of reality, it necessarily calls into question existing assumptions as to coherence and clarity; 
indeed, one of the key criticisms of postmodernism challenges its vagueness and absence of content.  
493 P. Legrand, 'Paradoxically, Derrida' (2005) 27 Cardozo Law Review 631, p.662. 
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developing legal orders496.  Yet while CLS challenges the status quo, it differs from new legal 
realism to the extent that it retains its links to positivism, understood as positive law 
supported by the state; the link between law and the state continues to exist because the Crits 
understand their battle as a political one, existing within a territorially-defined space497.   
 
The postmodern analysis brings to the fore the need for a reconsideration of the understanding 
of law as apolitical, the collary of which is the characterisation of legal rules as “technical”.  
A shift from this understanding requires, particularly in relation to comparative law and the 
Europeanisation of private law by the judiciary, that the significant political dimensions of the 
notions of culture, tradition and identity, and in particular, the references to “self” and 
“other”, are recognised.  However, a critical approach must nevertheless be adopted; legal 
scholarship – especially that on comparative law, and in particular, from a postmodern 
perspective – remains overtly conservative, avoiding paying due recognition to the diversities 
of legal cultures and traditions as well the consequences of as legal and cultural change, rather 
accepting or even promoting cultural and legal staticism.  Furthermore, the reference to the 
diversity of cultures, traditions and therein, identities, is frequently engaged in right-wing 
rhetoric as a means of promoting nationalistic tendencies; this is also true in the European 
context in respect of the “protection” (read: insulation) of “self”, i.e. the “national”, from the 
influence of the “other”.  While these concepts – and tradition in particular – might be 
understood to invoke notions of continuity and stability, of passing something along a chain 
and thus rooted in the past, giving rise to broad notions of embeddedness, it has been 
submitted that, if understood within and also beyond the national context, the notions of 
belonging and thus of identity, which find their roots in these notions of culture and tradition 
are multiple, that is to say, not exclusive.  This adheres to the assertion made in Chapter 2 that 
any European culture need not be single or distinct but should rather engage the plurality 
existing across the European space. 
 
ii. The Poverty of Mainstream Comparative Analysis: Theoretical and 
Methodological Deficits 
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The critique of comparative law is not difficult to identify, neither in legal discourse 
generally, nor in respect of the methodological discourse particularly.  In this section, an 
attempt is made to bring together the theoretical - while Legrand refers to “the poverty of 
legal theory in the comparative field”498, Van Hoecke highlights the discord between “naive 
epistemological optimism” and “strong epistemological pessimism” 499 - and practical 
sufferings of comparative law, and to engage these considerations with regard to the 
particularities of the Europeanisation of private law.   
 
There is no lack of recognition of the neglect of the subject’s theoretical underpinnings; a 
discussion re-ignited recently in the context of postmodern discourses within and beyond 
law500.  Two strands of critique are explored herein, underpinning the lack of theoretical 
framework: the absence of understanding as to what comparative analysis is and what it is for, 
and the reluctance of comparatists to engage with theoretical considerations.  Örücü identifies 
an epistemological categorisation of two variations of comparative law – the first, which 
represents comparative law as an independent discipline or legal science, and the second, 
which represents comparative law as a “mere” methodology501.  With regard to the former, 
reference can be made to the marginal status generally accorded to comparative law502 and the 
lack of appreciation of comparative law as a distinct scientific discipline, particularly in legal 
education503.  With regard to the latter, the debate surrounding the very nature of comparative 
analysis continues, as it is generally accepted that it must constitute more than a mere 
methodology employed in legal research.  There is a risk inherent in attaching oneself too 
rigidly to one of these polar opposite variations.  On the one hand, an exceptionally broad 
conception of comparison, one that conceives of comparison as, for example, any process of 
study of foreign or international legal elements, arguably cannot constitute comparative 	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500  See for example, Peters and Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism’ (n.480).  Yet, 
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analysis proper.  At the other extreme, an understanding of comparison which “would confine 
comparative law to a purely speculative science – an ‘exercise in hermeneutics’ or the object 
of a theoretical reflection, especially on the epistemological level”504, is unduly narrow.  
There is a very clear need to conceive of comparison in a manner that achieves a satisfactory 
balance between these two extremes and recognises that the variation employed may differ 
depending on the identity of the comparatist, the nature of the research being undertaken and 
the context in which this is done505. 
 
As Örücü understands the acquisition of new knowledge to reflect the foremost purpose of 
comparative law506, Reimann asserts that it must be understood as more than a method of 
inquiry given the substantial body of knowledge to which academic scholarship and the 
practice of comparison throughout the 20th century has given rise.  This knowledge concerns 
the nature, purposes and processes of comparison itself507, the structure and content of foreign 
norms which has allowed for the mapping of different constructs including that of legal 
families.  Sacco, in the context of structuralism, has considered that “comparative law remains 
a science as long as it acquires knowledge and regardless of whether or not the knowledge is 
put to any further use”508; he thus seems to suggest that the use of comparative analysis can be 
justified regardless of any practical benefit arising.  Thus, the Trento Group highlights that 
comparison “understood as a science, necessarily aims at the better understanding of legal 
data.  Ulterior tasks, such as the improvement of the law or interpretation are worthy of the 
greatest consideration but nevertheless are only secondary ends of comparative research”509.  
The fundamental “product” of comparison is the acquisition of knowledge; the more 
pragmatic aims of comparative law are deemed to be “ulterior”.  While the “fruits” of 
comparative law may be of use to those in practice, for the purposes of law reform and the 
harmonisation of law, these fruits are nevertheless produced via comparative law as a legal 
science, predominantly an academic pursuit and the concern of those involved in legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504  X. Blanc-Jouvan, ‘Centennial World Congress on Comparative Law:  Closing Remarks’ (2001) 75 Tul.L.Rev, 
1235, p.1236. 
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scholarship510.  In this respect - as comparative analysis is a “quest for knowledge”511 - it must 
necessarily be understood that “comparative law, properly pursued, is an essentially 
philosophical activity”512; an epistemological dimension, which engages both legal theory and 
the methodological discourses of comparison, is identifiable.  However, the opposite of 
Sacco’s assertion – the notion that the numerous practical purposes, to which the knowledge 
gained can be put, can single-handedly provide a satisfactory justification of comparison – is 
controversial513.  Generally, the pragmatic aims of comparison are often advanced over and 
above the arguably more abstract notion of the “acquisition of knowledge”, notwithstanding 
that this is underpinning; these include the facilitation of legal practice, law reform (by the 
national legislature, the European legislature, international bodies and private actors, 
including civil society organisations and private individuals), the promotion of harmonisation 
and unification (particularly at the European and transnational levels )514 and furthermore, the 
filling of gaps via judicial law-making (in both national and European courts).  In discussing 
the practice of comparative analysis, it seems appropriate to highlight the (almost unique)515 
nature of law in terms of the two realisms of reasoning with which comparatists must 
necessarily be concerned: on the one hand, law as a form of practical reasoning, reflects 
primary reason, informs lawyers of how to practice law, and is institutionalised in the legal 
profession; underlying this first order reasoning is secondary reasoning, constituting 
reflections on the practice of law.  Within legal scholarship and practice, lawyers must be 
concerned with both.   
 
The second of the fiercest criticisms in relation to the absence of a theoretical framework of 
comparison stems from the idea that comparatists should not concern themselves with 
philosophical considerations and provides a connection with the methodological deficit of 
comparison.  To return to Van Hoecke’s distinction between epistemological optimism and 
epistemological pessimism, those who adhere to the latter assert that cultural divergence 
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between legal systems 516  precludes a comparatist from being able to understand the 
specificities (including the normative content, character and assumptions) of the jurisdiction 
for the purposes of facilitating worthwhile comparison.  It can be said that inherent in 
epistemological pessimism is a “perfectionist view of ‘understanding’”517 such that nothing 
less than unqualified understanding will suffice; if the methodologies engaged and the 
knowledge derived are not absolute, this will preclude efficient comparison.  Those who fall 
within the former attach little importance to a supposedly debilitating theoretical reflection of 
comparative methodologies.  An observation of the German legal philosopher Gustav 
Radbruch has been adopted by Zweigert and Kötz518 to highlight this line of reasoning: 
“obsession with one’s own wellbeing is a sign of sickness in people as well as in 
scholarship”519.  The reluctance to engage with the theoretical considerations can also be 
identified in Weir’s rejection of the suggestion that theory necessarily underpins every legal 
institution520: “it is possible for us, like Hamlet, to tell a hawk from a handsaw and to do so 
without a complete theory of aerial predators or an exhaustive inventory of the carpenter’s 
toolbox”521.  From this perspective, comparatists seek to renounce philosophical reflection as 
a concern of legal theorists and instead seek to concentrate on “doing” comparative analysis.   
 
Thus, not only is it clear that the foundations of comparative law are reflected in a 
theoretically unstable ideological basis, which comes to influence its aims and purposes522, 
but it is also criticised for its methodological deficits.  These considerations are necessarily 
intertwined.  As Reimann notes, there is a severe lack of scholarship on how we actually “do” 
comparison523, concerning not only the identification and determination of what is being 
compared, namely the determination of the relevant unit of analysis, but also the manner in 
which comparison is undertaken, the notion of comparative analysis in context being of 
particular significance.  What we seem to have are acceptances of insights adopted by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516  See P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 45, esp. p.52. 
517 Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative 
Law (n.7), p.173. 
518  K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (T. Weir trans.) (OUP, Oxford; 3rd edn., 1998), 
p.33. 
519  G. Radbruch, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft, (Quelle & Mayer, Leipzig; 13th edn., 1982). 
520  G. Samuel, ‘Comparative Law and Jurisprudence’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 817, p.826; notwithstanding, Weir’s 
statement begs the question: of whether this “anti-theory” stance is nevertheless theoretical. 
521  T. Weir, ‘Contracts in Rome and England’ (1992) 66 Tul.L.Rev. 1615, p.1616. 
522 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 MLR 1; Patrick Glenn, ‘Legal Cultures 
and Legal Traditions’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (n.27). 
523  M. Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century’ 
(2002) 50 AJCL. 671, p.689.  
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comparatists in the past524.  Thus, it is now generally accepted that in comparing legal systems 
we need to compare in context, and so we must go beyond a consideration of what is provided 
for the in the rulebooks and identify the way in which the legal rules are applied in practice.  
A significant consideration underlying the lack of guidance as to comparative analysis as a 
process must relate to its “laissez-faire” characterisation.  Notwithstanding the interactions 
inherent between theory and practice, there exists a breadth of reasoning which suggests why 
– as a general rule – comparatists are reluctant to undertake philosophical reflection on their 
practice, a reluctance which necessarily undermines any reflection on its methodology.  
Comparatists who reject theoretical considerations are perhaps wary and apprehensive as to 
the difficulties inherent in a dalliance with legal theory525; indeed, it has been suggested that 
delving into a theoretical reflection of comparative analysis, with the potential of giving rise 
to a conceptualisation of comparison which looks beyond study of rules to the “law in action” 
and recognising the need to consider the context within which the rules exist, sets an 
“unrealistic and unattainable standard...entirely unworkable at the practical level”526.  This 
latter consideration is of particular relevance in respect of the workload of the CJEU (and 
national courts).  The theoretically “laissez-faire” approach to the development of comparison 
has also attributed to comparatists a wide scope, which they might be reluctant to relinquish.  
Kahn-Freund considered that comparatists had been afforded the “gift of freedom”527 such 
that they could decide exactly what they should compare and how they should go about doing 
it; each scholar thus seemed to develop his own methodology of comparative analysis with 
the result that it is now extremely difficult to concretely identify the dimensions of the 
comparative methodology.   
 
Having sketched the doctrinal and functional approaches to comparison, this subsection looks 
to briefly outline the key approaches advanced in respect of the Europeanisation of private 
law.  Thereafter, the scope for a reconceptualised understanding of comparison is explored.   
 
II. “Complex” Comparative Analysis in Light of the Scope for the Europeanisation of 
Private Law  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 E. Rabel, Gesammelte Aufstäge (Vol. III), pp.3-6. 
525  M. Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century’ 
(2002) 50 AJCL 671, p.688. 
526  V.V. Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando:  Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2005) 53 
AJCL 262, p.263.  
527  O. Kahn-Freund, ‘‘Comparative Law as an Academic Subject’ (1966) 82 LQR 40, p.41. 
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i. A Critical Evaluation of the Orthodox Approaches to Comparative Analysis 
 
a) From Orthodox to Complex Comparison via Legal Scholarship 
 
Many of the contributions to comparative law pertaining to European private law 
development have been advanced in the context of legal scholarship.  The PECL and the 
DCFR, developed by the Lando Commission and the Study Group on a European Civil Code 
respectively, have been outlined above.  Reference might be made to other scholarly 
undertakings, including the Common Core and Kötz’s project on European Contract Law528, 
both of which engaged the functionalist approach.  Underpinning these scholarly activities, 
although perhaps neither explicit nor intended, has been a focus on harmonisation.  The 
PECL, which is composed of three books and provides sets of principles  - essentially in a 
codified form – on general contract law (without providing for the acquis), was developed by 
national reporters, and drafted, discussed and refined by drafting and editing groups, beyond 
any one national system.  It had the purpose of facilitating trade and the internal market and 
thus, while identifying similarities and difficulties (with the aim of overcoming the latter), the 
identification of a set of neutral rules.  The PECL has come to be relevant to national law 
reform529, the revision of the acquis and furthermore, the approaches of the DCFR Study and 
Acquis groups.  
 
In its revision of the acquis, the Commission advocated an approach based on comparative 
analysis, one which steered clear in so far as possible from a focus on one particular legal 
order but which nevertheless adhered to a state-based understanding of the role of 
comparative analysis in the Europeanisation of law530.  Two key approaches can be identified 
and are explored in more detail through the thesis.  Firstly, the comparative analysis has 
largely focused on the identification of norms shared across national systems, that is, the 
“common core”531.  This approach has developed contemporaneously with the Commission’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 H. Kötz, European Contract Law (T. Weir trans.) (OUP, Oxford; 1998). 
529 Used in certain national courts as a source of inspiration and a driver of change.  See the examples of Spanish 
and Dutch case law in C. Vendrell Cervantes, ‘The Application of the Principles of European Contract Law by 
Spanish Courts’ (2008) 16 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 534 and D. Busch, ‘The Principles of 
European Contract Law Before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands’ (2008) 16 Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 549. 
530 The most noteworthy critique is relates to the significance of normative determination in comparative law and 
the idea that mere comparison of legal rules is insufficient.  Approaches to comparative law which purport to 
provide a solution to this issue, for example the functional approach advocated by Zweigert and Kötz: Zweigert 
and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), pp.34 et seq – have not been accepted without critique. 
531 See Bussani and Mattei, Making European Law (n.480). 
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request that the Common Frame of Reference should elaborate the “best solutions found in 
Member States’ legal orders” 532 by determining “clear definitions of legal terms, fundamental 
principles and coherent model rules of contract law, drawing on the acquis communautaire 
(the secondary legislation already in place)”533.  The pinnacle of these combined approaches 
is identifiable in the DCFR534, the academic drafters of which engaged in a comparative 
analysis of the norms, including rules, principles and concepts, and “the lessons of national 
experience”535 for the purposes of identifying the “best solutions”536 and the principles 
underlying Union law537.  The DCFR followed a code-based structure notwithstanding the 
absence of support for the construction of a European civil code538.  
 
Yet comparative scholarship has been developed beyond the DCFR.  In light of the evolution 
of functionalist and instrumentalist approaches, one might also refer to comparative law and 
economics scholarship, which engages a discipline external to law, strictly understood, and 
the legal origins theory to which it has given rise.  The former is of specific relevance to the 
legal transplants discourse, based on one particular function of legal norms, namely, 
efficiency, which it is anticipated will eventually lead to convergence539.  The identification of 
different solutions to problems in divergent legal systems gives rise to a “market” of 
solutions540, the most efficient of which is “adopted”.  The latter explores, via empirical 
analysis, the impact of legal origin on legal development, essentially in respect of the freedom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 In particular, those of “developed” legal orders; European Commission, ‘Action Plan on European Contract 
Law: A More Coherent European Contract Law’ COM(2003) 63 final, p.17. 
533 Commission, ‘Communication on European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis’ (n.274), p.3. 
534 Part of which, namely, the sales contract section, now constitutes the foundation of the pCESL. 
535 J. Mummery, ‘Links with National Courts’ in P. Moser and K. Sawyer (eds.), Making Community Law: The 
Legacy of AG Jacobs at the ECJ (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2008), pp.100-114, p.109. 
536 In particular, the focus of the Study Group: C. von Bar et al (eds.), Principles, Definition and Model Rules of 
European Private Law:  Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR, Outline Edition) (Sellier, München; 2009); 
the sales part of the DCFR has come to form the Proposal for a CESL: European Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law’ COM(2011) 635 final. 
537 The focus of the Acquis Group. 
538 Considering in particular, as Schulze highlights, the difficulty in the mere transfer of what exists at the 
national level to the EU level: ”e.g. with regard to different competences and tasks of a state on the one hand, 
and a supranational union on the other; with respect to European private law’s specific tasks concerning the 
realisation and functioning of the Internal Market and with regard to the new role of EU fundamental rights in 
the field of private law”; R. Schulze, ‘Contours of European Private Law’ in R. Schulze and H. Schulte-Nölke 
(eds.), European Private Law: Current Status and Perspectives (Sellier, München; 2011), pp.3-26, p.6. 
539 On the basis of the Coase theorem, that is, ”that the more efficient legal theories and solutions would spread 
around in a world with zero transaction costs”, U. Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (U.Michigan, Ann 
Arbor; 1997), p.219. 
540  A. Ogus, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to 
Comparative Law’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 405. 
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attributed to legal actors on the basis of these different origins541.  The legal origins discourse 
has been linked to the World Bank’s Doing Business reports542 in respect of the impact on 
policy reform543.  The comparative law and economics, legal origins and World Bank 
discourses challenge orthodox understandings of comparative law, as each extends beyond 
legal discourse (to the extent that it has tended to preclude analysis to economic analysis and 
the notion of competition between legal systems544).  However, these approaches necessarily 
retain a state-centred focus, reflected - particularly in the legal origins understanding – in the 
civil and common law divide545.  Furthermore, neither attributes sufficient consideration to 
the cultural context of law; rather, the focus falls on the legal solution deriving from 
economic efficiency.  This is particularly true of the World Bank reports, which is required by 
its Charter, to adopt an apolitical understanding of legal development.  Furthermore, it 
initially adopted a “one size fits all” method where not only problems but also solutions were 
identified as universal, regardless of legal, political, cultural or socio-economic context; the 
World Bank has only recently moved away from this orthodoxy546.  In light of the approach to 
comparative analysis advanced below, which pleads for a context-orientated perspective, this 
understanding does not fit well with the perspective of legal development adopted herein.  
 
In line with the notion of the existence of a variety of solutions, Smits’ theory of comparative 
law provides that private individuals should be able to choose the law applicable to their 
relations.  Challenging the pervasiveness of the economic rationale underpinning legislative 
harmonisation, he rather favours a “bottom up” approach to the drafting of legislative norms.  
The parties’ choice of norms might eventually lead to harmonisation but this is rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 R. la Porta et al, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 113; R. la Porta et al, ‘The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 286. 
542 World Bank, Doing Business 2014 Report (World Bank, Washington D.C.; 2013); The World Bank Doing 
Business Reports purports to develop “modernisation processes based on benchmark techniques and best 
practice indicators”; for the purposes of identifying “best practices in business” regulation, there exist (now) 
eleven sets of indicators, each of which measures the extensiveness of the regulatory environment in which a 
business exists at any given time. 
543 See for example R. Michaels, ‘The Functionalism of Legal Origins’ in M. Faure and J.M. Smits (eds.), Does 
Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth (Intersentia, Groningen; 2011), pp.21-40.  
544 With the potential for consideration of the idea of “measuring” those systems in light of the relevant social 
and historical background, including pertinent policy considerations.  For an approach favouring a 
neoinstitutional approach over orthodox neoclassical economic theory, see R. Caterina, ‘Comparative Law and 
Economics’, in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2006), 
pp.161-171. 
545 R. Michaels, ‘Comparative Law By Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, And the 
Silence of Traditional Comparative Law’ (2009) 57 AJCL 765. 
546 R. Zoellick, ‘Democratizing Development Economics’ 29.09.2010, Georgetown University, wherein he 
noted: “The record of development has shown that one size won’t fit all” 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22716997~pagePK:34370~piPK:427
70~theSitePK:4607,00.html>; Last Accessed: 01.04.2014). 
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spontaneous, occurring gradually in line with the emergence of a European legal culture as 
individuals become more educated about what occurs at the European level.  His focus on 
private actors and their behaviour shifts his analysis beyond the state547; furthermore, he looks 
to learn from outside of the Union, particularly from those “mixed legal systems” that reflect 
a mixture of legal cultures and traditions548.  While Smits’ emphasis falls neither wholly on 
unification nor on the identification of similarity over divergence, the fundamental difficulty 
with Smits’ approach arises from the lack of clarification as to the significance attributed to 
cultural context.  While it seems that his approach attributes greater significance to culture for 
the purposes of identifying the relationship between law and culture549, he also asserts that 
“linking law to other societal and cultural phenomena of a specific country would be 
impossible”550. 
 
While these approaches reflect shifts in the conceptualisations of comparison beyond 
doctrinalism and functionalism, it is submitted that they remain problematic for a number of 
reasons.  In particular, two dimensions of comparative analysis come to the fore: on the one 
hand, the focus on the identification of commonalities for the purposes of promoting 
unification via codification551 or harmonisation, notwithstanding that, as is submitted below, 
harmonisation – as is clear in light of its different reaches, evaluated above – does not 
preclude diversity, and on the other hand, the rationale and determinative factors for the 
identification of “best solutions”.  These dimensions have been recognised in the CJEU and 
are explicated in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9552.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 J.M. Smits, Private Law 2.0: On the Role of Private Actors in a Post-National Society, Inaugural Lecture 
Maastricht-HiiL Chair (HiiL, The Hague, 2011). 
548 J.M. Smits (ed.), The Contribution of Mixed Legal Systems to European Private Law (Intersentia, Groningen; 
2001). 
549 J.M. Smits, ‘European Private Law and the Comparative Method’ in C. Twigg-Flesner (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to European Union Private Law (CUP, Cambridge; 2010), pp.33-43, p.42. 
550 J.M. Smits, ‘The Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe: Some Insights From Evolutionary Theory’ (2002) 
31 Georg.J.Int.Comp.L. 79, p.80. 
551 Largely dominant, until recently, as note above, while the Commission has taken a more “sedate” approach 
recently: European Commission, ‘Green Paper from the Commission on Policy Options for Progress Towards a 
European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses of 1 July 2010’, COM(2010) 348 final. 
552 See, for example, the reference to these projects in the Opinions of the AG and judgements of the Court; it 
seems that, at least initially, the AGs have been more open to engaging such sources: for example, reference can 
be made to C-412/06 Annelore Hamilton v Volksbank Filder [2008] ECR I-02383, Opinion of AG Maduro, 
para.24, fn.48-49 (limitation of actions as a common principle, general reference to PECL and DCFR); Quelle 
(n.241), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.28 (duty of specific performance and its limitations, reference to Art.9.102 
(1) and (2) PECL).   
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As to the latter, the “best solution” is identified in response to a particular problematic, from 
the aggregation of knowledge engendered by comparative analysis.  It derives from the 
functionalist approach, which dictates that the theoretical foundations of mainstream 
comparison are inherently related to the identification of solutions to comparable practical 
problems553.  The existence of a solution in a number – even a majority of systems – cannot 
provide a basis upon which a determination of that which is “best” can be made; furthermore, 
functionalism itself does not provide any relevant criteria for such a determination.  For 
Michaels, who considers that it “provides surprisingly limited tools for evaluation”, there 
must be “something else”, which need not necessarily be found in law, and less so, in a single 
dimension of the methodological approach adopted554.   The identification of the “best/better” 
solution necessarily invokes a value-based, normative judgement, revealing the ideological 
appreciation not only shaping the comparative analysis adopted but also underpinning the 
particular decision made555; however current understandings of comparative analysis do not 
provide a satisfactory metric by which a normative determination can be made.  Yet it has 
been submitted that even the mere consideration of foreign rules and case law, which might 
reflect a laissez-faire or neoliberal approach to comparative analysis, reflect essentially 
political activities, even with a (albeit, potentially implicit) focus on harmonisation; they have 
a normative determination which necessarily involves evaluation, and which thus renders it as 
an essentially political process, shaped by policy considerations. 
 
The former consideration reflects “comparative law’s habitual focus on identifying 
commonalities”556 for the purpose of facilitating unification via harmonisation; even if this is 
neither expressly stated, nor expressly intended, it necessarily shapes the comparison 
undertaken.  The focus on similarity has the potential to set limits to comparative analysis.  
On the one hand, it often leads to the study of similar legal orders557 at the expense of others; 
furthermore, as Zimmermann notes, the underlying purpose of harmonisation advanced an 
approach, which predominantly (but not necessarily exclusively) dictates that similarities are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553  Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison’ (n.490), p.418-421.  
554 Michaels, ‘The Functional Method’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(n.449), p.374. 
555  Hill, ‘Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory’ (n.489), p.102. 
556 V.G. Curran, 'Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's Potential for Broadening Legal Perspectives' (1998) 
46 AJCL 657, p.666. 
557 G. Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarity or Difference?’ in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford; 2008), pp.383-419, p.387. 
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identified and promoted for the purpose of advancing unification558, while differences are 
identified merely for the purpose of their repression559.  This critique has been met in critical 
comparison, which – building on Gutteridge’s assertion that comparison should look to 
divergence as well as similarity560 - emerged in Frankenberg’s promotion of the difference 
theory, which challenged the neutrality of functionalism (given our inherent, culturally-
derived assumptions) and urged comparatists to understand themselves as “participant 
observers”561.  The “difference theory” not only dictates that there exists no level at which 
differences between national cultures and traditions are, or can be, entirely absent562 but 
further advances that these divergences should neither be disregarded nor eliminated for the 
purposes of facilitating a smoother path towards the harmonisation, and subsequent 
unification, of law563; it also aims to promote engagement with that which is different – the 
“other” – recognising the relevant socio-economic, political, and cultural context564.  The 
difference theory is engaged – with the cultural perspective underpinning – in the scholarship 
on legal transfers, discussed below.   
 
b) The Legal Transfers Discourse 
 
The legal transfers discourse reflects one key dimension of the relevance of comparative 
analysis to the Europeanisation of private law.  The Watson and Legrand discourse occupies a 
continuum.  At one end of the spectrum, Legrand asserts that “legal transplants” are 
impossible.  Rules, he asserts, cannot be separated from legal culture, the latter shaped by 
economic, social, cultural and political context.  Legal culture and tradition are products of 
creation and considerable experience, which cannot be easily replicated and is not the same in 
every legal context; as such, rules cannot survive transplantation.  By highlighting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Zimmermann, ‘Europeanization of Private Law’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (n.62). 
559 Which is to say, as a matter of practice, while divergence of legal norms will not legitimise legislative activity 
in itself, Art.114 TFEU nevertheless requires the existence of divergences, operating to undermine the 
functioning of the internal market.  It is for the European legislature to identify the scope, existence and impact 
of such divergence, and adopt the most appropriate legal instrument; the engagement with Art.114 TFEU 
therefore requires a preliminary analysis of the relevant national norms, dictating that comparative analysis – 
deemed to be a “harmonising handmaiden” (Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context (n.483), p.46) is 
necessarily fundamental to the legislative development of private law 
560 H.C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law (CUP, Cambridge; 1946), pp.8-9. 
561 See also, Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’ in Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(n.468). 
562 Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’ in Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (n.468), 
p.193-197. 
563 Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (n.516); Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison’ 
(n.490), p.434-440.  
564 Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison’ (n.490), p.443. 
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significance of context in legal development, Legrand asserts that where there is evidence of 
“legal transplantation”, the rule may be transferred but in the process, it loses its meaning; it 
is the cultural context, from which the rule, institution or principle derives its meaning.  The 
loss of this context renders the transfer unsuccessful because that which is transferred loses its 
original meaning or its meaning is changed565.  This discourse, to the extent that it can be said 
to promote the notion that the successful566 legal transfer must not only “fit” the “receiving” 
legal system 567  but also retain its shape and content, necessitates consensus on the 
understanding, assessment and determination of “success”, which is lacking 568 .  The 
appearance of convergence merely “papers over” the unbridgeable deep structures which 
remain569. 
 
If one follows this continuum to its opposite pole, Watson understands that transfers can be 
made between comparatively different legal systems through the cross-border activities of the 
legal profession, as it is understood that there exists little connection between law and societal 
background570.  Watson’s “legal transplants” theory challenges the “mirror theory” of legal 
development, advocating that law develops from internal, not external pressure, such that the 
cross-cultural transfer of rules, institutions and principles across societies is possible.  Thus 
norms can be separated from the “spirit of the law”; it is understood that law, which derives 
its own character from the characteristics and nature of the legal profession, is neither 
embedded in culture, nor does it necessarily have to be understood as being connected to 
social, political or economic evolution but is rather autonomous.  Watson’s thesis is based on 
empirical evidence of the transfer of legal rules, institutions and principles, primarily deriving 
from an analysis of Roman laws transplanted in bulk into the continental systems, and 
constituting the foundation for national – predominantly those which subsequently came to be 
identified as continental, notwithstanding exceptions571 - legal systems.  On the basis of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (n.465), p.117. 
566 The arguments on which the facilitation or avoidance of social change are based are relevant to the 
determination of the success of legal transplants: D. Nelken, ‘Beyond the Metaphor of Legal Transplants?  
Consequences of Autopoietic Theory for the Study of Cross-Cultural Legal Adaptation’ in J. Priban and D. 
Nelken (eds.), Law’s New Boundaries: The Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis (Ashgate, Aldershot; 2001), 
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569 Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (n.516). 
570 A. Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 CLJ 313, pp.314-315.   
571 Namely those systems deemed to be “mixed”; see, amongst others, K.G.C. Reid, ‘The Idea of Mixed Legal 
Systems’ (2003) 78 Tul.L.Rev. 5. 
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“domination of transfer”, Watson asserts that comparison is not only the equivalent of 
transplantation but should also be centrally concerned with legal transplants.  For Watson, 
“[l]aw is treated….as existing in its own right…[and] has to be justified in its own terms; 
hence authority has to be sought and found.  That authority (in some form, which may be 
perverted) must already exist; hence law is typically back-ward-looking”572.  Watson rejects 
the mirror theory of law; lawyers are deemed to be bound by tradition, by authority and by 
precedent, in respect of which they must look only to legal analysis573.  While he has strongly 
voiced his support for the claim that a sociological analysis of law is irrelevant for legal 
development, he recognises scope for assertions as to the inevitability of some connection 
between law and society574.  Watson nevertheless argues that legal transplants are “socially 
easy”575, such that while legal problems arise in specific societal contexts, “the weight of the 
investigation will always be primarily on the comparability of the problem, only secondarily 
on the comparability of the law”576.  Drawing a distinction between internal and external 
influences, he attempts to justify his exclusion of the socio-legal perspective of comparison 
(rather focusing on comparative legal history and the borrowing of legal ideas) on the basis 
that such a perspective is external; as such, it contributes nothing to the legal profession577.  
This understanding has been subject to criticism578 and does not explain – even if the 
internal/external distinction were to be accepted by legal actors, including courts and scholars 
– why they should also reject the sociological analysis of the internal579.  By largely 
disregarding key elements of society, Watson essentially neglects to consider various norms – 
of a political, religious, and social nature – thus limiting his examination to one based on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 A. Watson, The Evolution of Law (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore; 1985), p.119 cited in W. 
Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) 43 AJCL 489, p.499. 
573 Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II)’ (n.572), p.500. 
574 Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (n.570), p.321. 
575 A. Watson, Legal Transplants (University of Georgia Press, Georgia; 2nd edn., 1993).  See also, Ewald, 
‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II)’ (n.572).  Ewald makes the claim for an ‘inner’ perspective of the law, that is, in 
terms of the manner in which the law is understood by the actors within a system.  See also, W. Ewald, ‘Legal 
History and Comparative Law’ (1999) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 533. 
576 Watson, Legal Transplants (n.575), p.5. 
577 Watson, The Evolution of Law (n.572), pp.21-22.  
578 See R.B. Seidman, ‘Book Review’ (1975) 55 Bos.U.L.R. 682. 
579 For example, even in relation to a narrow understanding of what is internal to the law, in terms of what 
affects the legal profession, namely, clients, experiences etc.  See R. Cotterrell, ‘Comparatists and Sociology’ in 
P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds.), Comparative Legal Studies – Traditions and Transitions (CUP, Cambridge; 
2003), pp.131-153, p.145. 
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black-box concept of law580, arguing: “sovereign power determines legal change in all 
contexts”581.  This is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
 
The analysis of the legal transfer discourse - and its relevance to comparative analysis in 
respect of its understanding as a tool of integration and the Europeanisation of private law – 
requires that the breadth of legal autonomy perspectives, which encompasses a range of 
understandings as to the extent of law’s autonomy from society, are considered.  Where a 
strong link is drawn between law, society and culture, within or beyond the state, legal 
transfers, if they can be empirically established, must advance a particular understanding of 
legal change, shaped and facilitated by factors external to law582.  This can be identified 
Durkheim’s – at least initial assertion – that law mirrors society583 and in Montesquieu’s 
understanding of the relationship between law and society, and particularly, with regard to 
movements between systems584.  Montesquieu proposed that “[the political and civil laws of 
each nation] should be so closely tailored to the people for whom they are made, that it would 
be pure chance [un grand hazard] if the laws of one nation could meet the needs of 
another…They should be relative to the geography of the country; to its climate whether cold 
or tropical or temperate; to the quality of the land, its situation, and its extent; to the form of 
life of the people, whether farmers, hunters, or shepherds; they should be relative to the 
degree of liberty that the constitution can tolerate; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their 
inclinations, wealth, number, commerce, customs, manners”585.   
 
At the other end of the spectrum, law is understood as being entirely autonomous from the 
societal background in which it exists; it essentially constitutes a set of propositional 
statements.  Recent explications of legal evolution focus on social as well as economic 
efficiency, which dictates that legal actors engaging comparative law methodologies in order 
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(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford; 2006), pp.441-476, p.463. 
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to facilitate legal development will necessarily (and rationally586) adopt the most socially or 
most economically efficient rules, institutions and structures587.  As a consequence of the 
broader desire to achieve social or economic efficiency (and the rational thinking 
underpinning), this understanding purports that legal orders will necessarily and eventually 
converge.  While such an understanding might explain why actors engage with transfer, and 
their identification of what is transferrable from a number of putative choices, it fails to 
recognise the significance of path dependency, and ultimately, the significance of legal 
culture588.   
 
More closely connected to the evolutionary understanding of transfers are limited autonomy 
theories, which propose that there is some degree of connection between law and its social, 
political, cultural and economic background.  Limited autonomy reflects the “mirror theory of 
law, i.e., the theory that law is the mirror of some set of forces (social, political, economic) 
external to the law”589, which promotes the idea that law is not entirely autonomous but 
instead is relative to economic and social dynamics590.  Thus, prima facie, limited autonomy 
rejects any notion that transfer necessarily occurs; however, confronted with Watson’s 
empirical evidence, there have been attempts to deal with these phenomena.  Thus, there 
exists a scale in respect of the strength of the relationship between law and the relevant factors 
in society, from a universalist understanding which asserts that the shape of legal rules, 
institutions and structures find their origins in society, to an understanding in which the 
relationship between law and society is considerably weaker.  Thus, Kahn-Freund has 
advocated a revised understanding of Montesquieu’s theory, in which the idea that law may 
be “more or less” embedded in a nation and as such may be “more or less” capable of 
transplantation591.  Essentially, Kahn-Freund supports the notion of a continuum, at one end 
of which, rules may well break free of their economic, social, political and cultural ties, and at 
the other end, rules “designed to allocate power, rule making, decision making, and above all, 
policy making power” remain bound to their relevant background592.   
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The transfer discourse is not satisfactory and requires – as explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 9 - extension, in respect of the autopoiesis theory developed by Luhmann, and in the 
context of transfer, by Teubner.  Like the other approaches to comparative analysis advanced 
in light of Europeanisation and integration, both Watson and Legrand limit their study by 
focusing on law deriving from the state and the role of state-based actors in the “transfer 
phenomenon”, in relation to the relationship between law and authority, and law and culture.  
While the transplants discourse attributes import to the role of culture, and emphasises that 
this focus is functional593, and not new, Watson and Legrand occupy positions at two ends of 
a continuum (this is relevant both in respect of their understanding of the relationship between 
law and culture, and law and authority), which dictates – like those other approaches above – 
that their understanding of culture and tradition derives predominantly from the state; 
comparatists must avoid adhering to either approach too rigidly594.  The exception is perhaps 
identifiable in the contribution of Smits, whose understanding of the relationship between law 
and culture is unclear but who highlights the significance of private actors in the 
Europeanisation of private law.  The transfers discourse also illustrates the lack of clarity as to 
the purposes of comparison, which is also identifiable, as noted, in other approaches; the 
absence of such clarity (or a lack of assumption otherwise) leads to a focus on harmonisation 
and unification.  This can be identified in the scholarly contributions of the 1990s and 2000s; 
in certain approaches (the PECL/DCFR projects), the harmonisation aim was explicit while in 
others (the Common Core project), it was neither explicit nor necessarily intended but 
nevertheless came to delineate the nature and reach of the comparative analysis.   This focus 
necessarily shapes the way in which – particularly in relation to private law development, in 
respect of which harmonisation is not an end in itself but related to the very emergence of a 
body of European private law – the CJEU might employ comparative analysis, that is to say, 
in identifying commonality or similarity at the expense of the recognition and engagement of 
divergence.  More broadly, this attributes little consideration to the context in which 
comparison is undertaken, which not only undermines the potential to track the shifting nature 
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Transparency and Legitimacy (OUP, Oxford; 2004), p.299. 
594 It is worth noting that Watson, in particular, recognises the two sides of the discourse: Watson, Legal 
Transplants (n.575), p.21. 
 	  	  	   117 
of private law and integration595 but also the scope to engage the pluralist perspective shaping 
the way in which private law is understood to emerge in a multi-level space.   
 
ii. The Reconceptualisation of Comparison for Europeanisation and Integration 
Purposes: What Should Be Compared and How Should It Be Compared?  
 
The analysis in the first two parts of the thesis aims to illustrate – and this consideration is 
reiterated in the analysis of the case examples below – that the nature of private law in light of 
its Europeanisation is shifting; while the potential relevance of comparison as a tool of 
Europeanisation and integration is recognised from the analysis above, it is submitted that a 
refined conceptualisation of comparative analysis might provide for an approach which 
allows these theoretical and practical dimensions of private law development to be engaged.  
Indeed, the analysis above – and similarly, the case examples below – illustrate that there 
indeed already exists scope for the engagement of comparison in legal development.  
However, on the basis of this analysis, it is further submitted that comparison itself, as it is 
currently understood, does not provide a satisfactory framework for the use of comparative 
analysis as a tool of Europeanisation and integration.  It is necessary to ensure that, as the 
Europeanisation of private law emerges – in the Union legislature, via the interpretation of 
Union norms in the CJEU and their application in the national courts – there exists a way to 
understand and appreciate the potential for this dynamic evolution.  As noted above, similar 
to national private law, comparative law has long been tied to the nation state, understood as 
technical and apolitical.  These preliminary conclusions drawn from the analysis undertaken 
above do not advance the assertion that “orthodox” comparative law has not been subject to 
critique or that it has not evolved, indeed it has; however even as comparative analysis has 
progressed (for example, in respect of the refined approaches advanced in the context of the 
European private law project), it nevertheless retains some of the problematics of 
“mainstream” comparison, which undermine its potential as it might be engaged by the CJEU 
as a tool of Europeanisation and integration.  These problematics are theoretical and 
methodological and relate to: 1) the identification of what is being compared, particularly 
against the background of the focus on national legal rules and the resulting absence of 
consideration of culture and tradition; and 2) a lack of understanding and appreciation not 
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only of the context in which comparative analysis is undertaken but moreover, as to the 
purposes of comparison.  
 
An acknowledgement should be made at the outset.  There are different views as to whether 
the identification of a single methodology necessarily underpins comparative analysis.  For 
example, Lasser asserts that “the comparatist must choose a methodology”596 while Zweigert 
and Kötz, as noted above, engage functionalism as the “the basic methodological principle of 
all comparative law”597.  On the other hand, Patrick Glenn rejects the totality of any single 
method, noting that “much can be said about the virtues, and defects, of different models”598, 
while Legrand has highlighted the “negative and potentially stultifying impact [of 
methodology] on comparative law as an intellectual discipline”599.  Thus, for the purposes of 
this thesis, the assertion that it is necessary to consider the methodological dimensions of 
comparative law should not be read as a call for an absolute requirement of method.  Indeed, 
in light of the breadth of research questions in respect of which comparative analysis might be 
relevant, and against the background of the notion that the methodological approach must be 
shaped by the nature of these questions and the issues to which they give rise, it is unlikely 
that a “one-size-fits-all” methodological framework for comparative analysis is identifiable.  
Rather, one might proceed on the basis of the plurality of methods of comparison, “mak[ing] 
use of the full range of reasoning methods, schemes of intelligibility, paradigms and 
epistemological approaches”600.  That it to say, this thesis does not aim to propose a single 
model of comparison; it is recognised that the approach advanced below does not adhere 
rigidly to the understanding of comparison as a scientific endeavour from which the truth can 
be derived and on the basis of which, the highly selective nature of comparative analysis can 
be avoided and predictability and coherence can be established.  Furthermore, it is recognised 
that – as the case examples illustrate – the scholarly conceptualisations of comparison 
necessarily diverge from the way in which comparative analysis is engaged pragmatically in 
the courts.  Thus, as Bobek has considered, traditionally, “[t]he key question for a law-making 
judge is ‘could an idea like work here in the future?’ It is not ‘did I contextualize my reading 
of the foreign model sufficiently deeply within the historical, socio-economic, cultural and all 	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597 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), p.34. 
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other characteristics of the law in country X, in order to obtain a full and truthful account of 
the legal situation in country X?’”601.  This chapter rather intends to provide for the evolution 
of the perspective adopted of comparative analysis, which does not require that the courts 
engage these questions explicitly but that the understanding of comparative analysis engaged 
by, for example, the AG or the judge, is one that allows for recognition in itself, of the 
significance of contextualisation.  
 
Against this background, it is submitted that a complex understanding of comparative 
analysis602 reflects one way in which the dynamic nature of private law can be understood, 
and in which its evolution can be facilitated in light of this pluralist, multi-level context603.  It 
is necessary to consider the dimensions outlined above, namely, what is being compared and 
the manner – that is, context and purpose – in which it compared.  As the analysis above aims 
to illustrate, despite perhaps having the appearance of operating within a transnational space, 
and notwithstanding its evolution in light of European private law, comparative analysis has 
predominantly been limited - in its conceptualisation and scope - to the confines established 
by, and reflected in, the nation state.  This is particularly true of the determination of what is 
to be compared; most of the approaches advanced have engaged with that which derives from 
the nation state.  It is inherently related to a more fundamental, more preliminary question, 
which requires consideration and which integrates the theoretical and practical dimensions of 
critique noted above: comparatists must understand what “law” is; at the outset, one questions 
whether one can identify a single, general conceptualisation of law which is applicable, and 
satisfactory, in all contexts.  Herein, one connection  - the frequent absence of a theoretical 
approach having been noted above604 – between legal theory, which has as its primary 
epistemological concern the determination of what law is, and comparative law, which is, at 
its very foundation, concerned with the determination of what should be compared, attains a 
degree of clarity: both beg the analytical jurisprudential question of “what is law?” and that of 
normative jurisprudence, of “what should the law be?”  While the concepts of law developed 
within the context of legal theory are wide-ranging605, the key distinction is one between 	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normative and positive legal theory, as advanced by Marmor606.  While most of the 
approaches above no longer adhere to the positivist notion of “law as rules”, they continue to 
focus on legal development within the context of the state, and the state’s power to make 
law607.  Positivism can be overbearing; in Örücü’s words, research will undoubtedly “bear the 
prejudices of positivism”608 if we fail to transcend the study of law as it appears on the surface 
of the national legal system, and fail to try to account for a wider, global context of 
normativity609.  If it can be considered that the significance of the nation state, along with its 
territorial boundaries, are in a process of figurative disintegration, which calls for the 
abandonment of these orthodox nation-state based sources of analysis, such an assumption 
cannot continue to be justified.  In this context, any reference to comparison, which continues 
to engage this nation-focused approach, necessarily drags the discourse back to the confines 
of the nation state610.  The relevant unit of comparative analysis for comparison cannot (only) 
be identified on the basis of a rigid set of territorial boundaries611.   
 
The approach to comparative analysis is similarly deemed to be limited where the analysis 
engages culture or tradition as a reference point that also derives from the state.  On the one 
hand, the notion of culture or tradition transcends positivist approaches to law.  As noted 
above, the link between law and culture remains tied to functionalism612 and to the “realist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cicero, De re publica (C.W.Keyes trans.) (Heinemann, London; 1928), Bk.3, Chp.22, S.33), to theories within 
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607  H. Patrick Glenn, ‘A Transnational Concept of Law’ in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies (OUP, Oxford; 2003), pp.839-862, p.839. 
608  E. Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law:  Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First Century (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden; 2004), p.11. 
609  G. Teubner, 'Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation State' in P. Dobner and 
M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP, Oxford; 2010), pp.327-341, p.328: “Is 
constitutional theory able to generalize the ideas it developed for the nation state and to re-specify them for 
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611 See in particular, the work on the notion of legal tradition by H. Patrick Glenn, and the discussion in the 
introduction above. 
612  Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’ in Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (n.468), 
p.188. 
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conception of the law as an instrument for challenging or modifying human behaviour”613.  
Thus, while the engagement with even national culture and tradition arguably constitutes 
progress from a complete absence of social-cultural consideration, Augenstein nevertheless 
highlights that this approach is limited because it is “static”, to the extent that “it treats legally 
orientated patterns of social behaviour as historically determined and culturally entrenched” 
and “exclusive” because it “posits sharply demarcated units, in the European context mainly 
the nation states, as object of comparative analysis…as an exclusive unit of legal 
integration”614.   
 
This criticism is not to assert that comparative analysis which engages with sources of 
analysis of national norms - at the very extreme, the (technical) comparison of (technical) 
legal rules - is not useful.  Rather, it is intended to highlight that there must also exist 
something more, which can account for the different dimensions of European private law as it 
continues to emerge in the context of integration.  Thus, the fundamental assertion identified 
for the purposes of this thesis is that the unit of analysis engaged by the CJEU should be 
understood broadly; it might, but need not, be limited to that which emerges from the national 
legal system615, including national legal rules, national case law and aspects of national 
culture and tradition.  Rather, it might encompass aspects of culture and tradition arising 
beyond the nation state, the travaux préparatoires of EU legislation, Union norms (cross-
referencing between areas of Union law), decisions of the courts and tribunals other than 
those of the Member States, international law, “non-state” norms and legal scholarship.  
Essentially, there is a rejection of the “totality” of any single unit of comparative analysis.  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to understand how comparative analysis emerges in a pluralist, 
multi-level context, in which there exists a diversity of sources of private law and a number of 
courts, interpreting and applying the norms arising from those sources (albeit predominantly 
in respect of the national courts and the CJEU) and which thus constitutes a space of conflict.  
Thus, the context in which Europeanisation occurs must appreciated; to adopt the well-worn 
notion, one must move beyond what is provided for in the rulebooks.  As outlined, mere 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613  Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’ in Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (n.468), 
p.188. 
614 Augenstein, ‘Identifying the European Union’ in Augenstein, ‘Integration Through Law’ Revisited (n.123), 
p.104. 
615 That is to say, strictly understood, norms deriving from the national legislature or courts, not including, for 
example, norms of international or European law. 
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propositional knowledge, or knowledge only of legal rules, is inadequate for comparison; the 
structure and organisation, as well as the normative and conceptual dimensions underpinning 
an area of law, are relevant to its understanding616.  While much comparative analysis focuses 
on description and self-reflection for the purposes of generating and advancing knowledge 
and understanding, Hirschl asserts that it can transcend this purpose to explanation, with “the 
aspiration to make valid causal claims based on comparative research”617; the difficulty in 
achieving this, according to Hirschl, as noted above, is the absence of consideration of “basic 
methodological principles of controlled comparison, research design, and case selection”618.  
Indeed, Hirschl’s fourth type of comparative analysis builds on his third type, which advances 
the notion of “concept thickening through multiple description”619; it “attempts to move 
beyond the level of thick description and concept formation toward the ultimate goal of social 
inquiry: theory building through causal inference.  It is based on the notion that a good theory 
requires clarifying concepts as well as offering causal explanations for observed 
phenomena”620.  It should allow for hypotheses as to causal links to be established, tested621 
and proven or disproven on the basis of “inductive reference”622, “in order to assess change, 
explain dynamics, and make inferences about case and effect through systematic case 
selection and analysis of data”623, and thus, to allow for the avoidance of cherry picking of 
case-selection of comparative analysis624.  The aim of this kind of comparative analysis fits 
with the complex approach advanced herein, having the aim of explanation as well as the 
description of “variance in legal phenomena across polities”, which could help to explain the 
Europeanisation of law in and across the Member States, including, for example, public 
policy considerations, but also, as will be discussed in more detail throughout the thesis, the 
existence of commonality and divergence and the absence thereof, the identification of best 
solutions, the recognition of principles and the scope arising for transfer and dialogue.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616  J.C. Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 AJCL 617, pp.625-627. 
617 R. Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law' (2005) 53 AJCL 125, p.126. 
618 Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection’ (n.617), p.125. 
619 The first type involves a single country study, often, he asserts, misunderstood as comparative analysis, 
simply on the basis that the culture or tradition being examined is different from that of the “home system”; the 
second amounts to comparative analysis for the purposes of self-reflection, on the basis of which solutions to 
problems are identified.  The third type encompasses the “generat[ion] of rich concepts and analytical 
frameworks for thinking critically about constitutional norms and practices”, for the purposes of “sharpening” 
our understanding of “concept formation” via the identification of similarities and differences in terms of how 
similarly problems are dealt with across different political, social, economic and cultural contexts, that is 
“multiple description”; Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection’ (n.617), pp.126-130. 
620 Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection’ (n.617), p.131. 
621 In respect of the scope for the CJEU to advance such hypotheses, see below at pp.279-280. 
622 Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection’ (n.617), p.132. 
623 Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection’ (n.617), p.126. 
624 Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection’ (n.617), p.153. 
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Against this background, the stages of comparative analysis can be explicated, the 
significance of which might differ depending on the purposes for which comparative analysis 
is employed.  The preparatory stage involves the identification of the aims and objectives for 
which comparison is engaged against the background of the pertinent legal issue of the case 
and the determination of the relevant hypotheses of the CJEU.  The first stage of the 
comparison should encompass the selection of legal orders and the determination of what is to 
be compared, i.e. the unit(s) of analysis.  The second stage encompasses the description and 
explanation of the comparative analysis, shaped by the aforementioned hypotheses and 
ultimately shaping the context and purposes for which the analysis is engaged.  For example, 
it might have two dimensions: the identification and description of the similarities and 
differences, and thereafter, the explanation of these similarities and differences (where they 
exist).  The latter dimension concerns the determination of those considerations on which the 
similarities are based, the considerations on which lack of similarity are based, the nature of 
the similarities and the nature of the absence of similarity, and ultimately, what these 
similarities and differences reveal in light of the hypotheses initially developed.  Thereafter, 
there follows, depending on the nature of analysis and the purposes for which the comparative 
analysis is engaged, an evaluation stage625.  This should allow for the determination of the 
need to prove, disprove or revisit the initial hypotheses, and to determine the light that the 
comparative analysis sheds on the matter of interpretation and the CJEU’s development of 
“meta-mechanisms” of Europeanisation.   
 
It is submitted that, in the context of Europeanisation, this approach must attribute adequate 
significance to, and take account of, the socio-economic, political and cultural, as well as 
legal dimensions, of Europeanisation and integration, to allow for the link between theory and 
practice to be established626.  The manner in which comparison is undertaken – that is, its 
context – must allow firstly for the consideration of law in context (which is related to the 
determination of the unit of comparative analysis) and secondly, for the consideration of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 It has been suggested that this stage arises only where the engagement of comparative analysis is normative: 
M. Oderkerk, ‘The Need for a Methodological Framework for Comparative Legal Research: Sense and 
Nonsense of ‘Methodological Pluralism’ in Comparative Law’ Centre for the Study of European Contract Law 
WP 2014/04, pp.9-10, however, as noted above, it is submitted that even if comparison is descriptive, there 
permeates a normative thread through the analysis. 
626 As Gessner has asserted: “failing to take such an approach leads to “the development of a system of norms 
which is far removed from practice and therefore largely ineffective”: Gessner et al, ‘Introduction to the 
Patchwork’ in Gessner et al, European Legal Cultures (n.7), p.251. 
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context within which the CJEU operates.  This latter concern engages the exploration of the 
self-understanding of the CJEU’s jurisdiction and highlights, in particular, the relationship 
between “self” and “other”, arising from the recognition, outlined above, that comparison 
should not focus merely on the identification of similarities and differences.  Indeed, Geertz 
has proposed that “the comparative study of law cannot be a matter of reducing concrete 
differences to abstract commonalities…it cannot be a matter of locating identical phenomena 
masquerading under different names”627, rather, as Legrand asserts, it must facilitate “our” 
understanding, to the extent that “through the mediation of an other, the self can become more 
explicit to itself”628.  In a pragmatic context, this should ensure – while neither removing the 
selectivity that necessarily permeates the identification of that which is being compared nor 
replacing it with objective determinative factors – that the AG and the Court can avoid 
“cherry-picking”, in respect of what is compared, of the context engaged and perspective 
adopted629.  
 
It is submitted that these dimensions advocate a legal-cultural perspective of complex 
comparative analysis, engaging and promoting the significance previously attributed to 
culture and tradition in the shaping and construction of national law but which has 
largely “fallen by the wayside” in respect of European legal development.  The significance 
attached to culture and tradition might be reflective of the interaction between different legal 
orders; that is to say, the harmonisation of legal norms at the expense of legal culture and 
tradition arguably undermines the scope for bridging gaps and avoiding cultural relativism: 
“the task of those who understand the significance of human culture is to make sense of it 
without sealing cultures off from one another and making interplay between them 
impossible”630.   The alternative – a “universalist harmonisation approach”631 – advances a 
focus on the identification of commonalities, per the Common Core project, (same/self) in 
contrast to the recognition and acceptance of differences (contextualist/other), per Legrand632; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (n.38), pp.215-216.  Indeed, the need for an uncovering and 
examination both of similarities and differences extends far beyond law.  M. Weber, Agrarian Sociology of 
Ancient Civilizations (trans. R.I. Frank) (Verso, NY; 1998), p.385: Weber has provided that “A comparative 
study should not aim at finding ‘analogies’ and ‘parallels’… The aim should rather be precisely the opposite – to 
identify and define the individuality of each development, the characteristics which made the one conclude in a 
manner so different from that of the other”. 
628 P. Legrand, ‘Comparative Law’ in D.S. Clark (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Law and Society (Sage, Los Angeles; 
2007), pp.220-223, pp.222-223. 
629 Curran, 'Dealing in Difference’ (n.556), p.659. 
630 O’Hear, ‘Culture’ in Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (n.39), p.185. 
631 Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (n.175), p.144. 
632 Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (n.175), p.142. 
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the perspective adopted633 dictates whether scope for convergence is deemed to be possible or 
not634.  
 
The “dangers” of this approach are recognised.  As established in the introduction, it is 
difficult to define culture, both in its legal form – understood as a localised conceptualisation 
– and its general form.   Furthermore, there is a danger in “damaging” both law and culture: 
“law is so deeply embedded in the particularities of each culture that carving it out as a 
separate domain and only later making note of its cultural connections distorts the nature of 
both law and culture”635. These perspectives have been explored, in respect of the approach to 
comparison based on mentalité 636 , an approach of particular significance to legal 
development via the interrelations of the national and European courts.  This is inherently 
linked to culture, extending beyond the legal sphere, building on the anthropological 
scholarship of Lévy-Brühl, who focused on the component parts that shape the way in which 
people think; this has been applied in a legal context to uncover the way in which these 
components parts influence the means of legal reasoning, of understandings of rules, rights 
and facts, and the extent to which coherence and structure is deemed to be significant637.  In 
the context of the constitution of the CJEU and its influence on its reasoning, this can be 
linked with the notion of knowledge as “mental software” and Hofstede’s understanding of 
culture as “a collective phenomenon, because it is at least partly shared with people who live 
or lived within the same social environment where it was learned”638.  Similarly, Geertz’s 
suggestion of the need for “thick description” in order to understand culture639 can arguably 
be analogised in legal scholarship with Curran’s reference to “immersion comparison”640.  A 
mentalité-based approach opens up a kind of unconsciousness, underlying the legal structures 
and legal “cognitive experiences”.  Mentalité concerns memory, or a kind of “une identité 
préservée”641; in terms of experience, the engagement of mentalité brings to the fore the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 Smits, ‘Law Making in the European Union’ (n. 23), p.1195. 
634 P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60 MLR 44, p.44; Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems 
Are Not Converging’ (n.516), pp.61–62. 
635 L. Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton University Press, Princeton; 2006), pr.xii. 
636 Legrand, 'Antiqui Juris Civilis Fabulas' (n.55), p.312. 
637 J. Bell, French Legal Cultures (CUP, Cambridge; 2001), p.15. 
638 Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations (n.49), p.5.  It is worth noting that Patrick Glenn’s understanding of 
tradition find connections with the notion of localised or contextualised culture, to the extent that it must be 
consistently felt in a particular context; further, the notion of “consistency” allows for a connection to be drawn 
with Hofstede’s understanding of culture as a learned phenomenon. 
639 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Fontana, London; 1993) pp.6-10. 
640 V.G. Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in US Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 AJCL 43, 
p.91. 
641 Vovelle, Idéologies et Mentalités (n.55), p.22. 
 	  	  	   126 
“unspoken” component parts of the law642, namely, the culture or tradition of the legal 
profession.  Indeed, Descartes asserts that the “notion of self is established as a ‘positioning 
tool’; the Cartesian understanding of the ‘transcendental self’ provides a means by which the 
notion of truth can be linked with understanding of “accurate representations”643.  That is to 
say, the notion of self and other provides the basis upon which comparison can be undertaken.  
Thus, it is recognised that the position of the judge (and indeed, the AG) might shape the way 
in which he undertakes comparative analysis; only through this positioning can the “other” be 
identified; this will be explored further in relation to the constitution of the CJEU in the 
following chapter.   
 
For the moment, it is worth noting that on the one hand, Descartes asserts that man’s 
understanding derives from “pure thought”, as opposed to understanding in its entirety, which 
requires that epistemologically, man should be free or purified from all bias and emotional 
attachment and subjectivity644 .  Kötz’s comparative law is understood by Legrand to 
constitute an “actualized version of Descartes”645, in terms of the development of a “universal 
science”, whereby both endeavour to promote via a certain notion of system and logical 
structure, the purification of the subjective, reflected in Descartes’ rejection of knowledge that 
is only probable646 or insufficiently precise, and Kötz’s reluctance to consider culture and 
tradition, as it exists beyond that which is “legal”, narrowly understood and not at all 
embedded647.  On the other hand, Heidegger asserts that man is a “historical being”; 
historicity, and temporality establish his context, forming part of his very being, determining 
and shaping his options and decisions648.  As such, he rejects the notion that truth can be 
separated from historical experience in the way advocated by Descartes, considering there to 
be scope only to uncover the truth – via the interpretation of phenomena – on the basis of a 
deep level of understanding, which can only be shaped by “situated-ness”.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642 Legrand, 'Antiqui Juris Civilis Fabulas' (n.55), p.312. 
643 Legrand, ‘Comparative Law’ in Clark, Encyclopaedia of Law and Society (n.628), p.223. 
644 R. Descartes, ‘Méditation sixième’ in R. Descartes, Oeuvres philosophiques, F. Alquié edn. (Bordas, Garnier, 
Paris; 3 vols., 1963-1973), p.480.  The body being the “unclean part” in the distinction between mind and body, 
the assumption is made that purification of the mind is possible; it not necessary to expunge experience and 
background entirely but to ensure that experience is understood as an “object”, which can be separated and made 
external; this is what leads to the truth, from which propositional statements are derived. 
645 Legrand, ‘Paradoxically, Derrida’ (n.493), p.648. 
646 R. Descartes, Règles pour la direction de l’esprit (Vrin, Paris; 1997), p.80 
647 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), pp.35-36. 
648 P. Legrand, ‘Heidegger’ in D.S. Clark (ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and Society – Vol.II (Sage, Los Angeles; 
2007), pp.700-701, p.700. 
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Thus, one might question whether it is possible for the judges and AG to disregard their own 
national background – to “cleanse” their experiences as Descartes proposes – for the purposes 
of affording autonomous interpretations of Union law, as their role arguably requires649.  One 
might consider whether method facilitates this objectivity.  However, there is noting in 
method itself which renders it objective; method – “marked at its very core by an irresistible 
historicity which is constitutive of it”650 – is necessarily lacking in objectivity.  Moreover, in 
the CJEU, it is necessarily subjective for the very reason of its structure and composition.  
Indeed, a number of determinations might be shaped by factors underpinning this experience, 
including the model of comparison adopted and the aims and objectives sought.  These 
determinations might be shaped by the availability of materials of certain legal orders651, the 
national order of which the judge has the greatest personal knowledge, whether this is their 
“culture or tradition of origin” or that in which they were educated, have practiced or taught 
law652.  Moreover, it is submitted that such disengagement might not be necessary.  It is 
generally understood that the cultural perspective is difficult for judges and AGs to identify 
and engage individually; as Curran asserts, a cultural perspective requires “an immersion into 
the political, historical, economic and linguistic contexts that molded the legal system”.  Thus, 
as Frankenberg asserted, comparatists are outsiders653.  While the judge might not be able to 
achieve this individually, the at least dual, national and European, identity of the European 
judge and AG and the collective identity of the CJEU, might rather promote the possible 
scope for this positioning; it is considered – as will be explained in the following chapter – 
that if there is any institution in which such “cultural immersion” can occur, the CJEU 
constitutes the most appropriate space, given the diversity of its construction and its 
interrelation with the national courts.  
 
It should be clear from the analysis engaged thus far that there exists a multiplicity of 
conceptualisations of comparison, giving rise to diverse perspectives; furthermore, the scope 
for and conceptualisations, i.e. nature, of comparison might differ across areas of law.  It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 See Chapter 8, for more on autonomous interpretation. 
650 S. Glanert, ‘Method’ in P. Montaneri (ed.), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2012), 
pp.61-81, p.68. 
651 Consider in the international criminal law context, the Opinions of Judge McDonald and Vohrah, in which 
they highlighted the necessity of analysing the case law of the systems which could be deemed, “as a practical 
matter, accessible”; Prosecutor v Erdemović, Judgement, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge 
Vohrah, Case No.IT-96-22-A, App.Ch., 07.10.1997, s.57. 
652 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Conception of International Criminal 
Law’ (2003) 1 JICJ 13, p.18.  This is often particularly clear in the Opinions of AG Trstenjak. 
653 Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion’ (n.640), p.51. 
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would therefore be inaccurate to assume that the comparative methodology is a single one; 
rather, the understanding of complex comparative analysis should allow for the incremental 
development of the methodology, not only at T1 but developed, tested and refined over time. 
 
These abstracted considerations are placed in a concrete context, arising at different levels of 
regulation (national, European and even transnational)654 via the case examples examined in 
Part III.  Where comparative analysis is identifiable, its manifestation, the rationale upon 
which it is based and the reason for its engagement are noted, for the purposes of constructing 
the two classifications outlined in Chapter 8.  Thereafter, these considerations are further 
explored in the subsequent evaluation of the CJEU as a laboratory of comparative analysis. 
 
Chapter 3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Chapter 3 has aimed to advance an understanding of complex comparative analysis 
introduced in Part I of the thesis.  From the initial review of the foundations and development 
of understandings of comparative analysis, that is of doctrinal and functional comparison, it 
becomes clear that it has long suffered from an absence of theoretical and methodological 
evaluation.  These considerations are deemed to be necessary not only to the extent that they 
inform the understandings of the rationales, strengths and limitations of comparative analysis 
but also because they inform the determination of what is being compared, and the way, that 
is, the context in which and the purposes for which, comparison is undertaken. 
 
The evaluation in the first section of Chapter 3 has focused on the evolution of comparative 
law as it might be engaged in the Europeanisation of private law; it has illustrated that while 
these understandings certainly transcend the orthodox conceptualisations of comparison, they 
nevertheless continue to suffer from certain theoretical and methodological problematics, 
relating to: 1) the determination of what is being compared, i.e. the relevant unit of analysis, 
which remains predominantly tied to the nation state, and thus attributes little scope to the 
significance of culture or tradition; and 2) the lack of understanding of the manner, including 
the context (which also engages the significance of the cultural perspective) in which and the 
purposes for which comparison is undertaken.  It is submitted that the existence of these 
deficits should be read in line with the analysis undertaken in the previous chapters and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 C. Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New 
Constitutional Perspective’ (1997) 3 ELJ 378. 
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particularly Chapter 2, in light of which it is submitted that the current conceptualisations of 
comparative analysis are not the most satisfactory as tools of Europeanisation and integration.  
These preliminary conclusion have been drawn, on the one hand, from the continuing 
(theoretical and methodological) focus on the nation state as the predominant reference point 
of analysis, in a context characterised by its potential “post-nationalism”, and particularly, the 
pluralist, multi-level nature of private law outlined above, and on the other, consequent to the 
lack of consideration of the cultural perspective – at the national level but also beyond the 
state – in respect of the determination of the pertinent reference point of analysis and the 
context in which comparative analysis might be undertaken.   
 
It has been submitted that comparative analysis evidences the potential to be engaged as a tool 
for Europeanisation and integration; yet, if it is to be employed so as to attribute adequate 
significance to and take account of the socio-economic, political and cultural, legal and 
economic contexts in which Europeanisation occurs, as well as the shifting nature of private 
law via its materialisation, constitutionalisation and regulation, its conceptualisation must be 
reconsidered.  This need arises in light of two key problematics of comparative analysis as it 
has been predominantly advanced: 1) the determination of what is to be compared; and 2) the 
manner – the context in which and the purposes for which – comparison is engaged.  On this 
basis, certain aspects of a refined understanding of complex comparison have been proposed; 
these form part of a broader framework and are not intended to constitute a definitive model 
of comparative analysis.  As to the determination of what is compared, the “totality” of any 
unit of analysis has been rejected to the extent that this implies rigidity and staticism; 
fundamentally, it should not be limited only to rules or jurisprudence arising from the nation 
state (which is not to suggest that such sources of analysis are entirely irrelevant) but should 
engage diverse sources of normativity.  This preliminary determination shapes the context in 
which comparative analysis is undertaken and the purposes for which it is engaged by the 
CJEU.  These determinations should also be dynamic so as to reflect the character of legal 
development within and beyond the state, that is, by the national and European courts.  On the 
one hand, this is deemed to necessitate a more open engagement with the rationales 
underlying comparison, particularly for the purposes of transcending the functionalist 
approach and the focus on harmonisation, and therein, the identification of similarities and 
divergences for the purposes of promoting the former and repressing the latter.  On the other 
hand, it must also engage a contextualist approach, not only in terms of the relevance of the 
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socio-economic, cultural, political, social and legal context of Europeanisation and the 
interdependence of private law emerging within a pluralist, multi-level construct, but also the 
significance of the CJEU itself as a space of comparison.  This is the focus of the following 
chapter.   
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Chapter 4. Revisiting the CJEU as a Tool of European Integration 
 
The Court was established in 1952 on the basis of the ECSC Treaty.  It now finds its legal 
basis in Art.19 TEU and Arts.251-281 TFEU.  Depicted as the international court par 
excellence655, the CJEU is situated at the crest of the EU judicial structure656, hearing 
preliminary references from the national courts, infringement procedures initiated by the 
Commission and appeals, on points of law arising from violations of EU law, from the 
General Court657.  Following the exploration of the foundations of the jurisdiction of the 
Luxembourg Court, the focus shifts to the relationship arising between it and the national 
courts via the preliminary reference procedure and the potential impact of these interrelations 
on the framework of comparative analysis engaged by the former. 
 
I. The CJEU as a Space for Comparison: Examining its Dynamic Composition, 
Jurisdiction and Interpretative Role 
 
i. The Structure, Composition and Interpretative Role of the CJEU 
 
Initially, the Court was comprised of seven judges and one AG; it is now made up of twenty-
eight judges – of each Member State658 - and nine AGs, all appointed for a renewable, six-
year period.  Judges and AGs are appointed on the “common accord” of the Member States; 
nominations are advanced, and subsequently reviewed by the “Judicial Appointments 
Committee”659.  The most recent increase in the number of judges paralleled the 2004 
enlargement; the CJEU can also request an increase in the number of judges and AGs via the 
Council660.  The CJEU has recently made a call, one that has been recognised by the 
Commission, for an increase in the number of judges at the Court by twelve661, reflecting its 
increasing docket of cases and fears as to the consequences of its “crisis of workload”.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in 
Europe (OUP, Oxford; 2011). 
656 Which also includes the Civil Service Tribunal. 
657 Art.256(1)(1)(2) TFEU. 
658 Art.252 TFEU. 
659 Art.255 TFEU; a group composed of seven persons (including one proposed by the European Parliament). 
660 Art.19 TEU and Art.252 TFEU. 
661 See the Letter of Judge Skouris of 28.03.2011, President of the CJEU to the President of the European 
Parliament and President of the Council, (<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-
04/projet_en.pdf>; Last Accessed: 11.02.2012). 
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May 2012, the European Parliament separated this particular request from other proposals662, 
a decision reflecting the political significance and potential controversy arising from a change 
in the composition of the CJEU, relating to the background of the judges (their nationality, 
and their professional background, the latter relevant to the need to ensure a satisfactory 
breadth of knowledge and expertise across the institution, particularly in private law 
matters663). 
 
Neither the Treaty of Paris nor the Treaty of Rome provided for any specific requirements for 
the appointment of individuals to the Court; judges and AGs are therefore recruited from 
across the legal profession, including national judiciaries and governments, Union institutions 
and academia664.  The CJEU’s composition is understood to reflect a representative sample 
from across the Member States (of what can arguably be deemed as “representative” legal 
cultures and traditions665).  The evolution of the structure and composition of the EU judicial 
structure itself666 is shaped by the enlargement of the EU667 and has changed considerably in 
the past two decades; these changes are reflected not only in size but also in terms of the 
diversification of its social profile.   
 
In the first part of the thesis, the notion that the methodological lens adopted in scholarship 
will be shaped by those assumptions that constitute the Vorverständnis of a legal actor was 
introduced668.  It was suggested that manifestations of these cultures are identifiable within 
but also beyond the nation state.  Legal actors can be conceived as “products of specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662 Such a proposal requires amendment of the Statute of the Court and must therefore go through the ordinary 
legislative procedure; EP’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), on 21.06.2011 
(<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110620ATT21704/20110620ATT21704E
N.pdf>; Last Accessed: 11.02.2012); See also, Library Briefing of the European Parliament; 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2012/120301/LDM_BRI(2012)120301_REV1_
EN.pdf>; Last Accessed: 11.02.2012). 
663 It is important to bear in mind that almost all of the CJEU judges and AGs, with the exception of AGs Safjan 
and Wahl, more recently AG Szpunar and previously AG Trstenjak, come from a public, as opposed to private 
law background  (<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/>; Last Accessed:  14.08.2014). 
664 A. Cohen and A. Vauchez, ‘The Social Construction of Law – The European Court of Justice and its Legal 
Revolution Revisited’ (2011) 7 Ann.Rev.Law.Soc.Sci. 417, p.421; A. Cohen, ‘Scarlet Robes, Dark Suits – The 
Social Recruitment of the European Court of Justice’ EUI WP 2008/35. 
665 This has been recognised in the context of the ICJ: J. Barberis, Formación del derecho internacional (Abaco, 
Buenos Aires; 1996), p.246. 
666 V. Perju, 'Reason and Authority in the ECJ' (2009) 49 V.J.Int.Law 307, pp.329-332 and generally, J.H.H. 
Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale.L.J. 2403. 
667 Especially in the 1970s with the accession of the UK and Ireland and the appearance of the first “common 
law” trained AGs and judges in the CJEU, it is assumed that the balance of the Court might have changed in 
some particularly fundamental way.  This might also be reflected in the most recent enlargement.   
668 Therein, reference was made to Tuori’s understanding of the three levels of legal culture, and the deep 
structure at which Vorverständnis exists. 
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national legal systems”669; their development is shaped by multi-faceted variables, including 
the nature of legal education and the legal profession.  Bell references three perspectives 
which significantly influence judges, namely: “the personal perspective...the way individuals 
perceive their role and career”, “the institutional perspective…the way in which the structures 
of the career and organisation of judges, as well as legal processes affect the judiciary as a 
social institution” and “the external perspective…of its impact on the external world”670.  
While tending to be national, legal education is not confined to the learning of national legal 
norms but extends to EU law, international law and increasingly, transnational law; indeed, 
comparative legal education is becoming increasingly significant671.  The way in which legal 
reasoning is “taught” is perhaps more restricted and is often conceived in terms of “formal 
versus pragmatic, deductive versus inductive, abstract versus contextual” approaches672.  
While the legal profession has also tended to be national, increasingly, societies and networks 
of students, academics, scholars and judges are emerging673; furthermore, training for judges 
also exists beyond the nation state, in particular, in relation to European law674.  These 
endeavours potentially engender an internationalised or transnationalised professional legal 
culture.   
 
It is generally considered that national judges engage with the interpretation of national rules 
in the context of their own legal culture - “internalized in the course of legal socialization”675, 
being a product of the very education, practice and communication with which legal actors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 W. Mattli and A-M. Slaughter, ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration: 
Accounting for Judicial Preferences and Constraints’ in A-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler 
(eds.), The European Court and National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence (OUP, Oxford; 1998), pp.253-
276, p.271. 
670 J. Bell, Judiciaries Within Europe: A Comparative Review (CUP, Cambridge; 2006), p.2. 
671 C. Valcke, ‘Global Legal Education’ (2004) 54 J.Leg.Ed. 160; see also the special issue of the German Law 
Journal on the ‘Transnationalization of Legal Education’ at (2009) 10 GLJ, and the "Transsystemic Legal 
Education’ Programme at McGill University, Montréal. 
672 Mattli and Slaughter, ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration’ in Slaughter et al, 
The European Court and National Courts (n.669), pp.253-276, p.272. 
673 Including amongst others: the European Law Students’ Association; the Expert Group on a Common Frame 
of Reference (established by Commission Decision 2010/233); the European Judicial Network (established by 
Council Decision 2001/470); the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary; the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the European Union, and those which combine different actors, including 
the European Law Institute.  Similar networks exist outwith the European context, for example, in the African 
region; OHADA, l'Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, and l’École Régionale 
Supérieure de la Magistrature, established by Art.41 OHADA Treaty. 
674 Including the European Judicial Training Network, supported by the EU.  The EU has also recently adopted a 
Communication: European Commission, ‘Building Trust in EU-Wide Justice: A New Dimension to EU-Wide 
Training’ COM(2011) 551 final. 
675 K. Tuori, ‘Towards a Theory of Transnational Law:  A Very First Draft’ (2010) (on file with the author), 
p.23. 
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are engaged – such that national judges interpreting and applying EU norms will also be 
influenced by this similar national perspective.  On this basis, AGs and judges of the 
Luxembourg Court offering interpretations of Union norms must continue to be influenced by 
their national background.  The precise influence of legal tradition on legal reasoning is 
extremely difficult to prove676 , at the national, EU and international levels.  This is 
particularly true of the CJEU, where a single opinion is rendered on behalf of all judges; in 
international courts, dissenting opinions are often rendered.  There exists some evidence in 
the area of international criminal law that the style and tone of the proceedings in different 
chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda might diverge, as might voting patterns and the manner in 
which decisions are written (either in the short, syllogistical civilian law style, or in the 
longer, more personal style prevalent in the common law677) depending on the judges’ 
backgrounds678.  Notwithstanding, the bifurcated nature of the AG Opinions and judgements 
of the Court might provide a basis to determine whether the approach adopted differs 
according to the diverging background legal cultures and traditions679.  While the role derives 
from the avocats généraux as an institution of the French legal system680, the AG of the CJEU 
has been described as sui generis681.  The Opinions of the AG and the judgements of the court 
are therefore considered separately in the case examples, an approach which facilitates 
consideration of the influence of legal culture and tradition on engagement with comparative 
analysis682.   
 
While there exists a breadth of legal and political science scholarship on the CJEU’s 
composition and jurisdiction, little consideration has been attributed to the CJEU in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676  As Mégret notes in F. Mégret, ‘International Criminal Law:  A New Legal Hybrid?’ 
(<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1269382>; Last Accessed: 12.09.2012). 
677 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘L'influence du droit comparé sur l'activité des Tribunaux pénaux internationaux’ in A. 
Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales (PUF, Paris; 2002), 
pp.95-128. 
678 See the papers from the conference, ‘Common Civility: Criminal Law as a Cultural Hybrid’, 28 & 29.01.2011 
T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague.   
679 On this notion broadly in the CJEU, see Lasser, Judicial Deliberations (n.593), pp.145-240. 
680 P. Gori, ‘L’avocat général à la cour de justice des Communautés européennes’ (1976) Cahiers de Droit 
Européen 375. 
681 N. Fenelly, ‘Reflections of an Irish Advocate General’ (1996) Irish Journal of European Law 5. 
682 As will be explored in more detail below, reference can be made to comparative analyses – while perhaps not 
extensive – in cases including the Opinion of AG Saggio in Océano (Joined Cases C-240-244/98 Océano [2000] 
ECR I-04941), AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in KB (C-117/01 KB v The National Health Service Pensions Agency 
and the Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-00541) and AG Roemer in Stauder (C-29/69 Stauder [1969] 
ECR I-00419). 
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relevant legal-cultural, socio-economic and political context683; the Cohen and Vauchez piece 
is one of the first to consider the socio-professional “profile” of the Court, including the 
divergent backgrounds of the AGs and judges684.  Fundamentally, the CJEU has been 
described as a “site of contention where a number of legal professionals struggle over the very 
definition of the nature and future of the Court”685.  With reference to the evolution of Union 
law following Van Gend en Loos, Cohen and Vauchez note that the actors directly involved in 
the CJEU (including judges, AGs and référendaires) engaged in a  “collective interpretive 
process, turning a mere legal case into a common cognitive form, a ‘judicial theory of 
European integration’ emerged in which the Court of Justice gained a renewed institutional 
identity as a cardinal institution in the political process of European unification”686.  The 
evolution of the CJEU has arguably led to its gradual institutionalisation and the construction 
of its own institutional identity.  This identity can be identified, for example, in the role of 
language and translation in the functioning of the CJEU (one of the most significant 
challenges to the CJEU’s workload687); the CJEU works with twenty-three official languages, 
which allows most participants to partake in their mother tongue.  Notwithstanding, the 
working language - in which the juge rapporteur presents his preliminary report, and in which 
the judgement is initially drafted - is French.   
 
Moreover, given that the CJEU sits outside of any particular jurisdiction in which the 
participants share a common tradition688, the plurality of legal cultures and traditions 
permeating its constitution has been deemed to constitute part of an emerging European 
culture (in contrast to the focus on commonality at the expense of diversity); this chimes with 
the notion of pluralism as advanced in Chapter 2.  The acceptance of such plurality and its 
promulgation by the CJEU depends on the manner in which its role is understood, that is, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 Cohen and Vauchez, ‘The Social Construction of Law – The European Court of Justice and its Legal 
Revolution Revisited’ (n.664), p.418. 
684 See also, H. Schepel and R. Wesseling, ‘The Legal Community – Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in 
the Writing of Europe’ (1997) 3 ELJ 165 and S.J. Kenney, ‘The Members of the Court of the European 
Communities’ (1998) 5 Col.J.Eur.Law 101. 
685 Cohen and Vauchez, ‘The Social Construction of Law – The European Court of Justice and its Legal 
Revolution Revisited’ (n.664), p.419. 
686 Cohen and Vauchez, ‘The Social Construction of Law – The European Court of Justice and its Legal 
Revolution Revisited’ (n.664), p.426. 
687 House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, 14th 
Report of Session 2010-2011 (The Stationery Office, London; 2011), Appendix 5, ‘Evidence of AG Sharpston’, 
para.1.6. 
688 E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1; M. Shapiro, 
‘The Success of Judicial Review and Authority’ in A. Stone Sweet and M. Shapiro (eds.), On Law, Politics and 
Judicialization (OUP, Oxford; 2002), pp.149-184. 
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whether it is conceived as an institution that acts on behalf of the European (or international) 
community and which should therefore adopt a sui generis European approach providing a 
uniquely European outcome, or whether the CJEU is conceived as a meeting point of 
divergent cultures and a laboratory of diversity689.  It is submitted that the existence of a 
plurality of different legal cultures and traditions within a single legal tribunal is a 
characteristic worthy of being embraced and fostered.  The composition of the CJEU, and the 
plurality of legal cultures and traditions that define the EU judicial space, must also shape the 
determination of the methodological approaches adopted, and in particular, the scope for 
comparative analysis.  Furthermore, it been suggested that the representation of the national 
legal cultures and traditions by judges and AGs increases the public acceptability of the CJEU 
in the national systems690. 
 
Against this background, it is necessary to consider the manner in which complex 
comparative analysis might fit with the dominant methodologies and approaches of 
interpretation and reasoning employed by the CJEU.  In particular, there is some recognition 
of the notion that comparative analysis generally fits with the predominant – namely, the 
teleological – interpretative approaches of the CJEU.  AG Kokott has highlighted that a 
developed understanding of comparison must engage perspective and “must take due account, 
in particular, not only of the aims and tasks of the European Union but also of the special 
nature of European integration and of EU law”691.  For the moment, it is worth outlining 
briefly the fundamental dimensions of these teleological, textual, historical and contextual 
approaches.  The determination of the interpretative approach adopted by the CJEU not only 
shapes the understanding of the breadth of its jurisdiction but also its approach to legal 
reasoning and decision-making (whether, for example, it acts as a legislature, exercising a 
judicial law-making function and furthering what is arguably predominantly political).   
 
Furthermore, the scope for the interaction of the national and European judiciaries comes to 
the fore indirectly in light of the origins of these approaches to legal reasoning being arguably 
identifiable in the national orders.  The historical-originalist approach, engaged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 In respect of which, the notion of laboratory dictates that these cultures must be engaged and “in some way “ 
processed within this context. 
690 C. Tomuschat, ‘National Representation of Judges and Legitimacy of International Jurisdictions: Lessons 
from ICJ to European Court of Justice?’ in I. Pernice, J. Kokott and C. Saunders (eds.), The Future of the 
European Judicial System in Comparative Perspective (Nomos, Baden-Baden; 2006), pp.183-190. 
691 C-550/07 Akzo [2010] ECR I-8301, Opinion of AG Kokott, para.95; G. Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the 
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 14 ELJ 787, p.793. 
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infrequently692 (rarely identifiable, neither in respect of an explicit nor implicit reference to 
the drafters’ intentions, including specific declaration made in the drafting of the relevant 
legal provision693) can be deemed to have a “fossilising effect”, and set in contrast with the 
teleological approach, which is engaged more frequently and is deemed to be more dynamic 
and progressive in the scope it offers for the facilitation of integration.  A pure literal 
approach is also rare; deriving from the French Conseil d’État, and frequently employed by 
the common law courts, it engages concise and deductive reasoning, and succinct and 
formalist determinations as to the “ordinary meaning” text of the relevant provision694.  It 
reflects the assertion of Montesquieu that the judge should constitute merely the mouth of the 
law.  Contextual interpretation requires references to the context in which the relevant norms 
exist.  The CJEU might consider the context in which the rule operates in the national 
tradition or culture, the international sphere or the private regime.  The teleological approach 
has dominated within the CJEU, and involves reference to the “spirit, the general scheme and 
the wording” of the text of the legislative provision695.  The teleological approach finds its 
foundations in the methodology of the French Conseil d’État, and more generally in the 
nation’s post-revolutionary legal system696.  This is very much reflected in the argumentation 
and reasoning processes of the CJEU, and the distinct and formalistic nature of its decisions, 
identifiable even from its earliest jurisprudence697.  It follows the international law approach 
to interpretation, set out in Art.31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties698.  
This approach is functionalist and goal-orientated; it purports to facilitate the relevant aims of 
the Union order, as determined by primary and secondary law.  While the focus has 
predominantly been on the development of the internal market699, it is clear that the EU is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 C-149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, Judgement, para.3890. It should be noted that the CJEU 
will not make reference to the minutes of the Commission, the Council or the European Parliament when 
providing its interpretation: Quelle (n.241), Judgement, para.32. 
693 C-2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631, Judgement, para.666.   
694 The CJEU has maintained that it is not bound by this kind of “proper meaning” of the words of the legal 
language, i.e., the technical meaning of the legal concepts as it results from the legal culture of the Member 
States. The CJEU has thus vindicated its power to create a new “proper meaning,” a meaning which is specific to 
Community law and which best fit to its enforcement: “Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to 
it”, C-283/91 CILFIT [1982] ECR I-3415, para.19. 
695 Faccini Dori  (n.208) 
696 C. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Livre IX, Chapitre VI, (Barrillot, Paris; 1750). 
697 Van Gend en Loos (n.219), Judgement, para.12. 
698 Art.31(1) provides that Treaties should be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the Treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose“; Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.  It is also worth noting that Art.32 provides 
for explicit reference to be made to the travaux préparatoires of the Treaties. 
699 Art.114 TFEU (ex Art.95 EC).  See also, C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-08419, 
para.84:  private law directives should aim “to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and 
achieve a high level of consumer protection by approximating laws”. 
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concerned not only with economic development centred on the internal market but 
increasingly with considerations of a social nature700.  Since the 1970s, the CJEU has 
recognised that the protection of social rights must “be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the Community”701.  Yet the significance of the CJEU’s role in 
social protection has evolved, particularly in respect of the construction of the AFSJ, in line 
with the “the idea that European integration should not be pursued to the detriment of the 
integrity of the social systems of the Member States”702.  While the CJEU has therefore 
seemingly worked to balance 703  the protection of social rights and market integration 
objectives, it continues to be predominantly understood – in itself and by others - as a 
“market-building court”704.  Moreover, notwithstanding that teleology has generally been 
accepted, there has never been advanced an explicit normative justification for the judicial 
activism to which it might give rise705.  The dominance of the teleological approach arguably 
reduces the scope for the CJEU’s engagement with a “consequentialist” approach, or more 
generally, with the social and political dimensions of Europeanisation706.  Hesselink notes that 
the analysis of the aim or objective of the directive in itself will be of little determinative 
value where disputes arise as to the content of the directive and the rights and obligations to 
which it gives rise707; rather, he considers that it is necessary for the CJEU to move beyond a 
method of reasoning, which provides only for consideration of the purposes or objectives of 
EU law and “develop its own general rules or principles of private law”708.  The teleological 
approach alone is potentially limited to certain conceptualisations of private law and lacks the 
necessary tools to deal appropriately with the shifts outlined above, and the development of 
private law, within a pluralist, multi-level space.  The interpretative approaches and 
methodologies of the CJEU must evolve in line with the changing nature of private law, 
concerned not only with its classical conceptualisation but with fundamental rights, the public 
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dimensions of law, reflected particularly in the “policy-orientated, instrumental character of 
regulation”709 and increasingly, privately made law.   
 
Moreover, the evolution of the CJEU’s jurisdiction in line with its orthodox teleological 
approach has given rise to the notion of the emergence of a European teleology, which should 
bind the CJEU’s interpretation of Union law with the political, cultural and socio-economic 
dimensions of integration process; that is to say, interpretation should be made, not only with 
reference to the text of the provisions themselves but in the broader context of integration.  
Azoulai and Dehousse have drawn a connection between the emergence of a European 
teleology and the construction of a coherent and ordered, European system of law710.  The 
extent to which the CJEU should have a role not only in the management of the incoherence 
and fragmentation711 which arises from the Europeanisation of national law via legislation but 
also in the development of a coherent system of law remains unclear; it is shaped by the 
CJEU’s activism, or alternatively, its exercise of self-restraint.  Both the AGs and judges have 
recognised the need for consistency in CJEU jurisprudence: “after the declarations of 
principles of the 1960s, which definitively put Community law on the right track, came the 
period of profound immersion in the practical problems that we, the judges of the second or 
third generation, will have to manage”712.  On the one hand, (as will be explored in Parts III 
and IV below) the CJEU articulates commonality and generality in its reasoning and 
judgement via its recognition of general and common principles of private and Union law; 
this arguably facilitates coherence by establishing the scope for consistency along lines of 
jurisprudence.  On the other hand, the increasing jurisdiction of the CJEU creates a 
problematic to the extent that the lack of clarity underpinning its articulation of its own role in 
the Europeanisation of private law leads to the inconsistent and unsystematic evolution of its 
jurisdiction, particularly in respect of its relationship with national courts.  Indeed, Weatherill 
notes that the more interventionist an approach the CJEU adopts for the purposes of 
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systematising European private law, the greater its potential to undermine the systematic 
nature of national private law713. 
 
ii. The Dynamic Character of the Luxembourg Court: The Evolution of the CJEU 
from an Administrative Body to a Private Law Court 
 
The CJEU was originally intended to constitute an administrative body, with jurisdiction to 
review administrative decisions of the High Authority, where the validity of such actions 
were called into question before national courts714; the CJEU adopted this role for the purpose 
of “ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed”715, 
being entrusted with powers of review in respect of the infringement procedure under Art.258 
TFEU, annulment actions under Art.263 TFEU, and the preliminary reference procedure 
under Art.267 TFEU716.  Administrative and constitutional law constitute the established yet 
continually growing branches of its jurisdiction717 and private law, the young, sprouting 
branch.  This “branching out” has been characterised as a “juridical coup d’état”718 to the 
extent that the Member States did not expect that the CJEU would, or necessarily should, 
develop its jurisdiction in such a way.  
 
The CJEU has distinguished the EU from other international legal regimes as “its own legal 
system, which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal 
systems of the Member States”719.  The EU’s identity as a new legal order720 reflects the sui 
generis character of the Luxembourg Court itself721, in respect of its constitution and 
construction, methodology and reasoning.  As the Treaty itself does not provide for a 
framework of interpretation of primary and secondary EU law, the CJEU has self-engineered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 S. Weatherill ‘Interpretation of the Directives:  The Role of the Court’ in A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), Towards 
a European Civil Code (Kluwer, The Hague; 4th edn., 2011), pp.185-203, p.189. 
714 Art.41 ECSC. 
715 Now, per Art.19 TEU. 
716 Commission infringement procedure under Art.258 TFEU; preliminary reference procedure under Art.267 
TFEU; further, Member States or parties with appropriate locus standi may challenge the legitimacy of a 
directive under Art.263 TFEU. 
717 See, Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court’ (n.318). 
718 A. Stone Sweet, ‘The Juridical coup d’état and the Problem of Authority’ (2007) 8 GLJ 915. 
719 C-6/64 Costa v ENEL 1964 ECR I-1141. 
720 Opinion of the Court:  Opinion 1/91 on the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-1061. 
721 See Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (n.108); and also, A. Stone Sweet and M. McCown, 
‘Discretion and Precedent in European Law’ in O. Wiklund (ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective 
(Kluwer, The Hague; 2003), pp.84-115, p.92:  “…the legal system, as it is understood by the actors that use it, is 
a product of judicial discretion.  Most obviously, the Court supplemented Art.234 with supremacy, direct effect, 
and related ‘constitutional’ doctrines…”. 
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its own jurisdiction under Art.19 TEU, and by virtue of a process of constitutionalisation722, a 
specific role in line with its teleological method of interpretation723.  The CJEU has also 
developed the key principles shaping its relationship with the national courts in the 
development of EU law, namely, of direct effect724 and supremacy725. 
 
As highlighted, the Union has limited legislative competence726; this is reflected in the 
arguably “piecemeal” character of European private law as a body of law.  The CJEU’s 
jurisdiction is inherently linked to the furtherance of European integration via the effective 
implementation of EU law727, yet it appears unwilling to limit its role to one that involves the 
simple restatement of EU legislation 728 .  It has recognised strict standards for 
implementation729, providing minimal latitude for the national legislatures to distinguish 
between the effect of directives and of regulations730, thereby reducing scope for national 
variation.  The infringement procedure, and increasingly the preliminary reference procedure, 
allows the CJEU (and in respect of the latter, the national courts) to “police” Member States’ 
implementation731.  The CJEU’s reluctance to limit its jurisdiction reflects the Commission’s 
vision for the future development of private law, and in particular, its apparent preference for 
maximum (targeted) harmonisation.  Indeed, the CJEU’s jurisdiction via Art.267 TFEU is 
inherently shaped by the reach of Union harmonisation; where legislation provides for 
minimum harmonisation, national courts are not obliged to make a reference to the CJEU if 
the national standard is above the minimum established by the legislature.  Union legislation 	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examples.   
723 C-83/94 Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231 and CILFIT (n.694).   
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explicit provisions within the Package Travel Directive, 90/314, especially Art.5. 
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of a maximum (targeted or otherwise) nature, necessarily requires the national courts to refer 
where the relevant national standard operates at the borderline of the level of protection 
established at the EU level732.   
 
Whether the jurisdiction of the CJEU is deemed to be appropriate is ultimately dependent on 
attitudes towards Europe, including public733, political and policy considerations734 expressed 
predominantly via academic and increasingly, media (rolling press and internet) coverage735.  
This appertains not only to perceptions of Europe in general (for example, in the context of 
the Eurocrisis), but more specifically to EU and private law in particular.  It is foreseeable that 
as the CJEU’s jurisdiction in the private law sphere evolves and consequently, the scope for 
its influence on private party relationships becomes increasingly significant736, “normal” 
citizens will become increasingly aware of and interested in the Luxembourg Court.  There 
seems to be some recognition of such “public legitimacy” in Art.13 TFEU, which requires the 
CJEU as part of the “institutional framework” of the Union to “aim to promote its values, 
advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, 
and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions”737.  The 
specific effects and consequences of this obligation are unclear738 and may have a number of 
structural and organisational, as well as normative, consequences.  Solanke has considered 
that Art.13, TFEU might require a higher degree of transparency in CJEU undertakings in 
order to facilitate legitimacy via the trust that EU citizens place in the judicial system739.  This 
consideration of legitimacy reflects more broadly the notion that the EU can be conceived as 
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Viking and Laval cases:  Viking (n. 355) and Laval (n.355). 
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Relationships’, 28th-29.09.2011, St Anne's College, Oxford. 
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essentially a “judge-made order”740 via requests for preliminary rulings from the national 
courts. 
 
Furthermore, it should be recognised that the jurisdiction and role adopted by the CJEU is 
embedded in a particular political context which is also broadly temporal in its nature.  The 
CJEU might at times be accused of being activist, or of being too influenced by policy 
considerations in fulfilling its interpretive role741; at other times, it might exercise restraint, 
explicitly limiting itself.  It is not clear whether this choice is conscious or unconscious; the 
CJEU cannot choose the cases that come before it.  Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
legislature leaves gaps on purpose, due to a lack of political consensus.  The legislature can 
expect that the problematic dimension of such gaps will arise at some point after the 
implementation of the legislation and that the CJEU will be required to deal with the issues 
which have not been finalised by the legislature.  Thus, the CJEU contributes to the policy 
considerations and aims set out in the Treaty structure and developed by the Commission and 
Parliament (and in particular pieces of legislation, as discussed above).  The political bodies 
of the EU will focus on a particular policy area (or more than one) in each piece of legislation; 
the CJEU focuses on the legal issues arising from this area.  The CJEU’s engagement with 
comparative analysis for the purpose of this kind of “gap-filling” is identifiable in the case 
examples explored below, most evidently following the legislature’s silence on fundamental 
rights protection and the CJEU’s role in engaging in the development of this protection 
between the national, European (including CoE) and international levels.  Additionally, a 
more specific example can be identified in the Leitner case, in which the Union legislature 
refrained from stating explicitly the understanding of “damage” between different Union 
directives742; when a conflict arose within the Austrian courts, the CJEU provided an 
autonomous interpretation of damage (including compensation for non-material loss). 
 
Broadly speaking743, the legitimacy of the EU as a judge-made legal order must necessarily 
derive from the Member States; that is to say, the scope for judicial activism at the level of the 
CJEU is inherently facilitated, and also restricted, by social, political and economic attitudes 
at the national level.  Essentially, the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court is dependent on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740 Maduro, We the Court (n.703). 
741 T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, (OUP, Oxford; 5th edn., 2003), p.52; p.80. 
742 Leitner (n.728), in respect of Directive 85/374 and Directive 90/314. 
743 In order to avoid a discussion on authority and legitimacy, at this stage. 
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references from national judicial bodies, whether lower or supreme courts744, and the 
application of the interpretations rendered by the CJEU in the national jurisdictions (and in 
particular, in respect of the scope for cross-border and cross-sectoral impact).  Broadly, this 
consideration of the rationale underlying the making of the reference is relevant, and is 
explored in the next section, in the context of the interactions between the national and 
European Court.  For the moment, it is worth noting that the question referred to the CJEU 
might be understood as a specific version, shaped by the perspective of a particular legal 
tradition, of what might be a more generic European problem; similarly, the final 
determination might be made differently in diverse orders, following Sefton Green’s assertion 
that the way in which moral and legal issues are understood by individuals and communities 
constitutes “a cultural phenomenon, so it can be inferred that they form part of our cultural 
identity”745.   
 
The following section explores further the pertinence of the inter-judicial relationships – and 
the scope for comparative analysis to which they give rise – arising from the preliminary 
reference procedure, which has been identified as an appropriate analytical space, both for the 
purposes of choosing the case studies examined below, and limiting the breadth of the 
analysis and evaluation undertaken.  Thus, the preliminary reference procedure provides the 
framework for the interrelation of the national and European courts for the purposes of this 
thesis.   
 
II. The Preliminary Reference Procedure as an “Analytical Space” 
 
The preliminary reference procedure has existed in some form within the complex judicial 
structure that permeates the EU legal order since the ECSC Treaty was established in 1951746. 
Subsequent to the coming into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958747, the preliminary 
reference system was extended, thereby permitting the CJEU to engage in the interpretation of 
Union law even in the absence of challenges to its validity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 Micklitz, 'Judicial Activism of the European Court of Justice’ (n.417), p.20. 
745 Sefton-Green, ‘Social Justice and European Identity’ (n.343), p.276. 
746 Art.41 ECSC Treaty. 
747 Initially Art.177 EEC in 1958. 
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i. The Evolution of the Preliminary Reference Procedure Post-Lisbon 
 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the founding of the CJEU’s jurisdiction with regard to matters of 
freedom, security and justice, was contingent on the classification of those matters within 
either the First Pillar (Community)748 or the Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs).  In 
respect of the former, the CJEU’s jurisdiction was expansive; with regards to the latter, it was 
considerably more limited749.  Following the abandonment of the pillar structure, post-
Lisbon750, the CJEU’s jurisdiction arising from the preliminary reference procedure has been 
enlarged; it can now hear cases concerning all matters relating to freedom, security and 
justice 751 .  The number of preliminary references concerning private law matters is 
increasing752 however there are still comparatively few cases of such a nature753. 
 
Per Art.267(2) TFEU754, the CJEU can hear preliminary references from all national courts755 
on issues relating to the interpretation of primary and secondary EU law756 and the validity of 
the latter757.  Broberg and Fenger predicted, writing in 2009, that the extension of the scope 
for referrals – from supreme courts, to courts and tribunals758 operating at all levels – would 
constitute one of two key changes in procedure arising from the Lisbon Treaty759.  There 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 Thus, in respect of Title IV, TEC, the CJEU had jurisdiction in respect of applications for annulments of EC 
legislation (Art.230 TEC), actions for failure to act re the Council, Parliament or Commission (Art.232 TEC), in 
infringement actions against Member States for failure to satisfy obligations (Art.226-227 TEC) and also in 
respect of preliminary references from the state (under Art.234 TEC). 
749 In respect of third pillar matters, the CJEU has jurisdiction in relation to annulment, and not infringement, 
proceedings (under Art.35 TEU).  The CJEU has jurisdiction in respect of preliminary references in relation to 
matters referred to in Art.35 TEU, from any court of the Member States, where that state has so agreed.  
750 Still the CJEU does not have jurisdiction, with limited exceptions, in respect of what was the second pillar, 
that is, on Common Foreign and Security Policy, as per Art.275 TFEU. 
751 This jurisdiction also arises in respect of annulment, infringement and “failure to act“ proceedings. 
752 Consider the Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht reports on private law cases before the CJEU, published 
every year since 1995, C.H. Kohler, ‘Gemeinschaftsrecht und Privatrecht: Zur Rechtsprechung des EuGH im 
Jahre 1994’ (1995) 3 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 482. 
753 Johnston and Unberath suggest that in some cases, national courts are confident that they can solve the issue 
and are unprepared to wait for a reply from CJEU.  It may also be true that with the increasing breadth of 
alternative dispute resolution processes, and private dispute resolution, in particular, there is greater scope for 
private law cases to be decided out of court:  Johnston and Unberath, ‘European Private Law by Directives’ in 
Twigg-Flesner, The Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (n.248).   
754 Originally Art.177 EEC, and subsequently Art.234 EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
755 See previously, unless so agreed, Art.68(1) TEC provided that preliminary references could only be made 
from those national courts from which there was no judicial remedy in national law (i.e. essentially, courts of 
final appeal). 
756 Art.267(1)(a) and (b) TFEU. 
757 Art.267(1)(b) TFEU. 
758 Broberg and Fenger explore the institutions that “qualify” as “courts or tribunals”; M. Broberg and N. Fenger, 
Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, Oxford; 2010), pp.71-93, including judicial 
bodies, administrative authorities and ombudsmen and private bodies. 
759 Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (n.758). 
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remains a lack of explicit guidance in respect of the criteria to be engaged by national courts 
in deciding whether to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.  Under Art.267(3), courts 
have a duty to refer760 where there exists no judicial remedy in national law; this includes not 
only the availability of remedies before supreme courts but before all courts of (in practice) 
last instance761.  The limited guidance provided by the CJEU, explicated in the CILFIT 
judgement, essentially constitutes the exceptions to the obligation to refer762.  Thus, the 
circumstances in which preliminary references are appropriate and those in which they are 
not, remain unclear.  It is for the national judge to determine that “a decision on the question 
is necessary to enable it to give judgement”.  It is not for the CJEU to question the national 
court’s rationale for the reference; the CJEU is obliged to provide a judgement where the 
reference concerns the interpretation of acts of the Union763 and is necessary for the resolution 
of the main (national) proceedings764.  References cannot be made in respect of questions as 
to the validity or interpretation of national law in general, or in respect of the law applicable 
to the particular case before the national court.  In Wiener, AG Jacobs attempted to further 
clarify the “CILFIT criteria”, distinguishing between references from courts of last instance 
and those from other courts765.  As to requests from the latter, these should be made where the 
ruling is one of “general importance and where the ruling is likely to promote the uniform 
application of the law” rather than in those cases in which “there is an established body of 
case law which could readily be transposed to the facts of the instant case; or where the 
question turns on a narrow point considered in the light of a very specific set of facts”; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (n.758), p.14. The second change 
concerned references in criminal law and policing, and broadly justice and home affairs (previously, the Third 
Pillar). 
760 Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (n.758), pp.223 et seq. 
761 Sanctions can be imposed for failure to satisfy this obligation; infringement proceedings can be brought 
(Opinion 1/09 of 8/3/2011, para.87); action for damages on breach of EU law (C-173/03 Traghetti del 
Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-5177 and Opinion 1/09, [2011] ECR I-1137, para.86); consequences can arise under 
Art.6, ECHR.  See also, Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (n.758), 
pp.265-273. 
762 CILFIT (n.694), Judgement, para.21. 
763 C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003 and C-244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR I-3045, 
Judgement, paras.16 and 20. 
764 C-62/93 BP Soupergaz [1995] ECR I-1883, Judgement, para.9, where it is “quite obvious” that the 
interpretation is not relevant for deciding the case before the national court, “a court or tribunal against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of community law is raised 
before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established 
that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by 
the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable 
doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of 
Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in 
judicial decisions within the Community”. 
765 C-338/96 Wiener [1998] ECR I-6495, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras.59-60. 
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clearly, a vast body of cases exists in between766.  In respect of references from courts of last 
instance, AG Jacobs notes that rigid adherence to the CILFIT criteria would result in the 
referral of all questions of Community law; he pleads instead for an “evolutionary approach” 
with national courts referring only cases of general importance767.  However, it is not 
necessarily clear how these criteria should be engaged.  This issue is one of caseload, which 
concerns not only the strictly legal dimensions of the case (i.e. the processes involving the 
juge rapporteur, the AG and the chambers allocated to hear the reference) but which is also 
relevant in terms of the necessary legal translation, research and documentation processes.  
Unsurprisingly, there is concern that the increasing number of preliminary references coming 
before the CJEU will result in a “gridlocked” system768, which might dissuade national courts 
from referring matters significant to the evolution of Union law769.  The CJEU has adopted 
certain mechanisms to facilitate a speedier judicial process including: 1) the acceptance of the 
criteria for reference outlined above; 2) the rules of procedure provide that an Opinion will 
only be provided by the AG in those cases in which a new issue of law has arisen770; 3) 
national courts are encouraged to set out a possible answer to their own question771 and 4) the 
construction of a new urgent procedure.  In many cases, there will be no oral hearing, while in 
others, a reasoned order will be rendered by virtue of a simplified procedure772.  A number of 
other, more expansive, structural changes have also been proposed773; many of these are 
under discussion but have not yet been implemented774.  
 
ii. The Preliminary Reference Procedure as a Reflection of the Inter-judicial 
Relationship Between the National and European Courts 
 
The preliminary reference procedure is a purposively built and skilfully developed legal 
institution, underpinning which are various rationales and objectives.  Most of the cases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Wiener (n.765), Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras.59-60. 
767 Wiener (n.765), Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras.60-61. 
768 Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (n.758), p.7. 
769 EP Resolution of 9.07.2008 on the role of the national judge in the European judicial system (A6-0224/2008), 
points F and 25 (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-
2008-0352>; Last Accessed: 04.10.2013). 
770 Art.20 Protocol No.3, Statute of the CJEU, C 83/210. 
771 ‘Information Note On References From National Courts for a Preliminary Ruling’, OJ [2005] C-143/01. 
772 Art.104(3) Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, OJ L265/25, 29.09.2012..  See also, the accelerated procedures in 
respect of the Brussels II Bis Regulation; for example, concerning the return of an illegally retained child – C-
195/08 Rinau [2008] ECR I-5271. 
773 Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (n.758), pp.25-36. 
774 F.G. Jacobs, ‘Possibilities for Further Reforming the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2004), Papers from the 
Colloquium on the Judicial Architecture of the European Union, 15.11.2004. 
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examined below come before the CJEU as preliminary references; these cases arise from a 
diversity of Member States, and thus provide interesting examples of interactions between 
legal cultures and traditions, allowing scope for the exploration and perhaps identification of 
the locations at which the plurality of legal cultures and traditions might affect the 
methodology and reasoning of the CJEU.  Via the preliminary reference procedure, the CJEU 
has developed a number of key principles that have come to shape the relationship between 
the national courts, as institutional actors in the multi-level system of EU law, the European 
and international courts.  The national courts are confined not only by the operation of the 
supremacy principle775 but also by the doctrines established in Simmenthal776 (whereby 
national norms conflicting with EU law must be set aside), Marleasing777 (on the basis of 
which national law must be interpreted and applied, insofar as possible, so as to avoid a 
conflict with an EU norm) and Von Kolson778 (which imposes an obligation on the national 
courts to interpret national law in such a manner that it conforms with EU law).   It is clear 
that these principles do not preclude the existence of conflicts arising in respect of the 
formation, interpretation and application of norms, the nature of which have been outlined 
above and which ultimately underpin the making of the preliminary reference. 
 
Before considering the rationale and character of the reference procedure, and the relationship 
to which it gives rise, it is worth considering the way in which a case proceeds through the 
CJEU.  On receipt of the reference779, the greffe prepares the fiche objet wherein he identifies 
and summarises the key issues of the reference, identifies other relevant (open or closed) 
cases (in order to refer the case to the same AG or juge rapporteur), and outlines various 
procedural questions780.  At the same time, the case is sent to the direction de la bibliothèque, 
recherche et documentation781, which prepares a fiche préexamen and provides "second 
thoughts" on issues of competence, admissibility and procedure.  Furthermore, the DRD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
776 C-106/77 Simmenthal [1977] ECR I-62. 
777 Marleasing (n.393). 
778 C-14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein‐Westfalen [1984] ECR I-1891. 
779 The reference itself might have its foundations in comparative analysis; in Leitner, the Landesgericht 
(Landesgericht Linz, Beschluß vom 06/04/2000) made a comparison between the state of the law in Austria (The 
Directive had been transposed into Austrian law by virtue of Art.31(b)-(f) of the Konsumentenschutzgesetz 
(KSchG; Law of Consumer Protection) of 1993) and that of Germany, noting that the German legislature had 
legislated expressly to provide a basis for compensation for non-material damage, and that this provision had 
been applied and further refined by the German courts (Arts.253 and 651(f), BGB). 
780 Including those on the competence of the CJEU, the admissibility of the reference, the need for an 
accelerated, simplified or urgent procedure, and the scope - in light of previous jurisprudence - to deal with the 
case by virtue of the making of an ordannance. 
781 Hereinafter, DRD. 
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identifies the essential subject matter of the reference in the context of existing CJEU 
jurisprudence, as regards relevant Union, international and national issues, facilitating the 
identification of the relevant questions referred, of the context in which the request has been 
made and of the referring court’s procedure.  This allows the court to understand whether 
there exists an opinion of the national government on the matter, or an existing body of 
controversial case law or scholarship.  It also provides a key opportunity to locate the case in 
the context of relevant contemporary legal issues as well as for the identification of pertinent 
socio-economic, political and cultural considerations.  Thereafter, the greffe sends the fiche to 
the president of the CJEU and the premier AG; the case is then allocated to the juge 
rapporteur and the AG782.  At the beginning of the written procedure, an "informal" but 
important relationship is established between the AG and the juge rapporteur; both can 
communicate with each other and the president in respect of procedural questions, can request 
clarification of the reference per Art.101(1) of the procedural rules of the CJEU, the 
translation of additional documents by the direction générale de la traduction783 (via the 
greffe) and the completion of the fiche préexamen by the DRD.   
  
The juge rapporteur prepares the rapport préalable alone (or rather, with his or her 
référendaires)784.  It is split into three sections and a set of annexes.  The first part sets out the 
basic information of the case, including key words and a brief history of the procedure.  The 
second part refers to the relevant legal rules and the facts, and includes a synthesis of the 
parties’ arguments, and of the written observations advanced.  The third part outlines - in 
order to facilitate procedural decisions (at the réunion générale) - a brief outline of the case 
and the key legal issues and questions.  At this stage, the legal problem must be categorised 
and the applicable rules, that is all sources that might be relevant to the case, identified.  This 
stage should therefore consist of the taking of an “inventory” of the relevant knowledge and 
information, on the basis of which it is necessary to identify the additional information 
required to supplement and complement that which already exists if there is a gap, either in 
terms of what is included in the reference from the national court or that which is brought to 
the attention of the AG and the Court in the submissions of the relevant parties, including the 
Union institutions and national states, or in respect of the relevant legal provisions applicable.  
The nature of the information identified as relevant necessarily forms part of, and shapes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
782 Arts.15 and 16, Protocol No.3, Statute of the CJEU, C 83/210. 
783 Hereinafter, DGT. 
784 Art.59, Protocol No.3, Statute of the CJEU, C 83/210. 
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methodological approach adopted.  At an initial stage, the juge rapporteur sets out his 
recommendations as to procedure, that is, the chamber to hear the case, the need for an AG 
Opinion785, whether the case should be joined with others, whether a hearing should be held 
(the rapport should include a request of concentration and an indication of length; the reasons 
for the absence of a procedure should be stated) and his preliminary determinations as to the 
resolution of the case.  The juge rapporteur may request clarification or a note de recherche 
from the DRD; its scope and the issues to be explored should be set out precisely in the 
annex.  He (and if relevant, the AG) can engage with the DRD in advance of the publication 
of the rapport; this should be done informally.  These procedural decisions must be 
approved in the réunion générale, occurring before the hearing.  Interested parties786 can 
participate in the hearing; further, Art.25 of the Statute of the Court, permits it to "entrust any 
individual, body, authority, committee or other organization it chooses with the task of giving 
an expert opinion".  Similarly, per Art.24 "the Court may also require the Member States and 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies not being parties to the case to supply all information 
which the Court considers necessary for the proceedings". 
 
The date on which the AG's Opinion will be delivered is announced – in most cases – at the 
end of the hearing, and is normally rendered as soon as possible, or at the latest, ten weeks 
after the hearing (or the réunion générale).  The AG normally prepares the document in 
German, English, Spanish, French or Italian; account should be taken of the need for 
translation.  As a general rule, the judgement is pronounced within 16 weeks of the 
Opinion.  The juge rapporteur highlights his intentions to the other judges within one week; if 
there are no other objections, he reveals his projet de motif in conformity with the AG; if he is 
in disagreement with the AG, he either requests that the president of the chamber organises a 
tour de table for which he will prepare a note, or indicates that he will present a projet de 
motif to open the deliberé.  Other members of the chambers may request a tour de table, 
introducing their rationale in a note.  In the absence of an AG Opinion, the tour de table 
normally occurs immediately after the hearing.  Within the rapport, the juge rapporteur 
makes a preliminary determination as to whether it is necessary, within the deliberé 
(undertaken in secret), to interpret the relevant norms, where the “interpreter” (i.e. the AG or 
the Court) has to determine the norm is sufficiently clear from the ordinary meaning of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 If necessary, the focus should be outlined and the new points of law identified; if not, the absence of new law 
should be indicated. 
786 By virtue of Art.23, Protocol No.3, Statute of the CJEU, C 83/210. 
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terms to be applicable, or if doubt persists in the absence of settled case law787.  At this stage, 
the chamber will consider the appropriateness of the norms deemed to be applicable, and once 
there is agreement, will identify the relevant interpretative approaches.  These may not be 
identifiable in the written judgement; at this stage, there is scope for a revisiting of 
preliminary conclusions788, which “takes us into a broader sphere of practical argumentation 
where the values and principles appropriate to the institutions of the societies, the states and 
the supranational and international communities are taken into account”789.  Evidently, it is 
the key stage at which comparative analysis might arise which might find its foundations in 
the rapport of the juge rapporteur or indirectly in the note of the DRD. 
 
Once an interpretation has been identified and agreed upon, it must then – against the 
background of the understanding that the facts, and the final judgement are for the national 
court – be identified in light of a ratio, so as to potentially be applicable across the 
Union790.  At the end of the deliberé, the date on which the judgement will be pronounced is 
agreed; the juge rapporteur sets out his projet d'arrêt.  At the deliberé, if it is decided that 
part of the project should be subject to written procedure, the other judges present their 
written observations and the juge rapporteur must integrate these where appropriate and 
agreed.  In each version, the changes should be indicated, reviewed and checked.  The juge 
rapporteur then sends the final draft to all other members of the CJEU, and the final version 
to the appropriate departments (DRD, DGT, UPI) for translation and correction.  
 
The rationales underlying, and the objectives overarching the preliminary reference system, 
are multi-faceted.  Primarily, the procedure allows for the resolution of potential conflicts 
relating to ambiguous interpretations of EU law provisions; thus, it should facilitate the 
uniform and effective application of EU law and broadly promote European integration791.  
There is a breadth of empirical evidence that, per Stone Sweet, the “‘Europeanisation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787  J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of 
the European Court of Justice’ in G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice (OUP, 
Oxford; 2001), pp.43-85, p.55. 
788 Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice’ in de Búrca and Weiler, The European Court of Justice (n.787), p.56 and 60. 
789 Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice’ in de Búrca and Weiler, The European Court of Justice (n.787), p.57. 
790 Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice’ in de Búrca and Weiler, The European Court of Justice (n.787), pp.43-85, p.60. 
791 Van Gend en Loos (n.219); Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; C-4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] 
ECR 491.  Further, the CJEU has asserted that the interpretation of the Treaties should not be undertaken in a 
strict manner but in light of the aim of the integration process and the Treaty objectives. 
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national law’ has been determined, or at least meaningfully conditioned by, processes and 
outcomes generated through Art.234”792.  Weiler considers that the procedure has been key in 
facilitating the understanding of the “reciprocal” nature of EU integration, establishing an 
incentive relationship on the part of both the CJEU and the national courts not only to engage 
in the development of EU law and its uniform application in Member States, but at the same 
time to attempt establish the legitimacy and political justification for their actions.  This 
justificatory rationale, and the relevance of comparative analysis thereto, is considered further 
in Part IV. 
 
Initially – in line with the neofunctionalist characterisation of integration – the preliminary 
reference procedure was established in the Treaties as one of cooperation.  Indeed, this is an 
understanding to which the both the AGs793 and the Court794 continue to attach significance.  
As noted, where the national court cannot resolve the issue in compatibility with EU law, it is 
obliged to refer the case to the CJEU for an interpretative statement.  The nature of the 
preliminary reference procedure must be understood in light of the judicially-developed 
principles outlined above, and in particular, the doctrine of state liability, particularly as 
developed in Köbler795; the imposition of an obligation on the national courts to refer can be 
understood to reflect a relationship based on hierarchy.  It is submitted that Köbler, from the 
perspective of the evolution of the preliminary reference procedure, might operate to establish 
a degree of hierarchy, on the one hand, and actually promote cooperation and trust between 
the national courts and the CJEU, on the other; that is to say, it highlights the significance of 
the effective and compliant application of EU law to the construction of a cooperative 
relationship, especially, as Komarek has noted, with regard to the introduction of the new 
CEE judiciaries within the EU judicial sphere.  The alternative to the preliminary reference 
procedure is the infringement procedure, which has been criticised to the extent that, while 
proceedings are raised by the Commission, it might operate to undermine any notion of 
cooperation in the relationship between the courts796.  The structure of the preliminary 
reference system might also be understood to undermine the notion of hierarchy to the extent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 Stone Sweet, 'Integration and the Europeanisation of Law' (n.104), p.13. 
793 C-306/99 BIAO [2003] ECR I-1, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para.44. 
794 C-445/06 Danske Slagtierier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2009] ECR I-2119 Judgement, para.65. 
795 Köbler (n.184). 
796 J. Komarek, ‘Inter-Court Constitutional Dialogue after the Enlargement – Implication of the Case of 
Professor Köbler’ (2005) 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law 75, p.87.  
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that post-Lisbon, courts other than those of last instance are able and in some cases, obliged to 
refer.   
 
The hierarchy/cooperation distinction is relevant with regard to the assertion that the 
preliminary reference procedure necessarily shapes the methodological framework 
underpinning the Europeanisation of law and establishes an environment of cooperation and 
coordination in which dialogue and discourse can be fostered.  The emphasis on coordination 
and cooperation has been characterised as something akin to a public relations effort on the 
part of the (both European, and in some cases, national) courts, which have the aim of 
justifying their jurisdiction and activities, the operation of the preliminary reference procedure 
and the interaction to which it gives rise797.  While it has been asserted that it has 
predominantly been the CJEU that has exerted efforts to “cultivate” relations for the purposes 
of keeping the national judiciaries “onside”798, the control of the preliminary reference 
procedure nevertheless lies largely with the national courts.  Within the confines of their 
obligation to refer under Art.267(3) TFEU, and the requirements of a reference order799, it is 
the national court that decides whether to make a reference, when to make a reference800, the 
content of the question referred801 and significantly, determines the manner in which the 
CJEU’s judgement is engaged in the national sphere.  Thus, even the Court has recognised 
that “[t]he system of references for a preliminary ruling is based on a dialogue between one 
court and another, the initiation of which depends entirely on the national court’s assessment 
as to whether a reference is appropriate and necessary”802.  
 
Furthermore, the obligation of lower courts to refer dictates that there is scope for these courts 
to engage with the CJEU on the basis of various rationales; these rationales might undermine 
the hierarchy of the national judicial structure and allow the lower court to interact with its 
own legislature – should an incompatibility or conflict between national and EU norms be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 Mummery, ‘Links with National Courts in Moser and Sawyer, Making Community Law (n.535). 
798 Azoulai and Dehousse, ‘The ECJ and the Legal Dynamics of Integration’ in Weatherill et al, The Oxford 
Handbook of the European Union, (n.113), p.358. 
799 CJEU Information Note, OJ 2011 C 160, 1.   
800 In general, there are no time limits for a reference; the exception applies in relation to timelines for reviews of 
legality as per Art.263(6) TFEU. 
801 The CJEU will review the question referred and if necessary, reformulate the reference, requesting 
clarifications and confirmation from the national court, where necessary; Art.101 Rules of Procedure of the 
CJEU, OJ L265/25, 29.09.2012. 
802 C-2/06 Kempter [2008] ECR I-411, Judgement, para.42. 
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established – without involving its supreme court 803 .  This also engages the judicial 
empowerment and competition of courts hypotheses of Weiler804, Alter805 et al, relating to the 
empowerment of lower national courts through the reference procedure.  According to 
MacCormick, national courts find their obligations to apply Union law not in Union law itself 
but in national constitutional law806.  MacCormick advocated a pluralistic conception of this 
judicial interaction, understanding the principle of supremacy not as one dictating the 
“subordination” of national law, but rather as establishing a space of interaction in which both 
the CJEU and the highest national courts might be engaged; avoiding conflict is deemed to 
be:  
a matter for circumspection and for political as much as legal judgment. The ECJ 
ought not to reach its interpretative judgments without regard to their potential impact 
on national constitutions. National courts ought not to interpret laws or constitutions 
without regard to the resolution of their compatriots to take full part in European 
Union and European Community807.   
 
Indeed, the national courts can therefore use the preliminary reference procedure – both in the 
ascent and descent of the case – to modernise and develop the law of the Member State808; 
that is, in line with the principles of direct effect and superiority, the national court can refer 
to the CJEU to induce an interpretation of EU law which creates an incompatibility with 
national law and invokes scope for legislative or judicial change therein809.  It is clear, for 
example, from the state liability jurisprudence, that the preliminary reference procedure 
provides a means for lower national courts to engage indirectly with the national legislature, 
“skipping” the supreme courts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 A-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton; 2004), p.146. 
804 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors’ (1994) 26 
Comparative Political Studies 510, pp.521–3. 
805 Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (n.655), pp.47-48, and K. Alter, ‘Explaining National 
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and Jurisprudence (Hart, Oxford; 1997), pp.227-252, pp.241-242. 
806 N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP, 
Oxford; 1999), p.110. 
807 MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (n.806), pp.119-120. 
808 J. Basedow, ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law: Vacillations, General Principles and the Architecture of 
the European Judiciary’ (2010) 18 ERPL 443, pp.447-448. 
809 Basedow, ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law’ (n.808), p.448. 
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Yet, drawing a strict and rigid distinction between a characterisation that is “hierarchical” and 
one that is “cooperative”810 might also be problematic (in the alternative, de la Mare has 
considered that a shift can be identified from “cooperation” to “coordination”811).  Instead, 
Slaughter understands the relationship between the national and European courts as a 
fundamental aspect of the “vertical network”, which exists, alongside horizontal networks 
within a “networked world order” 812 : “[t]he possibility of direct relations between a 
supranational court and national courts, or between a supranational regulatory agency and its 
domestic equivalent, pierces the shell of state sovereignty and creates a channel whereby 
supranational officials can harness the coercive power of national officials” 813 .  The 
characterisation of the relationship in respect of the relevance of comparative analysis is a 
consideration to which further reference will be made throughout the case examples for the 
purposes of identifying a degree of clarity in a concretised context.  It is submitted that an 
abstract analysis of the norms structuring the preliminary reference system can only provide a 
framework of understanding; it is necessary to examine the bases upon which such references 
are made (or not made, as the case may be814), the methodology and reasoning of the 
European court in examining conflicts that arise, the relationship with the national courts in 
the preliminary reference procedure, and the return of the case to the national court.  While 
the interpretation of EU law is for the CJEU, the national courts are charged with the task of 
applying the law in the domestic context and rendering the final decision on the resolution of 
a dispute; the CJEU does not go so far as to apply national law, or to make a judgement in the 
context of the particular case.  This allocation of tasks is necessarily reflected in a “division of 
labour” which characterises the EU legal order; it dictates that the interpretation and 
application of norms are distinct processes undertaken by different institutions operating in 
diverse traditions and further reflects the limitation of the jurisdiction and role of the 
Luxembourg Court815.  The CJEU’s activity is seemingly facilitated and legitimated because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 In the second edition, T. de la Mare and C. Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: 
Evolution and Stasis’ in P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd edn., 
2011), pp.363-407. 
811 la Mare and Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration’ in Craig and de Búrca, The Evolution 
of EU Law (n.810), p.377. 
812 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), pp.131-165. 
813 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.145. 
814 Consider for example, the acte clair doctrine, which is used often by Member States’ courts to avoid making 
a reference; this is especially true in relation to the French Conseil d’État - See the General Report on ‘The 
Preliminary Reference Procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, 18th Colloquium of the 
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU, Helsinki, May 2002. 
815 K. Lenaerts, ‘Interpretation and the Court of Justice – A Basis for Comparative Reflection’ (2007) 41 
Int.Lawyer 1011, p.1012. 
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it is relevant through the national courts; at the same time, within the national system, the 
national court can justify the measures that it takes on the basis of its EU obligations, firstly to 
refer, and secondly, to implement the CJEU judgement816.  Essentially therefore, the national 
and European courts derive their power to act via the preliminary reference procedure; the 
exercise of this power is reflected in the communication that arises between the courts.   
 
The preliminary reference procedure is engaged as a space for interaction and contestation 
within the European sphere, one in which national, European (and potentially international 
and transnational) levels of regulation come together and which is ripe for communication 
between the diverse dimensions – political, social, economic, cultural and legal – of European 
integration and the Europeanisation of law.  The interpretation and application of EU law 
within the Member States gives rise to conflicts (identified above, and in the case studies), the 
resolution of which is for the CJEU and the national courts via the preliminary reference 
procedure.  It seems intuitively necessary that the CJEU engage with the resolution of 
conflicts in a way that would be deemed acceptable across the plurality of legal cultures and 
traditions of the Member States.  Methodologically, there is a lack of clarity as to the extent to 
which, and the means by which, the CJEU takes into consideration these divergent cultures 
and traditions817 .  This thesis explores the relevance of comparative analysis and its 
engagement by the CJEU in managing conflicts arising before the national courts within the 
context of the Europeanisation of private law and coming before it via the preliminary 
reference procedure; the relevance of comparison is examined not only descriptively but also 
normatively, to the extent that an attempt is made to frame its theoretical and methodological 
dimensions in light of the evolving nature of the Europeanisation of private law within a 
pluralistic, multi-level space and the critical assessment of comparison undertaken in Chapter 
3818.   
 
Chapter 4. Concluding Remarks 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816 Weiler, ‘The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (n.99); ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 
Yale.L.J. 2403; ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court and Its Interlocutors’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political 
Studies 510. 
817 Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law’ in Cafaggi and Muir Watt, The Making of European Private 
Law (n.59), p.329. 
818 Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law’ (n.397). 
 	  	  	   157 
Building on the examination of the Union legislature’s role in the Europeanisation of private 
law in Chapter 1 and the evaluation in Chapter 2 of the need to absorb the legal, socio-
economic, cultural and political dimensions of private law development, it has been 
recognised that Europeanisation and integration, more generally, cannot emerge only from 
legislative activities.  Rather judicial development and thus the interrelation of the national 
and European courts, is key.  Ultimately, Chapter 4 has aimed to facilitate the analytical shift 
from a legislative to a judicial focus.  The analysis in Chapter 4 has outlined, from a legal-
cultural and sociological perspective, the constitution and construction of the CJEU and 
thereafter, the evolution of its interpretative jurisdiction and role in private law; to the extent 
that this jurisdiction arises predominantly via the preliminary reference procedure, it 
necessarily engages the significance of the relationship between the national courts and the 
CJEU.  Fundamentally, this evaluation aims to allow for this space of interaction – not only 
between the courts but also more broadly between national, European and international legal 
orders within a plural, multi-level space – to be established as one within which the scope for 
comparative analysis arises.  Against this background and building on Chapter 3, in which 
different conceptualisations of comparative analysis have been critically assessed, Chapter 4 
aims to outline the key dimensions of these interjudicial relationships that potentially shape 
the framework of comparative analysis engaged by the CJEU.  These key dimensions derive 
from the dynamic character and structure of the Europeanisation of private law and are 
evident in light of the case examples evaluated in Part III; consequently, they permeate the 
analysis which follows in Parts III and IV.  They include: the multi-level construct of private 
law development in itself, the relevance of which permeates the three case examples; the 
constitution of the courts, including the background culture and tradition of its participants; 
the notion of a division of labour between the courts, which arises, inter alia, in respect of the 
ex officio regulation of contract terms and the erosion of national procedural autonomy and 
finally, the dynamic and shifting role of the courts, reflected, inter alia, in the notion of 
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PART THREE: A CASE-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE JURISDICTION AND ROLE 
OF THE CJEU 
 
The Selection and Methodology of the Case Examples 
  
This part of the thesis engages a thorough examination of three areas of case law, 
predominantly emerging through the preliminary reference procedure and key to the 
Europeanisation of law.  While it cannot be deemed to be comprehensive, as the jurisprudence 
examined does not cover the entirety of European private law, this analysis aims to explore 
and uncover the fundamental dimensions of the Europeanisation of private law, which 
permeate and overarch the substantive content of the case examples.  Furthermore, in light of 
the reasoning of the CJEU and the exploration of the relevance of comparative analysis in the 
Opinions of the AG and judgements of the Court, this part aims to uncover the relationships 
between the different legal orders within the European sphere, including national, EU and 
international law.  The aim is to concretise the discourse launched in Chapters 3 and 4 via the 
evaluation of key areas of jurisprudence.  
 
The rationales underpinning the identification of the relevant case examples are various.  For 
the purposes of integrating the observations as to the jurisdiction and structure of the CJEU 
arising from the legal-cultural and sociological assessment in the previous chapter, the 
analysis focuses on the jurisprudence coming before the CJEU via the preliminary reference 
procedure; where relevant, cases arising by other means are also discussed.  Broadly, this part 
aspires to bring together diverse yet connected areas of EU law, within each of which 
conflicts of the nature outlined above are potentially generated and at least one dimension of a 
private law nature arises.  The purpose of these case examples is not to scrutinise the 
substance of the CJEU's decisions as such 819  but to examine the approach and 
methodology adopted by the CJEU in each of these areas.  Each area reflects, to a greater or 
lesser degree, the different competences of the Union.  Three areas are identified and the 
structure of each follows broadly the same pattern; a number of cases have been chosen in 
each area for the purposes of lending the analysis a degree of systemisation.  The first case 
example focuses on the CJEU’s recognition of state liability as a principle of EU law.  As 
state liability constitutes a sector in which the CJEU’s judgements establish the foundations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 That is, the “rightness” or “wrongness” of the decision. 
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legal development, it permits a focus on the judicial development of European law; 
consequently, the preliminary reference procedure has been attributed particular significance, 
both in respect of the national courts’ engagement with the procedure and the scope arising 
for interinstitutional dialogue.  In contrast to the first, the second case example on the 
regulation of contract terms allows for reflection on the CJEU’s jurisdiction and role in an 
area predominantly finding its foundations in the activities of the European and national 
legislatures.  As the relevant cases also arise predominantly via the preliminary reference 
system from different national courts, the case example also illustrates that, in respect of 
contract term regulation, the scope and rationale of the national courts’ engagement in 
dialogue with the CJEU diverge, allowing for consideration of the extent to which the 
national courts, by referring to Luxembourg, become willing participants in the 
Europeanisation of domestic civil procedure.  The final case example deals with conflicts 
arising between different sets of EU and national norms, namely those with their basis in the 
EU Treaty structure, fundamental freedoms, and those arising from national constitutional and 
international law, and subsequently Union law, and their judicial construction, fundamental 
rights.   
 	    
 	  	  	   161 
Chapter 5. The CJEU’s Elaboration of a Regime of State Liability: The Interrelation 
of National, European and International Law 
 
Accepting their Treaty obligations820, the Member States must adhere to, comply with and 
avoid infringing primary and secondary Union law.  The evaluation of this case example aims 
to uncover the methodological approaches and reasoning engaged by the AG and Court in the 
development of a regime of state liability and recognition of state liability as a principle of 
Union law.  The regime is firstly uncovered as it derives from Francovich and thereafter, the 
way in which the Francovich doctrine has been elaborated is explored via the analysis of two 
key cases, namely, Brasserie du Pêcheur821 and Köbler822.  Francovich823 concerned the 
Italian legislature’s non-implementation of Directive 80/987/EEC, the correct implementation 
of which would have provided payment protection to workers on the insolvency of their 
employer.  Thereafter the employers brought a claim before the pretore di Vicenza and 
pretore di Bassano del Grappa for compensation in respect of their loss, suffered consequent 
to the legislature’s non-implementation.  The questions referred concerned the effect of the 
directive, and further, in the event that the directive could not be so relied upon against the 
state, the claim in damages before the court.  The predominant issue of referral was deemed to 
concern the existence of the state’s obligation to make reparation in respect of the liability of 
the legislature for breach of EU law824.  While the principle of state immunity was already 
disintegrating in the 1980s and 1990s and by no means remained intact across the Union at 
the time of Francovich825, in only a few national systems was the legislature liable in 
damages before the courts in respect of breaches of law arising from its acts and omissions826.  
Reflecting a broad constitutional law conflict, Francovich also brought to light a number of 
private law issues concerning the conditions underpinning and shaping the obligation (serious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820 These obligations were broadly recognised almost at the birth of the European legal order in C-6/60 Humblet 
v Belgium [1960] ECR 559, Judgement, para.36. 
821 Brasserie (n.186). 
822 Köbler (n.184). 
823 Francovich (n.219). 
824 M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart, Oxford; 2006), p.286. 
825 See in Ireland, Byrne v Ireland [1972] IR 241 and in England, the “King can do no wrong” principle was 
substantially amended by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947; also in the English context, for example, the so-
called public/private divide, arguably a key element of English legal tradition, could have operated as an obstacle 
to the acceptance of state liability.  See P.P. Craig, ‘Once More Unto the Breach: The Community, the State and 
Damages Liability’ (1997) 113 LQR 67, pp.70-71.  Despite the 1947 Act, pre-Francovich, the English court 
were nevertheless reluctant to impose an obligation to repair loss suffered; Hoffman-Laroche v Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295, p.359, per Wilberforce LJ in respect of administrative action, and 
Bourdin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] QB 716, p.790 per Nourse LJ. 
826 J. Bell and A.W. Bradley, Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study (UK Comparative Law Studies, 
Glasgow; 1991).   
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breach and causation) to make reparation (quantification and the availability of damages for 
pure economic loss).  While the Court did not undertake a comparative analysis of the 
applicable national norms, the AG examined the arguments of the intervening governments 
against the availability of such damages and highlighted the distinction between the national 
and European context and the divergent scope for liability arising therein827.  The Court rather 
engaged predominantly with systematic reasoning, deriving the obligation to repair loss from 
the need to ensure the full effectiveness of the sui generis Union legal order828 and the rights 
conferred thereby on individuals829 (the satisfaction of which it considered would otherwise 
be undermined if individuals could not obtain damages before the courts for loss caused by 
the state’s breach), highlighting that the obligation to repair finds its foundations in Art.4(3) 
TFEU830 (then, Art.5 EEC; subsequently, Art.10, EC)831.  State liability was therefore 
recognised by the Court as a principle of Union law “inherent in the system of the EC 
Treaty”832.  In Francovich, it therefore recognised Member State liability for infringement of 
EU law without elaborating on the conditions underpinning; these determinations were left 
entirely to the national court in line with its procedural autonomy833, providing that effective 
protection was afforded834.  In Brasserie835, the CJEU elaborated on the criteria upon which 
liability is based.  The assessment of the satisfaction of the conditions for liability and the 
determination and enforcement of awards, including the identification of heads of damage836 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
827 Francovich (n.219), Opinion of AG Mischo, paras.43 et seq for a discussion of the arguments of the national 
governments and para.47 in particular. 
828 Simmenthal (n.776).  See now, Art.19(1) TEU, which provides that “Member States shall provide remedies 
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. 
829 Van Gend en Loos (n.219) and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
830 Art.4(3) TFEU provides, “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.  The Member 
States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union's objectives.” 
831 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, para.35. 
832 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, para.35.  
833 C-33/76 Rewe-Zentral [1976] ECR 1989, Judgement, para.13. 
834 See Humblet (n.820), Judgement, p.569, J. Steiner, ‘From Direct Effects to Francovich: Shifting Means of 
Enforcement of Community Law’ (2003) 18 European Law Review 3.  Other remedies might have been 
available via other mechanisms, including actions for annulment and recovery against the EU institutions. 
835 Brasserie (n.186). 
836 A question asked by the English court - W. van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Unbridgeable – Community and 
National Tort Laws After Francovich and Brasserie’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 507, p.520 - explored further below in 
respect of AG Tesauro’s Opinion, Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.70 et seq.  See in respect of 
the non-contractual liability of the EU institutions, C-28/92 Banks [1994] ECR 1-1212, Opinion of AG van 
Gerven, para.2. 
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and the quantification of damages837 remains a task for the Member State courts838 in 
accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness839.   
 
Following Francovich and Brasserie, the CJEU has recognised that liability might arise 
where there is non-compliance with primary law, an absence840 or incorrect transposition of 
legislation 841 , or infringement of another nature by the national legislature, national 
administrative body842 or national court843, to the extent that liability potentially arises 
“whichever public authority is responsible for the breach”844.  The extension of state liability 
to the acts and omissions of the courts was made in Köbler.  Köbler845, an Austrian professor, 
had claimed an increase in his pension contribution in line with Austrian law, following 
fifteen years of work in an Austrian public university.  The Austrian state, Köbler’s employer, 
refused to award the increase on the basis that while he had worked in the universities of 
Member States for more than fifteen years, those universities were not Austrian.  This 
decision was challenged, in respect of (now) Art.45 TFEU on the free movement of workers, 
and the Verwaltungsgerichtshof – the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court – referred to 
the CJEU.  Following the CJEU’s judgement on a similar matter846, which would have 
resolved the issue in favour of Köbler if applied correctly in the Austrian context, the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof withdrew its reference.  The Supreme Court, from which there was 
no appeal, subsequently applied the judgement incorrectly to the Köbler facts, considering the 
increment as a bonus of a sort (contrary to its previous interpretation), the nature of which 
allowed for derogations from the fundamental freedom.  Köbler then brought another action 
before the Landesgericht Wien, a court of first instance in civil matters, claiming that the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s failure to refer, and its incorrect application of the CJEU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
837 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.105 et seq.  Guidance on the quantification of damages was 
sought by both courts. 
838 C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099; the Court, in contrast to the AG, and moving away from its approach in 
previous jurisprudence, refused to apply the conditions in Factortame to the case before it, highlighting the task 
was one for the national court. 
839 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.67.  The amount of compensation must be adequate, with deterrent effect 
– Von Colson (n.778) and C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
[1993] ECR I-4367, Judgement, para.24. 
840 As in Francovich.  See also, Joined Cases C-178-179 and C-188-190/94 Dillenkofer v Germany [1996] ECR 
I-4845, in which the CJEU held that failure to transpose a directive satisfies the sufficiently serious requirement, 
constituting a manifest and grave disregarded of the limits of the Member State’s discretion. 
841 As in C-392/93 R v HM Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631, even within the 
correct time period. 
842 C-5/94 R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553. 
843 Köbler (n.184); the court must have acted so as to “manifestly” breach EU law, Judgement, para.53. 
844 Konle (n.838), Judgement, para.62. 
845 Köbler (n.184). 
846 C-15/96 Schoning-Koigebetopoulou [1998] ECR I-47.  
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judgement, constituted a breach of EU law; he sought Francovich damages.  The CJEU 
extended state liability, having found that the acts or omissions of a court of last instance in 
breach of Union law could give rise to liability and an obligation to repair loss.   
 
I. The Construction of a Regime of State Liability from Francovich 
 
It is clear from this brief outline of the jurisprudence that as EU law neither made provision 
for state liability generally nor for the conditions underpinning, the elaboration thereof 
necessarily fell to the CJEU847.  Two dimensions of the reasoning of the AG and the Court – 
relevant to methodology generally, and comparison, in particular – can be identified, and 
permeate both the Opinions and the judgements in Brasserie and Köbler.  Building on the 
outline of the elaboration of liability, the analysis which follows focuses on the very 
attribution of liability to the state and the specific elements of its obligation to make 
reparation of loss arising in respect of its breach.  The diversity of national tort law rules – 
including the putative requirements of fault, causation, defences and the preclusion of 
concurrent liability – is reflected in the complexity of the CJEU’s explication and clarification 
of the specificities of the conditions of liability and the obligation to repair, that is, the 
variables delineating the duty and the scope for recovery.  Thereafter, the CJEU’s 
identification and recognition of state liability as a principle of Union law is uncovered, and 
the scope for commonality and generality is explored848 in light of the interrelationship 
between national legal cultures and traditions, EU and international law.  These two 
dimensions of analysis facilitate the subsequent exploration of the attempt to attribute 
coherence to the multi-level construct of state liability, the uncovering of the nature of the 
impact of the CJEU jurisprudence on the Europeanisation of private law and European 
integration, and identification of the division of tasks between the national and Luxembourg 
courts.   
 
i. The Diversity of National Tort Law Rules as a Point of Departure: The 
Conditions of Liability  
 
The CJEU initially left the determination of liability – in terms of the identification and 
application of the conditions underpinning and shaping the state’s obligation to compensate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847 Prechal, Directives in EC Law (n.215), p. 271. 
848 The scope for a distinction between commonality and generality is explored in Chapter 8 and 9. 
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the injured party – to the domestic courts, in the context of the national order.  Post-
Francovich, it became necessary to clarify these conditions; they were explicated by the 
CJEU in Brasserie 849 and elaborated upon in Köbler, as the doctrine of liability developed.  
Notwithstanding the putative clarity created, the CJEU’s jurisdiction and role has been a 
matter of contention; in particular, the German government asserted in Brasserie that the 
elaboration of the conditions of liability should fall to the Union legislature850.  Moreover, and 
contrary to this assertion, there is support for the notion that the task is one which falls within 
the CJEU’s jurisdiction851; both the AG and Court in Brasserie852 engaged, in support of such 
an understanding, the predominantly judicial character of the development of state liability 
within the national context (where such liability exists)853, a determination which reflects the 
recognition in Francovich that “in many national systems the essentials of the legal rules 
governing state liability have been developed by the courts”854. 
 
The broader issue is rather reflected in the notion that “the question is whether the rules on 
Community liability can be grafted to an embryonic system of national delictual liability; and 
if it is possible, whether it is desirable”855; that is to say, the concern arises in respect of the 
interrelation of the national and Union (and potentially, international) orders of liability, and 
the putative conflict arising therefrom.  Where reparation for liability is recognised in the 
national legal systems, certain conditions are identifiable therein for the purposes of 
delineating the scope for liability, and where relevant, the subsequent quantification of 
damages.  These determinations are reflective of national tort regimes, and thus, of national 
tort and compensation cultures, and necessarily differ between the Member States.  Indeed, 
the German court in Brasserie referred the case to the CJEU in respect of the relevant 
conditions delineating liability, and particularly, that of fault as a pre-requisite.  The AG 
recognised that “the individual States employ differing concepts” for the purposes of shaping 
liability and the obligation to repair856.  The CJEU has taken the opportunity in the cases 
above, amongst others, to identify and elaborate upon the conditions of state liability; the 
following paragraphs examine these conditions in detail.  In consensus with the AG, the Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
849 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.51.   
850 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.24 
851 Banks (n.836), Opinion of AG van Gerven, paras.49 et seq and Hedley Lomas (n.842). 
852 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.24-25. 
853 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.29-30. 
854 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, paras29-30. 
855 R. Lane, ‘The Fisherman’s Tale: National Liability for Breaches of Community Law’ (1996) 1 Edin.L.Rev. 
91, p.98. 
856 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.71. 
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in Brasserie made reference to the need for unlawful conduct, the existence of harm and a 
causal link857, and highlighting that limitations to liability cannot be stricter than those 
imposed under national law, assuming the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
satisfied; the applicable national norms should not make it “impossible or excessively 
difficult to obtain reparation’”858.  As it appears that there is no single context in which these 
rules are best explicated and applied, there is reference throughout the jurisprudence to the 
intertwinement of both the CJEU and national courts in the elucidation, explication and 
enforcement of the rights and remedies attributed to the individual.  This “division of labour” 
is further explored below. 
 
In respect of the damage arising from the breach, AG Tesauro referred to the notion that it 
should be real, i.e. certain and actual.  Rejecting the submissions of the French government, 
he similarly dismissed the assertion that reference should be made to a number of conditions, 
in respect of the nature and extent of the damage, for the purposes of limiting the scope for 
reparation859, even though this might be the approach adopted in some of the Member 
States860.  Rather, there was an apparent search for a common approach between the domestic 
systems; the AG noted that if a degree of commonality could be identified “that approach 
consists in not making compensation depend on the scale of the damage”861.  As to the heads 
of damage and the quantification of reparation, both the AG and the Court highlighted that 
these matters are generally for the national courts “in the absence of relevant Community 
provisions”862 and in line with national procedural autonomy.  Notwithstanding this division 
of competences, explored below in respect of its effect on the character of the regime, the 
national courts, bound by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, must be obliged to 
ensure that all loss is repaired863.  In the case itself, as the infringements of EU law were 
attributable to the legislature, neither in England nor Germany was compensation available; 
the fundamental issue therefore concerned whether a finding of liability on the legislature in 
respect of its own acts or omissions could establish an obligation on the part of the state to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
857 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.59 et seq. 
858 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.74.  In line with the limitation on procedural autonomy, C-33/76 Rewe-
Zentral [1976] ECR 1989, Judgement, para.13. 
859 A distinction is made between lawful and unlawful conduct, both in respect of the liability of stats and of the 
Union, Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.96. 
860 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.93. 
861 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.94. 
862 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.83. 
863 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.109-111 and Judgement, para.67. 
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compensate loss suffered864.  With regard to the harm caused, neither in German nor in 
English law was the national legislature deemed to owe a duty of care to the general public so 
as to give rise to liability and an obligation to repair loss.  The availability of damages for 
such loss is determined by legal rules but is similarly shaped by policy considerations; as 
such, there is broad potential for divergences across the national orders865.  Pure economic 
loss was not deemed to be recoverable under the common law of negligence866 or Art.823, 
BGB, to the extent that it does not reflect a legally protected interest.  On the facts of 
Brasserie, other Member States would have provided for such recovery; for example, under 
French law, Art.1382 Code civil as interpreted by the Cour de cassation and Conseil d’État, 
provided that pure economic loss must be understood as a protected interest, in respect of 
which a remedy is available867.  The Court recognised recoverability for pure economic loss, 
acknowledging that infringements of Union law often lead to damage of such a nature868.  
While full reparation should generally be made, national rules limiting reparation might 
nevertheless apply869 and might similarly be recognised at the Union level.  Thus, for 
example, while the identification of the causal link has always been considered to be a matter 
for the national court870, the principle of mitigation – that the “national court may inquire 
whether the injured person showed reasonable diligence” – is recognised at the EU level as 
common to the Member States871.  Other relevant factors might include time limits, the 
identification of the body obliged to make the reparation and more generally, the adequacy of 
the reparation872. 
 
With regard to fault, the Court highlighted that “as is clear from the case file, the concept of 
fault does not have the same content in the various legal systems” but that “certain objective 
and subjective factors” might be relevant in the determination of the serious nature of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.35. 
865 In particular, the “floodgate” argument is especially significant in English law. 
866 Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27.  These general negations of 
availability of damages are subject to exceptions, including the right to recovery in English law for breach of a 
statutory duty; consider also the evolution of the case law in respect of the scope for the existence of a duty of 
care owed by public authorities in negligence – until Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 
reversed by Murphy v Brentwood D.C. [1991] 1 AC 398. 
867 AJ.D.A. 1972 II Jur. 356 with the opinion of the Commissaire du gouvernement, M. Bertrand. 
868 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.87. 
869 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.84. 
870 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.97. 
871 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.98 and Judgement, paras.84-85, as recognised in Joined 
Cases C-104/89-C-37/90 Mulder v Council and Commission [1992] ECR I-3061, Judgement, para.33. 
872 See European Commission, ‘Case Law of the CJEU Connected With Claims for Damages Relating to 
Breaches of EU Law by Member States’, Brussels, 15.07.2009, p.14-15. 
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infringement873.  While noting that fault is a contentious issue, AG Tesauro in Brasserie held 
that “it must be acknowledged that most national systems still refer to fault as the basis for 
liability”874.  In particular, reference was made to the decisions of the French875 and Italian 
courts, and the Spanish system as an exception876.  In order to attribute to fault an increasingly 
objective as opposed to subjective understanding, the AG engaged with the divergent manner 
of the development of these norms in different cultures and traditions877.  Thus, he noted that 
while fault “has ended up by losing every subjective connotation” in the systems of Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Denmark, in England878, it is still deemed to be a subjective 
element of the unlawful act.  The “increasingly objectified” understanding of fault was 
engaged by the CJEU in relation to the non-contractual liability of the Union, that is, as a 
basis upon which the unlawful conduct could be identified; the AG therefore considered that 
“there is no relevance in inquiring into the existence of fault as a subjective component of the 
unlawful conduct”879.  As such, it was considered that the concept of fault, differing in its 
conception amongst the Member States - with reference to the Italian illecito, the French 
faute, the German Verschulden and the English concept of duty of care or misfeasance880 - 
could not be employed (the AG thus rendering an explicit answer to the German court) as a 
delineating variable of state liability as it derives from EU law, as it restricts liability to too 
great an extent881.  As the Court highlighted, in order to ensure the right to reparation is 
protected, “reparation of loss or damage cannot be made conditional upon fault (intentional or 
negligent)”882; the Court instead engaged the notion of the “serious nature” of the breach. 
 
The CJEU has developed the notion of serious breach883 - understood as the state body’s 
manifest and grave disregard - as a means of determining the “wrong” nature of the act or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.76-78. 
874 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.86. 
875 For example, fault is required in French law, by virtue of Art.1382 Code civil. 
876 The approach in the German domestic system is less clear; in BGHA 146, 153, the claim failed based on the 
absence of fault; in other cases, including BGHZ 74, 156, where the BGH looks more to the existence and nature 
of discretion.    
877 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.86-87. 
878 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.86-87, with reference to specific case law at fn.90. 
879 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.89, fn.92. 
880 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, fn.74. 
881 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.79. 
882 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.79. 
883 Hedley Lomas (n.842).  The case did not concern the exercise of discretion of the Member State; rather, 
where there is little or no discretion, the CJEU suggested that the very infringement of EU law could satisfy the 
“sufficiently serious” condition.  However, this will not necessarily be the case, but be for the national court, as 
in C-424/97 Haim v KVN [2000] ECR I-5123.  It has been asserted that the broader the discretion, the more 
difficult it is to establish that the breach is of a sufficiently serious nature, and vice versa; see Prechal, Directives 
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omission, where the Member State exercises broad discretion.  The discretion provides a 
means by which policy considerations diverging across the Member States can be engaged, 
the extent of which will now dictate how easily the breach can be established884; generally, 
where there is reduced or no discretion on the part of the Member State, the condition will be 
satisfied by the mere infringement of EU law.  The concept of “sufficiently serious” exists in 
a number of legal systems, albeit in different forms885.  The test can be identified as having 
been transferred from the case law of the Court on non-contractual liability of the Union 
under Art.340 TFEU.  The principles identified from this case law - based on, as explicitly 
stated in the Treaties, the national legal cultures and traditions – should be applicable in the 
context of reparation for the liability of the state “in like circumstances”, “in a comparable 
situation” and in “given equal situations”886.  If this notion of “sufficiently serious” can be 
identified as common, the national courts will continue to enjoy a degree of flexibility, to the 
extent that a test stricter than the sufficiently serious breach test can be applied; 
notwithstanding, there is a lack of clarity as to the way in which this operates alongside the 
principle of uniform application of Union law across the Member States.  It might be 
suggested that even if a higher standard is not adopted, the regime of state liability in respect 
of European law is understood to constitute a hybrid of national and European law; as Lane 
has noted “the instinct of the national courts will be to call upon principles that the judges 
know best…in order to determine what is a “sufficiently serious” breach of Community law”.   
 
Previously – in respect of the establishment of Union liability – a distinction was drawn 
between administrative and legislative action; thus, a “flagrant violation of a superior rule of 
law” was required in respect of legislative breach887.  In Bergaderm888 the CJEU neglected 
such a requirement, attributing less consideration to the administrative-legislative distinction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in EC Law (n.215), p.289.  As non-implementation or defective implementation will be considered sufficiently 
serious, and as the Member States enjoy no discretion in respect of whether a directive should be implemented 
(and properly implemented), it might be argued that discretion cannot be understood to be decisive but one 
factor.  This is recognised by AG Léger in Köbler; Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.132 et seq, esp. 
para.138.   
884 The various factors relevant in this determination are set out - Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.51, 55–56; 
following Köbler, these criteria also include non-compliance of a court of last instance with it duty to render a 
preliminary reference under Art.267 - Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.55. 
885 M. Künnecke, ‘Divergence and the Francovich Remedy in German and English Courts’ in S. Prechal and B. 
van Roermund (eds.), The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts (OUP, Oxford; 
2008), pp.233-254, pp.243-249, and the cases cited therein. 
886 As recognised in Lane, ‘The Fisherman’s Tale’ (n.855), p.102; Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.42 and 
47, and Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.68, respectively. 
887 As established in Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975. 
888 C-352/98 Bergaderm v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291. 
 	  	  	   170 
and more to the three Brasserie conditions.  Notwithstanding, the Court in Köbler elaborated 
upon the conditions set out in Brasserie889 and recognised the particular and potentially 
sensitive nature of liability arising from breach on the part of the judiciary, a consideration 
which suggests that the Court referred to the laws of the Member States, in light of the 
recognition of such liability only in a few systems890.  With regard to this sensitivity and the 
need - per res judicata - for certainty, the Court expressed that the notion of “sufficiently 
serious breach” 891, with regard to the nature of the conduct of the body causing the harm, 
must be understood to establish a higher “standard” of infringement; thus, “state liability for 
an infringement of Community law by a decision of a national court…can be incurred only in 
the exceptional case where the court has manifestly infringed the applicable law” 892.  
Furthermore, it referred to an additional criterion applicable to establish liability arising from 
the acts or omissions of the national courts, namely, the non-compliance with the duty to 
make a preliminary reference893.  While this determination remains for the national court, the 
Court seemingly aimed to provide some (apparently non-exhaustive) guidance as to relevant 
factors in the determination of the existence of a manifest infringement, noting that: 
the degree of clarity and the precision of the rule infringed, whether infringement was 
intention, whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the position taken, where 
applicable, by a Community institution, and non-compliance by the court in question with its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
889 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.52. 
890 The approaches and the determination of the serious nature differ.  For example, in Dutch law, the liability for 
the incorrect application of the law (either national or EU) is very limited under Art.6.162 the Burgerlijk 
Wetboek Dutch Civil Code; broadly, there must be a breach (not necessarily manifest) of a fundamental 
principle, for example, as Wissink notes, Art.6 ECHR; M.H. Wissink, ‘Dutch Case Note‘ (2005) 13 ERCL 419, 
p.422, citing amongst other cases, 18.03.2005, RvdW Rechtspraak van de Week, 2005, State of the Netherlands v 
M and Others.  Further, in England, the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 indeed amended considerably the principle 
of sovereign immunity; yet s.2(5) of that same Act basically excludes the liability of the state in respect of the 
acts an omissions of the Crown in “discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibilities of a judicial 
nature vested in him”; the Austrian case of the Verfassungsgerichtshof, 13.10.2004, A5/04 – the non-referral to 
the CJEU did not constitute a manifest violation of EU law (in Sweden, the “reminder” to the national courts, 
following Köbler, of their obligation to make a reference, might suggest the contrary - ‘Swedish Law Relative to 
Preliminary Rulings from the EC Court’ 24.05.2006, Svensk författningssamling, 14.06.2006, SFS:502; cited in 
A. Rosas, 'The European Court of Justice in Context- Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue' (2007) 1 EJLS 
(<http://www.ejls.eu/2/24UK.pdf>; Last Accessed:  03.03.2011), p.7.; in French law, the courts seemed to 
require “faute lourde” – as in Conseil d'État, 28.06.2002, Ministre de la Justice v. Mr Magiera; the “faute 
lourde” requirement will depend on the nature of the judicial activity, and also where the case falls within Art.6 
ECHR. 
891 The various factors relevant in this determination are set out - Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.51, 55–56.  
It is worth noting that the determination will of course, be for the national court.  In the Brasserie case, returning 
to the national system, the Bundesgerichtshof, applying the conditions determined that conduct of the German 
state, amounting to breach, could not be deemed to give rise to a remedy - See Zivilsachen Bd. 134, p.30, 
Entscheidung der 24.10.1996; BGHZ 134, 30. 
892 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.35. 
893 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, paras.55-56. 
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obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling….will be serious where the decision 
concerned was made in manifest breach of the case law of the Court of Justice in the matter894.   
 
With reference to the final condition set out in Brasserie, the CJEU in Francovich merely 
referred to the notion of causation895; neither the AG nor the Court elaborated on the nature of 
the causal link or the way in which it should be identified.  In Brasserie, the Court provided 
some additional specificity, noting that the link should be direct896.  The concept of directness 
is one which must be considered in light of national norms; for example, in Manfredi, in 
respect of infringement of competition law norms, no reference was made to the need for a 
direct link but to the need to refer to domestic norms to identify “the detailed rules…including 
those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’”897.  The Court in Brasserie 
has adopted the same approach, noting that the identification of the causal link is for the 
national court on the basis of national law898.  While the notion of “directness” can be found 
in most national legal orders899, and notwithstanding certain assertions to the contrary900, 
there does not appear to have been recognised an EU concept of causation.   
 
While Van Gerven has drawn an analogy between the conditions elaborated in Brasserie and 
the French approach, in respect of Art.1382 Code civil, which, provides “[t]out fait 
quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il 
est arrivé à le réparer”, with reference to a causal link, fault, and the existence of damage, it 
is not necessarily clear from the Opinion that the approach formulated derives from a single 
legal culture or tradition (indeed, as noted above, fault is not required per the CJEU).  
Following Brasserie, it rather seems that the elaboration of the conditions (without 
explication of the content) was based on that deemed to be common; where no commonality 
could be identified, the CJEU will not engage the concept at the Union level as a common 
one.  Thus, the national court should refer to that which is common where possible and where 
it is not, to national norms, in line with Union law.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
894 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, paras.52 et seq. 
895 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, para.37. 
896 This finds support from the AG in Köbler: Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.157. 
897 Joined Cases C-295-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619, Judgement, para.64. 
898 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.51-65. 
899 A distinction can be drawn between actual and proximate causation.  
900 N. Reich, ‘Horizontal Liability in EC Law:  Hybridization of Remedies for Compensation in Case of 
Breaches of EC Rights’ (2007) 44 CMLR 705, pp.727-728. 
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In the absence of an explicitly common approach, deriving from the lack of provision in the 
Treaty structure and the CJEU’s initial reluctance to provide guidance, and further, as a result 
of the national courts holding the reins in respect of the identification and delineation of 
liability and obligation to repair, the reach of liability has necessarily diverged across the 
Member States901 undermining the scope for the recognition of an “EU-wide” remedy of 
damages in respect of harm arising from the infringement of Union law.  Notwithstanding, the 
right to reparation for loss arising from breach is established as a right at the Union level, 
deriving from the recognition of state liability as a principle of Union law.   
 
ii. From Diversity to Generality and Commonality: State Liability as a Principle of 
Union Law 
 
For the better understanding of the interrelationship between national, Union and international 
law and the recognition of state liability as a principle of Union law, two key considerations 
arise: the scope for cross-referencing between areas of Union law and between international 
and EU law, and the recognition, in certain national cultures and traditions, of a “new” 
remedy arising from the recognition of state liability.  As noted above, it could not have been 
said at the time of Brasserie or Köbler that reparation for loss would have been available in 
all national orders; thus, the CJEU judgement provided the foundations for the availability of 
a remedy either unknown or generally unavailable in a particular domestic legal system, in 
respect of breaches attributable to the national legislature, and subsequently, the national 
court.  AG Tesauro highlighted in Brasserie that the issue had similarly been raised in 
Factortame I902 and Simmenthal903, and further, that the Union legislature had previously 
been willing to introduce when “faced with a large variety of solutions in the Member States’ 
legal systems…a system – which was certainly novel to a good many national systems – of 
damages…”904.  The AG clearly recognised the diversity existing between the Member States 
and the potential impact of the CJEU’s decision in the domestic context, which might “require 
the Member State concerned to adopt a judicial remedy not available under its legal 
system”905.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
901 W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 CMLR 501, pp.509-510. 
902 Re interim relief, C-213/89 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and 
others [1990] ECR I-2433. 
903 Simmenthal (n.776). 
904 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.46, 
905 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.14, paras.43-47. 
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In respect of the cross-referencing between areas of Union law, both the AG906 and the 
Court907 in Brasserie engaged with CJEU jurisprudence arising in other areas of EU law and 
particularly on that concerning the non-contractual liability of the Union908, the doctrine of 
which finds its basis in Art.340 TFEU (ex Art.215 EEC).  The Treaty provision on non-
contractual liability essentially afforded the legislative basis for the use of comparative 
analysis by the CJEU, providing that “in the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, 
in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make 
good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their 
duties”.  AG Tesauro909 asserted – in fact, he stated it was “not acceptable”910 - that the 
criteria for determining the obligation to make reparation might diverge depending on 
whether the body infringing EU law is an EU or a state institution; the level of protection 
afforded to individuals should not diverge 911 .  Without having engaged in explicit 
comparative evaluation, Tesauro cited a comparative study of the national laws on the 
enforcement of Union law912.  The AG evidently, while not explicit in the text, engaged 
comparative analysis, making an admittedly “a rapid appraisal of the rules in force in the 
national legal systems on liability on the part of public authorities …” noting that “the 
substantive preconditions for liability are more or less the same everywhere”913, namely 
unlawful conduct - the notion of a sufficiently serious breach914 (in respect of the state’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
906 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.61 et seq, with reference to “the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States” an considering, “the absence of a uniform set of rules in this field, a useful 
frame of reference for common rules on State liability”; para.61. 
907 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.42 – “the conditions under which the State may incur liability for damage 
caused to individuals by a breach of Community law cannot, in the absence of particular justification, differ from 
those governing the liability of the Community in like circumstances”.  Van Gerven also makes a broad claim 
for engagement with the non-contractual liability of the Union case law, van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and 
Procedures’ (n.901), p.511. 
908 In particular, Joined Cases 83, 94/76-4, 15 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL v Council [1978] ECR 1209, at 
Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.28–43. 
909 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.61 et seq, with reference to “the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States” an considering, “the absence of a uniform set of rules in this field, a useful 
frame of reference for common rules on State liability”; para.61. 
910 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.66. 
911 Essentially he argues “…I consider that there is no reason for applying different criteria – naturally in like 
situations – depending on whether the infringement of Community law in question is attributable to a State or 
Community institution”; Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.67. 
912 The Reports of the 1992 FIDE Congress: Volume II, ‘La sanction des infractions au droit communautaire’ 
(FIDE, Lisbon; 1992), at fn.73. 
913 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.53. 
914 Hedley Lomas (n.842).  The case did not concern the exercise of discretion of the Member State; rather, 
where there is little or no discretion, the CJEU suggested that the very infringement of EU law could satisfy the 
“sufficiently serious” condition.  However, this will not necessarily be the case, but be for the national court, as 
in Haim (n.883).  It has been asserted that the broader the discretion, the more difficult it is to establish that the 
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manifest and grave disregard for the limits of its discretion915) - on the part of the body 
causing the damage, the existence of harm, and a causal link916.  His conclusion as to the 
potential similarity of the national “general conditions for liability” reflects a focus on and 
comparison of (although perhaps a limited one, looking only to identify similarities) national 
norms, for the purposes of “enabling a common definition to be found of the conditions in 
question”917.   
 
Detailing the conditions underpinning the obligation to repair, the Court similarly engaged its 
own jurisprudence on the non-contractual liability of the Union, referring to the “general 
principles common to the laws of the Member States, from which, in the absence of written 
rules, the Court…draws inspiration”918.  While it engaged no direct comparative analysis of 
the national laws, the reference to the non-contractual liability jurisprudence established an 
indirect connection.  The Court, following the proposal of AG Mischo in Francovich, 
attempted to bring together and intertwine the rules on state and Union liability, to the extent 
that “the conditions under which the State may incur liability for damages caused to 
individuals by a breach of Community law cannot, in the absence of particular justification, 
differ from those governing the liability of the Community in like circumstances”; it 
recognised the significance of the consistent protection of rights which “cannot vary 
depending on whether a national authority or a Community authority is responsible for the 
damage”919.  It is worth noting that since Brasserie, the conditions upon which the obligation 
to make reparation in respect of state and Union liability have become almost identical920, 
there having been a clear process of cross-referencing between both bodies of law.  While AG 
Léger has spoken of “an alignment between the two systems” in Köbler921, one important 
distinction must be drawn in respect of the understanding of the state institution whose acts or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
breach is of a sufficiently serious nature, and vice versa, Prechal, Directives in EC Law (n.215), p.289.  As non-
implementation or defective implementation will be considered sufficiently serious, and as the Member States 
enjoy no discretion in respect of whether a directive should be implemented (and properly implemented), it 
might be argued that discretion cannot be understood to be decisive but one factor; see C-472/00 P, Commission 
v. Fresh Marine AS [2003] ECR I-7541. 
915 The various factors relevant in this determination are set out - Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.51, 55–56; 
following Köbler, these criteria also include non-compliance of a court of last instance with it duty to render a 
preliminary reference under Art.267 - Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.55. 
916 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.53. 
917 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.54. 
918 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.41. 
919 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.42. 
920 T. Tridimas, ‘Liability for Breaches of Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down’ (2001) 38 
CMLR 301. 
921 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.127. 
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omissions are of relevance; this concerns the conceptualisation of the state, the determination 
of which is reflected in the CJEU’s reference to international law, in comparison with national 
and Union norms. 
 
The determination of the bodies, in respect of whose acts and omissions the state can be 
deemed to be liable, is a constitutional issue, essentially concerning the scope and “unity” of 
the state922.  The AG in Brasserie considered that in order to determine the institutions in 
respect of which liability might arise, it was necessary to conceptualise the meaning of the 
state.  For this purpose, he referred to international law923 and with regard to the liability of 
different bodies, the recognition by the French Conseil d’État of the liability of administrative 
bodies acting, on the basis of domestic law, contrary to EU law924.  Similarly, the Court in 
Köbler considered that in order to determine whether the institutions of the judiciary might be 
conceived as falling within the category of “state institution”, it was necessary to 
conceptualise the meaning of the “state”.  It looked to international law925, in which liability 
arises from the state as it is understood as a single entity, irrespective of whether the breach 
generating loss is attributable to the legislature, the judiciary or the executive.  It was deemed 
that this principle must apply a fortiori in the Community legal order”926.  In addition, under 
the broad banner of international law, the Court further referred to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR for the purposes of attributing further foundation to the imposition of state liability for 
the acts or omissions of the highest domestic courts; the ECtHR has recognised that an 
obligation to repair loss can arise in respect of breaches arising from the acts or omissions of 
the supreme courts927.  Similarly, AG Léger engaged in a comparison between EU and 
international law, with explicit reference to legal scholarship928, legal doctrine929 and case 
law930, for the purpose of developing the scope for bridging gaps between different areas of 
laws and different legal orders; he recognised that in the absence of an EU understanding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922 W. van Gerven, J. Lever and P. Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and 
International Tort Law (Hart, Oxford; 2nd edn., 2000), p.392.  See also, Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in 
the European Constitution (n.824), pp.301-313. 
923 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.38 and fn.42. 
924 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.42 with reference to the Judgement of 28.02.1992, Arizona 
Tobacco Products, (1992) AJDA 210. 
925 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.32. 
926 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, paras.33-34. 
927  Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.49, citing Dulaurans v. France of 21.03.2000, (2001) 33 EHRR 45. 
928 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.45. 
929 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.42-44. 
930 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, fns.46-47. 
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the “unity of the state”931, reference could be made to international law, moving beyond the 
“system of the Treaty” 932.  The cases reflect the willingness of the CJEU to engage, in the 
absence of an EU provision, with the scope for the transfer of concepts (in this case, of the 
state), not only between areas of Union law, but similarly, between international, Union, and 
thereafter, necessarily, the national orders.  
 
Building on this consideration, AG Léger analysed in Köbler the divergent national 
approaches to the imposition of liability for the acts of the judiciary.  While he did not 
explicitly set out the applicable norms of the different Member States, an examination of the 
relevant national provisions is evident; in particular, reference to French scholarship 
(reflecting the influence of AG Léger’s own legal culture and tradition) led AG Léger to 
conclude that state liability for the acts and omissions of the judiciary must have been 
understood as “already implied” in the Brasserie decision933.  Further, a more developed 
“comparative legal analysis”934, which encompassed a consideration of legislation and case 
law, of similarities and divergences and, further, of the impact in the national orders of 
European adjudication generated via the preliminary reference procedure, is identifiable in the 
Opinion.  Similarities and differences were identified; in particular, consideration was made 
of those systems (namely, the UK and the Netherlands) in which a finding of liability was 
limited to breaches of rules of a fundamental nature (including Art.5 ECHR, deprivation of 
liberty, and Art.6 ECHR, right to a fair hearing), those systems in which no distinction is 
made as to the nature of the rule breached and those (including Austria and Sweden) in which 
liability arises only in respect the acts and omissions of ordinary courts, to the exclusion of 
supreme courts935.   
 
On this basis and despite the fact that such liability could not be established in all orders, AG 
Léger recognised state liability as a general principle of Union law, legitimising the 
recognition of such a principle where absolute commonality between the relevant cultures and 
traditions could not be established.  He considered that as “it is settled case law…that Court 
does not require that the rule be a feature of all the national legal systems”, it is no barrier to 
recognition of a principle of Union law that the manner and scope of the rules might differ in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
931 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.44. 
932 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.42, citing Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.31. 
933 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.51 and 52. 
934 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.82. 
935 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.77-81. 
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the national systems936.  Having recognised that there existed considerable support across the 
Member States for the notion that individuals should be able to seek reparation for injury 
incurred as a result of the acts of the courts, AG Léger asserted that “the principle of State 
liability for the acts or omissions of supreme courts can be acknowledged as a general 
principle of Community law”937.  Similarly, the Court’s rationale for its recognition of state 
liability for breaches arising from the acts and omissions of judicial bodies also derived from 
a comparative analysis.  While there was no explicit reference to the national norms in the 
text of the judgement, the Court did seem to consider the approaches in the domestic orders to 
liability arising in respect of the erroneous decisions of the domestic courts, and recognised 
the scope for liability in the absence of commonality in all orders.  That is to say, it 
considered that “the application of the principle of state liability to judicial decisions has been 
accepted in one form or another by most of the Member States” 938.  
 
Indeed, AG Léger afforded a level of abstraction to his reasoning in Köbler by highlighting 
the existence of national and European courts operating “at the crossroads of a number of 
legal systems”939.  He considered that one of the most significant questions concerned the 
level, either the national or the European, at which the “definition of the substantive 
conditions determining such liability” should be explicated.  Here, he explicitly advocated a 
mixture of national and European law; he noted, with support deriving from previous case 
law940, that for the purposes of promoting the effective judicial protection of rights, reference 
neither to European nor to national law alone is sufficient as the rights derive from EU law 
and must be engaged at the national level.  The AG’s broad acceptance of the notion of 
mixture as a starting point for understanding the development of the Union system is 
significant and can be said to underpin what has been deemed to be “the progressive 
development of a ‘Community judicial ethic’”941.  This notion might indeed reflect the 
emergence of a European judicial identity, which has the potential to affect also the way in 
which the national courts must necessarily operate as European courts, or rather as a hybrid of 
a national and European court.  Via Von Colson942, Simmenthal943, Marleasing944 et al it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
936 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.85. 
937 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.85. 
938 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.48. 
939 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.53. 
940 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.49. 
941 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, fn.51. 
942 Von Colson (n.778). 
943 Simmenthal (n.776). 
 	  	  	   178 
might arguably be deemed that the national judge must undertake a comparison of his own 
domestic law with that which is established at the EU level, in order to dis-apply or amend 
national law in line with EU law in those cases in which conflicts arise.  In respect of state 
liability, this might arise, for example, in respect of the non-availability of a remedy, reflected 
in the absence of an obligation to repair loss.  With a particular focus on French and German 
case law, the AG in Köbler has illustrated that the national courts have engaged with this role 
even in an ex officio manner945, where the effective protection of rights, recognised as a 
general principle of Union law arising from the “constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States…also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR” 946 , is afforded 
significance. 
 
As noted above, there is a clear reference, particularly in the Opinions of the AGs but also in 
the judgements of the Court in Brasserie and Köbler, of the scope for the transfer of norms – 
for example, of the conditions of liability and of the understanding of the unity of the state - 
from one area of EU law to another, and between the international, Union and national 
spheres.  Building on the approach in Brasserie, Léger referred in Köbler to the transfer of 
developments between different areas of the law, noting that the conditions underpinning the 
obligation to repair and the CJEU’s previous jurisprudence could be “fully transferable”947 
from one area of law (liability arising from the acts or omissions of the legislature) to another 
(liability arising from the acts or omissions of the judiciary), justified by the CJEU’s broad 
systemising interpretation, and the effective protection of individual rights.  These processes 
are not recognised as mere transfer; indeed, AG Léger has asserted that there is a need for 
more than mere transposition – of, for example, the conditions – from one context to 
another948 “because of the specific nature of the judicial function”949.  Indeed, an additional 
dimension is necessary, which could amount to a process like cross-referencing, undertaken in 
consideration of the need for system and coherence across EU law; consideration of the 
cultural, socio-economic and political contexts in which the norms are and will be applicable, 
in light of the nature of the judicial function, is identifiable.  Divergent understandings of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944 Marleasing (n.393). 
945 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, fns.72-73. 
946 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.67. 
947 Köbler (n.184)Opinion of AG Léger, para.36. 
948 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.122. Indeed, he recognised, the transfer might be more easily 
undertaken in respect of certain conditions than others (for example, concerning the nature of the rule infringed, 
he rejected the notion that there should be a distinction drawn in respect of hierarchy of norms; Köbler (n.184), 
Opinion of AG Léger, paras.122-129. 
949 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.122. 
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comparative analysis are identifiable in the Opinions of the AGs and judgements of the Court.  
A variety of sources of law – national law, EU law, the ECHR, and international law – are 
identified as being relevant; the identification of these norms is only possible through an 
engagement, on the part of the CJEU – although, as is clear from the above analysis, 
predominantly on the part of the AG – of the comparative methodology.  The engagement 
with comparative analysis differs between the cases; it is neither limited to a consideration of 
national laws nor to a finding of commonality or difference for the purpose of facilitating 
uniformity, by virtue of the promotion of the former and repression of the latter (for the 
purposes of which, it seems, as explored above, comparative analysis is largely – although not 
exclusively – engaged).   
 
From the analysis of the jurisprudence, and of the specificities underlying state liability, it 
becomes clear that the CJEU has not constructed a uniform scheme of reparation for state 
liability arising from a breach of EU law.  Instead, it has recognised state liability as a 
principle of Union law and set out three basic conditions delineating liability, the 
determination of the satisfaction of which is left to the national courts, applying the relevant 
norms specific to the domestic legal order in line with Union law.   
 
II. The Establishment and Enforcement of Liability: State Liability as a Multi-Level 
Construct 
 
The following section examines the interactions between national, EU and international law, 
considering the multi-level nature of the regime of state liability within the broader context of 
the European legal order, and the endeavour to promote coherence, in respect of the division 
of labour and the protection of rights at the national level. 
 
i. The Interrelation of the European and National Courts: European Rights and 
National Remedies 
 
The idea that European law should constitute a coherent system of rights and remedies is a 
judicial construction which permeates the “division of labour” between the national and 
European courts (explored below) and which finds one significant dimension in the CJEU’s 
recognition of the need to ensure effective judicial protection of individuals; the Treaties do 
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not provide for such an understanding.  Notwithstanding, the Treaty structure requires the 
Member States adhere to and comply with primary and secondary Union law.  This not only 
requires that the Member States do not act or omit to act in such a way as to breach Union law 
but also that national courts ensure, by virtue of national law, that individuals can invoke the 
rights they obtain from Union law950.  The Member States are required by virtue of Art.4 TEU 
to take all measures necessary to ensure that obligations arising from EU law can be fulfilled, 
and by virtue of Art.29(1) TFEU, to ensure that EU law is implemented by any measure of 
national law the adoption of which is deemed necessary.  The national courts must ensure that 
individuals can pursue claims before them; this is clear from Johnston, in which the Court 
held that “the requirement of judicial control…reflects a general principle of law which 
underlies the constitutional traditions of the Member States” 951 .  This is ultimately 
safeguarded by the Luxembourg Court; the CJEU concluded in in Brasserie and Köbler, in 
respect of its jurisdiction in the elaboration of the conditions of liability, that ultimately “…it 
falls to the Court to review the degree of adequacy of the protection afforded by the national 
legal systems” 952.  Even where Union law makes no explicit provision, the Court must, in line 
with its Treaty obligations, provide judgement on the basis of the “generally accepted 
methods of interpretation, in particular with reference to the fundamental principles of the 
Community legal system and, where necessary, general principles common to the Member 
States”953.  
 
Indeed, Francovich has been characterised as a piece in the “judge-made jigsaw of 
protection”, where there is a need for the judiciary to ensure protection which is otherwise 
unavailable due to the limits of Union and national law and the deficiencies that might arise in 
respect of the duty to interpret national law in line with Union law954, and furthermore, the 
absence of the direct effect of directives955.  While at its core Brasserie concerned the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
950 C-222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR I-1651, Judgement, para.1683. 
951 Johnston (n.950), Judgement, para.1683.  That is, in respect of discrimination claims in relation to Art.6 
Directive 76/207, Member States must take measures to ensure that individuals can pursue claims before the 
national courts. 
952 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.14, paras.43-47. 
953 The invocation of “where necessary”, to which AG Tesauro made no reference, arguably reflects the Court’s 
reluctance to engage in a distillation of principles via the comparison of norms applicable across the national 
cultures and traditions; Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.27. 
954 M. Ross, ‘Beyond Francovich’ (1993) 56 MLR 55, p.55. 
955 The formulation of the two questions of the Italian court reflect the direct effect issue in general; the first 
question concerned the direct effect of the directive while the second question concerned the liability of the state, 
as an alternative, in the case that the directive could not be relied upon against the state directly 
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development of state liability, it also highlighted, following Francovich956, the consequences 
of the absence of the direct effect of directives and the need to ensure effective judicial 
protection: "the obligations of the Member States and of the Community institutions are 
directed above all, in the system which the Community system has sought and sets out to be, 
to the creation of rights of individuals"957.  State liability, and the obligation of states to 
compensate for loss arising from an infringement of Union law, is characterised as a concern 
of individual rights, that is, as the protection of (a right of) the individual, established at the 
Union level and subsequently invoked at the national level958.  The recognition of the legal 
protection of the rights of individuals in the Treaty and the need to ensure effective judicial 
protection per Art.267(3) TFEU - giving rise to the notion that “individuals cannot be 
deprived of the possibility of rendering the state liable in order in that way to obtain legal 
protection of their rights”959 - further provides the basis for the extension of state liability to 
the highest national courts by the Court in Köbler, which acknowledged that, as a court of last 
instance, the supreme court provides the final opportunity for the protection of individual 
rights (in the sense that there is no scope for “correction” following its decision).   
 
The reference to the protection of the individual might be conceived differently and be 
determined by reference to diverse factors of a substantive and factual nature across the 
European space960; thus, the effect of individual rights established in the national orders961 - 
whether by virtue of Union directives, or by the national legislation transposing the EU 
legislation – might differ between the Member States.  An example of this broad divergence 
can be identified in the recognition of rights giving rise to remedies in the civilian tradition (to 
the extent that it might be said that there exists no distinct category of remedies962), compared 
to the system of causes of action963 from which remedies are derived in the common law.  As 
such, the distinction (at least initially) drawn at the EU level can be said to be more "at home" 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, para.11. 
957 Francovich (n.219), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.39. 
958 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, para.40 and Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.51. 
959 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.36. 
960 Consider, M. Rüffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 
34 CMLR 307, pp.325-327. 
961 In this context, one might also engage with the notion of the identity of the individual. 
962 Consider, for example, the German approach: Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Vorträge 
und Berichte (U.Bonn, Bonn; 1993), p.9. 
963 M. Brealey and M. Hoskins, Remedies in EC Law - Law and Practice in the English and EC Courts (Sweet 
and Maxwell, London; 1994), pp.75 et seq. They suggest that the possible causes of action are: (1) misfeasance 
in public office; (2) breach of statutory duty; (3) innominate tort; and (4) negligence.  See also the cases of 
Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130 and Bourgoin v. MAFF [1985] 3 All ER 585, in 
which the courts look to identify the relevant cause of action. 
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in the latter "introducing at the continental level a style of legal thinking which was 
characteristic of common law rather than civil law systems”964.  In principle, rights and 
remedies might be considered separately while in reality, there is a clear interaction between 
the two.  The rights and remedies discussion, and the considerations falling within 
each (apparently distinct) category, should be anchored in the context of the cultures and 
traditions of the Member States, of the Union and where relevant, the international law 
context.  
 
Francovich and subsequent cases have had a considerable impact on the national legal 
cultures and traditions.  Notwithstanding the recognition of state liability as a principle of 
Union law, the diversity of national norms, outlined above, dictates that the effects of the 
CJEU jurisprudence may not be identical across the national orders.  There is an interlacing of 
international, European and national norms in respect of the recognition of state liability, and 
interaction between the European and national courts with regard to the availability of the 
remedy.  The CJEU only provides for the basic conditions underlying the establishment of 
liability and the availability of the remedy; its provision and enforcement is for the national 
court, in line with Union law.  Consequently, the implementation of the state liability regime, 
and the system of remedies may differ between national cultures and traditions.  With 
reference to the relevant national context of Brasserie, a clear divergence can be identified in 
the English and German orders, shaping the interaction between national, Union and 
international law965.  In the German system, state liability arising from breach of EU law is 
distinguished from state liability generally (per Art.34 Grundgesetz).  The remedy arising 
from the former is therefore understood to be European, and the latter, national; distinct 
European and national heads966 of tort liability are therefore identifiable967.  In the English 
system, prior to Francovich, the courts considered liability for breach of EU law to derive as a 
breach of a statutory duty per the European Communities Act 1972968.  On this basis, state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964 R. Caranta, 'Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New ius commune Takes Shape' (1995) 32 CMLR 
703, p.717. 
965 Further, Künnecke, ‘Divergence and the Francovich Remedy in German and English Courts’ in Prechal and 
van Roermund, The Coherence of EU Law, (n.885), pp.233-254.   
966 The conditions for liability as mentioned above, discussed under the Brasserie case – Art.34 Grundgesetz and 
Art.839 BGB. 
967 BGH BGHZ 146, 153 14.11.2000 (a case of Fleischhygienegesetz – the BGH looked to both EU and national 
heads of tort, finding that no breach of EU law had occurred – the Court also negated to make a reference to the 
CJEU; then looked to the conditions under national law, ultimately finding that fault could not be established. 
968 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130. 
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liability was integrated into national law, corresponding to a breach of a statutory duty969.  
One potential impact in the domestic order has arisen where no remedy has been recognised 
for state liability or where the remedy available has been more limited that that envisaged at 
the Union level for the protection of the right.  As anticipated by AG Tesauro in Brasserie, 
the CJEU’s development of state liability has led to the adoption of a remedy otherwise 
unavailable in many national systems970.  Such a development might be understood as a 
transfer of a remedy from the European level to the national, piercing the principle of the 
“remedial autonomy” of the Member States971 .  The impact may not amount to the 
recognition of an entirely new remedy; rather, as Van Gerven considers, existing national 
remedies might be developed to ensure the satisfactory protection of the Union right972.  That 
is to say, the national remedial norms themselves will be amended, in light of Union and 
international norms, to provide for what is required at the Union level973.  
 
Regardless of their specificities, national rules must be applied in a way that is compatible 
with the aims of EU law.  As such, where national law would otherwise limit liability or the 
availability of the remedy to an extent greater than that anticipated at the Union level, it must 
be interpreted and applied in light of the objectives of Union law.  Such consequences can be 
identified in respect of Traghetti974, in which the CJEU provided that where loss arises from 
the acts or omissions of the state (in this case, the judiciary), national legislation which 
dictates that damages are unavailable in respect of loss arising from a national court’s breach 
of EU law deriving from the interpretation of legal provisions, of facts or of evidence, or 
which provides for serious fault as a requirement, cannot be maintained.  Furthermore, the 
CJEU has rejected that certain heads of damage – namely, loss of profit – can be excluded 
entirely.  This determination is exemplified in respect of the English rules excluding the 
availability of reparation for pure economic loss; these include, as expressly stated by the 
Court, rules which provide for the “total exclusion of loss of profit”975.  Other provisions 
which might limit the scope for liability – for example, those found in Art.839 BGB and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
969 Künnecke, ‘Divergence and the Francovich Remedy in German and English Courts’ in Prechal and van 
Roermund, The Coherence of EU Law, (n.885), p.242; Three Rivers District Council and Ors v Bank of England 
[2001] UKHL 16 (the House of Lords decided not to make a reference to the CJEU). 
970 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.14. 
971 Consider, C-158/80 Rewe [1981] ECR I-1805, Judgement, para.44, which highlights the notion of remedial 
autonomy, and the recognition of the CJEU that where no remedy exists in national law, the remedy has to be 
introduced, C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, Judgement, para.41. 
972 van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (n.901), p.517. 
973 N. Reich, 'Hybridisation of Remedies' (2007) 44 CMLR 705, pp.708-9. 
974 Traghetti (n.761). 
975 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.87. 
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Art.34 Grundgesetz – which provide that the obligation to repair will arise only where the 
duty breached is referable to a third party976, must be deemed inapplicable for the reason that 
their application would undoubtedly undermine the effectiveness of the protection afforded to 
the individual; the Court recognised that in respect of Union law, the duty may not necessarily 
(and will not generally) be referable to a third party, neither to an individual nor to a class of 
individuals, and will thus rarely satisfy this requirement977.  Thus, following Brasserie, 
national rules which "generally limit[s] the obligation to make reparation to damage done to 
certain, specifically protected individual interests” or those which might make it “impossible 
or extremely difficult to obtain effective reparation for loss or damage resulting from a breach 
of Community law” cannot remain applicable978.   
 
Consequent to Francovich, and the cases following, the CJEU has increasingly rendered 
interpretations which potentially impact what were previously wholly national norms 
providing for national remedies; it has arguably become engaged in a process of 
Europeanisation not limited to the interpretation of substantive rules, but also making inroads 
into national systems of civil procedure979.  This can be identified broadly in the assertion that 
the predominant consequence of Francovich is to establish a new European remedy of 
damages, albeit one which is to be provided for at the national level, similar to the way in 
which the first Factortame case gave rise to the possibility of a injunction, i.e. interim 
relief980.  Thus, the CJEU seems to have little hesitation in adopting such “interventionist” 
steps where they are deemed necessary for the purposes of ensuring that the rights of 
individuals are protected.  The interpretative statements of the CJEU have, as Dougan notes, 
created spillover effects in national systems giving rise to concerns that “Union law is 
interfering with the local, political, social and cultural preferences embodied in the national 
systems of judicial protection, which command greater legitimacy than choices made by the 
Court of Justice, and should not be reduced to the status of mere obstacles to the greater 
effectiveness and uniform application of the Treaty” 981 .  Notwithstanding, the CJEU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
976 See, for example, BGHZ 56, 40. 
977 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.4. 
978 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.71 and 73.  See also C-470/03 AGM-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749, 
Judgement, para.90. 
979 This will be discussed in greater detail in the case example on the ex officio application of directives. 
980 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame (n.902). 
981 M. Dougan, ‘The Vissicitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing Union Law 
Before the National Courts’ in P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd 
edn., 2011), pp.407-438, p.417, citing M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, in respect of the influence of the 
Factortame decisions. 
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maintains broadly that the provision of the remedy is a determination for the national court to 
be undertaken in the context of the domestic culture and tradition, in line with the application 
of domestic procedural rules; the court must nevertheless interpret and apply these norms in 
line with Union law.  The alternative approach for the CJEU would be to create a judicial 
order of rights and remedies, operating on the basis of a harmonised set of EU procedural 
rules982.  As is clear from above, it does not seem willing to go so far but rather provides for 
the “division of labour” between the national and European courts. 
 
ii. The Articulation of the Judicial Division of Labour and the Bridging of National, 
Union and International Law in the Name of Coherence 
 
Essentially, the Union system lacks an enforcement mechanism.  As such, it must “defer in 
the first instance to the existing domestic judicial systems for the decentralised enforcement 
of Treaty norms”983.  The absence of EU norms, and especially of rules of enforcement, 
invokes the principle of procedural autonomy984; the principle is expressed in Francovich and 
dictates that where Union law does not make provision for rules, it is for the Member States 
to set out the norms governing the procedural dimensions of legal proceedings in which 
individuals endeavour to invoke their Union rights before the national courts985.   Essentially, 
it is for the national courts, applying domestic law, to ensure subjective EU rights can be 
invoked and enforced, in line with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness986.  The 
distinction between substance and procedure is also relevant in respect of the jurisdiction, role 
and interaction of the national and European courts.  On the one hand, procedural autonomy 
and the role reserved for the national courts in applying national law in a manner compatible 
with EU law can be said to “cushion” the impact of EU law on Member States987.  On the 
other hand, the interaction between the national and European courts – facilitated broadly by 
the preliminary reference procedure – has rendered the boundary between substance and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
982 For a more in-depth discussion see, M.E. Storme, ‘Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and its Interaction With 
Substantive Private Law’ in X. Kramer & R. van Rhee (eds.), Civil Litigation in a Globalizing World (TMC 
Asser Press, the Hague; 2012), p.141-156. 
983  M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation 
(Hart, Oxford; 2004), pp.19-20. 
984 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral, [1976] ECR 1989. 
985 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, para.42. 
986 There is a wider discussion of procedural autonomy below, within the ex officio case example. 
987 G. van Harten, ‘Chapter 11 and the Francovich Doctrine: Comparing State Liability under NAFTA and EC 
Law’ (2003) Cahier de recherche, Centre Études internationales et Mondialisation, p.18. 
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procedure increasingly blurred988, to the extent that it has been claimed there exists no such 
principle989. 
 
Thus, due to the incomplete nature of the EU legal order, the CJEU necessarily leaves certain 
tasks to the national courts constructing a kind of “division of labour” between the national 
and EU levels.  It is for the national judge to identify the foundations of the claim arising in 
respect of state liability; as noted, if necessary, the national courts might look to establish a 
new cause of action or remedy or develop one that already exists.  It is here that the German 
and English differ990.  As AG Tesauro noted, “state liability is a creation of case law” in 
respect of which there has been a kind of transfer - he explicitly uses the word “lend” - 
between general civil liability and the liability of public authorities991.  The determination of 
the satisfaction of the conditions of liability, the relevant heads of damage and the 
quantification of reparation is for the national court.  Yet, the CJEU has provided that the 
award “must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure the effective 
protection for their rights”992.  Notwithstanding the notion of “division of labour”, in reality it 
is not as rigid as it might appear, prima facie.  The CJEU has attempted to provide some 
guidance in a number of cases, particularly, as noted above, in respect of the determination of 
a “sufficiently serious” breach.  As noted above, in Brasserie, the relevant factors were set 
out993; in certain – generally exceptional – cases, including British Telecom994 and Köbler995, 
the CJEU has made the determination itself, considering that it had the information before it 
to do so.  This, not-quite-rigid division of labour suggests that the relationship between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
988 Storme, ‘Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and its Interaction With Substantive Private Law’ in Kramer and 
van Rhee, Civil Litigation in a Globalizing World (n.982); see, for example, Storme’s reference to Joined Cases 
C-87-89/90 Verholen [1992] ECR I-3757, and the idea that “civil procedure should have rather open rules 
which, to a large extent, leave [e.g.] the question of standing to substantive law”, fn.7. 
989 M. Bobek, ‘Why There Is No Principle of Procedural Autonomy of the Member States’ in B. de Witte and H-
W. Micklitz (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, 
Antwerp; 2011), pp. 305-324.  Yet Bobek notes, despite the seemingly broad intervention of Francovich into the 
national procedural regime, in the case itself, Francovich was unable to obtain damages before the Italian courts, 
at p.311. 
990 See the discussion of Künnecke, ‘Divergence and the Francovich Remedy in German and English Courts’ in 
Prechal and van Roermund, The Coherence of EU Law, (n.885). 
991 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.7. 
992 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.82. 
993 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.56 and 58.  See also the text accompanying n.894 above (the factors set 
out in Köbler).  These considerations were further developed in Dillenkorf, in which it considered that the failure 
of a Member State to take action to transpose a directive in the time period would constitute a serious breach; 
Dillenkofer (n.840), Judgement, para.29. 
994 Ex p British Telecommunications (n.841), Judgement, para.41. 
995 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.101.  
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European and national courts is perhaps best characterised as an intertwinement of the legal 
orders. 
 
On the one hand, the CJEU has sought to promote the significance of the coherent and 
uniform application of Union law for the purposes of ensuring effective judicial protection.  
Yet this uniformity is deemed to be undermined both by the lack of clarity in the judgements 
of the CJEU (in respect of the terms employed and its elaboration - or lack thereof - of the 
understanding of certain concepts996), and the procedural autonomy of the national courts, 
outlined above.  The CJEU has highlighted that procedural autonomy must be limited by the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence, in order to avoid divergent applications of Union 
norms across the Member States, and thus promote a uniform level of protection throughout 
the Union; that is to say, it is on the application of this test of equivalence and effectiveness 
that the CJEU determines whether it can intervene in procedural autonomy, a consideration 
explored in greater detail in relation to the UCTD jurisprudence below.  On the other hand, it 
is recognised that uniformity is nevertheless difficult to achieve given the limits of the 
European order; as van Gerven notes, “that objective can be achieved only if the European 
Court is willing, in the absence of action by the Community legislature, to lay down the 
procedural, and more important, the substantive conditions of legal remedies” 997.   From the 
analysis of the jurisprudence above, the CJEU does not appear to be so willing. 
 
Rather, the law of state liability exemplifies the type of situation in which national courts 
must act as both national and European courts, giving rise to a context in which “Community 
law and national law are hence intertwined and blurred in a very complex manner…”998.  This 
intertwinement might in fact lead to a situation in which the task of the national courts 
changes.  Thus, to the extent that “national law operates as the vehicle carrying the 
application of the action in damages”999, the criticism with which Harlow charges the national 
courts, namely that the national courts are being understood more as administrative, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
996 For example, the way in which the Court dealt with the notion of causation in Brasserie has been criticised 
(see F. Smith and L. Woods, ‘Causation in Francovich: The Neglected Problem’ 1997) 46 ICLQ 925, p.928, 
Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.79. 
997 van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Unbridgeable’ (n.836), p.515. 
998 Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (n.824), p.382. 
999 Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (n.824), p.280.  
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opposed to dispute resolution bodies, seems to hold true1000.  Similarly, Weatherill has 
considered that in this area “national law is simply too deep-rooted and complex to permit 
immediate accommodation…” of changes1001; this suggests that the way in which these 
doctrines will be dealt with in different systems will depend on the rules already embedded in 
the particular social, political and economic contexts, which dictates that the courts must be 
understood as more than simply administrative bodies.  While the rights derive from the EU 
level, enforcement - “a particularly significant instrument for their realization”1002 - is a task 
which necessarily falls to the national courts1003.  The “structural deficiencies of the Union” 
and its “judicial architecture” necessarily dictates this is the case1004.  The limited jurisdiction 
of the CJEU derives from its function as it was initially established, where the focus was not 
on the invocation of rights by individuals but on the protection of freedoms necessary for the 
functioning of the market.  It is in this context of European legal development and integration, 
in which the Europeanisation of private law occurs, that the development of substantive and 
procedural norms at the EU level has been fundamental, in particular, to the extent that it has 
provided individuals with (subjective as opposed to procedural) rights. 
 
Snyder has recognised that this interaction between the European institutions and national 
courts, legislatures and administrative authorities, is necessary not only for the practical 
functioning of a system of remedies but also for its acceptance within the particular national 
culture or tradition.  The right and the availability of the remedy is established at the 
European level, and as such, the national institutions are necessarily reliant on what occurs 
there; yet the European institutions alone are not competent “to ensure the effectiveness of 
Community law in the broader social sense, in particular, in so far as it entails the 
commitment of citizens, popular participation and political legitimacy” 1005 .  The EU 
institutions are similarly reliant on what occurs within the national systems.  On the one hand 
it might therefore be suggested that the CJEU engages with the national courts, and national 
law, in line with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, and – albeit implicitly – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000 C. Harlow, ‘Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State’ (1996) 2 ELJ 199.  Indeed the criticism of 
Harlow is much broader; she challenges the theoretical foundations of liability as developed by the CJEU, and 
the influence on the national courts, an impact she characterises as “cross-infection”. 
1001 Weatherill, ‘Interpretation of the Directives’ in Hartkamp et al, Towards a European Civil Code (n.270), 
p.195. 
1002 S. Beljin, ‘Rights in EU Law’ in S. Prechal and B. van Roermund (eds.), The Coherence of EU Law: The 
Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts (OUP, Oxford; 2008), pp.91-122, p.96. 
1003 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.33. 
1004 Basedow, ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law’ (n.808), pp.471-472. 
1005 F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’  
(1993) 56 MLR 19, p.52. 
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facilitates the intertwinement of the two levels for the purposes of ensuring effective judicial 
protection1006.  This implicit promotion, on the part of the CJEU, might also be said to have 
its roots in the recognition that ensuring such protection is available often demands that 
changes are made within the national system; on this basis, the interaction might also be 
understood as a means – per Snyder – of the need to promote and ensure the legitimacy of any 
impact in the national system.   
 
Tridimas has considered that the evolution of the CJEU jurisprudence provides for the 
“universality of state liability” 1007 .  This notion of universality brings to the fore 
considerations of systemisation and coherence, which do indeed appear to be reflected in 
CJEU’s elaboration of state liability and its engagement of systematic reasoning, promoting 
the coherence of the Union regime1008.  In Francovich, the liability of the state and the 
availability of a remedy, were recognised by the Court “in the light of the general system of 
the Treaty and its fundamental principles” as “inherent in the system of the Treaty”1009.  
Furthermore, as noted above, the AG and Court in Brasserie recognised the significance of 
coherence in bringing together, at least marginally in terms of the conditions underpinning, 
the regimes of state liability and the non-contractual liability of the Union institutions.  AG 
Léger in Köbler has confirmed the predominance of the systematic approach1010.  By 
concluding at the outset that the obligation to repair damage should extend to loss arising 
from the acts and omissions of the national courts, Léger engaged fully with the CJEU’s 
existing state liability jurisprudence, recognising the very “general” nature of the reasoning of 
the Court in Francovich reflected in its “systemising interpretation”1011.  This “system-based” 
interpretation underpins the three bodies of support identified by the AG – including CJEU 
case law, the significance of the role of the national court, and national law – for the purposes 
of dealing with, and ultimately rejecting, the arguments advanced by the intervening 
governments against the extension of liability and the obligation to repair1012.  This approach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1006 Unibet (n.971), Judgement, para.37, in line with the traditions of the Member States, Art.47 CFR and Arts.6 
and 13 ECHR. 
1007 T. Tridimas, ‘State Liability for Juridical Acts: Remedies Unlimited’ in P. Demaret et al (eds.), Thirty Years 
of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe (Peter Lang, Brussels; 2005), pp.147-159, p.149. 
1008 D. Edward, ‘The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the Work of the European Court of 
Justice’, in D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmermann, (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law, Aberdeen 
Quincentenary Essays (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin; 1997), pp.309-20, p.318. 
1009 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, paras.30 and 35, respectively. 
1010 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.27 et seq. 
1011 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.28 et seq. 
1012 These were predominantly based on the principle of res judicata, and the independence of the judiciary: 
Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.92 et seq.  Further, the Court looked to the rules of the Member 
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reflects more broadly the CJEU’s role in facilitating the systemisation of Union law, explored 
in greater detail in Part IV.  For example, reference can be made to the Opinion of AG 
Lagrange in an early CJEU case, in which he highlighted the role of the Court in filling gaps 
in rendering interpretations where the text of legislation is silent: “[t]he text lays down a 
procedural requirement...but it fails to state by whom [it is to be accomplished]. It is therefore 
necessary to interpret the text in order to fill that lacuna. Even though the Code Napoléon is 
not applicable here I cannot refrain from recalling Article 4: 'le juge qui refusera de juger, 
sous prétexte du silence, de l'obscurité ou de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra être poursuivi 
comme coupable de déni de justice’”1013. 
 
The cases illustrate the true multi-level character of EU law, evidenced by the interaction of 
the national, European and international.  The post-Francovich judgements also highlight the 
potential for divergences in the reasoning (even if the final judgement is the same) of the AG 
and the Court, as well as the CJEU’s initial engagement with generality – in its recognition of 
state liability as a “general principle” – and in its subsequent development of the specifics of 
the liability regime.  The analysis above, which attempts to uncover the nature of the 
methodology, in particular, that of comparison, underpinning the Opinions and the 
judgements of the Court in two key cases of state liability, is engaged in the construction of 
the taxonomy of comparison in Part IV.  For the moment, it is worth noting that there are 
numerous, interrelated rationales which support a more substantive comparative analysis on 
the part of the CJEU, which are cultural (the Treaty requires that the diversities between 
Member States are respected and maintained)1014, political (which could support the more 
active role of the CJEU in the development of European private law, and in particular, justify 
those interpretations of the Court which might be deemed contentious, including, inter alia, 
Francovich), economic and legal (in respect of recognising similarities and diversities 
between different the national cultures and tradition, and different areas of EU law, for the 
purposes of removing obstacles to trade, promoting coherence and the facilitation of the 
internal market)1015.   	    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
States in order to reject an argument against liability made on the basis of res judicata, on the one hand, and the 
independence of the courts, on the other.    
1013 Case 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Authority [1954 to 1956] ECR 245, Opinion of AG 
Lagrange, p.277 
1014 Amongst others, Art.167 TFEU and Art.6 TEU. 
1015 See W. Van Gerven, ‘Rights and Remedies in the Enforcement of EC Law Before National Courts’ in 
Academy of European Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law: 1997 (Kluwer, The Hague; 
2001), pp.241-360, p.353. 
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Chapter 6. The Intertwining of EU Consumer Contract Law and National Procedural 
Law via the CJEU  
 
The second case example concerns the CJEU’s interpretation of the UCTD1016 and the 
regulation of contract terms in national courts.  As the UCTD arguably constitutes the EU 
legislature’s first foray into the “core” of private law1017, the analysis necessarily engages 
considerations concerning the reach of the Union legislature’s activities, the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU, and the impact of its decisions in the national orders, especially on the cultures and 
traditions of procedural regimes.  The jurisprudence analysed has arisen predominantly via 
the preliminary reference procedure from inconsistencies in the transposition 1018 , 
implementation and interpretation of the directive.  The transposition of the minimum 
harmonisation directive has not been strictly uniform; in some Member States, it has been 
transposed by a single legislative instrument (as is the case in the UK), while in others, 
various pieces of new and existing legislation, of both a public and private nature, are 
engaged (in, for example, Slovakia)1019.  Furthermore, the case example illustrates that the 
approaches of the national courts to the interpretation and application of the UCTD differ, 
potentially undermining the scope for the uniform application of Union law across the 
European space.  Both analytical dimensions of the thesis are explored, that is, on the one 
hand, the CJEU’s jurisdiction and role in its development of regulatory Union law that strikes 
at the heart of substantive national private law (and essentially, the scope for recognising the 
Europeanisation of national procedural law as a dimension of integration) and on the other, 
the relevance of the methodological discourse concerning the commonality and diversity that 
permeates the national cultures and traditions (and especially, those of procedural regimes).   
 
At the outset, the CJEU jurisprudence on the ex officio regulation of contract terms is traced 
from the initial recognition of the power of the national courts to regulate contract terms ex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1016 The ex officio application of the UCTD also concerns the engagement the other potential “case examples”, 
on liability for breach of EU law, on general clauses in private law, (in particular, on the substantive test of 
unfairness), and on remedies (the cases of Invitel and Banco Español could also be analysed in respect of the 
UCTD’s ex officio application; C-472/10 Invitel, nyr and C-618/10 Banco Español, nyr).  Given the high degree 
of intertwinement, the focus herein is as above, but cross-referencing will be made where relevant.   
1017  H-W. Micklitz, ‘AGB-Gesetz und die Richtlinie über mißbräuchliche Vertragsklauseln in 
Verbraucherverträgen’ (1993) ZEuP 522, p.533. 
1018 M. Ebers, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive’ in H. Schulte-Nölke et al (eds.), Consumer Law Compendium; 
The Consumer Acquis and its Transposition in the Member States (Sellier, München 2008), pp.197-261, pp.197 
et seq; European Parliament, ‘Unfair Contract Terms in Business-to-Consumer Contract in the pCESL: BEUC’s 
Viewpoint’ (2012) Policy Department (Legal and Parliamentary Affairs), Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, p.9. 
1019 See further, J. Basedow, ‘Grundlagen des Europäischen Privatrechts’ (2004) Juristische Schulung 89, p.94. 
 	  	  	   192 
officio, to the CJEU’s construction of the national courts’ duty to assess.  The focus then 
shifts to the scope for conflicts arising within national orders and the expectations of the 
national courts in requesting preliminary rulings; thereafter, the putative emergence of a 
Europeanised civil procedure is explored.  The jurisprudence concerns, predominantly but not 
exclusively, the UCTD (in respect of both jurisdiction and arbitration clauses1020) while the 
scope for ex officio regulation arising from other directives, including the Doorstep Selling 
Directive 1021 , the Consumer Credit Directive 1022  and the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive1023, is identified where relevant. 
 
The outline that follows does not aim to comprehensively examine the CJEU jurisprudence on 
contract term regulation; rather, it traces key cases and provides a foundation for the analysis 
that follows.  The power of the national court to examine contract terms ex officio was 
established in Océano, seemingly - per the CJEU’s reasoning – as it engenders the scope for 
the correction of any putative power imbalance between the parties; that is to say, in the 
absence of ex officio regulation, the effectiveness of consumer protection is undermined as 
inequalities between the parties might not be corrected1024.  This power was subsequently 
confirmed in Cofidis, a case concerning French procedural rules limiting, via prescription, the 
assessment of unfairness1025.  Subsequently, it has been considered that the CJEU’s attribution 
to the national courts of a power to regulate contract terms also has its basis in the right to be 
heard, as established in the CJEU’s jurisprudence, in Arts.6 and 13 ECHR, and Art.47 CFR 
per the constitutional traditions of the Member States1026.  This rationale highlights the 
significance of the relationship between the national courts and the CJEU, reflected in the 
relationship between national procedural law, the development of substantive Union law and 
the effective judicial protection of individual rights, and with particular reference to the 
UCTD, the obligations of the national courts per Arts.6 and 71027.   
 
Subsequent to Cofidis, the CJEU has gradually “scratched away” at the understanding that the 
rigid procedural autonomy of the Member States remains intact in light of the principles of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1020 C-243/08 Pannon [2010] ECR I-4713 and C-40/08 Asturcom [2010] ECR I-957, respectively. 
1021 Directive 85/577/EEC; C-227/08 Martin Martin [2009] ECR I-11939. 
1022 Directive 2008/48/EC; C-602/10 Volksbank Romania, nyr (from Romania) and C-429/05 Rampion [2007] 
ECR I‑8017 (then Directive 87/102/EEC) (from France). 
1023 Directive 2005/29/EC; C-453/10 Pereničová and Perenič, nyr. 
1024 Océano (n.682), Judgement, paras.26-27; Asturcom (n.1020), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.64. 
1025 C-473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR I-10875. 
1026 Asturcom (n.1020), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.61. 
1027 Asturcom (n.1020), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.50-51 citing Océano (n.682), Judgement, paras.25-28. 
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equivalence and effectiveness1028, thereafter reframing the power of the national courts as an 
obligation on their part to assess the contractual terms “of its own motion”.  The shift in the 
understanding of the domestic courts’ role has its foundations in Mostaza Claro1029; the 
“intrusion” into national procedural law has not been reflected in the establishment of the 
obligation as such but in the determination that where the consumer does not raise the 
unfairness issue initially in the arbitration proceedings but rather subsequently in the 
substantive (judicial) action, the national court must nevertheless return and assess the 
pertinent term as to its putative unfairness.  
 
The issues arising are broadly similar but each case generates distinct, substantive and 
procedural considerations.  Thus, Asturcom brought the nature of arbitration to the fore, 
extending the effect of ex officio regulation beyond judicial actions1030.  In Caja de Ahorros, 
the AG raised and for the first time engaged explicitly the economic rationale underpinning 
contract term regulation and demarcated the scope of contract term regulation with reference 
to the significance of party autonomy in respect of Art.4(2)1031.  In Pannon, the Court 
delineated the obligation to assess, with reference to the need for the national courts to 
possess the facts “necessary” to make an assessment as to unfairness1032.  In Pénzügyi Lízing, 
the AG engaged the significance of dialogue between the national and European courts, and 
considered the extent to which it might be affected by, and similarly affect, national 
procedure1033.  The consideration of impact extends beyond that which might arise by virtue 
of the relationship between the courts; thus, for example, Pereničová and Perenič concerned 
the consequences of a finding of unfairness on the coherence of distinct EU directives1034.  As 
a general rule, CJEU judgements are effective inter parts yet Invitel suggests an exception to 
this rule in relation to the UCTD.  While the AG considered that a finding of unfairness is 
“accorded fairly wide applicability”, she did not seem to include third parties not party to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1028 To the extent that national rules “cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a 
domestic nature nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law”: C-33/76 Rewe-Zentral  [1976] ECR 1989, Judgement, para.13, the limitation – essentially 
based on the principle of equivalence and effectiveness to be applied, “ by reference to the role of that provision 
in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In 
the light of that analysis the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as protection of the rights of 
the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be 
taken into consideration”; C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, Judgement, para.14. 
1029 C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I-10421, Judgement, para.38. 
1030 Asturcom (n.1020). 
1031 Caja de Ahorros (n.268). 
1032 Pannon (n.1020). 
1033 C-137/08 Pénzügyi Lízing [2010] ECR I-10847. 
1034 Pereničová and Perenič (n.1023), nyr. 
 	  	  	   194 
action; the Court found that terms found to be unfair would bind neither the parties to the 
action nor those who have concluded a contract on the same terms with the same supplier1035.  
Art.6(1) and 7(2) UCTD bring to the fore the connection between the CJEU’s judgement, 
which is generally inter partes, the collective action (i.e. the injunction action) and the effect 
of the judgement on individual contracts containing the pertinent unfair term.  Per Art.7, the 
need for adequate and effective protection seems to require that the effect of the judgement is 
not limited to the parties to the action but extended.  This will be discussed in more detail 
below in light of the shifting relationship between the national and Luxembourg courts. 
 
Aziz concerned the limited opportunity – as a result of the application of Spanish procedural 
rules - for the unfairness of contract terms to be pled in mortgage enforcement proceedings; 
the decision not only gave rise to the scope for the CJEU to provide guidelines to the national 
court in its assessment of contract terms1036 but also raised significant social considerations 
(especially in relation to eviction from the home), bringing to the fore the relevance of the 
constitutionalisation of private law via CJEU jurisprudence, a consideration which will be 
returned to below1037.  Thereafter, the Court in Banco Español, following the AG, provided 
that national procedural norms must be deemed to be incompatible with Union legislation 
where their application renders the achievement of consumer protection established therein, 
“impossible or excessively difficult”, and thus violates the effectiveness principle.  The Court 
further held that the national courts must ensure, where it identifies an unfair term, that it has 
no further binding effect, and provide, where possible, for the continuation of the contract1038.  
In Asbeek Brusse1039, the Court clarified that the UCTD applies also to tenancy contracts 
concluded with professional landlords and held that appellate courts, acting ex officio to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1035 Invitel (n.1016), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.51; Judgement, para.38. 
1036 C-415/11 Aziz, nyr.  This criteria for the national court is particular clear from AG Kokott’s Opinion, to the 
extent that she examined particularly the significance of rules on unilateral determination of the amount owed by 
the debtor in default, in light of national procedural rules, while the Court predominantly made reference to 
unfairness deriving from the limitation to the consumer’s right to a remedy, per point 1(q) Annex, UCTD.  See 
H-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the UCTD’ (2014) 51 CMLR 771, 
p.800.  
1037 “Hidden constitutionalisation” per Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), pp.800 et 
seq, in light of the fact that while neither the AG nor the Court explicitly engaged the respect for housing, as 
found in Art.7 CFR, their reasoning did engage constitutional considerations, in the relationship between 
domestic proceedings and contract law regulation, Opinion, para.52, and the highlighting of the purpose for 
which the loan had been made, that is, the purchase of the home, Judgement, para.61. 
1038 Banco Español (n.1016), Judgement, para.65. 
1039 In line with the notion that the national court must have the “legal or factual elements” available, explored in 
more detail below; C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse, nyr, Judgement, paras.41-42.  Similarly, in this case, like Aziz, 
noted above, the Court (there being no AG Opinion) raised the “social” issue of the “essential needs” of access 
to the home, Judgement, para.32. 
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enforce public policy considerations, must similarly assess contract terms even if the issue of 
unfairness was not raised at first instance.  As to the consequences of unfairness, the Court 
followed Banco Español and held that the effective implementation of the directive requires a 
finding, ensured via national procedural rules, that the term is deemed never to have existed; 
any other determination must be understood to “weaken the dissuasive effect” of contract 
term regulation1040.   
 
More recently, the Court, rendering a preliminary ruling in response to a reference arising 
from a reimbursement claim concerning gas price hikes before the Bundesgerichtshof, has 
held that standard term provisions allowing for the unilateral modification of price (it being 
normal that price changes in long-term contracts), requires the clarity of the conditions under 
which the changes are determined and an effective right to terminate, in order to be valid per 
the UCTD1041.  In Banif Plus, the Court confirmed that the consumer need not raise the issue 
to launch an assessment as to unfairness; rather, per Arts.6 and 7 UCTD, the court must 
ensure that both parties are informed and can launch a defence, the assessment being 
undertaken in consideration of all contract terms1042.  AG Mengozzi has very recently 
rendered an Opinion in a Spanish reference not only concerning the compatibility of national 
procedural law with the UCTD and the CFR (in respect of which little consideration was 
rendered as the AG considered the key issue to be one of effectiveness) but essentially 
concerning the demarcation of the UCTD, in respect of the parties at whom it is aimed.  
Essentially, he held that the relevant Spanish jurisdiction rules must not completely preclude 
access to justice or render the enforcement of Union rights “impossible or excessively 
difficult” and furthermore, that the UCTD should be demarcated; in respect of the latter, he 
held that the effective protection of rights to which it gives rise must be aimed at consumers 
and does not extend to consumer organisations (nor can the latter’s budgetary difficulties be 
relevant with regard to the compatibility of national rules on the founding of jurisdiction)1043.   
 
This outline has briefly traced the CJEU’s development of the ex officio monitoring of 
contract terms in the national courts, from its recognition of a power on the part of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1040 Asbeek Brusse (n.1039) Judgement, para.58. 
1041 C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb, nyr, Judgement, paras.28-29, paras.48-50.  Final decision:  the Bundesgerichtshof 
(case Az.: VIII ZR 162/09) awarded 25 consumers a total restitution of EUR 16,128.63 (<http://www.vz-
nrw.de/bgh-urteil--verbraucherzentrale-erfolgreich>; Last Accessed: 16.10.2013). 
1042 C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank, nyr, Judgement, paras.28-30 and para.41. 
1043 C-413/12 ACICL v. Anuntis, nyr, rejecting the scope for a consumer organisation to bring an action for an 
injunction in the courts of its place of business. 
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national court to the imposition of an obligation thereon.  The following section firstly 
outlines the diversity of the national regimes of procedural law, and identifies the scope for 
conflict arising in the national contexts that might, if identified, generate requests for 
preliminary rulings; thereafter, the notion of the preliminary reference procedure as a tool of 
integration is examined and in particular, the ascent and descent of the references to the CJEU 
are analysed, and the expectations of the national courts as to the interpretations rendered by 
the Luxembourg Court are uncovered. 
 
I. The Foundations of Procedural Law in the National Cultures and Traditions 
 
The Union legislature’s engagement with national civil procedure rules has broadly been 
limited to the norms of PIL, predominantly those concerning jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements1044 and the determination of applicable law1045.  Beyond PIL, civil 
procedure is an area in which there has been little explicit attempt at Europeanisation.  
Notwithstanding – and perhaps as a result of the absence of Union legislation, that is, the lack 
of clarity and the existence of gaps to which the non-action gives rise - a body of CJEU 
jurisprudence relating to procedural norms has emerged via the preliminary reference 
procedure hanging onto the coattails of the CJEU’s interpretation of substantive Union 
measures.  This jurisprudence, outlined above and from which the ex officio application of EU 
consumer protection directives derives, therefore establishes one distinct perspective of the 
Europeanisation of private law.  Two dimensions of analysis come to the fore, concerning the 
diversity underpinning national procedural regimes, and the scope for conflict between those 
regimes and the rights and obligations arising and deriving from Union law, which might not 
necessarily be characterised as procedural but which might nevertheless affect procedural law.   
 
The default position provides for adherence to the principle of procedural autonomy, 
underpinning which is a clear policy determination that permeates the national and Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1044 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(consolidated version), O.J. 1998 C 27/1, subsequently repealed and replaced by the Brussels I Regulation 
44/2001, OJ 2001 L 12. 
1045 In contractual and non-contractual relationships; Rome I Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, OJ 2008 L 177 6 and Rome II Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations, OJ 2007 L 199 40.  Reference can also be made to Brussels II Regulation 2201/2003 
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and matters 
of parental responsibility, OJ 2003 L 338 1 and Rome III on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, 
OJ 2010 L 343 10, and Rome IV Regulation 650/2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession, OJ 
2012 L 201 107. 
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levels; that is, where EU law is silent, the matter is one reserved – at least for the time being – 
to the Member State.  An analysis of the way in which national civil procedural norms reflects 
judicial cultures within and beyond the national context (and thus, the scope for diversities 
existing in the European sphere) facilitates the evaluation of the principle of procedural 
autonomy in the context of the interaction of national and European norms.  The first section 
outlines the potentially divergent foundations of procedural regimes, their culture and 
tradition; furthermore, it aims to uncover and clarify the domestic courts’ engagement with 
the preliminary reference procedure, and in particular, their expectations as to the CJEU’s 
judgement and impact potentially arising therefrom (particularly to the extent that this might 
necessitate a shift in the role of the national court to a regulatory court).  The rationales 
underpinning the obligation imposed on the national courts to assess contract terms ex officio, 
outlined above, are explored further, with reference in particular, to the mixing of the 
consumer protection and internal market rationales, and furthermore, to the pertinent public 
policy considerations arising therefrom.  Thereafter, the focus shifts to the making of the 
preliminary reference (or the lack of reference as is the case in the example from the English 
court), and the expectations of the national judge. 
 
i. The Scope for Conflict in the Diverse National Orders 
 
While a putative distinction might be drawn between the procedural and substantive 
dimensions of the UCTD, it becomes clear that such a bright line distinction is a fallacy1046; 
rather, both dimensions are intertwined.  However, for the purposes of the analysis which 
follows, this distinction is drawn as it highlights that the focus is not on the test of unfairness 
but concerns the procedural dimension of contract term regulation in respect of which there 
has been little explicit attempt by the Union legislature at Europeanisation1047.  
 
The preliminary references analysed herein give rise to three pertinent considerations 
concerning the scope for conflict arising as private law is understood to develop within a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1046 Storme, ‘Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and its Interaction With Substantive Private Law’ in Kramer and 
van Rhee, Civil Litigation in a Globalizing World (n.982), para.7.4.6; compare Storme who asserts that the 
obligations of national courts to apply directives ex officio should be understood as forming part of substantive 
European consumer law. 
1047 This distinction has also been recognised in the CJEU:  Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, 
para.59: her focus in this case is not on the determination of what is meant by unfairness but on the 
“jurisdictional and institutional aspects of the complex cooperative relationship between the Court of Justice and 
the national courts”. 
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pluralist, multi-level space: 1) the scope for conflict within the national cultures and 
traditions, with references made by courts operating at different levels in the hierarchy of the 
national judicial structures, from district to supreme courts; and 2) the scope for conflict 
between the national orders, with references deriving from diverse legal cultures and 
traditions, including Spain and what have been termed the “South and Central Eastern 
European” Member States (in this context, namely, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania), and 3) 
the scope for conflict between regulation at the national and Union levels, in respect of the 
operation of national procedural law and the development of substantive Union law.  The 
scope for conflict, outlined above, brings to the fore particular considerations related to the 
CJEU’s engagement of comparative analysis; in particular, the scope for dialogue between the 
national and EU courts and furthermore, between the national and EU legislatures (and 
additionally, administrative bodies within the national orders) arises.  Furthermore, the 
relevance of legal culture and tradition, and particular, the judicial culture established therein, 
is explored in respect of both the ascent of the reference, the interpretation rendered by the 
CJEU and thereafter, the impact engendered by and reflected in the final decision of the 
national court; as to the latter, the extent to which both the national and CJEU courts are 
aware of the potential for cross-referencing and spillover effects, is a matter of relevance but 
one in respect of which it is difficult to drawn conclusions in the absence of concrete 
empirical analysis.   
 
A consideration of the foundations of the cultures and traditions of national procedural 
regimes should help to explain the operation of the principle of procedural autonomy and 
thus, the interaction of national and European norms, recognising the scope for commonality 
and diversity existing across the European sphere.  The distinctions drawn between the 
systems are firstly uncovered in light of the cases evaluated above; thereafter, these 
distinctions are analysed in the context of the broader Europeanisation of private law.  This 
analysis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive historical analysis but rather aims to 
allow for evolution of the rules of institutional and procedural law to be placed in context.   
 
The CJEU’s shaping of the national courts’ role has been introduced via a tracing of its case 
law.  The way in which this role is examined is reflected in the role of the national judge as an 
institution rooted in national culture and tradition generally, from which distinct judicial 
cultures might arise.  Weatherill has considered that the role of the judge, the understanding 
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of justice, the role of private law (including party autonomy, the significance of performance 
and the protection of certainty in contract) in the facilitation of the internal market and the 
need to ensure effective consumer protection (underpinning which, as noted above, are 
fundamental rights considerations) are all issues that pertain to procedural regimes, at both the 
national and Union levels.  Thus, he describes domestic procedural rules as “typically the 
product of careful shaping over time”1048, suggesting that the relevance and application of 
these norms are necessarily shaped by the experiences underpinning the relevant judicial 
culture (including legal education and the legal profession), and the (procedural as opposed to 
substantive) norms that regulate the manner in which the profession functions, to the extent 
that divergent political, cultural and socio-economic development within the national cultures 
and traditions affects legal reasoning.   
 
It has been asserted that given the “particularismes nationaux” of national institutions, any 
attempt to promote the uniformity of the role attributed thereto is necessarily a task of a 
“utopian” outlook: that is to say, “on connaît de plus les mirages de l’uniformisation du 
droit”1049.  The broad, arguably reductionist, distinction between the “inquisitorial versus 
accusatorial” and “investigative versus adversarial” character of the judge is engaged to 
articulate the way in which the power, then obligation, of the national court has been adopted 
therein.  As is clear from, in particular, Pannon and Pénzügyi Lízing, this distinction, while 
broad, is nevertheless relevant.  The context is also shaped by the scholasticism versus 
pragmatism distinction; that is, the preference for reference to precedent and for reasoning 
from the bottom-up in the common law, as opposed to a reliance on purposive interpretation, 
as in the civil law; this reluctance is reflected in the English judges’ unwillingness to refer to 
broad general principles and highlights, the relevance of the particular political, economic and 
social backgrounds, especially in relation to values, and the significance attributed to the role 
of law in achieving social justice1050.  The notion of judicial “passivity”, concerning the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1048 S. Weatherill ‘Interpretation of the Directives:  The Role of the Court’ in A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), 
Towards a European Civil Code (Kluwer, The Hague; 4th edn., 2011), pp.185-203,, p.195 . 
1049 M-L. Niboyet, ‘La réception du droit communautaire en droit judiciaire interne et international’ in J-S. Bergé 
and M-L. Niboyet (eds.), La réception du droit communautaire en droit privé des États membres (Bruylant, 
Brussels: 2003), pp.153-181, pp.153-4. 
1050 Discussed in more detail below in the section on common and general principles.  For the moment, reference 
can be made to the non-recognition of a broad, overarching principle of good faith in English law.  More 
generally, the acceptance of principles, such as good faith, has been understood to amount to a particular 
conceptual diversity, reflecting differently constituted societies; consequently, it has been asserted that it would 
constitute “an abuse of the comparative legal method” to impose a principle of good faith in the common law; 
J.H.M. van Erp, ‘The Pre-Contractual Stage’ in A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code 
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determination of the “legal and factual elements”1051 (as discussed in more detail below), is of 
inherent relevance in respect of the undertaking of the national courts.  Thus the question 
arises as to whether the determination, or even the promulgation of these elements, is a task 
for the national court or for the parties.  The allocation of this task depends, as noted above, 
on the understanding of the nature of the judge in any given judicial culture, that is, whether 
his character is understood as passive or investigative; should the judge rule only on what is 
put before the court, or is he entitled to engage in his own investigation?  This determination 
will be shaped not only by specific rules of national procedure but also in the context of the 
general structure and culture of the judiciary; for example, in Van Schijndel, the CJEU 
recognised the significance of the principle of passivity in understanding the relationship 
between the state, the judiciary and the individual1052.   
 
An analogy can be drawn with the principle of jura novit curia in PIL, which provides that it 
is for the judge to decide on the relevance of PIL norms in the determination of the applicable 
law as opposed to relying on a plea of foreign law by one of the parties.  A broad distinction 
can be drawn between the common and civil law in this respect.  In the former, law is 
generally treated as fact and must therefore be pled by the parties; English procedural law 
dictates, as a general rule, that the judge is deemed to have no independent knowledge of the 
law1053.  Broad exceptions have been adopted (see for example, the 1950s case in which Lord 
Denning admittedly “devoted the better part of a summer vacation” to legal research)1054.  
Notwithstanding the changes facilitated by the Civil Procedure Rules (April 1999), the judge 
generally continues to entirely on the parties’ submissions.  This understanding is one which 
reflects more broadly the nature of English legal proceedings, and for example, the influence 
of the lay jury in civil hearings which shaped the urgency of the proceedings, particularly in 
respect of oral discourse1055.   
 
The civil traditions – while differing – are generally more open to the principle of jura novit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Kluwer, The Hague; 4th edn., 2011), pp.493-513, p.510 citing, M. Bridge, ‘Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law 
Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?’ (1984) 9 Canadian Business Law Journal 385. 
1051 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, para.32.  
1052 An approach followed in Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak. 
1053 “The way of knowing foreign laws is by admitting them to be proved as facts”; Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774), 1 
Cowper’s King’s Bench Reports (Cowp.) 161, 174 per Lord Mansfield. 
1054 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyberabad [1958] AC 379.  This was an individual approach and the other judges 
did not take this information into account. 
1055 At least until 1998, when the institution was abolished via the Civil Procedure Rules. 
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curia1056.  Thus, in the German system, while the judge is considered to “know the law” 
(including PIL rules)1057 - which is to say that even if a legal rule is not raised by the parties, 
the judges are required to engage with it of their own motion1058 - the court can still request 
written submissions on the scope and substance of a rule from a number of different parties, 
including academics.  In the civil systems, the absence of a jury contributes to the lack of 
immediacy in proceedings, allowing for the collecting of evidence to be understood as a task 
analogous to fact-finding, the process and fruits of which are subject to “piecemeal 
unfolding”1059.  The nature of the career judiciary, whereby judges are selected from the 
judiciary and legal practice, as well as from academia, similarly influences the role, 
responsibility and legitimacy attributed to the judge (including, for example, the power of the 
judge to select expert witnesses and allowing judges to develop expert knowledge via the 
splitting of the courts into particular specialised fields).  In the French system, while judges 
are deemed “know the law”, there is a lack of consensus as to whether the judge can engage 
that which has not been raised by the parties to the proceedings1060.  In Hungary, the judge is 
similarly deemed to know the law but in reality this knowledge is limited to that which is 
inscribed in national law; thus, for international law to be “known” it must have firstly been 
transposed into national law1061.  In contrast, Spanish legislation provides that foreign or 
international law is a matter of fact to be proven1062; notwithstanding, it seems to be the case 
in practice that, by virtue of Art.281(2) of the civil procedural rules, the courts can engage in a 
process to identify the (putatively applicable) foreign law1063.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1056 It is worth noting that the opposite is true in the Canadian systems; in the “common law“ jurisdictions, 
judicial notice is taken of international law while in the Québecois system, per Art.2807, Code civil du Québec, 
international law must be pled; S. Ferrerri, ‘Complexity of Transnational Sources’ in K.B. Brown and D.V. 
Snyder (eds.), Rapports Généraux du XVIIIème Congrès de l’Académie Inernationale de Droit Comparé 
(Springer, Berlin; 2012), pp.29-56; Canadian Rapporteurs – H. Dedek and A. Carbone. 
1057 Art.293, Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), with reference to the law of another state.  BGH 23.06.2003, NJW 
2003, 2685, 2686. 
1058 BGH, 29.11.1958, NJW 1958, p.1968. 
1059 M. Cappelletti, ‘Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure – Reforms and Trends in Western and 
Eastern Europe’ (1971) 69 Mich.L.Rev. 847.  
1060 Art.12(1) and (2), Code de procédure civile: “1) Le juge tranche le litige conformément aux règles de droit 
qui lui sont applicables; 2) Il doit donner ou restituer leur exacte qualification aux faits et actes litigieux sans 
s'arrêter à la dénomination que les parties en auraient proposé”; F. Ferrand et al, Procédure civile, droit interne 
et droit communautaire (Dalloz, Paris; 26th edn, 2006), paras.673 et seq.  Previously, the court was not so 
required (Cass.civ. 12.05.1959, Clunet 1960, 810, note Sialelli) and subsequently, Cass.civ. 11.10.1988 and 
18.10.1988 (arrêts Rebouh and Schule), Clunet 1989, 349, note Alexandre. 
1061 Ferrerri, ‘Complexity of Transnational Sources’ in Brown and Snyder, Rapports Généraux du XVIIIème 
Congrès de l’Académie Inernationale de Droit Comparé (n.1056); Hungarian Rapporteur – G. Suto Burger. 
1062 Art.281(2), Ley 1/2000, 08.01.2000 de Enjuiciamiento Civil: “1) La prueba tendrá como objeto los hechos 
que guarden relación con la tutela judicial que se pretenda obtener en el proceso; 2) También serán objeto de 
prueba la costumbre y el derecho extranjero….”; Art.12(6), Codigo Civil. 
1063 Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Auto de 24.06.2010 JUR 2010, 264354, in which the Supreme Court begins 
with the assertion that foreign law constitutes fact, and thereafter lessens this statement. 
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The nature of the institutions and actors engaged in dispute resolution processes, and the 
relevance of their cultural contexts might also be engaged in sector-specific evaluations of 
procedural rules, bringing to the fore the significance of comparative analysis for such a task.  
For example, Damaska analysed of models of criminal law in the 1970s; drawing a 
comparison between the crime control (repression of criminal conduct) and due process 
(control of the quality of the result) model adopted by Packer in the 1960s), he advanced a 
characterisation of the “ideal types” of dispute resolution processes in light of judicial 
cultures, as inquisitorial  (control held in the non-partisan officials) versus adversarial (control 
held in the parties)1064.  This allowed Damaska to advance the notion that value judgements 
underpin both characterisations, noting that the latter has “tropes of rhetoric extolling the 
virtues of liberation administration of justice” and the former reflects an “antipodal 
authoritarian process”.  Thus, rules of civil procedure, and in particular, the nuances of 
dispute resolution processes, including its substance and character, might be said to be 
particularly steeped in the cultures and traditions of those actors engaged, particularly in a 
multi-level construct.   
 
ii. The Ascent and Descent of the Preliminary Reference: The Expectations of the 
National Courts 
 
In light of the brief analysis, which attempts to place national procedural regimes and their 
potential Europeanisation in context, the focus shifts to the analysis of the ascent and descent 
of the preliminary reference.  The preliminary references underpinning the cases analysed 
above derive from different national orders, and thus, it is submitted, reflect divergent legal 
cultures and traditions in which particular judicial cultures have developed and continue to 
evolve; that is to say, these cultures also shape the attitudes of the national courts to EU law, 
their engagement with the preliminary reference system and their expectations as to the 
interpretations rendered by the CJEU.  From the outline of the jurisprudence, it is clear that 
the development of the ex officio regulation of contract terms has shaped the role of the 
national court and its relationship with the CJEU.  The ex officio regulation of contract terms 
has attributed to the national court, at least initially, a power that might not have existed in 
national procedural law; the CJEU’s development of ex officio regulation might therefore be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1064 M. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and Authority (Yale University Press, New Haven; 1986), p.4. 
 	  	  	   203 
characterised as an empowerment tool, which not only promoted the scope for national courts 
to ensure compliance with Union legislation and CJEU jurisprudence but which also 
broadened the Europeanisation of national law beyond those areas in which the Union has 
explicitly legislated.  The national court was potentially empowered not only within the 
national order, but also in respect of the litigant parties; that is to say, in relation to its 
potential jurisdiction to assess terms and practices beyond the claims advanced before the 
court by the parties.  As the outline of the jurisprudence illustrates, this power has evolved 
into an obligation on the part of the national court.  It is the shift to an obligation which limits 
the discretion of the national court and thus arguably removes the empowerment dimension, 
and which further potentially reflects the erosion of national civil procedure; national courts 
come to be understood to have a role, not only in providing access to justice but as a 
institution shaped by the CJEU as a market-regulating, private law instrument with the 
responsibility to regulate contract terms.   
 
The analysis of the UCTD brings to the fore the shifts in recent years in the relationships 
between the national and European courts in light of the need for the effective enforcement of 
European consumer law within a multi-level construct; as Micklitz and Reich note, the 
effective application of the UCTD was initially “nearly impossible”1065.  As a result of the 
Union’s political institutions stopping short of remedying the UCTD’s inadequacies, the 
CJEU seems to have engaged a more activist role via the preliminary reference procedure, 
shaping the scope of the legislative instrument – particularly, as an instrument of consumer 
policy – in addition to rendering interpretations of its provisions.  The national courts’ 
expectations in making the preliminary reference evidently transcend their engagement of ex 
officio regulation but also concern the scope and application of the substantive unfairness 
assessment; that is to say, in almost every reference, the domestic court seems eager to obtain 
more guidance from the CJEU against the background of the uncertainty deriving from the 
initial UCTD rulings, up to and including Freiburger, with national courts seeking guidance 
on contract term regulation in light of emerging conflicts, not only of a legal but also political 
and social nature1066.   
 
Notwithstanding, is not clear that even if the Luxembourg Court were to provide, obiter 
dictum, such substantive assessment criteria on how to assess unfairness that the national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1065 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), pp.773-774. 
1066 As is the case, for example, with Aziz (n.1036). 
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court would actually use it1067.  Nor is it clear that the national court anticipates “intrusions” 
into national (substantive or procedural) law; it is submitted that it must anticipate such 
effects, particularly in the line of UCTD cases, in which similar questions (of lesser and 
greater detail) have been and continue to be referred by courts across the Member States.  
With these considerations in mind, the rationales underpinning the reference are often 
ambiguous.  The impact of the reference in the national order, and furthermore, its 
anticipation of its potential empowerment, via the CJEU’s interpretation might also shape the 
court’s attitude to Union law.  That is to say, there are cases in which, in the alternative to 
referring to the CJEU, the national court could have - providing national procedural law 
allows1068 - afforded leave to appeal to a higher domestic court.  Rather, by referring to 
Luxembourg, the national court applies pressure in respect of the status quo, and thus 
generates scope for change in the national order.  The national court might - the relevance of 
which has also been discussed in respect of the state liability case example – understand that 
the preliminary reference procedure allows it to engage indirectly with the national 
legislature, and thus, facilitate change while eluding the jurisdiction of the supreme court; in 
this respect, the national court anticipates its empowerment.  The preliminary reference 
procedure also potentially allocates to the national court scope to shape the hearing of the 
case; that is to say, it might engage in a strategic approach, for example, by delaying cases 
through referral or alternatively, deciding not to refer to avoid being accused of engaging 
delaying tactics.  Furthermore, the national court’s determination of whether to refer allows it 
to shape the interaction of the national and Union orders and the potential impact arising 
therefrom.  Herein, it seems worthwhile to consider two cases – both arising in the English 
system – in which no reference has been made.   
  
None of the cases examined above were referred from the English courts; notwithstanding, 
two of the key national cases concerning the scope of the UCTD’s putative application and 
the application of Art.4(2)1069 (discussed in greater detail below) have arisen in the English 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1067 One might make reference to the Aziz case, in which the AG and Court provided more in depth guidance 
than previously, without going anywhere near so far as to establish the existence of an imbalance for Art.3 
UCTD purposes; Aziz (n.1036). 
1068 Cf. Spain, where the lower courts are basically bound by national procedural law to make a reference; I am 
grateful to Judge Ignacio Sancho Gargallo for this reference.   
1069 Regulation 6(2)(b) as implemented in the national system: the directive was implemented in the legal 
systems of England and Wales, and Scotland, by Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 SI 
1994/3159 and subsequently through the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 SI 1999/2083.   
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system, namely, Director General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc1070 and The 
OFT v. Abbey National1071.  These cases reflect not only the scope for conflict between 
English procedural law and EU norms but also the scope for conflict at the highest levels of 
the English judiciary (the House of Lords as it then was, and the Supreme Court as it is now 
established) concerning, in particular, the delineation of contract term regulation.  It is 
submitted that the foundations of the conflict arising between the House of Lords and the 
Supreme Court are more significant than the characterisation of the particular terms, and can 
be identified firstly, in the courts’ approaches to the directive’s purpose1072.  The House of 
Lords emphasised the consumer protection dimension of contract term regulation, 
highlighting the need to protect the consumer from unreasonable terms1073.  To this extent, it 
seemed to support (and find support in) the CJEU jurisprudence1074.  The UKSC rather 
engaged the information paradigm, highlighting the importance of transparency underpinning 
the potential for consumer choice.  Whether these approaches provide for the same level of 
protection is unclear; the notion of transparency as set out in the directive and as engaged by 
the UKSC is narrow, as transparency is otherwise deemed to “clearly go beyond plain and 
intelligible terms”1075.  The roots of conflict are further identifiable in the courts’ construction 
of the Art.4(2) exclusion (although in both, there existed general consensus as to a narrow 
understanding).  While the House of Lords distinguished core and incidental terms1076, the 
UKSC adopted a broader understanding per Lord Walker who, while recognising its potential 
relevance, rejected the distinction1077.  The UKSC attempted to reconcile the diverse 
approaches with reference to the notion of “price”, considering that in First National, the 
relevant “default” terms nevertheless fell outwith the scope of the Art.4(2) exclusion; the 
UKSC characterised the terms before it – charges for unarranged overdrafts – as part of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1070 Director General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52; [2002] 1 AC 481; see also, 
H-W. Micklitz, The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU: Sunday Trading Equal Treatment and Good 
Faith (CUP, Cambridge; 2005), pp.401-423. 
1071 The OFT v. Abbey National [2009] UKSC 6; [2010] 1 All E.R 667.  
1072 Including also the approach adopted in the determination of the nature of the terms; S. Whittaker, ‘Unfair 
Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’ (2011) 74 MLR 106, pp.116-117. 
1073 Director General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, para.34 per Lord Steyn and 
para.12 per Lord Bingham. 
1074 Consider in particular, Mostazo Claro in which the Court highlights the purpose of the directive ”to 
strengthen consumer protection”; C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I 10421, Judgement, para.37.  
1075 M. Chen-Wishart, ‘Transparency and Fairness in Bank Charges’ (2010) 126 LQR 157, p.160. 
1076 Director General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, para.12 per Lord Bingham 
making a distinction between the “core terms” of the substance of the contract (which would fall within the 
exclusion) and “incidental (if important) terms which surround them” (which would not). 
1077 The OFT v. Abbey National [2009] UKSC 6, paras.41-46 per Lord Walker, and in the Court of Appeal, 
which restricted the exclusion to “core terms” (although obviously, little understanding of what “core terms” 
should mean); The OFT v. Abbey National [2009]  EWCA Civ 116. 
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price, falling within the exclusion’s scope1078.   
 
The UKSC approach therefore diverges from Caja de Ahorros1079 (which had not then been 
decided), not only per the engagement of the exclusion but also as to the way in which the 
case builds on previous CJEU jurisprudence, in respect of the purpose of the directive 
(whereby the consumer deemed to be the weaker party). As this latter dimension is deemed to 
concern the “public interest underlying the protection which the Directive confers on 
consumers”1080, it is inherently linked to public policy; consequently, its conceptualisation 
will potentially diverge across the national courts.  Indeed, the UKSC’s understanding of 
“price” reflects much more than a mere textual conceptualisation of the term; rather, it reflects 
the consumer, not as the weaker party as in the CJEU case law but as a “rational” actor, and 
thus, its understanding of the relationship between party autonomy and consumer protection 
in English contract law1081.  The UKSC decision has been described as “very formal”1082, 
“very English” and “insufficiently” European1083; indeed, it seems that the UKSC rather 
followed the national legislature on this issue1084, reflecting the policy choices broadly 
established therein1085.  It was recognised that the bank charges cases engaged considerable 
social and economic dimensions, concerning the financial and banking industry in the UK, 
and particularly, the authority of regulatory bodies – namely, the Director General of Fair 
Trading1086 and the OFT1087 – to regulate contract terms as to their unfairness.  That is to say, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1078 The OFT v. Abbey National [2009] UKSC 6, para.43 per Lord Walker. 
1079 Caja de Ahorros (n.268). 
1080 C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I 10421, Judgement, para.38. 
1081 This is also true with regard to the understanding of good faith in the first case. 
1082P.P. Davies, “Bank Charges in the Supreme Court” (2010) 69 CLJ 21, p 22. 
1083 P. Morgan, ‘Bank Charges and the UTCCR 1999: The End of the Road for Consumers?’ [2010] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 208, p 212. 
1084 Consider the opinion expressed by Lady Hale, in noting that the determination of the nature of consumer law 
– whether protecting the consumer from his own potentially “bad choices”, or establishing consumer choice, is 
“fortunately…for Parliament and not for this Court”. 
1085 It is worth noting that the approach adopted in the German system diverges significantly from that of the 
UKSC, as regards the Art.4(2) exception.  The Art.4(2) exception was added on the instigation of German 
professors (H. Brandner and P. Ulmer, ‘The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: 
Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission’ (1991) 28 CMLR 647).  This 
exclusion predates the UCTD, having been included in AGBG 1976.  German law provides for a breadth of 
“default” rules such that all standard terms that are not default terms are subject to assessment; as there is no 
default rule on price/subject matter, a term cannot deviate from it and thus cannot be subject to the assessment 
(although ancillary terms will be accessible)1085.  The approaches of the German and English courts are 
interesting to the extent that they highlight the scope for the analysis of the divergences in the cultures and 
traditions of procedural regimes.   See: BGH 21.10.1997, BGHZ 137, 43, NJW 1998, 309; BGH 30.11.1993, 
BGHZ 124, 254, NJW 1994, 318 (charges to withdraw cash from a teller than from an ATM); BGH 13.02.2001, 
BGHZ 146, 377, NJW 2001, 1419 (charge for being overdrawn); BGH 08.03.2005, NJW 2005, 1645, 1647 
(charge for going back to debit following withdrawn status). 
1086 In respect of the UTCCR 1994.   
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for the UKSC, the UK legislature could have adopted a higher level of consumer protection in 
transposing the directive, as in Spain.  Indeed, Lord Walker invited the Westminster 
Parliament to legislate on the issue, recognising the policy considerations underlying the 
issue1088.  
 
The cases not only reflected the scope for conflict between the highest English courts1089 but 
also highlighted the lack of clarity in the lower courts as to the scope of contract term 
regulation1090.  The cases further emphasised the divergent approaches of the English courts 
and the CJEU, both as to the nature and purpose of the directive, and as to the scope of 
contract term regulation; despite the scope for such (vertical) conflicts, the UKSC nonetheless 
refused to refer to the Luxembourg Court, and thus, to engage explicitly in dialogue.  Rather 
the acknowledgement of the influence of Union law on national procedural norms was 
indirect in both cases, with reference to the travaux préparatoires and other language versions 
of the directive.  The rationale underlying the reluctance to refer to the CJEU is unclear; it 
might be characterised as reflecting “resistance” on the part of both the House of Lords and 
the UKSC, reflecting the preferences enshrined in the broader judicial culture (for example, 
with regard to the use of good faith for determining unfairness).  There was a lack of 
consensus between the justices of the UKSC, as to: 1) the significance of the construction of 
Art.4(2) in the determination of the case; 2) the acte clair nature of Art.4(2); and ultimately 3) 
the need to refer to the CJEU, each of which remain, particularly in respect of the acte clair 
nature of the Art.4(2), an ambiguity which endures still1091, matters of contention across the 
European sphere. 
 
II. The Putative Foundations of an Emerging Europeanised Regime of Civil Procedure 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1087 In particular, the authority of the OFT rested on whether the bank charges could be considered penalties.  
1088 The OFT v. Abbey National [2009] UKSC 6, para.52 per Lord Walker. 
1089 Notwithstanding that in the second case, the clauses were excluded from the unfairness test, and in the 
second case the terms were found not to be unfair.  
1090 Scottish and English Law Commissions, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach?’ (Law 
Commission, London; 25.07.2012); the lack of clarity in the bank charges cases arises in respect of the 
application and scope of the directive itself.  A lack of clarity also arises in respect of the application of the 
notion of good faith in the national system; see M. Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract 
(OUP, Oxford; 16th edn., 2012), pp.233 et seq. 
1091 Thus, the case highlights the way in which the UKSC engages with the acte clair rule. The OFT v. Abbey 
National [2009] UKSC 6, para.91 per Lord Phillips; “I do not find the resolution of the narrow issues before the 
court to be acte clair.  I agree, however, that it would not be appropriate to refer the issue to the European 
Court”. 
 	  	  	   208 
i. The Contemporaneous Expansion and Delineation of Contract Term Regulation: 
The Judicial “Necessary Legal and Factual” Requirement and the Legislative 
Art.4(2) UCTD Exception 
 
Following Océano, the domestic courts’ power to regulate ex officio contract terms could 
have been understood as an empowering mechanism, developed by the CJEU via its 
interpretative role.  However, the subsequent imposition of an obligation necessarily limits 
the discretion initially attributed to the domestic courts via this power; consequently, the 
scope for conflict between national procedural law and Union law hurries to the fore, where it 
might previously have arisen only where the national court identified and engaged it.  This 
understanding, which shapes the relationship between the national and European courts and 
the scope for the Europeanisation of procedural law to which this interaction might putatively 
give rise, engenders a preliminary consideration, namely whether an attempt to limit the scope 
of contract term regulation can be identified on the part of the CJEU.  This section therefore 
explores the extent to which the judicially-developed requirement that the national courts 
have the “necessary legal and factual”1092 information to assess contract terms constitutes a 
condition of the role of the national courts and thus necessarily limits the scope of contract 
term regulation; thereafter, the operation and effect of the legislative limitation in Art.4(2) 
UCTD is uncovered.  
 
The case of Pannon1093 arose from the Hungarian Budaörsi Városi Bíróság (the municipal 
court of Budaörsi) and concerned a subscription for mobile phone services, the contract for 
which included a jurisdiction clause indicating the place of business of the service provider, 
Pannon but was not individually negotiated.  Pannon brought a payment action in the district 
court situated in its own place of business, almost 300km from the consumer’s residence; the 
court considered that, per Hungarian procedural rules, in the absence of a jurisdiction clause, 
jurisdiction lies in the courts of the consumer’s place of residence.  While acknowledging that 
the jurisdiction clause should be examined as to its fairness, the court considered that it was 
precluded from doing so as the consumer, having advanced a substantive defence, had 
submitted to its jurisdiction.  Thus, recognising the need to examine the jurisdictional issue 
within the regulatory context established by the UCTD, it referred a number of questions to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1092 C-397/11 Jörös nyr, Judgement, para.27 citing Banco Español (n.1016), Judgement, paras.42-44 and Banif 
Plus Bank (n.1042), Judgement, paras.22-24. 
1093 Pannon (n.1020). 
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the CJEU, concerning: 1) the obligation to assess the nature of the term; 2) the relevant 
criteria for undertaking such an assessment; and 3) the consequences flowing from Art.6(1), 
namely, whether a term found to be unfair is non-binding as a matter of law, or only at the 
consumer’s request1094.   
 
The Court in Pannon acknowledged the domestic courts’ obligation to assess unfairness ex 
officio1095 and continued to engage, as the rationale underpinning the obligation, the weaker 
position of the consumer and the need to provoke the restoration of equality between the 
parties1096 deriving, via Mostaza Claro, from Art.6(1) 1097.  One key dimension of the case 
concerns the understanding that the obligation to assess arises1098 only where the national 
court has available to it the “necessary legal and factual” information to assess the fairness of 
contract terms1099.  This requirement gives rise to the considerations of culture and tradition 
outlined above, and in particular, questions concerning the role of the national judge, and 
particularly whether he is limited in his analysis to the facts submitted by the parties.  While 
the Court did not seem to establish a “fact-finding” obligation on the part of the national 
court1100, the notion of “necessary for that task” suggests that the national court need not 
necessarily be limited to the fruits of the parties’ labour, i.e. that advanced before the court.  
Notwithstanding, neither EU law nor the CJEU provides explicit guidance as to how the 
national judge should determine that he has such facts available to him, nor is any explicit 
guidance provided as to the need for an additional investigation by the national judge.  Rather, 
these determinations must be for national law in which the consequences of these 
considerations - in particular, the latter - will chime differently in diverse legal cultures and 
traditions across the European space.  The scope for the judge to be “active” as opposed to 
“passive” in identifying and undertaking his task is inherently related to the understanding of 
the role of the individual judge, in respect of the structure of the judiciary within the national 
orders, cultures and traditions of procedural law.  Yet the CJEU confirmed that even if the 
national court would not otherwise, by virtue of national law, engage in an assessment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1094 In fact, the national court, referred the questions in the alternative order. 
1095 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, para.30, citing Cofidis (n.1025). 
1096 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, paras.25 and 31. 
1097 C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I-10421, Judgement, para.37. 
1098 G. Straetmans and C. Cauffman, ‘Legislatures, Courts and the Unfair Terms Directive’ in P. Syrpis (ed.), 
The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (CUP, Cambridge; 2012), pp.92-204, p.109. 
1099 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, para.32. 
1100 It is not necessarily clear that this amounts to “fact-finding”; it might be enough that the CJEU goes beyond 
the submissions of the parties, in so far as looking to the case file - A. Ancery and M. Wissink, ‘Case Note - C-
243/08, Pannon’ (2010) 18 ERPL 307, p.314.  
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contract terms unless the consumer invokes unfairness, it should nevertheless do so where the 
UCTD applies, considering that “to this extent national courts are required to go beyond the 
ambit of the dispute”1101.   
 
Notwithstanding, in the absence of the explicit recognition of the scope for the national courts 
to engage in “fact-finding”, the Court in Pannon implicitly or rather, by default (that is, 
without undertaking an analysis of the relevant national procedural norms and the 
historically-shaped and culturally-determined understanding underpinning these norms), 
engaged the notion of passivity as it arises in certain legal cultures and traditions.  “Passivity” 
finds its foundations in party autonomy and pacta sunt servanda, both of which also underpin 
the choice available to the consumer; that is to say, once a contract term has been found to be 
unfair, the national court is not obliged to acknowledge and enforce the non-binding nature of 
the term if the consumer does not wish the (nevertheless, unfair) term to be excluded.  In this 
case, the term continues to be “applicable”1102.  This determination dictates that the role of the 
national court is to provide the consumer with information upon which he can choose to act or 
alternatively, choose not to act.  The passivity of the courts on the one hand, and the 
autonomy of the consumer on the other, have been recognised as issues of public policy by 
the CJEU1103, the determination of which, it is submitted, can only be made by comparative 
analysis.  Furthermore, this comparative analysis must be of the complex nature outlined 
above, to the extent that this passivity is shaped not only by legal rules but also by the 
significance of context, that is, judicial tradition and culture and the identity arising 
therefrom. 
 
Pénzügyi Lízing 1104  is another Hungarian case, decided subsequent to Pannon, which 
concerned a contract for a loan for the purchase of a vehicle.  On the consumer’s failure to 
complete payment, an action was brought for termination and payment of outstanding 
amounts, not in the court of general jurisdiction (that of the defendant’s place of residence) 
but in the courts of the place close to that of the registered office of the service provider per 
the contract’s jurisdiction clause.  The court of first instance made an order for payment; the 
consumer appealed.  Staying the appeal, the Budapesti II. És III. kerületi bíróság – the district 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1101 Ancery and Wissink, ‘Case Note - C-243/08, Pannon’ (n.1100), p.313. 
1102 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, para.33. 
1103 C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I-10421. 
1104 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033). 
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court - referred a number of questions to the CJEU, amended and subsequently withdrew its 
referral in light of Pannon.  Following the Pannon judgement, the court considered it relevant 
to clarify: 1) the compatibility with EU law of national procedural rules, which require that 
the Ministry of Justice is notified of preliminary references1105; 2) the meaning of “unfair” per 
Art.3; and 3) “what aspects the national court may or must take into account should the 
general criteria” in making its assessment and whether it “is obliged to undertake, of its own 
motion, an examination with a view to establishing the factual and legal elements necessary to 
that examination where the national procedural rules permit such an examination only if the 
parties so request”1106.   
 
The Hungarian court’s referral concerns the interpretative jurisdiction of the CJEU, and its 
interaction with the domestic courts as it arises per Art.267 TFEU.  The notion of unfair term, 
which has been deemed to “require[s] further legislative definition”1107, is one to which only 
the CJEU can attribute an autonomous interpretation.  Per Caja de Ahorros1108, it must be 
recalled that this jurisdiction does not extend to the determination of the compatibility of a 
contractual term with the directive; rather, this determination is for the national courts in line 
with the “division of jurisdiction”1109.  The AG in Pénzügyi Lízing recognised the private law 
dimensions underpinning the task of the national court, which raises the scope for “different 
legal consequences in different legal systems”1110.  Acknowledging the absence of a uniform 
civil code, while highlighting the significance of academic studies (including the DCFR), the 
AG considered the possibility that the CJEU might rather construct, on a case-by-case basis, a 
“common European legal denominator” for assessment; the assumption of this task must be 
considered in light of the fact that legal certainty might be undermined, as the CJEU is 
“forced into the role of a substitute civil legislature”1111. 
 
The focus of this analysis falls on the final question referred by the Hungarian court, which 
arose following Pannon1112 and concerned not only the examination of the contractual terms 
ex officio, but the process of assessment, that is, its order, in the national court.  It is clear that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105 In particular, Article 155/A(2) of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, which requires national courts also 
make a reference to its Ministry of Justice in making a CJEU reference. 
1106 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.45. 
1107 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.87-89. 
1108 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak,  para.69. 
1109 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.91-92. 
1110 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.97. 
1111 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.54. 
1112 In particular, Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, paras.34-35. 
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procedural autonomy is not infallible; “ad hoc intrusions” by the CJEU are seemingly deemed 
to be permissible in line with the test of equivalence and effectiveness.  This determination is 
essentially one concerning the balancing of party autonomy, on the one hand, and ex officio 
regulation on the other.  Hungarian law provided that the court could only investigate 
unfairness if one of the parties so requested; that is to say, it could not be obliged to undertake 
an investigation to identify the relevant “legal and factual elements necessary”1113.  The CJEU 
ruling is one in which there was both consensus and dissensus between the AG’s Opinion and 
the Court’s judgement, both affirming the notion of “division of labour” between the courts.  
Both AG Trstenjak and the Court characterised the case as concerning the “clarification of 
certain jurisdictional and institutional aspects of the complex cooperative relationship 
between the Court of Justice and the national courts” 1114 reflecting, it seems, as noted above, 
the want of the national courts, post-Freiburger, of guidance on the scope of contract term 
regulation in light of emerging conflicts, not only of a legal but also a political and social 
nature; however, the AG diverged from the Court, which considered there to be a general 
obligation on the national court to review terms ex officio1115.   
 
The AG’s response – the rejection of a general obligation to assess1116 - seems to have been 
influenced by two interrelated considerations: party autonomy, and practical policy 
considerations relating to judicial caseload.  Deferring to national procedural law1117, AG 
Trstenjak considered that the obligation of the domestic court arose only where there existed 
evidence of unfairness1118, that is, where the parties had raised it in their arguments1119.  It 
seems that divergent public policy considerations underpin the Opinion and judgement and 
thus are deemed to shape the role of the national judge, and the extent to which he is required 
to firstly, engage in contract term regulation, and secondly, adopt an active approach in so 
doing.  Substantive public policy dimensions therefore shape contract term regulation, in 
respect of “the extent to which public policy should qualify the private nature of substantive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1113 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.110-111. 
1114 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.59, and 73; Judgement, paras.31-32. 
1115 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033),  
1116 The AG further rejected the notion that a general obligation of this nature is necessary to satisfy either the 
principles of equivalence or effectiveness, or to establish effective judicial protection. 
1117 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.113-115. 
1118 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.109. 
1119 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.107-109.  She also engages with a comparison of 
different language versions at fn.75. 
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individual rights”1120.  Rejecting the existence of a general obligation to assess contract terms, 
the AG highlighted the significance of party autonomy, her understanding of which was 
informed by the civilian tradition in general1121, and German law, in particular.  The basis of 
the AG’s reasoning in national law is not explicit but finds expression in her references and 
the scholarship engaged, the majority of which was German.  Notwithstanding, similarly, in 
the English tradition, the dispute is deemed to exist only as the parties identify it, that is to 
say, the judge is not obliged to consider the relationship of the parties beyond what they 
advance before the court.  As such, the judge is not obliged to assess the relationship of the 
parties, and the legal consequences arising therefrom, beyond this identifiable dispute.  That 
is to say, only in very limited circumstances – for example, in relation to issues of illegality – 
will the English court engage any entitlement to raise issues of law of its own motion1122.   
 
Contrary to the AG, the Court concluded that the national court should determine whether the 
term falls within the directive - that is, “in all cases and whatever the rules of its domestic 
law…whether or not the contested term was individually negotiated…”1123 - and in so far as it 
does, it must assess the term1124.  While the Court’s ruling seems to suggest that the national 
court has a role in investigating the “legal and factual elements necessary”, its task 
nevertheless remains unclear as, in order to allow the national court to decide the case before 
it, the Court did not respond to the broader question referred as to the obligation of the 
national court to “investigate”.  The Court engaged a public interest rationale in protecting the 
consumer as the weaker party.  While the Court did not explicitly elaborate on what public 
interest encompasses, it seems to have been conceived as multi-faceted, providing a basis 
upon which the Court looked to the national court, “justifying an exception to the general 
principle of party initiative in civil litigation”1125.  It was on this basis that the Court 
recognised, following its own precedent, a general obligation of the national courts to assess 
ex officio contract terms, that is, to “re-establish equality” between the parties1126.  The 
approach of the AG also seems to be the one adopted by AG Wahl in a more recent case, in 
which he considers that consumers should “make the first move”; this must be appropriate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1120 S. Whittaker, ‘Who Determines What Civil Courts Decide? Private Rights, Public Policy and EU Law’ 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 2012/46, p.48. 
1121 The notion that it is for the parties to the dispute to “take the initiative” can be found both in French and 
German law. 
1122 This is reflected in the submissions of the UK government. 
1123 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.51. 
1124 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, paras.56-57. 
1125  Whittaker, ‘Who Determines What Civil Courts Decide?’ (n.1120). 
1126 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.46-47. 
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against the background of the case1127, such that while the consumer cannot be protected 
against his will, the national court must ensure the consumer – generally understood as 
“passive” – has the opportunity to advance his position1128.  In this sense, the notion of 
effectiveness – reflecting the constitutionalisation of private law via its engagement in these 
UCTD cases1129 - is deemed not necessarily to limit party autonomy but rather to facilitate its 
scope1130. 
 
The second consideration as to the balancing of party autonomy and the ex officio regulation 
of contract terms concerns the Art.4(2) exception, the reach of which has been briefly 
introduced above.  Caja de Ahorros 1131  concerned variable-rate, loan agreements for 
residential property, concluded between Caja de Ahorros and its clients, which contained 
clauses (not individually negotiated) providing for the bank’s setting of nominal interest rates, 
and in particular, the “rounding up” of rates to the nearest quarter percentage.  The Asociación 
de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios brought the case before the Spanish courts, its standing 
deriving from the Spanish constitution, which provides that public authorities shall guarantee 
the protection of consumers1132.  Having been subject to the appeals process, the case 
eventually came before the Tribunal Supremo1133.  Art.4(2) UCTD provides that the contract 
term regulation should not extend to the assessment of core terms to the extent that such terms 
are expressed in plain, intelligible language.  This provision was not transposed in Spanish 
law1134, which rather provides for the assessment of  “all those terms not individually 
negotiated”1135, which are void if found to be unfair1136; that is to say, no distinction is made 
in respect of the character of contract terms.  Notwithstanding, the Tribunal Supremo 
characterised the interest rate term as a core one in terms of Art.4(2), and subsequently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1127 The notion of “make the first move” is used by Micklitz and Reich, Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and 
Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.784, while AG Wahl has provided that - in a Slovakian reference concerning the 
fairness of a clause allowing for the extra-judicial enforcement of a loan, which would allow for the public 
auction of the security thereto (the home of the consumer), where Slovakian law does not require prior judicial 
review - a period of four months should allow the consumer to challenge the action and bring a judicial action to 
prevent the public auction; C-482/12 Macinsky, nyr, Opinion of AG Wahl, paras.62-65.  At the end of December 
2013, the Slovakian court withdrew its request for a preliminary ruling.   
1128 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, para.35. 
1129 Finding explicit expression in Art.47(1) CFR and Art.19(1) TEU. 
1130 S. Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2nd edn., 2013), pp.310 and 314. 
1131 Caja de Ahorros (n.268). 
1132 Art.51: “ Los poderes públicos garantizarán la defensa de los consumidores y usuarios…”; Constitución 
Española, 1978. 
1133 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Civil, Sección 1ª, Auto de 20.10.2008, Ref. JUR 2008\387488. 
1134 Ley 26/1984, 19.07.1985, general para la defensa de consumidores y usuarios, implemented by Ley 7/1998, 
13.04.1998, sobre los Condiciones Generales de la Contratación, transposing the directive.  
1135 Art.10a, Ley 26/1984, 19.07.1985. 
1136 Art. 8(2), Ley 7/1998, 13.04.1998. 
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referred to the CJEU the question of whether national courts are precluded, by virtue of 
Arts.4(2) and 8 UCTD (the minimum harmonisation provision) from examining the nature of 
core contractual terms where these terms are in plain, intelligible language1137.  
 
There existed general consensus between the Opinion of the AG and judgement of the Court, 
at least as to the final determinations.  Per Art.8, the UCTD is of minimum reach, which 
allows for a more protective regime to be established within the national orders.  In light of 
this minimum nature, the AG similarly referred to the existence of a “margin of discretion” on 
the part of the national court, particularly with regard to the satisfaction of its obligations per 
Arts.6 and 7 (that is, the consequences of a finding of unfairness1138).  As suggested in Part I, 
the minimum reach of Union legislation shapes the intertwinement of national and EU law in 
the construction of a regime of contract term regulation. While the Court understood the 
consumer to be in a weak position as regards the seller, both in terms of his bargaining power 
and knowledge1139, the AG adopted a less consumer-orientated approach1140, characterising 
consumers as “typically weaker”1141. 
 
AG Trstenjak, having evaluated the travaux préparatoires of the directive, recognised that the 
initial drafts did not contain a provision similar to Art.4(2); she therefore characterised it as a 
“value-based decision of the Community legislature”1142.  In fact, the provision was adopted 
on the recommendation of two German academics1143.  AG Trstenjak highlighted the public 
policy dimension underpinning her analysis, and focused on the compatibility – that is, 
consistency and coherence – of a comprehensive assessment of contract terms, promoting 
consumer protection, with “the principles of the open-market economy and free 
competition”1144.  Art.4(2), excluding the need for assessment, was understood to restrict the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1137 The third question referred by the Spanish court was not necessary for the determination of the issue. 
1138 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.53-54. 
1139 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Judgement, para.27. 
1140 For the first time, the AG explicitly highlights the significance of party autonomy in private law on the one 
hand, and consumer protection on the other; the approach thus differs from previous Opinions in respect of the 
significance attached to the economic rationale underlying the UCTD, that is to say, that the limitation on 
freedom of contract must correct “an imbalance in economic power”: Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG 
Trstenjak, paras.38-39. 
1141 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.38. 
1142 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.62. 
1143 Brandner and Ulmer, ‘The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Some Critical 
Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission’ (n.1085).  Nebbia has recognised that the Council 
derived the basis of Art.4(2) from the German law, namely what was then Art.8, AGBG and is now established 
in Art.307(3), BGB; P. Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (Hart, Oxford; 2007), pp.124-125. 
1144 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.42. 
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directive’s “put[ting] an end altogether to the parties’ freedom”1145.  The AG considered that 
it was the “unanimous view of legal theorists” that Art.4(2) provides for a “functioning 
market based on competition in respect of price and efficiency” based on the “principles of a 
liberal economic order”.  The concern arising from the characterisation of such a statement as 
“unanimous”1146 lies in the divergences in the rationales underpinning and the application of 
freedom of contract between national, European and potentially transnational, cultures and 
traditions.  Trstenjak indeed recognised that the understanding of freedom of contract 
diverges and therefore made indirect reference to the significance of comparative analysis 
without actually undertaking a comprehensive analysis, engaging predominantly German but 
also French and Spanish scholarship on the legal theory of freedom of contract1147.  She 
further acknowledged that freedom of contract is recognised as a principle of EU law; it 
seems that the unanimity derives from the existence of the principle across the national 
systems, notwithstanding that its application might diverge therein.  Following the AG, the 
Court rejected Caja de Ahorros’ argument that Art.4(2) should be understood to be excluded 
from the scope of Art.8.  Furthermore, it considered that Art.4(2) could not constitute the 
ratione materiae of the directive1148 and therefore rejected the argument that it defines its 
scope; rather the Court considered Art.4(2) should be concerned with “establishing the 
detailed rules and the scope of the substantive assessment”1149.  Thus, for the Court, the 
national court could not be precluded from adopting rules that aim to establish a higher degree 
of consumer protection; the national court must enjoy the power to engage in an assessment 
of the unfairness of even “core” terms.   
 
Neither the directive itself nor the CJEU explicates what is meant by “core terms”; Art.4(2) 
merely refers to terms concerning the “main subject matter of the contract…and adequacy of 
the price and remuneration”1150.  Even in Germany – the scholarly tradition from which, as 
Trstenjak notes, the exclusion derived – the distinction between non-core and core terms is 
unclear1151.  Thus, for the purposes of determining whether the stricter provisions of national 
law fell within the scope of the directive, AG Trstenjak asserted that the interpretation should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1145 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.40. 
1146 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.62-63, and fn.28. 
1147 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.9 and 12. 
1148 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Judgement, paras.28-29. 
1149 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Judgement, para.34. 
1150 This provision is also made in the pCESL, Art.80(2). 
1151 See the cases arising in respect of Art.307(3) BGB, implementing the Art.4(2) exception (originally, s.8 
AGBG); German law makes a distinction between price/subject matter (not subject to assessment because there 
exists no default rule) and ancillary terms (default rules exist, thus subject to assessment). 
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be made “using all the methods…available to the Court”, and in particular a historical and 
purposive approach1152.  Indeed, she recognised that price and remuneration might be 
understood in diverse ways, potentially both shaping and resulting from the different 
understandings as to the scope of the directive, the understanding of the concept of contract, 
and the conceptualisation of performance.  As the determination of the term’s “core” nature is 
for the national court, it is inevitable that the way in which the exclusion is applied will differ 
between cultures and traditions across the European space1153.  The lack of guidance as to the 
core/non-core distinction reflects, though unclearly, the attempt at a division of tasks between 
the national and EU courts.  The CJEU does nothing more than “give abstract criteria”1154; to 
go further, it would have to engage in an assessment of all types of contract terms, which it is 
clearly unwilling to do.  
 
As the litigation in Caja de Ahorros was abandoned following the CJEU’s judgement, the 
Spanish court did not render a final judgement1155; notwithstanding, subsequent cases seem to 
refer to it to support the determination that similar terms are ancillary in their nature1156.  The 
judgement might also be understood to reflect the scope for the Member States to legislate - 
in line with primary Union law - for a higher degree of protection in contract regulation1157, 
an understanding apparently confirmed by the CJEU in respect of the Consumer Credit 
Directive1158.  Writing extra-judicially, AG Trstenjak considers that the Caja de Ahorros 
judgement reflects “the general principle that Member States may derogate from minimum 
harmonization directives in the field of consumer protection by introducing or retaining 
remedies which go beyond what is required by those directives”1159.  On the one hand, it is 
not necessarily clear that the judgement can be understood to reflect the recognition of a 
principle of Union law as opposed to simply, an interpretative statement of rules. The notions 
of commonality and generality, underpinning the recognition of principles of law, are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1152 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.60. 
1153 For example, the “supreme” English courts have attempted to provide some guidance within the English 
system, with a key divergence identified in two cases (discussed in more detail below). 
1154 J. Stuyck, ‘Case Note – C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros’ (2010) 5 ERCL 459, p.465. 
1155 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Civil, Sección1ª, Auto de 06.07.2010.  Ref. JUR 2010\264207 
1156 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Civil, Auto de 01.07.2010 (insurance); Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Civil, 
Autos de 29.10.2010 and 04.11.2011 (both on ‘round-up clauses’). 
1157 C-205/07 Gysbrechts [2008] ECR I-9947, Judgement, paras.34 et seq. 
1158 C-509/07 Scarpelli [2009] ECR I-3311 in relation to Directive 87/102/EEC, 22.12.1986 (now, Directive 
2008/48/EC); the consequences in respect of a full harmonisation directive are identifiable in the CJEU’s 
interpretations of provisions of the Directive on Product Liability 85/374/EEC, 25.07.1985). 
1159 V. Trstenjak and E. Beysen, ‘European Consumer Protection Law: Curia Semper Dabit Remedium?’ (2011) 
48 CMLR 95, p.111. 
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explored in Part IV.  Furthermore, as opposed to constituting a “derogation”, the 
understanding that a higher level of protection might be established within the national orders 
rather arises as the default position, that is, in the absence of Union norms; thus, as Trstenjak 
herself notes, the “margin of discretion of the Member States only exists in the absence of 
specific rules of EU law on the subject”1160.  Only where the directive is of a full 
harmonisation nature does the EU legislature establish default rules of a substantive 
character1161, usually interpreted by the CJEU in such a way as to provide that a higher degree 
of protection cannot be established by virtue of domestic law.   
 
Both cases illustrate that the relationship between national procedural autonomy and EU law, 
in respect of its ex officio application, is complex; in the absence of European rules, the 
principle of procedural autonomy presupposes the application of national norms.  Where 
express EU provision is made, the principle of direct effect necessitates its applicability; 
beyond this, the national rule endures, providing that it satisfies the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness1162.  Yet it is clear that even where the Union regime does not explicitly, it 
might nevertheless implicitly affect national procedure; consequently, it is where an attempt 
at full adherence to each would necessarily create incompatibilities and result in non-
compliance with both regimes, that complexities arise.  Furthermore, this “test” of 
equivalence and effectiveness is similarly complex, not only in light of the ties between 
national legal traditions and cultures, and procedural law1163 but also, as Bobek notes, to the 
extent that while equivalence tends “towards the Member States’ national regime, 
effectiveness [pushes] towards a harmonised Euro-standard” giving rise to difficulties in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1160 Trstenjak and Beysen, ‘European Consumer Protection Law’ (n.1159), p.113. 
1161 C-183/00 González Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901, Judgement, para.25 and C-358/08 Aventis Pasteur [2009] 
ECR I-11305, Judgement, paras.39 et seq, where it was considered that the national court could not circumvent 
the 10-year limitation period (Art.11) on producer’s liability (by way of substitution of parties), given the 
maximum harmonisation character of the directive. 
1162 Simmenthal (n.776), Judgement, paras.17 et seq; Van Schijndel (n.1193), Judgement, paras.13-14.   Art.81 
EC (now Art.101, TFEU) has been considered as a rule of public order by the CJEU, and thus – albeit, 
depending on the context - applicable by the national courts ex officio; Manfredi (n.897) and C-8/08 T-Mobile 
[2009] ECR I-4529. 
1163 Adinolfi, ‘The "Procedural Autonomy" of Member States and the Constraints Stemming from the ECJ’s 
Case Law’ in de Witte and Micklitz, The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States 
(n.1166), p.286.  The relevance of national legal traditions and cultures on domestic rules on default interests is 
also recognised by both the AG and the CJEU in Aziz (n.1036), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.86 (noting, “The 
purposes lawfully pursued by default interest may be different from one Member State to the next. It is not the 
spirit and purpose of Directive 93/13 to level out differences between national legal cultures”) and Judgement, 
para.74. 
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identifying the correct balance between Union and Member States’ interests1164. 
 
ii. The Multi-Faceted Rationale of the Ex Officio Application of Union Law 
 
The development of ex officio regulation arguably reflects one example of the CJEU’s 
engagement with the preliminary reference procedure in such a way that the impact of its gap-
filling and interpretative role (arguably, the former is more significant, given the absence of 
Union legislation), operates to open up the scope for Europeanisation in an area which falls 
outwith the explicit competences of the EU.  Yet while there is no evidence of an explicit 
legislative shift towards Europeanisation, inward roads into national procedural autonomy can 
be identified1165, generating challenges as to its (continued) existence1166.  While the evolution 
of the ex officio regulation (of contract terms, and as noted, of other directives) does not 
reflect, in itself, the Europeanisation – or perhaps rather part of the transnationalisation1167 - 
of procedural law, it does reflect shifts in the relationships between national and European 
courts, he relevance of comparative analysis and particularly, the division of labour in the 
interpretation and application of EU law.  This latter consideration, for which the preliminary 
reference procedure is understood to provide a basis, engages private law as a multi-level 
construction: “[a]rticle 234 EC is based on cooperation which entails a division of duties 
between the national courts and the Court of Justice in the interest of the proper application 
and uniform interpretation of Community law throughout all the Member States”1168.   
 
This multi-level characterisation fits with the notion that while the broad norms governing the 
regulation of unfair terms derive from the EU level, other substantive considerations 
including, for example, policy determinations, particularly those concerning justice, diverge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1164 Bobek, ‘Why There Is No Principle of Procedural Autonomy of the Member States’ in de Witte and 
Micklitz, The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.989), p.319 and p.312, 
respectively 
1165 The notion that national procedural autonomy is a myth has been considered briefly in respect of the 
development of state liability, an observation that highlights the interconnections between the two case studies. 
1166 Bobek, ‘Why There Is No Principle of Procedural Autonomy of the Member States’ in de Witte and 
Micklitz, The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.989) and A. Adinolfi, ‘The 
"Procedural Autonomy" of Member States and the Constraints Stemming from the ECJ’s Case Law’ in B. de 
Witte and H-W. Micklitz (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States 
(Intersentia, Antwerp; 2011), pp.281-304. 
1167 Herein, reference can be made to the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, published 
in 2004 and the commentary that it has received, including, amongst others, H. Patrick Glenn, ‘The 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure as Global Standards for Adjudication?’ (2004) 9 
Uniform.L.Rev. 829. 
1168 C-244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, Judgement, para.14. 
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not only between cultures and traditions but also between the national and Union levels1169.  
The division of labour particularly finds support in the attribution to the national court of the 
determination of unfairness1170, showing “deference to the national court” as it is understood 
as a  “functional Community court”1171.  AG Geelhoed has referred to the need to ensure the 
“interpretative monopoly” of the CJEU, on the one hand, and the “decentralisation” of the 
assessment of terms, on the other.  As to the latter, the notion of the floodgates argument, and 
the “overload” of the CJEU’s docket, is relevant; he highlights the need for “the economic use 
of legal remedies”, and as to the former, the “need for a clear demarcation of powers as 
between the Community and the Member States” 1172.  Freiburger Kommunalbauten not only 
confirmed that the determination of unfairness per Art.3 is a matter for the national courts but 
also provided that the interpretation of general clauses, such as those to which reference is 
made in the UCTD (good faith and significant imbalance) should be deferred to the national 
orders.  Notwithstanding, it is rather the structure of the preliminary reference procedure 
which dictates that the final decision should be one for the national court; this does not in 
itself preclude the CJEU from playing a role in interpreting general clauses1173.   
 
It should be noted that on the one hand, the CJEU confirms the notion of a “division of 
labour” between the national and Luxembourg Court in respect of the “policing” of unfair 
contract terms, noting that the former “is bound…to examine of its own motion all the 
contractual terms”; the same limitation - “where it has available to it the legal and factual 
elements necessary for that task” - applies1174.  This cannot be a task for the CJEU; while the 
obligation is established at the Union level, it cannot be carried out there.  The understanding 
of the domestic court as a functional court is integrated with the idea of the domestic courts 
having been attributed a role via the CJEU as regulatory actors, functionally empowered via 
the ex officio obligation, in the regulation of the market; this understanding broadens the 
court’s role beyond the protection of the specific consumer in the case before it.  
Notwithstanding, on the other hand, the role adopted by the CJEU, leading to the scope for an 
increasingly centralised approach to Union law enforcement, calls into question this division 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1169 J. Basedow, ‘Der Europäische Gerichtshof und die Klauselrichtlinie 93/13: Der verweigerte Dialog’ in G. 
Müller et al (eds.), Festschrift für Günter Hirsch zum 65. Geburtstag (Beck, München; 2008), pp.51-62, p.61. 
1170 The AG Opinion, at paras.21-22, having been followed by the Court in Freiburger Kommunalbauten, and in 
the cases dealing with the procedural dimensions of the UCTD, in those cases evaluated above, and in particular, 
by AG Trstenjak in Pénzügyi Lízing: Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.93-97. 
1171 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.59. 
1172 Freiburger Kommnalbauten (n.265), Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para.29. 
1173 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.779. 
1174 Aziz (n.1036), Judgement, para.41. 
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of labour, with levels of justice generated at the Union as opposed to national levels1175.  
There is little scope to consider the other cases in more detail here, but more recently, the 
CJEU has provided for the use of different mechanisms, predominantly, injunctions, and the 
scope for collective effect, allowing for the diffusion among a breadth of consumers of 
determinations of unfairness (per Pannon1176, Invitel1177 and Pénzügyi Lízing1178). 
 
This section further builds on the analysis above, examining two interrelated rationales 
underpinning the ex officio application of Union law, namely the invocation of public policy 
and value considerations and the need to ensure effective judicial protection, against the 
background of the relevance of unfair contract term regulation to the constitutionalisation of a 
multi-level private law.  Firstly, it is worth exploring the two rationales highlighted by Ebers 
concerning the rationale of the ex officio regulation of contract terms.  On the one hand, it is 
the imbalance in the relationship between the parties to the contract that gives rise to the 
scope for the abuse of one party, and which thus underpins the ex officio regulation.  The aim 
of contract term regulation is to ensure that this weaker group is protected, by removing any 
imbalance between the parties (in respect of their power and knowledge); on this basis, only 
B2C contract terms are subject to assessment1179.  On the other hand, contract term regulation 
derives from the economic rationale underlying contract; that is to say, parties drafting 
standard clauses are understood to be better informed, not only as to the relevant transaction 
cost arguments (allowing for the - likely, efficient - dissemination of the costs of contracting) 
but as to the rights and obligations arising from contracting in general.  An imbalance in 
knowledge can arise in both B2B and B2C contracts; as such, terms in both are subject to 
review1180.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1175 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.806. 
1176 Pannon (n.1020). 
1177 Invitel (n.1016). 
1178 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033).  Notwithstanding, it should be noted that the CJEU has also looked to draw a 
distinction between consumer organisations and consumers, aligning the former more with business 
organisations, notwithstanding their differences; for example, in ACICL (n.1043), the CJEU rejected that a 
consumer organisation could launch an action for an injunction in the courts of the place of its own business. 
1179 The approach broadly followed in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Malta (in 
which both individually negotiated and standard terms in B2C contracts are subject to review); the UK, Ireland, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, Romania, Slovakia (only non-negotiated terms in B2C 
contracts); see Ebers, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive’ in Schulte-Nölke, EC Consumer Law Compendium 
(n.1018), p.204. 
1180 The approach broadly followed in Germany, Portugal, Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia (in which standard terms in both B2B and B2C contracts, and individually negotiated terms in B2C 
contracts are subject to review.  In the Scandinavian traditions, standard and negotiated terms in B2C and B2B 
contracts will be subject to review; See also, Ebers, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive’ in Schulte-Nölke, EC 
Consumer Law Compendium (n.1018), p.204. 
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The basis upon which the consumer is identified as the weaker party may differ, from that of 
market failure (where the market essentially fails to provide consumers with the information 
they require) to market unfairness (which in turn engages the diverse understandings of 
justice, where the market might allow for economic bargaining but does not provide for 
“redistribution of wealth” between the parties).  These considerations give rise to the question 
of what the market is supposed to do and the role played by the consumer in its operation.  It 
is clear from recital 9 of the UCTD that the EU legislature had taken account of both sets of 
rationale; it provides that the directive has the purpose of securing the protection of the 
weaker party, and the negation of the danger posed to the consumer with regard to the 
imbalance of knowledge, on the one hand, and with regard to the transaction cost, 
information-provision rationale, on the other (even though it applies only to B2C 
contracts)1181.  The reference to the protection of the consumer as the weaker party is frequent 
in the CJEU’s jurisprudence, providing the broad rationale for the operation of the directive 
and forming the starting point of the CJEU’s (and in particular, the Court’s) teleological 
interpretation1182.  Notwithstanding, from Pereničová and Perenič, it is clear that consumer 
protection is understood not as the CJEU’s sole consideration1183 but as one amongst many; it 
is rather balanced with other “objective” factors, including those of an economic nature, for 
example, the significance of contract as an instrument for the regulation of private 
relationships, and the need to ensure, where possible, its continuation1184.  
 
While the notion of public policy or ordre public is frequently engaged by the CJEU, it has 
rarely been defined; this, in time, might become problematic as it differs between Member 
States, shaped by and embedded in the cultural, political and socio-economic contexts of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1181 See also, Ebers, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive’ in Schulte-Nölke, EC Consumer Law Compendium 
(n.1018), p.205. 
1182 Consider also the point made by Azoulai and Dehousse with regard to the emergence of a European 
teleology and the CJEU’s engagement in the development of a coherent system of EU law; Azoulai and 
Dehousse, ‘The ECJ and the Legal Dynamics of Integration’ in Weatherill et al, The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union, (n.113), p.357. 
1183 Pereničová and Perenič (n.1023), nyr, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.65. 
1184 Pereničová and Perenič (n.1023), nyr, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.63 et seq; citing examples from 
German scholarship, i.e. if the gaps left by the exclusion of the term are too big (at fn.19), and with reference to 
the different language versions (German, French, English, Italian and Spanish), if the contract can continue with 
in respect of its “purpose and legal nature” without the unfair term.  More recently, the CJEU has provided that 
if a term is found to be unfair, while it is reluctant to provide that national courts can adjust the term itself, it can 
replace it with default rules in order to ensure the continuation of the contract; C-26/13 Kásler, nyr, Judgement, 
para.78 et seq. 
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national cultures and traditions (as is obvious from the Rampion case1185) and potentially 
beyond the state, for example, the policy of the group identified as European consumers, or 
more broadly, of European society and of international law, in addition, more ambiguously, to 
those underpinning norms which are privately-made.  The origins of these policy and value 
considerations, including the principle of legal certainty, of national procedural autonomy and 
the balancing of protection and the market, are therefore national, European and international.  
These value concerns might also be attributed to a non-national, globalised community, 
including for example, the business community.  The public policy dimensions underpinning 
the UCTD jurisprudence are diverse.  At a fundamental level, the national courts’ decisions to 
refer are shaped by policy and value considerations and by judicial culture in the relevant 
national contexts; these influences might be explicit or implied.  For example, in Hungary, the 
national courts rarely engage with policy considerations as justifications for their reasoning; 
notwithstanding, the courts are required – as highlighted in Pénzügyi Lízing and Invitel – to 
notify the Ministry of Justice (and also the constitutional court), of its decision to refer to the 
CJEU.   
 
The policy and value considerations invoked in the intertwining of fundamental rights and 
consumer contract law, as regards the ex officio application of secondary law, allows for 
consideration broadly, of the need for a high level of consumer protection at both the national 
and Union level, and more specifically, of the second strand of the rationale underpinning the 
CJEU’s development of the ex officio application of Union law, namely ensuring access to 
justice and effective judicial protection.  As to the former, in Martin Martin1186, AG Trstenjak 
engaged the CFR as the basis of her interpretation of the ex officio nature of the Doorstep 
Selling Directive1187.  The case, which arose in the Spanish courts, concerned the scope for 
the national court to apply the directive ex officio, which would lead it to find the contract to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1185 Thus, for example, looking to the case law of the Cour de cassation, the Court explicitly recognises the 
distinction in the French system between: 1) those rules ordering society (règles d’ordre public de direction) and 
2) those protecting specific interests (règles d’ordre public de protection); Rampion (n.1022), Judgement, 
para.58. 
1186 Martin Martin (n.1021). 
1187 Directive on Distance Sales 85/577/EEC, 20.12.1985, hereinafter DSD.  The AG noted that while the 
provisions of the CFR could be employed “as an aid” to interpretation (referring to those cases in which either 
the AG or indeed the Court engaged the CFR1187), it is not “possible to rely on them in answering the question 
referred”; Martin Martin (n.1021), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.44, highlighting the Orders underpinning 
various cases: C-328/04 Vajnai [2005] ECR I-8577, para.13; C-361/07 Polier [2008] ECR I-0006, para.11.  
Indeed, a range of AG predominantly, from the national traditions, including AG Maduro, C-465/07 Elgafaji 
[2009] ECR I-0921, Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.21 and 23; AG Mengozzi, C-12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] 
ECR I-6653, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.49, 83, 95 and 97 and AG Kokott, C-75/08 Mellor [2009] ECR I-
3799, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras.24, 25 and 33. 
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be void.  The reference to the CFR – specifically, Art.38, which establishes that EU policies 
should ensure a high level of consumer protection - was raised initially by the Audiencia 
Provincial de Salamanca1188, along with other provisions of primary and secondary Union 
law, including then Art.153 EC, Art.3 and Art.95 EC.  As to the latter consideration, the 
CJEU has consistently affirmed the principle of effective judicial protection, bounded by 
equivalence and effectiveness1189.  In Johnston, the CJEU, recognising a general principle of 
law arising from the constitutional traditions of the Member States and the ECHR (and now 
also Art.19(1) TEU and Art.47 CFR), asserted that the Member States must ensure EU law 
can be relied upon in the national courts1190.  The activist approach of the CJEU in this period 
culminated in the Emmott case, which initiated a retreat on the part of both the AG and 
Court 1191 .  While AG Maduro has considered that effective judicial protection, and 
effectiveness broadly, “does not impose a duty on national courts to raise a plea based on 
Community law of their own motion, even where this plea would concern a provision of 
fundamental importance to the Community legal order”1192, such an approach – followed by 
the Court – cannot be true in all areas of law; certainly, the ex officio obligation has developed 
in the context of contract term regulation.  In Van Schijndel, the Court proclaimed that the 
national court “can act of its own motion only in exceptional cases where the public interest 
requires its intervention”1193; not only does this understanding provide a rationale for the 
national courts to act ex officio but it also seems to support its transcending of the facts of the 
dispute as established before it by the parties1194.   
 
The identification of the relevant policy considerations, which support the ex officio 
application of Union law, might differ between Member States and between the national and 
European levels1195.  With regard to the impact of the need to ensure effective judicial 
protection within the domestic courts, AG Jacobs has attributed explicit consideration to the 
diversities underpinning the national cultures and traditions; indeed, he has asserted that the 
unbounded application of the principle of effective judicial protection, which would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1188 Audiencia Provincial de Salamanca, Auto de 20.05.2008; Audiencia Provincial de Salamanca, Sección 1a; 
Sentencia núm. 79/2010 de 22.02.2010, Ref. JUR 2010\145869. 
1189 Cf. Ancery and Wissink, ‘Case Note - C-243/08, Pannon’ (n.1100), p.310.  
1190 Johnston (n.950).   
1191 C–188/95 Fantask [1997] ECR I–6783. 
1192 Joined Cases C-222-225/05 van der Weerd [2007] ECR I-4233, Judgement, paras.39-40, Opinion of AG 
Maduro, para.29.  See also, the Judgement, paras.39-40. 
1193 Joined Cases C-430-431/93 Van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705, Judgement, para.21. 
1194 Pannon (n.1020), Judgement, paras.20-22. 
1195 Ebers, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Directive’ in Schulte-Nölke, EC Consumer Law Compendium (n.1018), 
p.203.  
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necessarily require the application of Union law in favour of national procedural law, could 
“unduly subvert established principles underlying the legal systems of the Member States” 
1196.  The principle cannot merely be understood as a Union construction but rather must be 
conceived as one that permeates national cultures and traditions based on the rule of law, and 
international law.  Public policy considerations also shape the operation of the principle of 
equivalence.  The CJEU has considered that the national courts should conceive of rules of 
consumer protection as having the same status as rules of public policy in national 
systems1197; this understanding “indirectly obliges Member States to extend their most 
favourable procedural rules to actions for the enforcement of those consumer rights derived 
from EU law”1198.  AG Trstenjak has considered in the context of contract regulation that “the 
enforcement of an arbitration award which is contrary to public policy is prohibited, in the 
light of the fact that in Mostaza Claro the Court implicitly ranked Community-law consumer 
protection provisions as rules capable of being governed by considerations of public 
policy”1199; thus consumer protection norms are deemed to have the same status as public 
policy rules, which might reflect a Union principle ”recognised not only in international law 
but also in the legal orders of some European Union Member States”1200.  Thus, where a 
public policy determination engages national procedural rules, the application of which would 
oblige the court to intervene (that is, engage ex officio with regulation), a consumer protection 
determination might require the same action on the part of the domestic court.   
 
The diversity of public policy considerations is further reflected, for example, in the scope for 
the delineation of contract term regulation, explored above.  The floodgates argument is often 
engaged by the CJEU as one of the rationales underpinning the division of labour, in relation 
to the monitoring of contractual terms, and in particular the allocation of the assessment to the 
national court1201.  Furthermore, it is identifiable in the CJEU’s the reluctance to recognise the 
ex officio application of EU norms providing for contract regulation across all areas of 
contract law; rather, the CJEU has limited the scope of ex officio regulation, engaging clearly 
with value considerations relevant to each area of regulation.  The case law relating to 
consumer contract can therefore be compared with the approach adopted in commercial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1196 Van Schijndel (n.1193), Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras.38 and 27, respectively. 
1197 Asturcom (n.1020), Judgement, paras.51 et seq. 
1198 Trstenjak and Beysen, ‘European Consumer Protection Law’ (n.1159), p.121. 
1199 Asturcom (n.1020), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.71, citing C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I-10421, 
Judgement, para.38. 
1200 Asturcom (n.1020), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.70. 
1201 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.96. 
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arbitration, in which the CJEU has refused to impose an obligation on dispute resolution 
bodies to examine ex officio.  The floodgates argument is similarly significant within the 
national courts.  Following Pannon, the influence of the CJEU’s interpretation can be 
identified in the legislative amendments made to Art.209B of the Hungarian Civil Code, and 
Art.41 of the Civil Procedural Code, the drafting of which had the purpose of avoiding 
judicial overload in the courts of Budapest1202.  Not only does the need for effective judicial 
protection shape the breadth of contract term regulation, it also shapes the impact of the 
judgement, reflecting the division of labour between the courts.  Thus it is the invocation of 
the effective protection of the consumer’s rights that provides the basis upon which the CJEU 
deems the infiltration into national procedural law to be justifiable1203; two considerations can 
be explored herein.  On the one hand, the CJEU has held consistently that national courts 
must “establish all the consequences thereby arising under national law, in order to ensure 
that the consumer is not bound by that clause”1204.  The existence and scope of compensation 
and restitution depend on national law and perhaps most significantly, prescription rules, (for 
example, those German rules refined by the BGH1205).   
 
As Micklitz and Reich note, while prescription is a matter of procedural law and thus, 
following the notion of procedural autonomy, for the national courts, the application of such 
norms must nevertheless satisfy the principles of equivalence and effectiveness1206.  It 
remains to be seen whether such rules might be challenged under EU law.  On the other hand, 
as noted above, CJEU judgements are generally effective inter partes; an exception has been 
advanced in Invitel in relation to the UCTD.  However, neither the Opinion nor judgement are 
entirely clear, particularly in respect of the role of the national court with regard to the 
extension of the effect of the judgement to third parties.  A term which has been deemed to be 
unfair is void as such, which dictates that this finding must be followed by national courts, ex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1202 Further, within the Hungarian system, following Pannon and Pénzügyi Lízing, the relationship between the 
lower courts and the Supreme Court has developed in an interesting way.  The Supreme Court has thus far issued 
three (non-binding) opinions on the interpretation of Art.209B of the Hungarian Civil Code (by which the UCTD 
is implemented).  These include: Opinion 3/2011. (XII. 12) on the issue of the national court acting of its own 
motion; Opinion 2/2011. (XII.12) on the consequences of a determination of nullity of a contract (including 
consequences of unfairness), and Opinion 2/2012 (XII. 10) on the interpretation of standard clauses applicable 
following unilateral amendment of contract terms by banks.  I would like to thank Prof. Monika Józon for 
bringing these opinions to my attention. 
1203 Joined Cases C-222-225/05 van der Weerd [2007] ECR I-4233, Judgement, paras.39-40. 
1204 Asturcom (n.1020), Judgement, para.59. 
1205 Providing that the prescription period begins at the date when the average consumer could have brought a 
claim and not from that date on which the illegality has been found to exist.    
1206 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), pp.797-798. 
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officio, so that the term can no longer be relied upon.  This must be a task for the national 
court, attributing thereto a degree of discretion1207.  Different theories have been advanced to 
justify the erga omnes effect of the judgement; in particular, it has been considered that it is 
justified not because the action reflects an individual right but rather because it is one 
supporting a public interest1208. 
 
Indeed, the public interest dimension of contract term regulation is coming increasingly to the 
fore; furthermore, the scope for constitutionalisation via the integration of value 
considerations has been introduced above in relation to Aziz, characterised as  “public interest 
litigation”1209.  The Court in Aziz largely followed AG Kokott’s Opinion, which engaged 
fundamentally the notion of effective legal protection and undertook an assessment of the 
relevant contractual clauses1210.  Both the AG and the Court drew connections between the 
nature of the terms – particularly the default interest and unilateral determination clauses – 
and national procedure, recognising that both are shaped by national legal cultures1211.  The 
Court not only followed the AG’s approach, providing guidance to the national courts on the 
assessment of unfairness but also went further, engaging a balancing exercise in respect of the 
determination of disproportionality; ultimately, it highlighted that the final decision is for the 
national judge1212.  Aziz is another example of the CJEU attempting to balance national rules 
of procedure with the ex officio obligation underpinning the regulation of contract terms, in 
line with the notion of effectiveness per Art.47 CFR and the national court’s role in providing 
a remedy, per Art.19(1) TEU.  This balancing suggests the CJEU does not abandon the notion 
of procedural autonomy but rather recognises the multi-level nature of contract law regulation 
and consumer protection, particularly in light of the consumer as the weaker party1213.  On the 
one hand, the CJEU therefore recognises the multi-level structure of the Europeanisation of 
private law.  Yet on the other, by providing guidance on the assessment of terms, it not only 
impacts procedural autonomy but also calls into question the division of labour between the 
courts, where consumer protection might otherwise the undermined in enforcement at the 
national level.  As a result, it shifts from establishing minimum standards to maximum, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1207 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.795. 
1208 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.796, citing A. Halfmeier, Popularklagen 
im Privatrecht (Mohr, Tübingen; 2006), p.295. 
1209 Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), p.4. 
1210 Aziz (n.1036), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.57.  The relevant clauses being the acceleration clause, the 
default interest clause and the clause providing for unilateral determination of the amount owed. 
1211 Aziz (n.1036), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.86; Judgement, para.84.  
1212 Aziz (n.1036), Judgement, para.53. 
1213 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.46.  
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autonomous standards applicable across the Union, bringing to the fore the potential for 
increased centralised enforcement. 
 
Following Invitel, Aziz brings the significance of the collective dimension of consumer 
protection to light once again.  Described as a “test case” of the social dimension of the crisis, 
its facts bring to the fore, from the perspective of consumer protection, the context of the 
crisis, and the indebtedness of consumers, the significance of which diverges across the 
Member States.  The facts of the case highlight the absence of potential for justice at the 
national level, within both the courts and political institutions and the absence of any explicit 
solution deriving from the Union legislature.  The Spanish court’s reference puts the CJEU 
explicitly in the position of “social engineer”1214 whereby only it can protect those consumers 
who might not find protection elsewhere, whether as a result of national procedure or other 
factors1215.  The CJEU essentially engages in a political undertaking with which the political 
institutions at both the Union and national levels seem unwilling to engage, balancing market 
interests with the social; in so doing, it seems to aim to remedy the “social and political 
constitutional deficit” arising therefrom, integrating value considerations into the 
interpretation and application – thus engaging the national courts – of Union and national 
norms1216.   
 
The fact that these conflicts arise not in one Member State but across Member States dictates 
that the judgement rendered must be applicable across all national traditions and cultures, 
bearing in mind that it has the potential to affect not only the economic and legal foundations 
of the Union therein but also its political, social and cultural underpinnings.  For example, in 
Aziz, the Spanish government, the Commission as well as other intervening parties supported 
the lender, stressing the significance of the clauses for effective and efficient enforcement 
within the national orders.  The issue is essentially one of legitimacy, also raised by Micklitz 
and Reich.  The relevance of comparative analysis for the purposes of rendering a decision 
which might be deemed acceptable and applicable by the national courts across the Member 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1214 Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), p.3. 
1215 A recent case illustrates the limits of the UCTD.  Art.1(2) provides that contractual terms reflecting national 
statutory and regulatory provisions are excluded from its scope; none of the provisions (which allowed for the 
the acquisition of the debtors’ home by the bank  and an outstanding debt of over 100,000 euros) at issue in the 
case were contractual nor did they affect the role of the national court to assess contract terms.  Rather they were 
statutory and regulatory, and thus exlcuded from the scope of the UCTD and the regime of protection to which it 
gives rise.  See C-280/13 Barclays Bank v Sanchez Garcia, nyr, Judgement, paras.38 et seq. 
1216 Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), p.3. 
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States is explored in Chapters 8 and 9.  Furthermore, the potential relevance of comparative 
analysis is identifiable in the fact that this social dimension, arising from the facts of the case, 
not only reflects the shifting nature of private law but more generally, the scope for the 
development of a European identity via the empowerment of the consumer.  This identity 
emerges not from the top down but from the bottom up, via the preliminary reference system 
and the integration of fundamental rights into private law via, per Comandé, the “vehicle of 
economic freedoms”1217, which links individuals as citizens to community both within and 
beyond the Member States 1218 .  This consideration, relevant, it is anticipated to 
Europeanisation, has been explored in Chapter 2. 
 
The constitutionalisation dimension of Aziz derives therefore from the CJEU’s integration of 
value considerations into its judgement.  Notwithstanding however that Art.7 CFR makes 
reference to “respect for his or her…home” – a principle per Art.52(5) – neither the AG nor 
the Court engaged the CFR in their reasoning.  The rationale is unclear.  It is reflective, 
according to Micklitz and Reich, of a hidden constitutionalisation of private law, which is to 
say that while the CJEU is aware of the constitutional aspect of the conflict, it is not explicitly 
recognised but rather integrated into its reasoning1219, with reference to the purpose for which 
the loan had been made, that is, the purchase of the family home1220.  Micklitz and Reich note 
that a more explicit acknowledgement of constitutionalisation would not only have required 
the CJEU to engage in a direct dialogue with the Spanish courts but to also explore the 
foundations – whether national, European or international – and nature – as a right or a 
principle – of the respect for the home, and its significance in context.  The CJEU’s 
understanding could have been derived from engagement with national, Union and 
international sources of protection, as well as the CFR, via comparative analysis, an 
opportunity perhaps missed by the AG and Court.  Notwithstanding, as Micklitz and Reich 
highlight, the CJEU’s “hidden” approach also reflects the CJEU’s acknowledgement of the 
danger of attributing a constitutional dimension to every private law conflict that comes 
before it1221.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1217 G. Comandé, ‘The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating Citizenship ... around Private Law’ in 
Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), pp.61-101.  
1218 Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), p.12. 
1219 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), pp.800-801. 
1220 Aziz (n.1036), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.52; Judgement, para.61. 
1221 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.801. 
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A more explicit engagement of the constitutional dimension by the CJEU could have further 
clarified not only the national courts’ application of the CJEU’s interpretation but the 
relationship between the courts generally in the context of Europeanisation and integration.  
On the one hand, a more explicit recognition of the constitutionalisation of private law, its 
advantages and disadvantages would have advanced the significance of the shifting nature of 
private law.  It has generally been assumed that private law suffers from the same social 
deficits as the Union legal order; as noted in Parts I and II, private law has long been linked to 
the nation states, which late into the twentieth century, and to different extents, attempted to 
integrate “the social” via national legislation on labour law, tenancy law and consumer law.  
As a result and within the context of Europeanisation and integration, values are not only 
integrated into private law but private law itself is integrated into a higher (Union) legal order, 
undermining the notion of a (number of) distinct private law order(s)1222.  This gives rise to a 
lack of clarity as to how these orders interact and the mechanisms that frame this 
intertwinement.   
 
In this context, the broader question concerns whether the CJEU can really engage such a 
“social engineering” role in light of its relationship with the national courts.  In the absence of 
provision at the national and Union level, it seems that the CJEU will “step in”, which 
requires it goes further and at the same time facilitate the development of the European 
society.  Yet, as noted, the CJEU might be criticised for being overly intrusive, undermining 
the role of the national court and the division of labour.  The CJEU makes it clear that the 
final decision always remains for the national court, notwithstanding that enforcement might 
not ultimately be as effective as anticipated1223.  The relationship between the national courts 
and the CJEU within a multi-level construct of private law illustrates that “the CJEU may take 
strong positions, but the prime addresses of judgments are and should be the member states, 
their courts and their competent bodies in charge of ‘applying’ the European rules to the case 
at issue.  Even the best and most promising ‘just’ constitutionalized rulings require the 
national enforcement authorities and courts to awaken the European rulings to life”1224.  Thus, 
it is clear that the national courts also have a role to play; this role might be itself “awakened” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1222 Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), p.5. 
1223 Consider for example, the outcome of the Heininger case, and the lack of enforcment possible; C-481/99 
Heininger [2001] ECR. I-9945, 
1224 Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.404), p.22. 
 	  	  	   231 
by virtue of the CJEU’s engagement of comparative analysis in its rendering of 
interpretations, outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 and explored in the following Part.   
 
The case study has highlighted the scope for conflict, arising as a result of the application of 
national procedural rules, between national law and the protection to be afforded to 
consumers via Union law.  The case study has also illustrated the nature of the relationship 
that arises by means of the preliminary reference procedure between the national courts and 
the CJEU, the multi-level nature of contract term regulation and the potential for diverse 
impacts in national cultures and traditions (including, and beyond the Member State of the 
referring court).  The analysis of the jurisprudence has allowed for explication of the diverse 
rationales underpinning the decision of the national court to refer (or not) a case to the CJEU; 
of particular interest is the empowerment hypothesis, which itself, constitutes an impact in the 
national cultures and traditions, and which is likely affect the depth of the impact of CJEU 
decisions in the national legal orders.  The rationale underpinning the CJEU’s development of 
the ex officio application of directives is inherently related, and shapes the role of the national 
court; as noted, it is hypothesised that the role of the court shifts to that of a functional dispute 
resolution body.  The substance of these rationales, and the policy and value considerations 
underpinning, engage a number of considerations against the background of the 
constitutionalisation of private law, which might diverge between the national traditions, and 
also at the Union and international level; there is thus evidence of a comparative analysis – or 
scope for a comparative analysis – in the Opinions of the AG and judgements of the Court.   
 
While it does not seem, as noted above, that there exists an established dialogue between the 
national courts, many of the questions referred concern similar issues, or slightly developed 
problematics of similar issues, which suggests that national judges are at least aware of 
references made by other courts and the descent of the CJEU’s interpretations.  The scope for 
such comparative analysis similarly brings to the fore the scope for diverse impacts in the 
national traditions and the potential significance of judicial dialogue (which is not only 
lacking explicitly but was rather implicitly avoided in, for example, Aziz) as part of a 
methodological framework for legal development within the broader political, cultural and 
socio-economic context of integration, which is to say that the engagement of complex 
comparison at the level of the CJEU might facilitate its engagement at the national level, such 
that comparison comes to constitute a mechanism for spillovers and thus, for Europeanisation 
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and integration.  	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Chapter 7. The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Multi-Level Space of 
Europeanisation: Balancing Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
The interrelation of the sources and protection of fundamental rights1225 of a national, Union 
and international origin, and national private law, reflects well the complexities arising from 
the overlapping of different spheres of law and the interdependences of legal orders1226.  In 
Parts I and II, private law is engaged as a multi-level construct, to the development of which, 
comparative analysis is advanced as pertinent; this chapter explores the relevance of this 
characterisation with regard to the interaction of fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms1227 in the context of European integration.  The Europeanisation of private law has 
largely highlighted its instrumental dimensions, in respect of integration in general, and the 
facilitation of the internal market, in particular.  Consequently, private law rules have 
necessarily been connected with the fundamental Treaty freedoms, underpinning the market, 
and enshrined in the Treaty structure of the EU1228.  The fundamental freedoms were initially 
broadly aimed at the Member States (that is to say, national legislation that did not comply 
with economic freedoms could have been struck down1229); by virtue of CJEU jurisprudence, 
inter alia, Angonese1230 and Bosman1231, the putative scope for the influence - if not the 
precise context (i.e. whether vertical/horizontal and direct/indirect effect), and degree of 
impact - of EU law on private law relationships has arisen.  The precise influence of 
fundamental rights (and the policy considerations inherent)1232 on private relationships is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1225 For a historical overview of the development of fundamental rights law and policy in the EU context, see G. 
de Búrca, ‘The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law’ in P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU 
Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd edn., 2011), pp.464-497 ; de Búrca engages with a three-stage development. 
1226 Reference can be made to the preliminary cases of the CJEU in which the horizontal effect of freedoms and 
rights have been recognised, including C-127/73 BRT [1974] ECR 51 (direct horizontal effect of freedom of 
competition and right to fair competition in respect of articles of association and copyright agreements); C-
155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409 (direct horizontal effect of freedom of competition and right to fair competition – 
contracts for services); C-36/74 Walrave  [1974] ECR 1405 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in respect of collective labour agreements and rules of sports associations). 
1227 It is worth noting that the idea of a bright line distinction between fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms is becoming increasingly blurred; thus, in Bosman, and in other cases, the CJEU has recognised free 
movement as a fundamental right - C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, Judgement, para.95.  Further, Art.45, 
CFR engages freedom of movement and residence as fundamental rights.  
1228 Art.26(2) TFEU: free movement of capital: Art.63 TFEU; free movement of goods: Art.28 et seq. TFEU; 
free movement of services: Art.56 TFEU; free movement of persons: Arts.49-55 TFEU. 
1229 Consider the stages of the development of the CJEU’s jurisdiction, above.  
1230 C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.  
1231 Bosman (n.1227). 
1232 Chantal Mak comes to the conclusion in the first part of her book that “fundamental rights argumentation 
reveals the policy issues underlying“; this is built on here; C. Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract 
Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy and England (Kluwer, The Hague; 2008), p.292, the “fundamental rights hypothesis” set out 
at pp.229-230. 
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ambiguous yet this interaction has not sprung up “out of the blue”.  Fundamental rights have 
been recognised as principles of EU law1233, and can be said to reflect one articulation, or part 
thereof, of that phrase to which much reference has been made in recent years, and to which 
reference is made throughout the case examples, namely, the “constitutionalisation of private 
law”.   
 
With regard to the discourse elaborated upon in Parts I and II, the relevance of fundamental 
rights further underpins the need for the reconsideration, or at least the adaptation of the way 
in which private law is conceptualised, particularly in respect of its relevant regulatory 
dimension, social and political goals.  This, and the following considerations are reflected in 
the analysis of the jurisprudence that follows.  The “access points” at which fundamental 
rights might enter into private law are numerous; their significance ultimately depends on the 
manner in which, and how broadly, they are conceived.  Fundamental rights are included in 
various bodies of regulation that govern relationships, whether public or private or mixed1234 
in their nature.  The notion of horizontal effect (or Drittwirkung), which developed initially 
within national constitutional contexts, of fundamental freedoms and rights is key.  A 
distinction must be drawn between direct (where rights are directly applicable, providing an 
individual with a legal basis for a claim) and indirect effect (where rights are relevant in 
respect of the application and interpretation of private law rules, the focus being on the role of 
the legislatures and courts)1235.  The political, cultural and socio-economic dimensions of 
horizontal effect - and particularly, its “liberal” foundations – further engage the shifting 
nature of the role of the state in private law1236 and the increasing role of the individual1237, 
either identifying as an individual or as part of a group, for example, of consumers.  This 
further highlights that European integration must be understood to be concerned with more 
than the mere facilitation of the common market; economic integration is rather one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1233 A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human Rights and the Core of 
the European Union’ (2000) 37 CMLR 1307, with a consideration of the critique advanced against the CJEU’s 
human rights protection, at pp.1320 et seq. 
1234  For example, labour regulation. 
1235 N. Ferreira et al, ‘The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in EU Law’ in G. 
Brüggemeier et al (eds.), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union, Volume I: A 
Comparative Overview (OUP, Oxford; 2010), pp.8-118, p.9. 
1236 Indeed, it is the nature of the understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual, which 
gives rise to the notion of horizontality versus verticality. 
1237 From Aristotle’s conception of the political character and participation of man, to Rousseau’s social contract, 
to the notion of civil society and order arising not solely through the state but through individuals. 
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dimension of a broader process, which is also political, social and cultural1238.  Indeed, the 
fundamental rights case examples, falling under the broad umbrella of the 
constitutionalisation of private law, further illustrate, as do the two case examples above, the 
nature of Europeanisation and integration and the context in which it occurs, as well as the 
scope for shifting understandings of private law.  
 
The final case example engages with the putative conflict arising between those norms which 
are enshrined in the EU Treaty structure, namely fundamental freedoms, and those which find 
their origins in national constitutional law but have subsequently been interpreted by the 
CJEU and consolidated in primary Union law, that is, fundamental rights.  Thus, these 
conflicts can be conceived as arising between national and Union norms, but also between EU 
norms.  There exist diverse sources of fundamental rights, diverse levels of protection and 
interests underpinning and diverse rationales as to the level at which fundamental rights 
should be protected1239.  The cases bring to the fore the promise of consideration of the 
significance attached to the national and transnational interests shaping standards of 
protection of fundamental rights and thus to the cultural diversity that permeates the Union 
space; it seems that only comparative analysis can allow for this promise to be realised.  
Furthermore, a pertinent political dimension to the balancing of fundamental rights and 
freedoms is introduced, in respect of the significance attributed to economic interests 
underpinning the development of the free market, on the one hand, and to individual and 
group interests in the protection of weaker parties, on the other. 
 
I. The Foundations and Consolidation of Fundamental Rights Protection 
 
This section begins with an exploration of the foundations of fundamental rights protection in 
the national, European and international contexts; thereafter, the analysis shifts to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1238 Consider the two key papers of Joerges: C. Joerges, ‘The Market Without the State? The "Economic 
Constitution" of the European Community and the Rebirth of Regulatory Politics’ and ‘States Without a Market? 
Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Maastricht-Judgement and a Plea for Interdisciplinary 
Discourses’ European Integration Online Papers 1997/19 and 1997/20, respectively. 
1239 L. Azoulai, ‘The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence’ in B. de Witte and H-W. Micklitz 
(eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, Antwerp; 2011), 
pp.207-218, who for example, references the German and Italian constitutional courts, which have argued that 
protection should be provided predominantly via national law: P. Pescatore, ‘Les droits de l’homme et 
l’intégration de droit européenne’ (1968) 4 Cahiers de droit européen 629, and significantly, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft GmbH (‘Solange I’) [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Wünsche (‘Solange II’) [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
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engagement with fundamental rights in the private law relationships from which possible 
conflicts arise, particularly between the economic and social dimensions of the Union. 
 
i. The Sources of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe 
 
This section engages with a consideration of the diverse foundations of fundamental rights 
protection within and beyond the national systems and the engagement of this protection at 
the Union level via the CJEU’s recognition of common and general principles 1240 , 
subsequently enshrined in primary law.  The interaction of the diverse levels from which the 
sources of rights protection arise arguably necessitates the conceptualisation of this protection 
as existing as a multi-level structure, as it permeates the national, Union and international 
legal orders.   
 
Unlike the fundamental freedoms, which find their basis in the text of the Treaties, no 
provision was explicitly made for fundamental rights protection, which developed judicially.  
In 1977, the Union institutions declared their support for the CJEU jurisprudence tackling this 
legislative silence1241, subsequently affirmed in the Maastricht Treaty1242.  The addition of 
fundamental rights, and its diverse bases to the mix of relevant sources of the Europeanisation 
of private law, confirms the existence of multiple strands of interaction between national, 
European and international law.  The origins and protection of fundamental rights appear to 
be of a multi-level character (explored further in the following section), comprising the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States, the CFR, the relevant international treaties, 
including the ECHR, and increasingly, transnational norms1243. 
 
At the European level (encompassing both the EU and the ECHR), fundamental civil and 
political liberties (the ECHR and CFR) and social and economic rights (CFR) are generally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1240 To which further reference is made in Part IV. 
1241 Following Nold (n.791), it became clear this gap would be filled by the CJEU. 
1242 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission Concerning the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, OJ C 103 1, and thereafter Art.F TEU.    
1243 Art.6 TEU is of prominent significance.  It not only provides the CFR with the status of the Treaties, in 
Art.6(1), but further, for the accession of the EU to the ECHR in Art.6(2).  Art.6(3) then explicitly refers to 
fundamental rights as principles of EU law: “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, shall constitute the general principles of the Union’s law”.   
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distinguished1244.  One observation, which will be deepened below, relates to the seeming 
assumption that a distinction must be drawn between the protection of fundamental rights in 
international law, binding on the Council of Europe and its Contracting States and subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, and the protection of fundamental rights within the context of 
the EU.  The foundations of the CFR were established by the German presidency of the 
EU1245 following the CJEU’s Opinion 2/941246, in which it held that the then-EC was not 
competent to accede to the ECHR, on the basis of the flexibility clause of Art.352 TFEU 
(then Art.235 EC), responding somewhat it seems to the decision of the BverfG in 
Brunner1247, in which the German court considered that Art.235 EC could not have effects 
similar to an extension of the Treaty1248.  As some Member States challenged the status of the 
Charter – for example, the UK argued it was political, as opposed to legal and constitutional, 
and without a place in the Treaty structure1249 - it initially did not constitute binding primary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1244 This is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the divergences between the ECHR and the CFR but for the 
purposes of the evaluation of the CJEU’s engagement with comparative analysis, the nature of the interaction 
between these regimes of fundamental rights protection, particularly with regard to their function, should be 
briefly outlined.  The ECHR is understood to be concerned with human rights, while the EU – and in particular, 
the CFR – with civil, social, economic and political rights.  Yet, no strict distinction is clear in the jurisprudence; 
the CJEU recognises the significance of the ECHR, and the ECtHR adopts an “integrated approach” whereby 
Convention rights are considered and interpreted with some reference to social and economic rights.  Consider 
the speech of the ex-President of the ECtHR, Jean-Paul Costa, who in 2008 highlighted the increasing inference 
of socio-economic rights by the Court, particularly via the European Social Charter, 1961 and the CFR, citing in 
particular, Budina v. Russia, A.45603/05, ECHR, 18.06.2009 (in the end, the Court held there was no evidence 
that pension/social benefits were so low as to give rise to a situation incompatible with Art.3, ECHR (prohibition 
of inhuman and degrading treatment); Speech of Jean-Paul Costa, La Déclaration universelle des droits de 
l’homme (1948) ; Les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels en question, Strasbourg, 16.10.2008 
(<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/42BD71A1-099A-4B88-B907-
185CFF3B3968/0/2008_Strasbourg_colloque_déclaration_universelle_16_10.pdf>; Last Accessed: 24.04.2013). 
1245  Cologne Presidency Conclusions, 03.06.1999 and 04.06.1999; 
(<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm>; Last Accessed: 
11.06.2012).  
1246 Opinion 2/94 on the Accession by the Communities to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759. 
1247 Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
1248 Indeed, this case provides an example of the nature of inter-institutional dialogue explored in Chapter 9, and 
the political consequences of a decision of the CJEU, reflected in the subsequent actions of the Union 
institutions. 
1249 G. de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 26 ELR 126.  It is 
also worth noting that per the protocols, Post-proclamation, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, rejected the 
notion that the CFR would provide a basis upon which actions could be founded in English and Scottish courts, 
that is, that it would “not be justiciable…or alter British law” 
(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6232540.stm>; Last Accessed: 02.12.2013).  The actual application of the 
protocol is unclear; that is to say, whether it will provoke little difference in the application of the CFR across 
the Member States, or whether does actually provide an “opt-out” for the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic; 
the EU Committee of the House of Lords has provided support for the former, stating that the protocol “should 
not lead to a different application of the Charter in the United Kingdom and Poland when compared with the rest 
of the Member States” (House of Lords, EU Select Committee, ‘The Impact of the Treaty on the European 
Institutions’ 10th Report of Session 2007-2008 (The Stationery Office, London; 2008), para.5.103).  Very 
clearly, the English courts have attempted to hold that the CFR will not provide a basis for an action: R(S) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 705 Admin, para.58 per Cranston J.  The CA 
referred a question to the CJEU essentially asking whether the protocol could be understood as a general “opt-
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law but was deemed to be “solemnly proclaimed” by the EU.  Following the Lisbon Treaty, 
which renders the CFR binding, and obliges the EU to accede to the ECHR, these dimensions 
have become interlinked.  Thus, there is a need to consider the EU/national law mix and the 
international/national law mix, bearing in mind the “horizontal” interaction between the EU 
and the international.  Negotiations to accession began in July 2010, and a draft agreement 
was finalised in April 20131250, arising from the deliberations of the Steering Committee for 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CDDH), and the European Commission1251.  The 
CJEU will now provide its Opinion, as required under EU law (the accession constituting an 
international agreement, to which the Union is party)1252.  The Council of the EU must then 
agree and the contracting parties of the ECHR must assent, following which the Commission 
will render a draft declaration, a draft Memorandum of Understanding and a draft explanatory 
report. 
 
It is submitted that the cases analysed herein contribute to the understanding of integration as 
social and cultural, as well as legal, economic and political, in respect of the evolution of 
fundamental rights protection as it arises in the context of private law relationships.  It has 
long been recognised that fundamental rights play a key role in European integration; prior to 
the CJEU jurisprudence discussed herein, the Commission President called for support of 
rights as principles of Union law1253.  The initial silence of the Treaties has been attributed to 
various rationales.  In particular, the role of the national courts in the protection of national 
constitutional rights was significant; this has shaped the understanding of the rationale 
underpinning the CJEU’s engagement with fundamental rights protection.  On the one hand, it 
has been considered that the CJEU’s engagement with principles derives from the need to 
maintain the supremacy of Union law; and in particular, as a means of managing the scope for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
out” in respect of the validity in the UK and Poland; the AG and Court deemed this to be a question to be 
answered in the negative by the national court: C-411/10 NS [2011] ECR I-13905, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, 
paras.167-177, Judgement, para.116 et seq. 
1250  The draft agreement can be found in annex I, of the Final Report to the CDDH 
(<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/accession/Meeting_reports/47_1%282013%29008_final_re
port_EN.pdf>; Last Accessed: 17.04.2013), 
1251 The group of “47+1”, which held five negotiation meetings with the European Commission, adopting a final 
report on the negotiation on 05.04.2013.  The meeting report can be found here: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/accession/Meeting_reports/Web_47_1%282013%29R05_EN.
pdf; Last Accessed: 17.04.2013.  
1252 It should be recalled that the (then) ECJ earlier rejected the notion that the (then) EC was competent to 
accede to the ECHR: Opinion 2/94 (n.1246). 
1253 W. Hallstein, Speech on the Debate on the Dehousse Report (On the Primacy of Community Law Over the 
Municipal Law of the Member States), European Parliament, June Session, 1965 
(<http://aei.pitt.edu/13642/1/S69%2DS70.pdf>; Last Accessed: 30.04.2013). 
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conflict between the CJEU and the German BVerfG1254.  The Solange jurisprudence reflected 
a kind of dialogue between both courts.  In Solange I1255, the BverfG held that “as long as” the 
European integration process did not include fundamental rights protection, the German 
courts could, having requested a preliminary ruing, request that the BverfG provide a ruling 
on the compatibility of Union (then EC) acts with the protection of fundamental rights under 
the German constitution.  This understanding was fundamental to the CJEU’s assurance of the 
protection of fundamental rights as “an integral part of the general principles of law protected 
by the Court of Justice”.  The Court further held that such protection “whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the member states, must be ensured within the framework 
of the structure and objectives of the Community”1256, thus setting out, in respect of the 
German court, the supremacy of Union law.  Subsequently, in Solange II the BverfG held that 
as long as the CJEU continue to protect fundamental rights against Union acts, it would no 
longer exercise its jurisdiction for reviewing Union acts with fundamental rights under the 
German constitution1257.  Arguably – as explored in more detail below - the CJEU also looked 
to “fill a threatening gap in the legal protection of individuals by formulating its own doctrine 
of the protection of fundamental rights as an unwritten part of the Community legal 
order”1258.  Indeed, de Witte rejects the dominance of the supremacy analysis and rather 
considers that the CJEU’s recognition of fundamental rights as principles of Union law is 
rather “closely modelled on, and possibly inspired by” the approach of the French Conseil 
constitutionnel.  Similar to the Treaties of the Union, the 1958 Constitution made little 
express reference to fundamental rights but the Conseil constitutionnel rather subsequently 
engaged and set out the unwritten principles “of the law of the Republic”1259.   
 
The CJEU has thus long recognised fundamental rights as principles of Union law, which find 
their basis in that which is shared by the Member States.  That which is shared reflects a  
“philosophical, political and legal substratum” deemed to be common, from which “an 
unwritten Community law emerges” 1260; it is submitted that this substratum must exist not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1254 For more on the German foundations of fundamental rights protection, reference can be made to O. 
Jouanjan, ‘La théorie allemande des droits fondamentaux’ (1998) Annuaire français de droit administrative 44. 
1255 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH (‘Solange I’) [1974] 2 CMLR 540; BVerfG 37, 327. 
1256 C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  [1970] ECR I-1125, Judgement, para.4. 
1257 Wünsche (‘Solange II’) [1987] 3 CMLR 225; BverfG 73, 375. 
1258 B. de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Human Rights’ in P. Alston (ed.), The 
EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford; 1999), pp.859-897, p.863. 
1259 de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Human Rights’ in Alston, The EU and 
Human Rights (n.1258), pp.864-866. 
1260 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe, paras.1146-1147. 
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only at the level of the national cultures or traditions but also at the Union level where it is 
engaged via the CJEU’s jurisprudence.  The CJEU’s recognition of these fundamental rights 
as general or common finds its rationale in the need to “ensure the respect for the fundamental 
rights of the individual and respect for the fundamental rights which form the common 
heritage of the Member States” 1261, which dictates that it is not necessarily the case that the 
approach followed by the CJEU is necessarily common, that is to say, unanimous; this is clear 
from Werhahn, where the AG rather advocated that the analysis engaged should lead to that 
which is the “most carefully considered”1262.   
 
The CJEU makes reference to a breadth of sources, including the national regimes of 
fundamental rights protection, primary Union law (the CFR understood as an 
“inspiration”1263) and the “guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are 
signatories”1264, reflected in the “special significance” of the ECHR1265.  The scope for cross-
referencing between the ECHR and EU systems has long been recognised; in the 1980s, 
Frowein observed a dialectical development between the national systems, the (then) EC and 
the ECHR, and in his analysis, highlighted examples of cross-referencing, particularly of 
norms and principles of a “constitutional nature”, underpinning fundamental rights 
development in the EU context1266.  The reference to the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court is perhaps gaining increasing importance in light of the EU accession to the 
ECHR, as outlined above1267.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1261 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe, paras.1146-1147. 
1262 Joined Cases 63/72-69/72 Werhahn [1973] ECR 1229, Opinion of AG Roemer, para.1260. 
1263 As noted, a distinction can be drawn between the approach of the AGs and the Court to the CFR.  While the 
AGs drew on the CFR as a source of inspiration very soon after its proclamation, the Court first made reference 
to the CFR in the “Family Reunification Directive” case, concerning Directive 2003/86/EC (C-540/03 
Parliament v Council (Family Reunification) [2006] ECR I-6535, Judgement, para.38); subsequently, the latter’s 
reluctance to refer to the CFR seems to have waned (Unibet (n.971), Judgement, para.37).  See also, M.W. 
Hesselink, 'The Common Frame of Reference as a Source of European Private Law' (2009) 83 Tul.L.Rev. 919. 
1264 Opinion 2/94 (n.1246), para.33. 
1265 C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, Judgement, para.71 and the cases cited therein, and specifically, 
C-46/87 Hoechst AG v Commission [1989] ECR I-3283, Judgement, para.13. 
1266 J.A. Frowein, ‘Fundamental Human Rights as a Vehicle of Legal Integration in Europe’ in J.H.H. Weiler et 
al (eds.), Integration through Law. Europe and the American Federal Experience, Vol. I (de Gruyter, Berlin; 
1986), pp.231-344. 
1267 Nold (n.791), Judgement, paras.12-13 and for greater consideration, Hauer (n.701), Judgement, paras.13-23, 
and on the right to property, in particular, paras.17 et seq. 
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As noted above, in Nold, it became clear that the legislative silence of the Treaties would be 
filled judicially by the CJEU1268.  In the absence of fundamental rights concretised at the EU 
level, the CJEU thus engaged itself to fill relevant gaps to ensure the effective protection of 
rights; it used comparative analysis, referring to the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States.  The evolution of fundamental rights in the EU context thus reflects the 
willingness of the CJEU to adopt a role in attempting to facilitate coherence.  On the one 
hand, the reference to the common traditions of the nation states engages value considerations 
and allows for the identification of common (or shared) fundamental legal values that might 
also play a systematising role in EU development.  On the other, it also allows for the 
identification of diverging approaches to fundamental rights protection (particularly in respect 
of private law) to be engaged at the Union level.  A connection therefore arises between a 
functional understanding of commonality and generality and the system of fundamental rights 
protection, engaging two interrelated purposes of comparative analysis, namely the 
engagement of comparative analysis for the purposes of interpretation, and furthermore and 
relatedly, for the “creation” of something that might not have previously existed in such a 
form (the recognition of general or common principles or the recognition of “best solutions”).  
There is evidence of both approaches in the early jurisprudence of the CJEU.   
 
The German Verwaltungsgericht, referring the case of Stauder, questioned the compatibility 
of a contested Union measure with “the general legal principles of Community law in force”; 
for the national court, this referred to principles of national law.  AG Roemer accepted the 
understanding advanced by “many writers” (of the time), who asserted that “general 
qualitative concepts of national constitutional law…which form an unwritten constituent part 
of Community law” must be identified by “a comparative valuation of laws”; it was 
considered that secondary legislation must comply with such concepts1269.  The Court 
followed this understanding1270.  An alternative approach – which does not rely on a finding 
of absolute commonality - can also be identified.  In Werhahn v Council, a case following 
Stauder, German mill owners sought, on the basis of a claim of “legislative injustice”, 
compensatory damages from the Council and Commission in respect of the loss they incurred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1268 Nold (n.791). 
1269 Stauder (n.682), Opinion of AG Roemer, p.428. 
1270 Stauder (n.682), Judgement, p.422; Noting that fundamental rights protection finds its basis in Arts.7 (non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality) and 40(3) (exclusion of discrimination between producers and 
consumers in respect of the common agricultural policy) EEC Treaty and the “general principles of law in force 
in Member States”. 
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consequent to European legislation regulating the market for durum wheat.  In an earlier case 
– Schöppenstedt1271 – the Court had referenced the “widespread existence” of the notion of 
liability for legislative injustice.  The defendants argued, per Art.215 EC (now Art.340 TFEU) 
providing a basis for comparison, that following the accession of three new Member States, 
the acceptance of such basis of a claim could no longer be understood as “widespread”.  The 
question arising concerned the scope for the continued relevance of pre-enlargement case law, 
post-enlargement, where the comparative analysis would identify an absence of commonality 
between the national systems.  The Opinion is an interesting one, particularly in relation to 
enlargement; while the AG notes that the rules in the new systems should be taken into 
consideration, the fact that the addition of such considerations strips the previous finding of 
its unanimity need not be conclusive.  The AG’s approach followed Zweigert’s comparative 
scholarship, an approach, termed “wertende Rechtsvergleichung”1272, wherein, “what might 
be highly relevant is to ascertain which legal system emerges as the most carefully 
considered”.  It is not sufficient to consider the way in which the law exists but reference 
should be made to any “tendency to further development”.  Essentially, such an approach, 
focusing – it seems - on the “best solution”, is functional – that is, identifying the most 
appropriate rule with regard to the particular issue – and necessarily normative, invoking 
value judgements on the part of the court.  The AG, with reference to the “narrowing down of 
the gap”, clearly recognised the scope for cross-border impact, arising from the influence of 
the “more progressive” states; the structure and nature of the Union order, and the 
“strengthening by the Court of legal protection within the Community”, must be understood 
to be of relevance to the comparative analysis of the CJEU1273.   
 
Furthermore, the interpretation of primary and secondary EU law must comply with 
fundamental rights1274, giving rise to scope for rights-led interpretations across Union law1275.  
Union measures must comply with fundamental rights1276; if the legislature does not engage 
with an assessment establishing compatibility ex ante, that is, taking measures to ensure that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1271 C-5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975. 
1272  The idea was introduced to EU law by Zweigert, K. Zweigert, ‘Der Einfluß des Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Rechtsordnungen der. Mitgliedstaaten’ (1964) 28 RabelsZ 601. 
1273 Werhahn (n.1262), Opinion of AG Roemer, 1259-1260. 
1274 C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) [2008] ECR I-271, Judgement, para.68 and C-
400/10 PPU McB [2010] ECR I-8965, Judgement, paras.51-52. 
1275 An interpretation which could potentially be proposed and explicated by the national court in its making of 
the reference: CJEU, ‘Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals in Relation to the Initiation of 
Preliminary Ruling Proceedings’ OJ C 338, 6.11.2012, para.24. 
1276 As is clear from Hauer (n.701) and Kadi (n.147), Judgement, paras.283-285, citing Schmidberger (n.1265). 
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respect is attributed to fundamental rights in the drafting of EU legislation1277, then the CJEU 
has jurisdiction to review European legislation ex post, in respect of its legality and 
compatibility with fundamental rights.  Union legislation might explicitly provide that it 
should not affect the exercise of fundamental rights in the national systems1278; furthermore, it 
might explicitly proclaim its respect for principles of Union law (including fundamental 
rights) or the principles set out in the CFR1279.  The CJEU has recognised that measures which 
do not comply with fundamental rights should not be accepted as having force1280.  Clearly, 
the national courts are also bound by fundamental rights in their interpretation and application 
of legal norms 1281 ; they must "also make sure that they do not rely on an 
interpretation…which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other 
general principles of Community law"1282.   
 
As noted above, the CJEU engages diverse sources of law.  Evidently, national levels of 
protection might differ amongst each other, from the Union level of protection - reflected in 
the CFR1283 - and also from the ECHR1284; national courts can question the compatibility of 
Union measures with each.  Such a challenge might provide an indication to the CJEU of 
possible rights violations, facilitating the latter’s role in relation to rights protection while 
comparative analysis allows for the identification of such diverse standards of protection, as 
well as these indications.  Of particular consideration as a source of law, shaping the multi-
level character of rights protection, is the CFR.  The negotiations and drafting of the CFR was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1277 Since the CFR was proclaimed in 2000, it has broadly been provided within the Commission that it should 
be ensured in the proposal and drafting of legislation that it respects the fundamental rights as enshrined in the 
CFR (European Commission, ‘Decision on the Application of the CFR of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union’ SEC (2001) 380/3); this has been recognised explicitly thereafter (European Commission, 
‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Compliance with the 
CFR of Fundamental Rights in Commission Legislative Proposals: Methodology for Systematic and Rigorous 
Monitoring’, COM(2005)172, 27.04.2005). 
1278 For example, reference can be made to Art.1(7), Directive 2006/123/EC on Services in the Internal Market, 
OJ 2006 L 376/36. 
1279 For example, reference can be made to the Preamble of the Consumer Rights Directive, at recital 66, where it 
is provided that ”This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in 
particular by the CFR of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. 
1280 C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, Judgement, para.41.   
1281 Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, paras.64-94 and Opinion 2/94 (n.1246). 
1282 Including Lindqvist (n.309), Judgement, para.87, C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I-271, Judgement, 
para.68 and McB (n.1274), Judgement, paras.51-52. 
1283 National constitutional norms which provide for a higher degree of protection than the CFR; L. Besselink, 
‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ FIDE 2012, p.6. 
1284 National constitutional norms which provide for a higher degree of protection not found in the ECHR; L. 
Lazarus et al, ‘The Evolution of Fundamental Rights Charters and Case Law’ Study for the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, PE 432.755 (European Parliament, Brussels; 2011), pp.182-
187. 
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undertaken in two steps prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, via first and second Conventions, led by 
the Praesidium.  The determination of the scope of the CFR constituted a fundamental 
dimension of these processes; the result is now found predominantly in Art.51(1) which 
provides that the CFR applies and operates to bind national courts "only when they are 
implementing Union law".  The provision might be interpreted very narrowly – indeed the 
notion of "only" is significant – and indeed, it is narrower than "within the scope of 
application of the Treaties" as established in Art.18 TFEU.  For CFR purposes, "acting within 
the scope of EU law" was rejected as too broad; ultimately, the drafters - essentially reflecting 
a political matter1285 - adopted the wording used by the CJEU in respect of its delineation of 
the relevance of fundamental rights1286.  Art.51 has been interpreted in one of two cases – 
Melloni, concerning Art.53 CFR, and Fransson – shaping the application of the CFR and 
ultimately, the multi-level system of fundamental rights protection1287.  These cases will be 
set out immediately below while their affect on the notion of the multi-level system of rights 
protection will be analysed at the beginning of the next section on the synergies between the 
national and Luxembourg court in such a construct. 
 
The CFR is deemed to be potentially applicable across all areas of Union competence.  
Art.51’s lack of clarity derives from the divergence between its text, which makes reference 
to “implementing Union law” and its Explanations, which provide that the Member States are 
bound by fundamental rights “when they act within the scope of EU law”.  The CJEU 
engaged comparative analysis of sources to which reference is found in the Treaties as well as 
those to which no such reference is made and ultimately, drew a conclusion equating the 
scope of EU law with that of EU fundamental rights protection and thereby extending its own 
jurisdiction; consequently, where the Member State is deemed to act within the scope of 
matters “covered by EU law”1288, it is necessarily bound by Union fundamental rights 
protection.  The CJEU ultimately equated “implementing Union law” with the notion of 
“acting within its scope”, following the Explanations1289; on the facts of Fransson itself, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1285 Expressed particularly, as noted above, by the UK and evident from the European Ombudsman’s release of 
internal Commission papers (Complaint 2293/2008/(BB)(FOR)TN against the European Commission). 
1286 Explanations on Art.51, citing the wording of the judgement C-292/97 Karlsson [2000] ECR I-2737, 
Judgement, para.37. 
1287 C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson nyr, Judgement, para.22 and 29, citing C-399/11 Melloni nyr, Judgement, 
para.60. 
1288 Åkerberg Fransson (n.1287), Judgement, para.22 and 29 citing Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, para.60. 
1289 Fransson (n.1287), Judgement, paras.17-22. 
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found a connection “in part” in relation to the matter of VAT1290. 
 
Moreover, Art.53 CFR shapes the interaction of different rights regimes within the European 
space, which necessarily overlap, not only in terms of competence but also in “fields of 
application”.  In Melloni, the Spanish court recognised the scope for the assessment of the 
relevant Union measure – the Framework Decision on the EAW - in light of Art.24(2) of its 
Constitution, and the notion, per Art.53 CFR, that it should not adversely affect or restrict the 
rights in the constitutional traditions.  On the one hand, it considered that if Art.24 established 
a higher degree of protection1291 than that provided in Art.4a(1)(b) of the Framework 
Decision, Art.53 CFR should allow for the engagement of this higher protection 1292.  
Evidently, the CJEU did not adopt this approach, considering that such an interpretation 
would undermine the effectiveness of Union law, the principles of primacy and supremacy.  
The CJEU therefore deemed that national norms might apply1293 only where such principles 
would not be undermined.  In Melloni, the CJEU did not engage the CFR’s Explanations but 
rather interpreted Art.53 in light of its previous jurisprudence1294, holding that it does not 
provide that a national court can dis-apply a measure of EU law, which complies with EU 
rights protection, on the basis that it does not comply with the national regime. 
 
Art.51 not only has the aim of establishing the addressees of the CFR, confirming the binding 
force of fundamental rights protection on EU institutions and Member States but further aims 
to ensure that the CFR cannot be engaged for the purposes of shifting or reallocating powers, 
or extending the field of application of EU law beyond that established in the Treaty 
structure1295.  Thus per Art.51(2), the CFR cannot provide the Commission with a legal basis 
for legislating1296; the Union has no general competence in fundamental rights, even in 
respect of Art.352 TFEU and this remains true following the CFR1297.  It is also worth noting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1290 Fransson (n.1287), Judgement, para.24. 
1291 In the sense that extradition in cases of trial in absentia would be deemed conditional on a guarantee of 
retrial. 
1292 The CJEU considered that the Spanish court had pre-determined its own approach; Melloni (n.1287), 
Judgement, para.56. 
1293 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, para.60. 
1294 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, para.63. 
1295 NS (n.1249), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.71-83.  This is explained in the Explanations and provided for 
in Art.51(2). 
1296 M. Petite, then Director-General of the Commission's Legal Service in Working Group II of the Second 
Convention, WD 13 of Working Group II, p.39 (<http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd2/1821.pdf>; Last 
Accessed: 29.09.2013).  The CFR “does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of 
the Union, per Art.51(2) CFR. 
1297 Opinion 2/94 (n.1246) and Decision 2007/252, COM (2011) 758. 
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that a distinction between rights and principles is seemingly identifiable in Art.51(1) and 
52(5)1298.  The scope for such a distinction has been engaged in the Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalon, in respect of the consideration of social rights as rights or principles; the AG notes 
that “Cependant, il est remarquable que la Charte ne classe pas les droits fondamentaux dans 
chacun des deux groupes, comme cela est habituel en droit comparé” 1299.  The AG further 
makes reference to the comparative foundations of such a distinction, as it arises in the 
national traditions and the role of principles – many of which were initially characterised as 
“social” - in “complementing” rights. 
 
Notwithstanding, the CJEU’s understanding of the scope and application of the CFR seems to 
lack consistency.  Its jurisprudence provides that in transposing directives1300 Member States 
must ensure consistency with the Treaties and the ECHR and compliance with principles of 
EU law (including fundamental rights).  Where the Member State legislates beyond the 
directive1301, or where it merely acts within a policy area in respect of which the EU has 
competence, this will not suffice to constitute “implementation”1302.  Discretion conferred on 
Member States must be exercised in line with Union law, including fundamental rights1303.  
AG Trstenjak, in an Opinion upheld by the Grand Chamber, has also confirmed that 
"decisions made by Member States on the basis of the discretion available to them under EU 
legislation are to be regarded as implementing measures for that EU legislation for the 
purposes of protection of fundamental rights under EU law"1304.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1298 Which makes reference to the obligation of national courts to “respect the rights, observe the principles” of 
the Charter.  The distinction might be relevant for private law regulation; for example, Art.38 CFR is understood 
as a principle and not a right yet as a high level of consumer protection is now also established in the Treaties, it 
is unclear if such a distinction will affect the protection afforded.  The CJEU has recently engaged the 
distinction, a shift in its previous case law in which it seemed reluctant to do so, in its separate proportionality 
reviews of the compatibility of Annex III, Directive 2006/126 with Arts.21 and 26 CFR, recognising the latter as 
a principle and not a right; C-356/12 Glatzel, nyr, Judgement, paras.41 and 74 and with reference to the CFR 
Explanations therein. 
1299 C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale, nyr, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon, paras.42 et seq. 
1300 Johnston (n.950), Judgement, paras.13-21 
1301 C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, Judgement, para.104. 
1302 C-361/07 Polier [2009] ECR I-0006, Order, paras.13-15.  Yet consider C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-
1177, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para.163 et seq. 
1303 C-5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR I-2609 and McB (n.1274). 
1304 NS (n.1249), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.82; see also, C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-
5769, Judgement, para.104 and C-108/10 Scattolon [2011] ECR I-7491, Opinion of AG Bot, paras.110-118. 
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The original Explanations to the CFR referred to Wachauf1305 and ERT1306, to which the CJEU 
continues to refer, the former, in respect of the stricto sensu application of Union law in 
national courts, and the latter, in respect of the scope for derogation from the fundamental 
freedoms.  Where fundamental freedoms are restricted, fundamental rights cannot be ignored 
but rather must constitute an essential aspect of a proportionality assessment, both where the 
restriction of the freedom also affects the fundamental rights of a person or a citizen 
(including Familiapress), and similarly, where the protection of the fundamental right is 
invoked to justify the restriction of the fundamental freedom (Schmidberger and Omega); this 
understanding has been confirmed in NG by AG Trstenjak1307.  The second Convention made 
further reference to Annibaldi, in which the CJEU denied the applicability of fundamental 
rights due to a lack of connection between EU and national law1308.  It has long been held that 
national laws will fall “within the scope of EU law” where these national provisions restrict 
the exercise of the Treaty freedoms1309.  More recently, the Court has provided that the 
fundamental rights dimension of analysis might be engaged when "a national measure...is 
connected in any other way with EU law"1310, an understanding which broadly opens up the 
connecting factors between the national dispute and the application of Union law1311.  Where 
the application of the CFR on the basis of the dispute having an EU law connection arises, the 
complexity of the relationship between the CFR, as a written source of fundamental rights, 
and the unwritten sources of fundamental rights protection, comes to the fore1312.  The CJEU 
recently overlooked the opportunity to provide some clarity as to this relationship; the case, 
concerning the parental rights of a third-country individual and custody of a Union citizen 
child, concerned the relationship between the application of unwritten sources of fundamental 
rights, and the CFR.  The Court merely highlighted that Art.51 provides for the latter’s 
application only where EU law is relevant1313.  The idea that the breadth of the CFR is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1305 Wachauf (n.1303).  Wachauf provides for the Member States as Union agents when they engage in the 
transposition and application of EU law; as such, they must be able to uphold the respect for EU law, and ensure 
in its application that fundamental rights are respected. 
1306 ERT (n.1280).  From ERT, the Member State is understood to act not as an agent of EU law but in its own 
interest and in line with national law. 
1307 NS (n.1249), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.78. 
1308 C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493. 
1309 C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, Judgement, paras.39-45. 
1310 C-27/11 Vinkov, nyr, Judgement, para.59. 
1311 Consider the wide interpretation (not followed by the Court) rendered by AG Sharpston in Zambrano; 
proposing that the application of fundamental rights applies wherever the EU is competent to act – whether full 
or shared competence, C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para.163. 
1312 Editorial Comments, ‘The Scope of Application of the General Principles of Union Law: An Ever Expanding 
Union?’ (2010) 47 CMLR 1589, p.1595. 
1313 C-40/11 Iida, nyr, but did not find a connection with Union law and so did not rule on this question.   
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deliberately attributed for the purposes of avoiding overlap and potential conflict between 
different layers of protection dictates that the various institutional actors are aware of the 
scope for conflict, and thus of the need for interaction, across levels and across sectors, where 
both private law and fundamental rights protection are conceived as multi-level orders.  On 
the other hand, a broad understanding of the scope of the CFR could further increase the 
caseload of the CJEU; it also gives rise to questions of legitimacy, concerning in particular 
the CJEU’s jurisdiction and role in rendering interpretations of Union law which potentially 
impact national law, even in cases in which the link with EU law is (relatively) narrow.   
 
The CFR itself provides the foundations for judicial comparative analysis, with reference both 
to national constitutional traditions and to the Convention system of rights protection.  Two 
provisions of Art.52 CFR are relevant: Art.52(4) provides that “in so far as this Charter 
recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions”, while 
Art.52(6) establishes that “full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as 
specified in this Charter”.  Both provisions derive from the processes of diplomacy and 
consensus building, leading to the “Explanations Relating to the CFR” in the drafting of 
which the Working Group on the Second Convention was engaged1314.  The Explanations 
recognise that the reference in Art.52(4) to common constitutional traditions derives from 
Art.6(3) TEU, giving rise to an interpretative approach based on commonality.  The article 
initially arose from the proposal of one Member State that the bases of the rights, principles 
and freedoms protected in the CFR should be expressed explicitly in the document, to allow 
for certain provisions to be traced back to the relevant international conventions or treaties, 
jurisprudence, or national constitutional traditions; the provisions which could not be so 
traced would be characterised as “non-justiciable principles”.   While this proposal was 
rejected, Art.52(4) promotes the interpretation of CFR rights deriving from the common 
national constitutional traditions “in harmony” with those traditions, in order to avoid 
conflicts in the scope and meaning of rights identifiable from different sources.   
 
The CFR aims to establish a high standard of protection, in line with both Union law and the 
national constitutional traditions and does not simply identify the lowest common 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1314 Praesidium of the European Convention, ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 
2007/C303/03, OJ C 303/17,14.12.2007.  The Explanations are not binding but are intended to constitute a 
“valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter”. 
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denominator1315; this suggests that the CJEU might also look to identify the “best solution” 
even where that solution is not necessarily “common”.  From Omega – a pre-CFR case – it is 
clear that the CJEU will not necessarily seek commonality, in respect of the justification to an 
infringement or the operation of the proportionality test.  Art.52(6) was inserted in respect of 
those CFR provisions that make reference to national laws and practices in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity1316; it is intended to deal with those provisions in respect of which 
there exists divergence in the national traditions, those in respect of which the competence of 
the EU to legislate was called into question and those which were particularly controversial.  
Yet it is not explicitly clear why similar provisions in different pieces of legislation refer to 
national law differently, or in some cases not at all.  The Explanations provide no further 
explication or guidance on how Art.52(6) might be engaged. 
 
Art.52(3) CFR provides that the same scope and meaning should be attributed to 
“corresponding” CFR and ECHR provisions.  The CFR establishes that the Union can afford 
greater protection than that established by the Convention; essentially, Art.52(3) dictates that 
the ECHR reflects the minimum level of protection.  It similarly aims to avoid conflicting 
interpretations as to meaning between the ECHR and CFR; “in order to ensure the necessary 
consistency”1317 the CJEU must – and indeed seems to1318 - refer not only to the relevant 
Convention provision but also to the meaning attributed thereto by the ECtHR.  The CFR 
confirms the multi-level protection of fundamental rights, per Art.53 CFR, in respect of EU 
law, national constitutional laws, and international law, predominantly, the ECHR1319.  The 
CJEU’s analysis confirms the scope for reference to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1315 (Then) Judge Skouris similarly expressed that the CJEU "is not bound by the common constitutional 
traditions as such" and does not "mechanically transpose their lowest common denominator into the Community 
legal order", but "merely draws inspiration from them in order to determine the level of protection appropriate 
within the Community legal order"; this has been characterised as “evaluative comparison”: Working Group II 
‘Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR’, Working Document 19, p. 8 (<http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/wd2/3057.pdf>, Last Accessed: 08.10.2013).  For a recent confirmation of the Court's 
methodology of "evaluative comparison", see Opinion of AG Kokott, Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, 
paras.93 et seq (in particular to para.104) 
1316 Including, Arts.9, 10(2), 14(3), 16, 27, 28, 30, 34(1) and (3), 35, CFR.  In respect of 52(6), reference can be 
made for example, to C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-7091, Judgement, paras.38-39: "It is 
apparent from Article 28 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 52(6) thereof, that protection of the 
fundamental right to bargain collectively must take full account, in particular, of national laws and 
practices...Furthermore, by virtue of Article 152 TFEU the European Union recognises and promotes the role of 
the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems". 
1317 Praesidium of the European Convention, ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 
2007/C303/03, OJ C 303/17,14.12.2007, Art.52. 
1318 McB (n.1274), Judgement, para.54. 
1319 Consider, for example, C-135/08 Rottman [2010] ECR I-1449, Judgement, para.55 which recognises a 
double layer of scrutiny in respect of the proportionality assessment. 
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where the relevant CFR right parallels that found in the ECHR, in respect of the 
determination of its scope and meaning1320.   
 
While the CFR along with national law, and the ECHR and other international human rights 
treaties, facilitate the interpretation of EU law as a mix of these different sources1321, the CFR 
might come to constitute a “one-stop shop” for reference to fundamental rights.  This is 
essentially a matter of constitutionalisation, particularly of private law; while the CJEU has 
until now referred to constitutional traditions common to the Member States, the ECHR and 
both before and since it has become binding, the CFR itself, it remains unclear whether there 
will be a shift in scope in respect of this approach to constitutionalisation.  Evidently, to the 
extent that this involves the generation of information, the scope for comparative analysis is 
pertinent.  That is to say, in the alternative to engaging in a comparative analysis, for the 
purposes of identifying common or general principles, or “best solutions”, the CJEU might 
rather engage with the CFR as a written source of law, recognising that (most of) the Member 
States have assented to and will be bound by the CFR.  The CFR amounts to the “creative 
distillation” of rights, civil, political, economic and social, deriving from various sources, 
including national, Union and international law1322.  Such an approach would arguably negate 
the need for in-depth comparative research; instead, generality or commonality could be 
identified prima facie, namely international treaties, the ECHR and the ECtHR jurisprudence.  
 
The primary recognition and evolution of rights within a national context necessarily engages 
the notion of (cultural) relativism1323; the danger of which was highlighted in the processes of 
drafting international human rights treaties1324.  Yet to the extent that human and fundamental 
rights are advanced as universal in their nature, the focus underpinning their analysis should 
not necessarily be on the national culture or tradition1325, suggesting the scope for a shift in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1320 McB (n.1274), Judgement, para.53. 
1321 H. Collins, 'The Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law in Europe' University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law Research Paper No. 13/2011, p.15. 
1322 Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (n.212), p.395. 
1323 It is worth noting, which cannot be expanded upon here, the difficulties – like those encountered in relation 
to culture - with the notions of cultural and moral relativism and the confusion surrounding the two. 
1324 On the United Nations Commission on Human Rights preparation of the Convention on Human Rights in 
respect of which the “Western“ dominance was noted: Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, 
‘Statement on Human Rights’ (1947) 49 American Anthropologist 539. 
1325 It is worth noting that there has been some political science research undertaken in respect of whether certain 
traditions are more or less likely to bind themselves to international human rights conventions; see B. Simmons, 
‘Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations’; Paper prepared for 
meeting of the Conference on Delegation to International Organizations, May 3-4, Brigham Young University, 
Provo, Utah (< http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/752__SimmonsWhyCommit.pdf>; Last 
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the determination of what is compared, i.e. the unit of comparative analysis; that is to say, it 
should not be limited to the national legal order, culture or tradition but might extend beyond 
the national order. 
 
The multiple sources of rights protection, and the potential scope for conflict arising between 
fundamental rights and national norms but also, as is the focus herein, between rights and 
fundamental freedoms, attribute to these cases an additional dimension of complexity.  These 
conflicts give rise to preliminary references where national judges seek guidance; the 
reference procedure engenders scope for interaction between the national, EU and 
international systems of protection, and in particular, between the national courts and the 
CJEU.  However, these conflicts and the interaction arising therefrom, also open up the 
potential for engagement with different methodologies and furthermore, potential avenues of 
communication, in respect of which, the recognition of generality and commonality, the 
identification of “best solutions”, and thereafter, transfers and dialogue become possible.   
 
ii. Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: Rights-Based and 
Integration-Orientated Understandings of the Balancing Exercise 
 
Schmidberger, Omega, Viking and Laval highlight the breadth of conflicts that might arise 
from legal disputes arising from private law relationships in (cross-)national contexts, which 
cannot be merely characterised as legal but are shaped by significant political, cultural and 
socio-economic factors.  The relevance of these dimensions are reflected in the identifiable 
scope for conflict between the Treaty freedoms as “fundamental [Union] provisions”1326 and 
fundamental rights in private law relationships, and more broadly, particularly in the Viking 
and Laval cases, the scope for “conflict” between national legal cultures and traditions, in 
respect of the putative (and arguably, crude) West/East (former Communist) divide.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Accessed: 22.04.2013), who argues that there  cultural (including legal tradition), political (including states of 
transition) and regional (including what neighbouring states do) that will shape commitment to human rights 
agreements; and O. Hathaway, ’Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties ?’ (2007) 51 J.Con.Res. 
588 who rather argues that the scope for domestic enforcement of the treaty, and its consequences, will largely 
determine whether the national system will commit. 
1326 C-49/89 Corsica Ferries [1989] ECR I-4441, Judgement, para.8. 
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Omega follows a line of case law in which the CJEU has been required to engage in the 
balancing of fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, including Schmidberger1327, a 
preliminary reference and Commission v France 1328 , an infringement proceeding.  
Schmidberger concerned an environmental protest, organised by the “Transitforum Austria 
Tirol” at the Brenner Pass, a motorway in Austria against levels of pollution in the Alps; it 
had been authorised by the Austrian government and which disrupted traffic and blocked the 
motorway between Germany and Italy for thirty hours.  Consequently, Schmidberger’s 
international transport company, based in Germany, was precluded from transporting goods 
between Germany and Italy; he subsequently sought damages from the Austrian government, 
arguing that its authorisation of the protest had failed to ensure the free movement of goods.  
The CJEU accepted that the protest created a blockage, which precluded the transfer of goods 
between Germany and Italy via Austria and as such, constituted an infringement of the free 
movement.  Schmidberger is often compared with the decision in Commission v France1329, 
an action brought by the Commission in which the French government was accused of failing 
to take satisfactory preventative action to ensure the free movement of goods (in particular, 
the import of Spanish produce) in light of the prolonged and destructive protests of French 
farmers.  The CJEU held that France had, in failing to act, breached its obligations under 
Art.4(3) TEU (requiring loyalty; then Art.10 EC) and violated freedom of movement under 
Art.34 TEU.  In Schmidberger, notwithstanding its recognition of Austria’s obligation per 
Commission v France, the CJEU considered that the infringement of free movement 
enshrined in the Treaties had to be balanced with the fundamental rights (including that of 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly), as enshrined in Art.10 and Art.11 of the 
ECHR.  The Court adopted the notion of balancing or “weighing” in light of whether the 
Austrian government had acted in a proportionate and reasonable manner, “having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck 
between those interests1330 and held that this balance could be reflected in the recognition of a 
restriction of, the economic freedom enshrined in the Treaties, justified by the fundamental 
freedoms at stake; the CJEU therefore found there to be no violation of Art.34 TEU.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1327 Schmidberger (n.1265). 
1328 C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959. 
1329 Commission v France (n.1328). 
1330 Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, para.81. 
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Omega1331 concerned a prohibition, issued by the police of the city of Bonn1332, on Omega’s 
providing access to a particular game in which participants stimulated the shooting of others; 
the “commercial exploitation” of shooting arose as a public policy issue and was reflected in 
public protest.  The supply of the game materials by a British company established the EU 
dimension; Omega argued against the restriction in the absence of a “sufficiently concrete and 
precise basis in national law” on the basis that it constituted a breach of legitimate 
expectations in the absence of a public policy justification1333 and restricted its freedom to 
provide services and the free movement of goods1334.  Omega appealed through three courts 
before reaching the Bundesverwaltungsgericht; while considering that the commercial activity 
affronted human dignity as a “cardinal principle of the Constitution” 1335  per the 
Grundgesetz1336, it recognised the scope for a conflict between adherence to national 
constitutional law and free movement and thus referred the case1337 to the CJEU and 
subsequently rendered the final decision1338.  Omega provides a key example of the scope for 
conflict and the putative incompatibility arising from an attempt to fully comply with both 
national and Union law.  The reference is rather unique: the German court engaged with 
previous CJEU jurisprudence in formulating its understanding of the issues, which brings to 
the fore an interesting rationale underpinning the decision to refer, including the CJEU’s 
consideration of the need for commonality, that is, whether “the restriction [of fundamental 
freedoms by rights] must be based on a legal conception that is common to all Member 
States”1339.  With regard to the relationship between national and EU systems of rights 
protection, distinct national concepts will not prevail over EU law; this has long been the 
approach followed by the CJEU and is applicable as the “default” position, supported by the 
need to ensure the uniform and effective application of EU law, its structure and 
coherence1340.  Thus, mere engagement with national constitutional principles will not 
necessarily justify a restriction on freedoms; the key question referred concerned whether the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1331 C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609.  
1332 On para.14(1) of the Ordnungsbehördengesetz (the law of the police authority) on the basis of public policy 
(Öffentliche Ordnung) concerns, namely, the principle of human dignity enshrined in Art.1, Grundgesetz. 
1333 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.40. 
1334 The AG and the Court operate on the restriction of freedom to provide services: Omega (n.1331), 
Judgement, para.27. 
1335 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.18. 
1336 BVerwG, Beschluss vom 24.10.2001 - 6 C 3/01, OVG 5 A 4916/98 (including the cases heard before VG 
Köln Beschluss vom 03.09.1998 - Az., VG 20 K 8466/95 and OVG Münster Beschluss vom 27.09.2000 - Az.: 
OVG 5 A 4916/98. 
1337 BVerwG, Beschluss vom 24.10.2001, 6 C 3.01. 
1338 BVerwG, Beschluss vom 13.12.2006 - 6 C 17.06. 
1339 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, para.23. 
1340 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Judgement, para.3. 
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legitimacy of national restrictions of freedoms, per public policy derogations, depends on the 
existence of a common basis identifiable in all Member States. 
 
The German court referring Omega questioned whether a common conception underpinning a 
restriction is required, taking into consideration previous CJEU jurisprudence, including 
Schindler in which the Court recognised that the basis upon which different Member States 
restrict certain activities will be shaped by diverse considerations such that “it is not possible 
to disregard the moral, religious or cultural aspects of lotteries, like other types of 
gambling”1341.  Thus, the diversities in the Member States with regard to the level of 
protection of fundamental rights have been recognised as significant1342.  Thus, while limits 
are established at the EU level, the assessment is based on “national value judgements”, it 
seems these may but need not necessarily be shared between the national cultures and 
traditions: “[m]ethodologically speaking…There is no question here of any general opinion in 
the Member States”1343.   
 
The Court in Omega ultimately rejected any need for commonality, either in respect of the 
common conception underlying the “system of protection” or the proportionality test1344.  
Both the AG and the Court specifically highlighted that there is no need for a common 
conception underpinning a restriction to freedoms1345 (notwithstanding, the Court considered 
it might be a possibility, that is to say, it was deemed “not indispensable”).  While the Court, 
following the AG, recognised that respect for human dignity should constitute a principle of 
EU law, based upon the national and international legal cultures and traditions, it did not 
undertake a comprehensive comparative evaluation of the relevant norms. The Court rather 
followed previous CJEU jurisprudence and looked to national and international law, 
attributing “special significance” to the ECHR1346 as “inspiration”.  At the time of Omega, the 
Union had not yet acceded to the Convention and the CFR was not yet binding; yet it was 
recognised that Union and Member State acts must comply with the relevant rights, the Union 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1341 C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, Judgement, para.60. 
1342 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.3. 
1343 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.105. 
1344 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, paras.37-38. 
1345 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.71. 
1346 C‑305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones and Others [2007] ECR I‑5305, Judgement, 
para.29. 
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having been founded on such respect1347.  The rationale underlying the reference to the 
international treaties lies in the treaties deemed to form part of the “constitutional traditions 
common” to the Member States as a result of their collaboration in their drafting and 
development, and their role as signatories, i.e. having consented thereto1348; on this basis, the 
content of the ECHR can also be understood to be “common”.  This might be explained in 
two ways, discussed in more detail below1349. 
 
The AG considered nevertheless it necessary to conceptualise human dignity as a general 
principle, having the status of primary law1350.  Reference was made to a number of – 
predominantly German - scholars, and “a variety of religious, philosophical and ideological 
reasoning...[a]ll in all, human dignity has its roots deep in the origins of a conception of 
mankind in European culture”1351.  Considering the “generality” of the principle, the AG cited 
the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the case law of the ECtHR, in which human 
dignity is recognised to exist as ”the very essence of the Convention”1352.  At the national 
level - again with predominant reference to German scholarship – human dignity was 
recognised as having divergent conceptions, definitions and interpretations, and not 
necessarily as an “independent, justiciable rule of law”, in particular to the extent that it 
constitutes a broad “generic concept”, which is more often rather engaged by its component 
parts1353. 
 
The Court, following the AG, considered that the order, while restricting free movement, 
could be justified1354.  The Court actually engaged in the “balancing” of the freedoms and 
rights, in respect of the public policy derogation, and did not leave this to the national courts.  
Its recognition of the need to reconcile rights and freedoms1355 suggests that there is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1347 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.55, citing Art.51, CFR even though it was not binding at 
the time. 
1348 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, para.34. 
1349 See the discussion of international law as a source of comparative analysis in Chapter 8. 
1350 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.93. 
1351 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, fn.46-48; 51-53, para.78. 
1352 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.83, citing Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
1353 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, fn.55-56, para.85-86. 
1354 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, para.41. 
1355 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.50. 
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hierarchy between these norms, as both sets constitute primary law1356.  Indeed, the Court 
engaged with the conclusion derived initially by the referring court – that the prohibition 
“corresponds to the level of protection of human dignity which the national constitution seeks 
to guarantee”; by banning only one type of game – where the problem is clear, in the 
stimulated killing of people – the measure is also deemed to be proportional1357.   The link 
between the Omega (and also the previous Schmidberger) cases and those of Viking and 
Laval (as discussed below) derives from the engagement of fundamental rights as a limitation 
of free movement in the former, and with free movement rules as a limitation on the (social) 
fundamental rights in the former.  Clear processes of cross-referencing in the CJEU and 
particularly, in the latter cases to the approaches adopted in the former, can be identified, 
especially with regard to the balancing of freedoms and rights and the application of the 
proportionality test.   
 
Viking1358 and Laval1359 (often incorrectly bundled together, with the relevant divergences 
highlighted herein) are perhaps two of the most evaluated decisions of the CJEU in recent 
years.  Following the judgements, Viking was settled out of court in 20081360, when the ferry 
line decided to reflag not from Finland to Estonia but to Sweden, while the Swedish 
Arbetsdomstolen rendered the final decision in Laval.  The analysis of the jurisprudence 
focuses primarily on the conflicts identified above, particularly those between rights and 
freedoms.  Both cases also concerned the application of EU law to collective action, its effect 
against unions and the “protection” of the competences reserved to the national social 
systems.  In both cases, the CJEU1361 rejected the argument that national social policy – 
encompassing labour law and in particular, the right to take collective action – fell outwith 
EU law; furthermore, the CJEU found EU law (Art.49 and 56 TFEU) to have horizontal direct 
effect against unions1362.  Thus, like the state liability cases, Viking and Laval are cases in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1356 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, paras.48-49 and 52 citing Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, 
paras.77-79; in particular, the approach is interesting to the extent that the Court undertakes a comparison of 
justifications of the limitations of fundamental rights considered by the CJEU and those by the ECtHR. 
1357 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, para.39. 
1358 Viking (n. 355). 
1359 Laval (n.355). 
1360 <http://www.itfglobal.org/press-area/index.cfm/pressdetail/1831%22>; Last Accessed: 17.04.2013. 
1361 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.39-41; C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767, Judgement, para.88. 
1362 The Opinion of AG Maduro deserves greater consideration.  It engages a number of other considerations, 
while the Court in both cases followed AG Mengozzi in Laval, building on and extending the notion of “vertical 
direct effect“ from Walrave and Koch; Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.58-61; Laval (n.355), paras.97-98.  
Consider also, C-171/11 Fra.Bo, nyr in respect of the horizontal direct effect of free movement of goods. 
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which EU law establishes the ultimate remedy, that is to say, neither national system would 
have been able to provide for such an outcome.   
 
Viking concerned the right of the International Transport Workers’ Federation and the Finnish 
Seamens’ Union (FSU) to engage in collective action, which purported to deter the reflagging 
of Viking’s ferry from Finland to Estonia and prevent Viking from negotiating pay and 
conditions with associations other than the FSU.  Viking had the explicit intention of lowering 
costs1363 while FSU’s concern related to the potential impact of reflagging on pay and 
employment conditions.  At first instance, Viking obtained an injunction to preclude the 
union’s foreseeable breach of the freedoms of establishment and movement under Art.49 
(freedom of establishment) and 56 (freedom to provide services) TFEU (then Art.43 and 49 
EC); this was lifted on appeal1364.  The English Court of Appeal referred to the CJEU and the 
case was settled in 2008 following the CJEU judgement1365.  Three questions were referred: 
the first concerning whether EU social policy dictates that collective action falls outwith the 
scope of EU law, per Albany (in which the CJEU held that a collective agreement fell outwith 
the scope of competition law rules)1366; the second, concerning the horizontal direct effect of 
free movement and the third, concerning the justification of restrictions to free movement on 
the basis of fundamental rights.  
 
The Court followed the AG (although not explicitly) and accepted that union activities fell 
within the scope of EU law, rejecting both the analogy with Albany1367, and the argument that 
the fundamental nature of the right to strike brings it outwith Art.49 (ex Art.43 EC)1368.  The 
Court recognised that Art.49 TFEU has horizontal direct effect, essentially allowing for an 
analogy with its findings in its case law against free movement in relation to other private 
bodies1369.  Notwithstanding, the AG noted that free movement provisions cannot replace 
national law; national rules can operate to regulate these relationships providing there is 
compatibility with EU law and that a remedy exists in national law.  If this is not the case, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1363 ITWF v Viking Line et al [2005] EWCA Civ 1299, para.24 et seq. per Waller LJ. 
1364 Viking Line et al v ITWF (Unreported) Commercial Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court, 
2004 Folio 684, per Mrs Justice Gloster. 
1365 <http://www.itfglobal.org/press-area/index.cfm/pressdetail/1831%22>; Last Accessed: 17.04.2013. 
1366 C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751. 
1367 Viking (n. 355), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.26-28; Judgement, paras.48-55. 
1368 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.38 et seq 
1369 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.33 et seq (applicable not only to public authorities, unions not considered 
as such, para.60). With reference to Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, paras.57 and 62 and Commission v 
France (n.1328), Judgement, para.30. 
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Treaty can be engaged directly1370.  The AG recognised the scope for diverse approaches in 
the national cultures and traditions and highlighted that the courts enjoy a “margin of 
discretion”1371 aiming, on the one hand, for the preservation of “national law grounded in the 
values of the national legal system” and on the other, the effectiveness of Union law1372.   
 
The Court determined that the ITWF and FSU action constituted a restriction on freedom of 
establishment, the fundamental nature of which was highlighted, with relative ease1373 
considering the impact of the action in rendering Viking’s exercise of freedom of 
establishment “less attractive or even pointless”1374.  This left the predominant discussion to 
the scope for the justification of such restrictions in respect of the FSU’s organisation of 
collective action, and the ITWF’s call for “solidarity” strikes, in line with its policy against 
flags of convenience.  The Court considered that the right to strike, if proportional and having 
“a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty…justified by overriding reasons of public 
interest” could constitute a justifiable restriction to free movement1375.  ITWF as well as the 
German, Irish and Finnish governments argued that the objective of protecting workers 
constituted a legitimate interest, overriding in the public interest1376.  The Court accepted this, 
following Schmidberger, and noted that the Union is of both an economic and social 
character1377 (characterised as a “social contract”1378 by Maduro), the dimensions of which 
must be balanced.  Having engaged with national, European and international law, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1370 Viking (n. 355), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.50-53. 
1371 It should be noted that the term “margin of discretion” is used in respect of the CJEU, and “margin of 
appreciation” with regard to the ECtHR. 
1372 Viking (n. 355), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.54. 
1373 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.68-70. 
1374 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, para.72. 
1375 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, para.75. 
1376 It is worth noting that the AG distinguishes collective action in the interest of jobs and conditions of current 
crew, and collective action to prevent an undertaking from providing services following relocation, and that to 
improve terms of workers throughout the Union.  The first must be considered in respect of whether it 
constitutes a breach of non-discrimination, and whether it is proportional (for the national court); the second will 
constitute a restriction on establishment, to be justified, and the third “in principle…constitutes a reasonable 
method of counter-balancing the actions of undertakings who seek to lower their labour costs by exercising their 
rights to freedom of movement”, which can be abused and so has to be limited; Opinion of AG Maduro, 
paras.65-70.  The Court similarly highlights the distinction in the action, and the solidarity action called for by 
ITWF, against “flags of convenience” in respect of protection of terms and conditions of employment (from the 
“case file”, the Court notes that ITWF would have called for such action, regardless of whether the employment 
conditions are at stake: Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.88-89); the determination is for the national court, and 
might depend on the “social model” in the national system and the extent to which the national court is willing to 
go in order to establish such an assertion, as the Court itself seems to reject establishing a broad socially-
orientated approach at the European in this context.   
1377 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.76-78. 
1378 Viking (n. 355), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.59-60. 
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the ECHR, the Union and COE Charters1379, the ILO conventions1380 and the CFR, the Court 
recognised the right to strike as a fundamental (yet not absolute) one, and as a general 
principle of Union law1381.   Following Schmidberger and Omega, both the AG and Court 
rejected the notion that this status necessitated that the right be deemed to fall outwith the 
scope of EU law but rather considered that the protection of fundamental rights constitutes a 
legitimate interest, which, if proportionate, could justify a restriction on economic 
freedoms1382.   
 
The Court made explicit reference to the “division of labour” between the courts: it provided 
guidance to the domestic courts, in respect of both the determination of worker protection and 
the proportionality assessment1383; notwithstanding, the final assessment is for the latter on 
the facts before it1384.  The action must have the objective of protecting workers; that is to say, 
jobs or conditions of employment must be “jeopardised or under serious threat” 1385 .  
Thereafter, to satisfy the proportionality requirement, the measure cannot go beyond what is 
necessary, which depends on whether alternative action is available or has been pursued1386.  
In identifying “common ground” underpinning this determination of “appropriateness”, the 
Court engaged the justifications advanced in the ECtHR in respect of trade union 
objectives1387, explicitly cross-referencing between ECHR and Union law.  
 
The facts of Laval are well known but merit brief consideration.  Laval, a Latvian 
construction firm had brought an action calling for a declaration of illegality, interim relief 
and compensation before the Swedish labour court (the court of final appeal in relation to 
collective agreements), in respect of collective action, engaged following Laval’s posting of 
Latvian workers to Sweden and the subsequent failure of negotiations for a collective 
agreement.  The collective action constituted the obstruction of a construction site - in respect 
of which Laval had a contract with Swedish town government - the effect of which was to 
basically preclude the operation of the site; Laval’s contract was subsequently terminated.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1379 The Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (09.12.1989) and the European Social Charter 
(18.10.1961). 
1380 Convention No.87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (09.07.1948) 
1381 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.43-44. 
1382 Viking (n. 355), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.24; Judgement, paras.46-47. 
1383 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, para.85. 
1384 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.79-80. 
1385 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.81 and 83. 
1386 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.84-87. 
1387 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, para.68, citing Syndicat national de la police belge v Belgium, 27.10.1975, A.19 
and Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v United Kingdom of 02.07.2002, 2002‑V, para.44. 
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The Posted Workers Directive made provisions for unions1388 however Swedish law had not 
transposed the relevant measures in the directive for the purposes of regulating the conditions 
and wages of posted workers 1389.  Rather Swedish law had continued to provide that unions 
could not take collective action purporting to elude an existing collective agreement; per the 
lex britannia, adopted prior to its 1995 accession to the EU, this prohibition was not 
applicable in relation to collective action against a foreign enterprise posting workers.  Rather, 
it had provided that unions should have been, for the purposes of negating scope for social 
dumping, able to exercise their autonomy to enter collective agreements with employers 
established in other Member States1390; this would have also allowed unions to take collective 
action (an established constitutional right1391) against employers who did not so agree1392.  
Essentially, the lex britannia provided that the Swedish unions were not required – in respect 
of their collective action – to respect the collective agreements between Laval and Latvian 
unions.  Laval brought an action for interim relief – an injunction precluding the action – and 
compensation; in November 2004, the Arbetsdomstolen - the Swedish labour court, rendering 
the preliminary reference1393 and final decision1394 - refused to satisfy Laval’s initial claim.  
Rather, it wanted to know if primary and secondary Union law (namely, Arts.18 (non-
discrimination) and 56 (freedom to provide services) TFEU, then Art.12 and 49 EC and 
Directive 96/71) precluded unions from engaging collective action in order to force an 
enterprise established outwith Sweden but posting workers therein, to accept and apply a 
Swedish collective agreement.  The questions referred concerned the compatibility of the 
collective action with the free movement and non-discrimination principles in primary law, 
and furthermore with the directive, where the action has the aim of forcing a foreign service 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1388 Directive 96/71/EC, O.J. 1997, L 18/1 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services. 
1389 Art.3 Directive 96/71, with the Swedish adopting neither of the two means set out in the directive, that is, 
state regulation on minimum wages, or the universal application of collective agreements. 
1390 The ‘Britannia’ Judgement of the Arbetsdomstolen, 1989, No.120, in which the court held that the provision 
of para.42 of the Law on Workers’ Participation 1976, om medbestämmande i arbetslivet ou 
medbestämmandelagen, (which prohibited collective action which had the purpose of repealing or amendment a 
collective agreement entered into by other parties), also applied in in respect of foreign parties.  The lex 
britannia of 1991 inserted provisions into the 1976 law, essentially excluding collective agreements between 
unions outside of Sweden from this limitation on collective actions, thus creating a difference between Swedish 
and foreign collective agreements. 
1391 Workers’ freedom of association and right to strike is established in Chp.2 of the Swedish Basic Law, 
Regeringsformen, and the Employment (Co-Determination in the Workplace) Act 1976, Medbestämmandelagen 
(MBL). 
1392 J. Malmberg, ‘The Collective Agreement as an Instrument for Regulation of Wages and Employment 
Conditions’ (2002) 43 Scan.Stud.Law. 190, pp.207-210, on “Outside Employers” in the Nordic countries, in 
general. 
1393 Case No. A 268/04, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al, Judgement No.49/05, 
29.04.2005. 
1394 Case No. A 268/04, Laval, Judgement No.89/09, 02.12.2009. 
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provider to sign a collective agreement and where the host system’s transposition of the 
directive did not make provision in respect of the terms and conditions of employment in a 
collective agreement.  Furthermore, the court asked whether Swedish law, including the MBL 
and the lex britannia, in respect of its application to the collective action of Swedish unions 
against foreign enterprises posting workers, should be precluded by the principles of freedom 
of movement and non-discrimination and the directive itself. 
 
The Court begun by reformulating the first question referred, concerning whether primary 
(namely Arts. 18 and 56 TFEU) and secondary EU law precludes union action which purports 
to force a provider of services established in another Member State to enter into negotiations 
for a collective agreement on pay, and terms and conditions, where some of those issues are 
dealt with in Directive 96/71, and others are not.  By virtue of PIL rules, workers are 
protected under the legal system of the Member State in which they work; to counter the 
difficulties that a firm operating across the EU might face, the directive provides an exception 
from this general rule in respect of “posted workers”.  
 
The collective action was initiated following Laval’s refusal to provide the wage requested by 
the union (even though Sweden adopted neither of the two provisions in Art.31395 for the 
purposes of regulating the wages of posted workers) and to sign the collective agreement, 
(some of the provisions of which provided for better conditions than those provided in the 
directive, while others extended beyond).  With regard to the scope for the Member States to 
determine terms and conditions, including wages, the Court held that the directive does not 
provide for full harmonisation and thus initially recognised the broad scope and means by 
which the national systems might have transposed the “non-harmonising” directive, thus 
accepting putative divergences between the national traditions, particularly in respect of the 
social and industrial regimes established therein.  The determination of the content of the 
rules has been deemed to be for the national legislature, providing that EU law is 
respected1396.  Yet the Court highlighted that Art.3 only establishes minimum rates of pay 
“lay[ing] down a nucleus of mandatory rules”1397 but that certain terms of the collective 
agreement went beyond this minimum standard; while Art.3(7) could not have precluded this, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1395 It is worth noting that in 2012, the Commission published a proposal for a new Posted Workers Directive 
COM(2012) 131 and a proposal for a Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
COM(2012) 130. 
1396 Laval (n.355), Judgement, para.68. 
1397 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.59-60. 
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the Court holds that this provision cannot be employed to force the enterprise via collective 
action to agree to more favourable terms1398.  Thus, Member States which do not establish 
wages per Art.3 cannot require foreign enterprises to negotiate and agree to rates demanded 
by the unions1399. 
 
The AG examined the labour cultures and traditions of the national orders, and in particular, 
the Swedish labour model1400; consequently, he considered that the autonomy-based approach 
of the Swedish legislature could not in itself reflect inadequate transposition1401.  From the 
AG’s Opinion, it is clear that a new/old Member State conflict is identifiable in the 
submissions as to Sweden’s correct implementation of the directive.  Thus, the Scandinavian 
systems, as well as Austria, France and Iceland supported Sweden’s assertion of correct 
implementation; the German, Spanish and Irish governments, as well as the Commission, 
“follow the same general line of reasoning” but considered that the terms and conditions in 
the collective agreement must either have fallen within Art.3(1) or have been caught by the 
public policy derogation; on the other hand, Laval, as well as the Estonian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Polish and Czech governments argued that the directive was implemented 
incorrectly1402.   
 
With regard to the compatibility of the collective action and Union law, and in respect of the 
scope for collective action under Swedish law, the Court distinguished between that action 
which purported to force Laval to negotiate on posted workers’ wages and that which 
purported to force the negotiation of a collective agreement, the terms of which would have 
transcended the minimum protection of the directive (by virtue of being more favourable or 
dealing with issues not included therein); the Court rather considered there to be incomplete 
implementation of the “nucleus” of the directive, to the extent that the Swedish law on the 
basis of which the union could have taken action, purported to force the enterprise to sign a 
collective agreement including “more favourable terms and conditions…as regards the 
matters referred to in Art.3(1)”, or on issues not included in the directive1403.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1398 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.78-80. 
1399 Laval (n.355), Judgement, para.70. 
1400 In respect of which, he makes reference to legal scholarship.   
1401 Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.180-182. 
1402 Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.166-169. 
1403 Laval (n.355), Judgement, para.99. 
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Both the AG and the Court rejected the argument, based on the social policy of the Union, per 
Art.153 TFEU (then Art.137 EC), that the right to take collective action fell outwith free 
movement provisions.  With reference to national and international law instruments, including 
the ECHR1404, ILO Conventions, Art.6(4), European Social Charter and the Charter on the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (which, as a political declaration, is not binding) and 
the CFR (which at the time was not binding), the Court recognised the right to strike as a 
fundamental one, and as a principle of Union law1405.  Arriving at this view, the AG who 
recognised the scope for divergences between the national traditions, was “not of the view 
that they must be examined exhaustively”1406; rather, building on Schmidberger and Omega, 
it was considered that the right had to be recognised as a “legitimate interest”, which, 
providing it satisfied the principle of proportionality, could have justified restrictions to the 
fundamental freedoms1407.  The AG and Court recognised the restriction of Art.56 TFEU (of 
horizontal effect) caused by the union’s collective action1408 and held that a restriction on 
freedom of establishment could be justified only if it pursued a legitimate interest “involving 
a real advantage that made a significant contribution to the social protection”, if it was 
compatible with the Treaty, in the “overriding public interest” and proportional1409. 
 
The public policy (including health and safety) dimensions of Laval were clear from the 
“balancing” undertaken by the Court.  The Court accepted that the public interest advanced - 
the protection of workers – might normally justify the restriction engendered by the collective 
action (and even the blockage of the site), considering, in particular, the social and economic 
character of the Union 1410 .  Notwithstanding, the Court rejected this objective as a 
justification in light of the facts of the case, where the action had the purpose of forcing the 
employer to enter an agreement the terms of which go beyond the nucleus of mandatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1404  Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para.68, citing C-540/03 Parliament v Council (Family 
Reunification) [2006] ECR I-5769, Judgement, para.38. 
1405 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.90-92. 
1406 Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.77-78.  It is worth noting that the AG only looks to those 
systems in which these rights and freedoms are protected in constitutional traditions and where there is explicit 
reference; thus, while there is no explicit constitutional right in England, the AG does not make reference to the 
exceptions provided therein.  Mengozzi rejects the need for “exhaustive review” of national rules because of the 
existence of the CFR, which essentially brings together the rights found in the different Member States.  This 
affirms the consideration made above, in respect of the legitimacy attributed to an international or European 
instrument by the Court, on the basis of the consensus of the Member States.  
1407 Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.81-83; Judgement, paras.94, 101 and 108. 
1408 Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para.161, and para.240; Judgement, paras.97-99. 
1409 The AG makes reference to ECHR case law which he considers should also be taken into consideration by 
the national courts, providing the preliminary reference with character of a kind of mechanism for dialogue 
between the national courts and ECtHR, Laval (n.355)Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.303-304. 
1410 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.102-105. 
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protection, and further, in respect of pay, where the action purported to force the employer to 
enter into a national “context characterised by a lack of provisions of any kind” and with 
which it is impossible or excessively difficult for the employer to comply1411.   
 
The domestic court’s second question concerned Swedish law; the MBL and lex britannia, 
precluded union action which purported to set aside a collective agreement to which a service 
provider was already party but limited this prohibition to terms and conditions to which 
Swedish law directly applied (i.e. the lex britannia exception), such that a foreign enterprise, 
posting workers, and which had entered into an agreement in another state, would not have 
been able to rely on the prohibition.  The Court found that the Swedish legislation – including 
the lex britannia, which operated for the purposes of facilitating the exercise and enforcement 
of the right to collective action – restricted free movement, per Art.52 and 56 TFEU1412.  
Further, the Court held that as the lex britannia failed to take notice of collective agreements 
already in existence in the state in which the economic undertaking (i.e. Laval) was 
established, it gave rise to discrimination, by drawing a distinction between Swedish and non-
Swedish agreements1413.  The Court further rejected the scope for the application of the 
“public policy, public security or public health” justification per Art.36 and 52 TFEU in order 
to justify the restriction with free movement.  Arts.52 and 56 TFEU (then 49 and 50 EC) were 
deemed to preclude such a condition.  
 
Thus, national law, as well as EU and international law played a key role in the determination 
of the need for a balance between economic freedoms and social rights; in such balancing 
exercises, there should not simply be a preference of one over the other, but it must be 
recognised that the Union has both economic and social purposes1414.  Balancing is deemed 
necessary for the purposes of avoiding a conflict between the exercise of the right and other 
rights or freedoms; there can be no adherence to hierarchy1415.  With respect to the character 
of the approaches and reasoning of the AG and Court, it seems that a distinction can be 
identified between the approaches to balancing reflecting, one the one hand, a social-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1411 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.108-111. 
1412 Laval (n.355), Judgement, para.120. 
1413 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.110 and 118, ex Art.46 and 49 EC. 
1414 Laval (n.355), Judgement, para.79. 
1415 Including, per CJEU precedent, the principle of non-discrimination: Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG 
Mengozzi, paras.84-86; 88-89. 
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protection orientated approach and on the other, a “liberal” market-orientated approach1416.  
Thus, while the Court – following Schmidberger and Omega – engages a “balancing” 
approach between the freedoms and rights, as opposed to falling in favour of one over the 
other, it nevertheless appears that the approach is a “classic market access” one1417.  These 
considerations are returned to below, in light of the operation of the “division of labour” in 
the national courts. 
 
II. The Management of Conflict in a Multi-Level Space: Identifying Synergies in the 
CJEU and National Courts 
 
This section firstly follows up on the Fransson and Melloni cases and their shaping of the 
character of the multi-level system of rights protection; thereafter, it aims to reiterate the 
different types of conflicts arising in the European sphere and further explore the effects of 
key CJEU decisions at the national, Union and international levels.  Thereafter, it analyses the 
role of the national courts in balancing fundamental rights and freedoms, on the basis of the 
guidance provided by the CJEU and looks to identify the CJEU’s recognition of the different 
values, and considerations relevant to this balancing exercise.  The framework that the CJEU 
advances for the purposes of managing such conflicts – namely, the balancing of rights and 
freedoms – is examined and the guidance it provides to the national courts explored.  
Thereafter, the legal, socio-economic, and political implications in the national cultures and 
traditions are explored, and the scope for cross-referencing and spillovers – of a cross-border 
and cross-sectoral nature - will be identified.  By engaging developments at the Union level, 
and beyond, the possible contribution to a European, or transnational, culture is explored.  
Thereafter, the analysis shifts to the scope for impact in the national contexts, and beyond the 
state.  Reactions can be identified from various sources, from the courts and legislatures and 
also from academic scholarship, newspaper reports 1418 , and from private and public 
organisations and civil society bodies.  These reactions establish that the putative influence of 
these judgements extend beyond the legal to the political, social and cultural dimensions of 
European integration.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1416 Compare Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, ‘Institutional Theories, EU Law and the Role of Courts for Developing a 
European Social Model’ in Neergaard et al, The Role of Courts in Developing a European Social Model (n.61), 
p.336, who is “less inclined to see in the decision of the court a denial of fundamental union rights…and even 
less so, a triumph of unfettered market freedoms over social policy concerns“. 
1417 C. Barnard, ‘Viking and Laval: An Introduction’ (2007-2008) 10 Cam.YB.Eur.Leg.Stud. 463, p.486. 
1418 There are a number cited in Barnard’s article, identifying a shift from a “pro-social model” reaction, 
following the AG Opinions to a “social-model undermined” reaction, following the judgement; Barnard, ‘Viking 
and Laval’ (n.1417), p.487, fn.141.  
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The cases of Fransson and Melloni have been outlined above.  The interpretations rendered of 
Arts.51 and 53 CFR shape its scope, application and interaction with national and 
international regimes; essentially, the cases concern the primacy of Union law, where primacy 
is understood to preclude the application of national constitutional law over Union law in a 
case of conflict1419.  While the CJEU seems to affirm the multi-level nature of fundamental 
rights protection, its interpretations also exemplify the notion of floors and ceilings of rights 
protection.  As noted above, both the ECHR, per Art.53, and the CFR, per Art.53, seem to 
establish themselves as “floors”, i.e. as providing minimum levels of protection, which would 
allow the Member States to set their own standards, providing they do not fall below this 
“floor”.  While the national courts in practice might raise the incompatibility of Union 
measures and the ECHR, it should not arise in theory.  Furthermore, while the Court in 
Melloni remarks that in so far as the Union had not yet acceded to the Convention, it “does 
not constitute…a legal instrument” and as such, Union law should not be understood as 
governing interrelations or potential conflicts arising between national law and the ECHR1420, 
both the CJEU and the ECtHR “cross-reference” and exercise a degree of mutual respect1421; 
the Court in Melloni also confirms that it aims to ensure conformity and will therefore 
examine ECHR jurisprudence1422. 
 
In Fransson, as noted above, the CJEU attributes a wide scope to the CFR via its 
interpretation of Art.51 and in the case before it, considered the relevant connection could be 
drawn with Union law.  While the CJEU provided that “national authorities and courts remain 
free to apply national standards…provided that the level of protection provided for by the 
Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law 
are not thereby compromised”1423, which would seem to advance the CFR as a “floor” of 
protection, it also essentially, together with Melloni, establishes a burden on those who claim 
for a higher standard of protection – of national or international origin – to establish that the 
principles of primacy, supremacy and effectiveness would not be undermined.  As a result, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1419 This would be the approach followed in Hauer (n.701) whereby the CJEU would not look to the level of 
protection of any particular national tradition. 
1420 Fransson (n.1287), Judgement, para.44. 
1421 Not to mention the other problems with the Bosphorus judgement, the ECtHR held that “the protection of 
fundamental rights by Community law [is] ... “equivalent” ... to that of the Convention system”; Bosphorus 
Airways v Ireland, no.45036/98, 30.06.2005, para.165. 
1422 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, para.50. 
1423 Fransson (n.1287), Judgement, para.29. 
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the CFR might come to be understood as a default maximum level of protection.  In Melloni, 
the Court specifically rejected that the Spanish court could rely on Art.53 to engage a higher 
(national) degree of protection, considering that such an interpretation thereof “cannot be 
accepted” as it would “allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in 
compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that 
State’s constitution”1424.  Essentially, this decision establishes Union standards of protection 
as the “ceiling” where national and Union competences in this area overlap.   
 
Both cases have given rise to criticism from academic and judicial perspectives.  In particular, 
the BverfG1425 has challenged the CJEU’s finding, in Fransson, of a connection with Union 
law, as well as the consequent extension of its own jurisdiction1426.  It has rejected the notion 
that the facts of the case fell within the CFR’s scope, considering that any effect on Union law 
would have been indirect; against the background of the “cooperative relationship” it 
considers to exist between the courts, it has indicated that it will engage a narrow 
understanding of the CJEU’s interpretation of Art.51.  Following Melloni, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, shifting from previous approaches, has interpreted its own constitutional 
norms so as to ensure that it falls in line with the supremacy of Union law1427.  The 
foundations of the Spanish decision are diverse.  On the one hand, it engaged ECtHR 
jurisprudence, in which it had been considered that no violation of Art.6 ECHR could occur if 
the right to be physically present at a trial had been waived by the relevant party1428; this 
jurisprudence was referenced by the court notwithstanding that it had not been followed in a 
previous case1429, suggesting that the decision could not be deemed to be based on the ECHR 
jurisprudence itself.  On the other hand, it considered that the CJEU’s response and its own 
final decision had to be rendered in line with the SSC Declaration 1/2004 on the Lisbon 
Treaty, which sets out the relationship between the Spanish courts and the CJEU1430.  Yet the 
Spanish court did not explicitly state that its shift in approach directly resulted from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1424 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, paras.57-58. 
1425 Judgement of 24.04.2013, 1 BvR 1215/07.   
1426 Indeed, in the case itself a number of Member States as well as the Commission, had made interventions 
arguing that the Swedish authorities could not be deemed to be “implementing Union law”; moreover, the AG 
found no such connection. 
1427 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional, Auto de 26/2014 de 13.02.2014, recurso 6922-2008 
<http://boe.es/boe/dias/2014/03/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2014-2650.pdf>; Last Accessed: 25.03.2014). 
1428 Sejdovic v Italy (2004) ECtHR, 10.11.2004, App.No.6581/00, paras.82 et seq. 
1429 Sala Segunda. Auto de 177/2006, de 5.06.2006 (BOE núm. 161, de 7.07.2006) and Sala Primera. Auto de 
199/2009 de 28.09.2009 (BOE núm. 254, de 21.10.2009). 
1430 It essentially provides that powers can be transferred providing there remains respect for some characteristics 
of the Spanish constitution, including, sovereignty, fundamental values, and constitutional structures. 
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CJEU’s decision.  Indeed, two different approaches are identifiable in the decision; on the one 
hand, in the majority opinion, Art.24, Spanish Constitution is reinterpreted, and on the other, 
in the concurring opinions1431, an interpretation is advanced, engaging Art.93, Constitution 
and thus utilising EU law as a references in respect of the interpretation of fundamental rights 
harmonised at the Union level1432.  Ultimately, against the background of the CJEU’s 
interpretation, the Spanish court rejected Mr Melloni’s argument on the basis of his 
constitutional claim, a decision that nevertheless seems to be limited to those cases in which 
there has been an indirect violation of the Spanish Constitution.   
 
The CJEU’s approach seems to clearly aim at advancing a harmonised level of fundamental 
rights protection across the Union space, by virtue of its interpretation of Arts.51 and 53, 
provisions inserted into the CFR by the Member States for the very purpose of limiting the 
scope of the Union regime.  While the focus on uniformity might undermine the scope for 
reference to and the acknowledgement of divergent national and international levels of 
fundamental protection, the affirmation of the multi-level nature of rights protection in the 
European space also allows for developments at these different levels to be engaged as re-
interpretations are rendered by the CJEU1433.  Furthermore, within this multi-level space, 
Art.4(2) TEU - engaged by the CJEU in Sayn-Wittgenstein1434 - provides for explicit reference 
to national “constitutional” identities and the relevant legal norms therein; it underpins a 
pluralist perspective of development, facilitated by reference to the commonality and diversity 
of national approaches via comparative analysis, and the scope for judicial dialogue.  Art.4(2) 
allows for the identification of common and divergent standards of fundamental rights 
protection across the Union space, as well as evolutionary developments in such regimes; the 
existence of relevant changes and their manifestations across the Member States and at the 
international level might be identifiable over time and space via the CJEU’s engagement with 
comparative analysis1435.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1431 Of Justices Asua, Roca and Ollero in STC 26/2014 (n.1427). 
1432 The descent of Melloni provides that Art.93 Constitution does not make EU law part of the constitutional 
canon.  See judgments Pleno. Auto de 28/1991 de 14.02.1991 (BOE núm. 64 de 15.03.1991) and Sala Segunda 
Auto de 41/2002 de 25.02.2002 (BOE núm. 80 de 3.04.2002). 
1433 F. Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe (OUP, Oxford; 2014), pp.41-42. 
1434 Previously in Omega, the CJEU had engaged national values, legitimising a public policy restriction to free 
movement based on human dignity interpreted by the German court, recognising that such “local values”, which 
the CJEU acknowledged give rise to public policy considerations which diverge across the Member States, could 
be engaged. 
1435 Of the “evaluative comparison” engaged by the AG in Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.94. 
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Not only have Melloni and Fransson confirmed the supremacy of Union law, and particularly, 
its level of rights protection, over national constitutional law and international law where 
there is an overlap in competence but furthermore, the CJEU has essentially opened the scope 
for the extension of its jurisdiction and its establishment at the apex of this multi-level 
construct as the institution responsible for resolving future conflicts in respect of the 
interaction of national, Union and international protection.  The following section aims to 
uncover the nature of conflicts arising, in light of the analysis of the cases above, and the role 
of the CJEU and the national courts in the management of these conflicts.   
 
i. The Jurisdiction and Role of the National Court as a Conflict-Resolution 
Institution 
 
The cases illustrate the breadth of conflicts that might arise in the context of the multi-level 
protection of fundamental rights.  The conflicts are not merely of a broad nature, that is, 
between fundamental rights and national norms, or between fundamental rights and freedoms 
but are rather multi-dimensional and increasingly nuanced.  One dimension of the conflict in 
Omega concerned the promotion of public policy considerations, underpinning which is 
respect for the fundamental principle of human dignity, on the one hand, and the resulting 
interference with free movement, on the other.  Viking and Laval concerned the effect of the 
collective industrial action on freedom of establishment and the free movement of workers; 
both cases also engaged an additional East/West, ”social dumping” dimension.  Across the 
cases, there also existed a broader conflict (of a kind), namely, the determination of those 
competences attributed to the Union, and those remaining with the Member States (per 
Art.153 and provision (5) TFEU, ex Art.137 EC)1436.  These conflicts might also be 
characterised as “freedom versus solidarity”, or “social versus liberal” conflicts, underpinning 
both of which is a broad range of ideological considerations.   
 
Generally, and very broadly, the constitutionalisation of private law has been conceived as 
setting autonomy, reflected in the freedom of private parties, against solidarity, reflected in 
the protection of fundamental rights.  The cases discussed can arguably be conceived as such 
but the characterisation is more complex; the former concerned not only the freedom of 
Omega to make the game available but of the British supplier to provide the materials for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1436 N. Reich, ‘Free Movement v Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – the Laval and Viking Cases Before the 
ECJ’ (2008) 9 GLJ 125, p.127. 
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such a purpose, and further, the choice of the individual to engage with the activity, i.e. to 
play the game; herein, the autonomy underpinned the free movement.  With regard to Viking 
and Laval, the social autonomy of the labour unions, on the one hand, and of the national 
social models, on the other 1437  (which most likely differ between national traditions) 
underpins the exercise of the fundamental right.  Yet the autonomy – freedom of movement 
and of establishment - of the enterprises was similarly significant, as was the solidarity that 
underpinned the collective action.  In both cases, the private parties, attributing to the conflict 
its horizontal character, were not private individuals but economic enterprises and social 
associations1438; the cases illustrate that the CJEU will connect Union law and private law 
relationships between legitimate state interests, the principle of non-discrimination and the 
fundamental rights of individuals.  
 
In Schmidberger it was considered that “fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction on a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the EC Treaty, such 
as the free movement of goods”1439.  The Court recognised in Laval that free movement can 
be limited; with regard to previous jurisprudence1440, the distinction can be made in terms of 
where the “power” is held.  In Defrenne, power rested in the hands of the employer, and in 
Viking and Laval, in the hands of the unions; it is this power, to force the employer to 
negotiate and conclude an agreement which constitutes the restriction1441.  The determination 
of legitimate interferences, which restrict free movement, has been recognised as a balancing 
exercise, in line with the principle of proportionality.  The balancing task is to be undertaken 
at the national level "at the stage of application...of the legislation implementing the 
directive...between the rights and interests involved"1442.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1437 Reich, ‘Free Movement v Social Rights in an Enlarged Union’ (n.1436), p.132. 
1438 Angonese, concerning a national collective (employment relationship, essentially a private agreement 
providing for the organisation of workers) agreement requiring satisfaction of a linguistic test, confirms the 
vertical and horizontal direct effect of free movement: Angonese (n.1230), Judgement, para.34. 
1439 Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, paras.74-75. 
1440 Including Defrenne, in which the CJEU attributed horizontal direct effect to Art.157 TFEU (then Art.119 
EC) in respect of equal pay (including labour agreements), C-43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, 
Judgement, para.39. 
1441 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, paras.72-73 and Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.99-100.  This can also be very 
clearly identified from AG Maduro, Viking (n. 355), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.70. 
1442 NS (n.1249), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.85. 
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A national dimension can also be identified in the conflicts in Viking and Laval, that is, a very 
crude East/West distinction, in the context of enlargement1443.  Before considering the nature 
of the conflict and the CJEU’s reasoning, an interrelated consideration, reflected throughout 
this thesis in the constitution of the CJEU and the bifurcated analysis of the case law1444, and 
concerning the construction of the chamber hearing each of the cases, can be explored.  In 
Laval, the judgement was rendered by the Grand Chamber, including four judges from the 
recently acceded Member States, namely Makarczyk (Poland), Kūris (Lithuania), and Levits 
(Latvia).  The juge rapporteur in the case – Uno Lõhmus – is Estonian, having been an 
academic, a judge of the ECtHR and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Estonia, prior to 
taking his seat at the CJEU in 20041445.  Similarly, in Viking, the Grand Chamber included the 
same four judges of the recently acceded states, with a Luxembourgeois juge rapporteur.  The 
conflicts concerned the protection of free movement (predominantly in respect of workers and 
enterprises – employers - in the “new” Member States) and the protection of union rights 
(predominantly in respect of the social systems in the “Western” Member States, and trade 
unions’ concerns about the inundation of cheap “Eastern” labour, and the consequent 
undermining of labour conditions).  Within the Nordic tradition in general, the social welfare 
system has been inherently tied to the nation state, its structure and the relationship 
established between the state, the labour market participants and the unions1446.  A number of 
restrictions on the free movement of workers and freedom of establishment in the new 
Member States putatively arise, none of which applied to enterprises established in the 
acceding Member States or in “old” Member States, which might seek to re-establish therein 
to take advantage of the cheap labour available.  This East/West distinction highlights 
divergent perspectives on the need to balance the exercise and protection of economic 
freedoms (on the part and to the advantage of the new Member States) and the protection of 
fundamental rights (on the part of the Western Member States, and in particular, their national 
social welfare systems).  It is important to note that even within the “Western” States, welfare 
systems diverge.  The UK was however the exception in supporting the position adopted by 
Estonia and Latvia in its submissions.  Pollicino identifies a distinction in the approach to 
conflict between fundamental rights and freedoms due to enlargement, from justification with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1443 In Viking, the English courts founded jurisdiction because the defendant (Viking Line having sought an 
injunction) ITWF, has its offices – principle place of business, per Art.60 - in London Brussels I, per Regulation 
44/2001, Art.2. 
1444 See Chapter 4.  
1445 <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/>; Last Accessed: 23.04.2013. 
1446 Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, ‘Institutional Theories, EU Law and the Role of Courts for Developing a European 
Social Model’ in Neergaard et al, The Role of Courts in Developing a European Social Model (n.61), p.332. 
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reference to a “majoritarian activist approach”, prior to Omega, (which Pollicino engages as a 
kind of benchmark case splitting the pre- and post-accession environments), “to a post-
accession reference to the required protection, at least in the most sensitive cases, of the 
fundamental rights peculiar even to a single Member State’s Constitutional identity”1447.  He 
argues that the “new” CEE Member States make a “strong, identity-based demand of 
recognition”1448, which, across the national cultures and traditions, might be tied to the 
CJEU’s willingness to recognise the significance of national constitutional values (reflected – 
as asserted above - in the public policy considerations underpinning the invocation of rights, 
and also freedoms) invoked in the national court’s balancing exercise.   
 
The fundamental rights argument is invoked in different ways in each of the cases.  From 
Schmidberger and Omega, for example, it is clear that the private individual defends the 
private interest and the public authority protects “national” values: “the private X may have a 
public authority under EU law.  This is potentially disturbing for the social policy of the state 
but also for the structural features of the national system of private law”1449.  Furthermore, 
from Viking and Laval (as well as Albany1450 – concerning the exemption of social actors, 
with “social policy” interests, from competition law rules) it seems that, where the conflict 
arises between economic freedoms and fundamental rights, both dimensions invoke policy 
considerations, potentially rendering different repercussions depending on the area of law.  
Firstly, this will be relevant in the determination of whether the conflict engages Union law; 
for example, while in Albany the “social policy” aims arising from the collective agreements 
resulted in the determination that such agreements fell outwith EU law, in Viking and Laval 
the CJEU rejected the argument analogising Albany, and rather held that union action fell 
within the scope of EU law. 
 
The invocation of fundamental rights as a justification to restriction of freedoms falls to the 
discretion of national courts, in line with EU law and on the basis of “public policy, public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1447 Pollicino, ‘The New Relationship Between National and the European Courts After the Enlargement of 
Europe’ (n.223), p.92.  Although see M. Avbely, ‘European Court of Justice and the Question of Value Choices: 
Fundamental Human Rights as an Exception to the Freedom of Movement of Goods’ Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No. 6/2004, who considers that in fact there is a shift from the national as the majority, to the national as 
the minority and the favour of the “European demos”. 
1448 Pollicino, ‘The New Relationship Between National and the European Courts After the Enlargement of 
Europe’ (n.223), p.92. 
1449 Azoulai, ‘The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence’ in Micklitz and de Witte, The 
European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.1239), p.215. 
1450 Albany (n.1366), Judgement, para.60. 
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security or health” (per Art.36 and 52 TFEU, then Art.30 and 46 EC).  Public policy, shaping 
the relevant circumstances of the justification of the derogation, potentially engages a “margin 
of discretion” in respect of national interests, where public policy might diverge “from one 
country to another and from one period to another”1451, and between its national and European 
conception.  The public policy consideration is restricted by the CJEU’s recognition (without 
detailing substantive content) of the need for a “genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the 
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”1452.  The 
determination of a sufficiently serious threat is nevertheless for the national court, in line with 
the principles of appropriateness and proportionality.  EU “law does not impose upon the 
Member States a uniform scale of values”; the assessment may therefore differ depending on 
the specific issue and as such the national courts exercise discretion, “in particular in areas 
that are especially sensitive ideologically or associated with particular risks”1453.   
 
By bringing together the interference with the fundamental freedoms, which underpin the 
economic Union, and the fundamental rights, and asserting that these must be 
“reconciled” 1454 , in line with the governing principles of the Union (particularly, 
proportionality), the CJEU arguably undermines the “very autonomy of Member States’ 
labour and social constitutions”1455; Joerges and Rödl thus characterise the relevant conflicts 
as examples of “asymmetrical (diagonal) interlinking”1456 (the “interlinking” established by 
the CJEU).  This requires consideration of the interaction between the orders, which arises – 
particularly in respect of the national courts and the CJEU via the preliminary reference 
procedure. 
 
Reference has been made above to the crucial role of constitutional courts in protecting 
fundamental rights as an explanation for the initial silence of the Treaties.  That is to say, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1451 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.97 (citing C-41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, 
Judgement, paras.18-19 and C-54/99 Église de scientologie [2000] ECR I-1335, Judgement, para.17); 
Judgement, paras.31-32. 
1452 C-30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR I-1999, Judgement, paras.33-35; Judgement, para.30, citing C-54/99 
Église de Scientologie [2000] ECR I-1335, Judgement, para.17, in which it is clear that this understanding of 
public policy is relatively well established, with a case from 1975 being cited: C-36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR I-
1219. 
1453 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, paras.101-102. 
1454 Viking (n. 355), Judgement, para.45, citing the approach in Omega. 
1455 C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘On the ‘Social Deficit’ of the European Integration Project and its Perpetuation 
through the ECJ Judgements in Viking and Laval’ Recon Online Working Paper 2008/06, p.11. 
1456 Joerges and Rödl, ‘On the ‘Social Deficit’’ (n.1455), p.11. 
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certain national courts1457 argued that fundamental rights protection is most appropriately 
assured within the domestic courts1458.  It is therefore for national courts, in line with national 
law, to assess the facts and to make the determination as to the satisfaction of the conditions 
of proportionality1459.  The proportionality test is key to the balancing exercise, and it is the 
latter which shapes the impact on national law; as Collins notes, “ultimately, the impact of 
human rights law on private law will turn on how competing rights will be reconciled.  At the 
core of every private law dispute exists a contest between rights of individuals”1460. 
 
It has been noted that the identification of a connecting factor between national and EU law, 
the protection of fundamental rights being dependent on another secondary EU law rule1461, is 
often controversial.  Azoulai has considered that where Union law is invoked (e.g. in the 
transposition and interpretation of directives1462), the CJEU has taken the foundation of 
fundamental rights protection from the national level and transferred it to the EU level, 
building on the notions of commonality and generality identified from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States1463.  This “expansion” of both the CJEU’s jurisdiction and 
role has given rise to a number of issues of legality and legitimacy, which underpin the 
integrity (if any exists) of fundamental rights protection.   
 
It must be recognised that the EU is not the appropriate level for balancing; rather, a kind of 
division of labour exists1464, which might be said to reflect the empowerment of referring 
courts: where the “power” in respect of the protection of fundamental rights was transplanted 
from the national courts to the EU level (that is, to the CJEU), it is then given back to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1457 For example, the ECHR is a guide to interpretation in German law, without having the same rank as the 
German Basic Law, as is the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; BVerfGE 128, 326 and BVerfGE 111, 307.  The wide 
interpretation of Art.51(1) CFR has been criticised by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht,  BVerfGE, 1 BvR 
1215/07. 
1458 The jurisdiction of the CJEU on the basis that the case falls within Union law remains controversial; for 
example, in the Mangold case, the connecting factor is not very clear. 
1459 The application of this proportionality test might be more difficult in some systems than in others.  This is 
true in certain courts, and in respect of certain areas of law (including, for example, labour law in the English 
and Scottish courts), in respect of which there has been a solid attempt to avoid politicisation.  Furthermore, the 
“absence of knowledge” of the principle of proportionality – finds its origins in the civilian, particularly, the 
German tradition is potentially problematic (M. Reimann and J. Zekoll, Introduction to German Law (Kluwer, 
The Hague; 2005), p.76 – the notion of “Grundsatz der Verhaltnismässigkeit”). 
1460 H. Collins 'The Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law in Europe' University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law Research Paper No. 13/2011, p.15. 
1461 C-117/01 KB [2004] ECR I-0541. 
1462 C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I-271. 
1463 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256). 
1464 Lindqvist (n.309). 
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national courts1465.  Azoulai engages this division of labour as a reflection of the protection of 
national identity (and by extension, the collective of citizens) in light of the constitutional 
identity of the Member States, has been attributed to the Member States.  However, per Laval, 
he notes that the protection of this identity only engages in respect of state identity and not 
that of social organisations: thus “what the CJEU had previously granted to Member States, it 
then refused to grant to trade unions”1466. 
  
While the balancing of rights and freedoms is for the national courts, the CJEU as recognised 
that it “must provide all the criteria of interpretation required” for a determination as to the 
compatibility of national law with Union law to be made1467.  The consequence of such 
reasoning is that the impact on the Member States should be characterised as formal as 
opposed to substantive; that is to say, the CJEU might provide guidance to the national courts, 
but not as to the substantive outcome of the relevant case1468.  While the CJEU might want to 
make clear to national courts (and the Member States more generally) what is acceptable and 
what is not in terms of broad public policy considerations policy in this balancing exercise, its 
policy dictates that, even if the final conclusion is obvious and can be easily identified by 
“reading between the lines”, the determination will nevertheless be left to the national court. 
 
Balancing provides for the constitutionalisation of private across and between the national, 
European and international cultures and traditions1469; where the task falls to the national 
courts, this constitutionalisation essentially occurs within these diverse cultures and traditions.   
The CJEU has recognised that national values, whether moral, religious or cultural, are 
relevant for the purposes of justifying reliance on the margin of appreciation in the national 
systems1470.  The balancing task of the national court might concern the balancing of values of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1465 Azoulai, ‘The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence’ in Micklitz and de Witte, The 
European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.1239), p.217. 
1466 Azoulai, ‘The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence’ in Micklitz and de Witte, The 
European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.1239), p.217. 
1467 C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] ECR I-10369, Judgement, paras.34-35 citing C‑260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, 
para.42, and C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland [1991] ECR I-4685, Judgement, 
para.31.  The case concerned national procedures of the application of the (then) Community Customs Code, and 
in particular the principle of the right of the defence. 
1468 O. Cherednychenko, ‘EU Fundamental Rights, EC Fundamental Freedoms and Private Law’ (2006) 14 
ERPL 24, p.60. 
1469 See V. Kosta, ‘International Market Legislation and the Private Law of the Member States: The Impact of 
Fundamental Rights’ in ‘The Impact of the Internal Market on Private Law of Member Countries’ EUI Working 
Paper 2009/22, p.29. 
1470 Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, para.82 and C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-0505, Judgement, 
para.44 (in the former, the wide margin of discretion is recognised and any restrictions must be subject to the 
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the Member States and those of the Union, or the balancing of Union (and international) 
values.  The task falls to the domestic court to bring “fundamental national values into 
accordance with EU provisions taking account of the specific features of the national 
state”1471.  The deference to the national systems as to their domestic values might also be 
extended to notions of national identity, the connections between which have been explored 
in Parts I and II; this is recognised in Sayn-Wittgenstein, in which the Court, engaged in the 
assessment of a restriction of free movement of persons on public policy grounds, highlighted 
that the Union must “respect the national identities of its Member States” per Art.4(2) 
TEU1472.   The reception of national identities within the broader integration process arises on 
the one hand, from the need to respect national constitutional identity; to the extent that 
fundamental rights protection broadly falls within the constitutional jurisdiction of the 
Member States’ courts, the fundamental rights cases before the CJEU establish a passageway 
through which national identities become ever-increasingly significant at the Union level1473.  
AG Maduro has asserted that “De même que le droit communautaire prend en compte 
l’identité constitutionnelle des États membres, de même le droit constitutionnel national doit 
s’adapter aux exigences de l’ordre juridique communautaire“1474, suggesting that these 
identities undergo a process of change from the national to the Union level.   
 
On the one hand, the CJEU clearly recognises the significance and scope of value-based 
choices in the Member States and attempts to ensure these national values are balanced with 
the economic values of the Union, “reassuring” the Member States, especially the new ones, 
that their interests will not be wholly disregarded in favour of those of the Union; on the other 
hand, the Court obviously continues to promote an integrationist approach.  Tridimas 
describes Omega as an “integration model based on value diversity”1475; that is to say, the 
CJEU renders a judgement which furthers the integration process but by virtue of which it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proportionality test; in the latter, given “inter alia, moral or cultural” views, the states’ margin of discretion must 
be understood as “definite”). 
1471 Azoulai, ‘The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence’ in Micklitz and de Witte, The 
European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.1239), p.216; Azoulai makes reference to 
C-353/06 Grunkin-Paul [2008] ECR I-07639. 
1472 C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I-13693, Judgement, para.92, in respect of the law on the abolition 
of the nobility, which has constitutional status, is deemed to be reflective of national identity, implements the 
principle of equal treatment and the removal by the Austrian state of the “nobility” part of a name (where that 
name had previously been registered in another Member State). 
1473 D. Ritleng, “Le droit au respect de l’identité constitutionelle nationale’ in J-D. Mouton et J-C. Barbato (eds.), 
Vers la reconnaissance de droits fondamentaux aux Etats membres de l’Union européenne? (Bruylant, 
Bruxelles; 2010), pp.22-47. 
1474 C-213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I-9999, Opinion of AG Maduro, para.33. 
1475 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd edn., 2006), p.341. 
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also seems to attempt to balance the predominantly economic values of the Union with 
diverse national and international values, without deriving or constructing an unambiguous 
common understanding to be shared across the Union.   
 
The Court has considered that it is not “indispensable” that the protection offered is shared or 
common in all national systems but recognises that both the level of protection afforded in the 
national system and the national values “inter alia, moral or cultural” underpinning the 
protection, may diverge; as such, a margin of discretion must be recognised and 
maintained1476.  The line of fundamental rights jurisprudence arguably reflects a plural 
understanding of the existence of various constitutional ideals in the Union context, including 
those not necessarily restricted to the market. 
 
Following the inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty, of Art.4(2) TEU, a provision requiring that the 
Union “respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government” (and the deletion, from the Draft Constitution of the 
provision explicitly enshrining the principle of primacy), Kumm has asserted that the shifting 
conception of the supremacy principle dictates that the CJEU must render interpretations of 
EU law which guide the national court, and facilitate the balancing of constitutional, identity-
shaping values with the economic ones of the Union1477.  This understanding, which arguably 
reflects a more “compromised” understanding of supremacy, has been tied to the 
consequences of enlargement, as explored above1478.  Yet while the CJEU – particularly, AG 
Mengozzi in Laval1479 – seems to reject the notion of a hierarchy or ranking of primary Union 
law norms, it is clear that, in most cases, fundamental rights are engaged by the CJEU in a 
particular way as a justification for Treaty derogations, which undermines this equal ranking 
“plurality of values”.  On this basis, Davies characterises the CJEU’s invocation of rights as 
“defensive”1480. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1476 C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-0505, Judgement, para.48. 
1477 M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and 
After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) ELJ 262, pp.298 and 303, respectively.  
1478 Pollicino, ‘The New Relationship Between National and the European Courts After the Enlargement of 
Europe’ (n.223), p.97-98. 
1479 Laval (n.355), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para.84. 
1480 A.C.L. Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 
In.L.J. 126, p.139. 
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In Viking, the Court asserted, via its interpretation of the Treaties, that the Union should be 
characterised not only in terms of the internal market but also in terms of social protection (ex 
Art.2 and 3 EC), illustrating the need to balance the economic and social “purposes” of the 
Union 1481 .  Even where it seems that the right “triumphs” over the freedom (as in 
Schmidberger and Omega), the economic freedom is validated as the primary norm, from 
which derogations – interpreted narrowly – must be justified.  This justification is not to be 
found in the right itself but with what AG Trstenjak describes as “written or unwritten 
grounds of justification” (which seemingly, would include considerations of public policy, 
illustrating the “public interest”, as noted above); the AG further asserts that “the approach 
adopted in Viking Line and Laval…sits uncomfortably alongside the principle of equal 
ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms”1482, the balancing test advocated 
in Schmidberger and the “equal ranking” being “central” therein1483.  Trstenjak highlights the 
significance of the proportionality test – of appropriateness, necessity and reasonableness1484 - 
as a means of concretising the notion that not only must the restriction of a fundamental 
freedom by a fundamental right be proportional but the restriction of a fundamental right by a 
fundamental freedom must similarly be proportional; only on this basis can the rights and 
freedoms be understood to be equal.  The CJEU’s approach can be contrasted with that of the 
ECtHR, where the burden of proof is reversed.  On the basis of the European Social Charter 
and Art.11 ECHR, - the freedom of assembly and association – the ECtHR has recognised 
and developed the right to take collective action1485.  Both the AG and the Court in Viking and 
Laval engage with the ECHR and its jurisprudence, and additionally, in certain cases, the ESC 
and the CFR, the process of balancing in both courts differs; arguably this comparison reflects 
the way in which the economic dimension dominates the CJEU’s decision making, despite its 
seeming openness to a plurality of Union values.   
 
Viking and Laval, as well as Schmidberger and Omega, are often bundled together, failing to 
account for the key distinctions between the cases; one such distinction – in particular, with 
regard to the relationship between the national and EU order, and more specifically, the courts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1481 Viking (n.355), Judgement, paras.78-79. 
1482 C-271/08 Commission v. Germany [2010] ECR I-7091, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.183. 
1483 C-271/08 Commission v. Germany [2010] ECR I-7091, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.195. 
1484 Also per the proportionality assessment in Art.51(2) CFR; see also, C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, 
highlighted by Trstenjak, in which the Court seems to recognise the notion that  
1485 More recently than Viking and Laval, Demir and Baykara v Turkey, A.No.34503/97, 12.12.2008 (and 
therein, on the recognition and development of the right to strike, paras.140-146) and Enerji Tapi-Tol Sen v 
Turkey, A.No.68959/01, 21.04.2009. 
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– concerns the finality of the CJEU judgements.  A scale of “conclusiveness” can be 
constructed in respect of the CJEU judgement and the discretion left to the national courts.  In 
Laval, the Court held that Swedish law – the lex britannia - was incompatible with EU law; it 
rendered a comprehensive determination that the Swedish union could not attempt to force the 
Latvian enterprise by means of collective action to enter into a collective agreement, nor 
could it rely on the exception established in the lex britannia, which would require it to make 
a distinction between Swedish and foreign bodies.  The scope for the effect is clear in relation 
to Laval, at least in respect of the Swedish system, and less clear in Viking, given the absence 
of a final decision.  In Omega, the Court rendered a relatively concrete answer: while the 
determination of the relevant national rights was for the national court, the Court indicated 
that it would provide guidance as to the balancing of the rights and freedoms 1486 .  
Notwithstanding, the Court was clearly unwilling to engage to too great an extent with what 
would occur at the national level; thus, there was no consideration of the issues relevant to the 
particular private relationship, including the contract, between Omega and the British 
company, Pulsar.  Nor was the possibility of remedies considered at the EU level in Laval1487; 
the CJEU left the final decision to the national court.  These degrees of conclusiveness reflect, 
from the perspective of the national court, the level of discretion exercisable in its final 
decision. 
 
ii. The Balancing Exercise as a Means of Addressing Diversity 
 
Policy considerations and choices necessarily diverge across the national, Union and 
international levels; when these form part of judicial reasoning – in particular, by virtue of 
engagement of fundamental rights argumentation, as Mak has asserted1488 – it is necessary to 
consider if these divergences are accounted for, and if so, on what basis.  Public policy seems 
to be engaged not only to establish an equilibrium at the EU and national levels but for the 
very purposes of allowing for consideration of the distinct nature of the systems of protection 
– and in particular, the various dimensions and constitutional sensitivities, predominantly the 
social, cultural and often political – in the multi-level space of protection.  Yet, as Azoulai 
notes, the invocation of public policy considerations concern not only rights but also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1486 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, para.34.  The (relatively limited- extent of the “guidance” provided contributes 
to the lack of concreteness. 
1487 See J. Malmberg, ‘Trade Union Liability for ‘EU-Unlawful’ Collective Action’ (2012) 2 Eur.Lab.Law.J. 5. 
1488 Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law (n.1232). 
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freedoms; that is, while they might operate to limit fundamental rights; the effect on any 
understanding of national identity is not clear1489.  This applies more specifically to the 
“national regimes of protection” and the divergent factors engaged in the determination of the 
balance.   
 
In light of the diversities existing, the CJEU therefore recognises a margin of appreciation on 
the part of the national courts but has long considered the need to ensure the objectives of 
Union fundamental rights protection are satisfied 1490 .  In Productores de Música de 
España1491, concerning a conflict of rights arising from competition, intellectual property and 
consumer data protection issues, in the context of secondary Union law1492, between two 
private parties, the national court raised the application of the CFR.  The CJEU established 
that the balancing of rights is for the national courts but recognised that a discretion exists; 
when implementing and interpreting the directives “a “fair balance [should] be struck” 
between conflicting rights, which must also be compatible with fundamental rights and 
principles recognised at the EU level1493.  This not only seems to reinforce the existence of a 
margin of appreciation but also similarly confirms that the CJEU is reluctant to construct a 
benchmark, which should be applied in a uniform manner by national courts in the balancing 
of fundamental freedoms and rights.   
 
Social, labour and welfare systems diverge across the EU; these divergences transcend the 
crude East/West distinction highlighted above.  Strike action, and the right to strike in 
particular, is of cultural, political, economic and legal significance across Europe, related to 
periods of social and civil resistance1494.  Within Western Europe, certain states do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1489 Azoulai, ‘The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence’ in Micklitz and de Witte, The 
European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (n.1239), p.215 citing Joined Cases C-305/85 
and C-142/86 UK v Commission [1988] ECR I-5813. 
1490 That is to say, to avoid the situation in which different national standards undermine the effectiveness of 
Union law; see recently, C-206/13 Siragusa, nyr, Judgement, paras.31 et seq.  
1491 C-275/06 Productores de Música de España [2008] ECR I- 271. 
1492 Including Directive 2000/31/EC, OJ L 178/1, 17.07.2000; Directive 2001/29/EC, OJ L 167/10, 22.06.2001 
and Directive 2004/48/EC, OJ L 195/16, 02.06.2004. 
1493 C-275/06 Productores de Música de España [2008] ECR I- 271, Judgement, para.68. 
1494 It became increasingly significant during the Industrial Revolution as large bodies of labour emerged.  
Striking has also been attributed varying degrees of significance throughout the 20th century, with various 
objectives.  For example, the first non-communist controlled union, Solidarność (Solidarity) emerged from the 
strikes at the Gdańsk shipyard in Poland of 1980; the union – which had the objective of promoting workers’ 
rights and protection, as well as significant political changes – contributed to the end of communist rule in 
Poland; A. Smolar, '"Self-limiting Revolution": Poland 1970-89' in A. Roberts and T. Garton Ash (eds.), Civil 
Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (OUP, 
Oxford; 2009), pp.127-43. 
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recognise a right to strike (including the UK and Ireland), while in others, the right to strike is 
established and protected by a breadth of mechanisms, which includes direct constitutional 
provision (for example, in the Preamble of the French Constitution or Art.59 of the Polish 
Constitution), indirect constitutional provision (as in the German constitution, via the right to 
freedom of association in Art.9, GG), case law and collective agreements1495.  There is no 
“right to strike” in the UK1496; the cases have had little effect in this respect, and it is unlikely 
that they will1497.  In the UK, the impact of Viking and Laval, as well as Omega, might be felt 
in relation to the fundamental rights dimension, and particularly, with regard to policy1498.  
 
The Nordic social model – dubbed “the holy grail […] reconciling flexibility with 
security”1499 – which has previously been promoted by the European Commission, has thus 
been forced to undergo significant changes following Laval.  These changes concern not only 
the character of the system but the law itself.    For example, as noted, the lex britannia was 
not amended on Sweden’s joining the EU; apparently, there had been no attempt – neither by 
the Swedish government nor by the relevant social actors - to render this law compatible with 
primary EU law 1500 .  Following the CJEU’s finding of incompatibility in the Laval 
judgement, the final decision in the Laval case concerned the liability of unions for unlawful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1495 Rather, reference can be made to the comparative study of the Institute for Employment Rights, ‘The Right 
to Strike: A Comparative Perspective’ (IER, Liverpool; 2008) 
(<http://www.ier.org.uk/system/files/The+Right+to+Strike+A+Comparative+Perspective.pdf>; Last Accessed: 
27.03.2013).  
1496 Striking is unlawful and constitutes an economic tort.  To avoid liability, the union must be able to engage 
immunity by virtue of statute; this broadly reflects the CJEU understanding – a finding of a restriction 
(unlawfulness), which must subsequently be justified.  This might seem normal in the common law system, 
where the focus lies not on rights but on remedies, where available; yet at the European level, and within the 
other traditions, the negation of the “rights-based” approach, which would be accepted elsewhere, is significant.  
Regardless, within the UK context, the union must engage in a subjective determination of the legality of the 
strike based on whether it is undertaken “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”, established in 
s.244(1) Trade Union Labour Regulations (Consolidation) Act 1992.  In the UK, the political, social and cultural 
influence can be identified in respect of the miners’ strikes in the 1980s, after which - under Thatcher’s 
Conservative government – the scope for striking was reduced considerably, and the power of trade unions 
repressed.  Per Art.1(2), CFR, the UK has opted out of Title IV of the CFR (which includes Art.28 and the right 
to collective action).  Contrast, Barnard, ‘Viking and Laval’ (n.1417), p.489, who considers that the task might 
be much more considerable for the English and Scottish courts. 
1497 A.C.L. Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 
In.L.J. 126, pp.137-138. 
1498 For example, with regard to the notion of the right to strike as a fundamental right, the Trades Union 
Congress – a federation of fifty-three unions in the UK – initially welcomed the decision 
(http://www.tuc.org.uk/workplace/tuc-14088-f0.cfm; Last Accessed: 24.04.2014) but has subsequently 
challenged the Viking, Laval, and Rüffert jurisprudence, and the balance between the social and the internal 
market, http://www.tuc.org.uk/international/tuc-21938-f0.cfm; Last Accessed: 24.04.2014).  
1499 Barnard, ‘Viking and Laval’ (n.1417), p.488. 
1500 Many thanks to Professor Jonas Malmberg for this observation. 
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collective action1501.  Laval, in bankruptcy, was awarded damages, payable by the union, on 
the basis of Art.56 TFEU (ex Art.49 EC), in respect of the free movement of services, the 
Swedish court having found that the article included a right to damages arising from a dispute 
between private parties.  The case reflects an example of the influence of EU law on national 
law, in particular on remedies1502, which is less evident in the other cases.  Like the rights and 
remedies impact in the state liability example, Laval highlights the need for a new remedy in 
the Swedish tradition; in other systems, it might not be required that a new remedy is 
developed but amendment of an existing remedy might be sufficient.  Reich calls this 
hybridisation, to the extent that the remedy drives from an action which finds its basis in 
national law, which is “upgraded” by EU law1503.  The system - which has been inherently 
tied to the nation state, its structure and the relationship established between the state, the 
labour market participants and the unions 1504  - relies on the interaction of different 
institutions, namely (rather weak) employment protection legislation, a developed and 
established labour policy and strong, independent unions.  The effects of the Laval reference 
have been felt in the Nordic tradition broadly, and not only in Sweden, to the extent that the 
“flexicurity” of the model has been undermined1505.  Furthermore, the ETUC – the European 
Trade Union Confederation – also anticipated in 2007, “negative implications for other 
countries’ systems”1506, which illustrates that the potential impact of these cases will be felt 
not only in the state of the referring court but be of a cross-border character. 
 
The putative impact of the fundamental rights cases has been felt beyond the legal sphere, 
strictly understood.  Micklitz asserts that Laval reflects a particular notion of justice, namely, 
access justice (Zugangsgerechtigkeit), which he ties to the emergence of the “market state”, 
encompassing the emergence of new values, freedom and fairness of market access, and the 
constitutionalisation of private law1507.  For Patterson et al, this notion of the market state, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1501 It is worth noting that the union applied for a hearing before the Supreme Court, on an extraordinary basis 
(claiming there had been a substantive defect, there being no normal appeal), and arguing inter alia that the 
damages issue should have been referred to the CJEU.  The Supreme Court rejected the application – 
App.No.2181/10, 06.07.2010 (as cited in U. Bernitz and N. Reich, ‘Case Note’ (2011) 48 CMLR 603, fn7). 
1502 More recently, the issue of liability in cases of labour law has come before the CJEU; C-282/10 Maribel 
Dominguez nyr. 
1503 N. Reich, 'Hybridisation of Remedies' (2007) 44 CMLR 705. 
1504 Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, ‘Institutional Theories, EU Law and the Role of Courts for Developing a European 
Social Model’ in Neergaard et al, The Role of Courts in Developing a European Social Model (n.61), p.332. 
1505 ETUC Response, ‘Disappointment of the ETUC’ (<http://etuc.org/a/4401>; Last Accessed: 23.04.2013). 
1506 ETUC Response, ‘Disappointment of the ETUC’ (n.1505).  
1507 Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law' (n.326), p.39.  See also, H-W. Micklitz, 
‘Introduction’ in H-W. Micklitz (ed.) The Many Concepts of Social Justice in Private Law (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham; 2011), pp.3-60, and pp.37-43, especially. 
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inherently tied to the promotion of integration through free movement – the free movement of 
workers and services having been reinforced in Viking and Laval – and the facilitation of 
competition, reflects one particular understanding of European culture1508.  Both Micklitz and 
Patterson argue that the judgements in Viking and Laval rather disconnect the exercise of 
rights and freedoms (and thus the possibility to engage in transnational relationships on the 
basis of these rights and freedoms), from the nation state; thus, the individual – that is the 
worker - similarly becomes less connected to his national (collective) group1509 (and perhaps, 
as explored above, his national identity).  This brings to the fore the question of whether the 
individual, and thus, (at least one of) the group(s) to which he belongs, can be understood to 
exist beyond the state.  Without considering in detail the “demise of national social welfare 
state” that might derive from Viking and Laval, the question arises as to whether the unions 
might similarly “transnationalise” themselves1510, establishing, beyond the state, a kind of 
cross-boundary and cross-cultural approach to social welfare, on the basis of which unions 
can engage regardless of their national origin.  This “transnationalisation” seems to follow 
Micklitz’s understanding that the judgements aimed to open up the markets for labourers (and 
thus, to cheap labour but nevertheless, facilitating the functioning of the market, and thus 
integration)1511.  The argument made by Micklitz and Patterson can be linked to the notion of 
the “social market economy”; whether this sufficiently engages consideration of both 
economic and social issues in practice - as opposed to merely projecting the “holistic” 
perception of an economic and social Union - is not clear.   The consequences would seem to 
depend on the significance attached to the guidance offered by the CJEU; the scope for the 
development of these issues at the CJEU level, i.e. future references, and the impact in the 
national systems and beyond the state, which broadly – beyond that discussed below – 
remains to be seen.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1508 Patterson et al, ‘Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture’ (n.171), p.8.   
1509 Micklitz, ‘Three Questions’ (n.355), p.7, with reference to AG Maduro’s Opinion in Viking at paras.70-72, 
and Micklitz’s understanding of Maduro’s recognition of the need for cross-border cooperation between unions.  
Micklitz also engages with Durkheim’s “cult of the individual”, noting the shift from mechanical solidarity 
(collective with the state) to organic (emerging forms of solidarity).  To take this a little further, post-Division of 
Labour, Durkheim began to move away from this mechanical/organic distinction.  Initially, he had considered 
that the construction of the individual in respect of organic solidarity inferred that the “cult of the individual” 
bound one not to society but to oneself; (Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (n.66), p.122); thereafter, 
he seems to suggest the continuing significance of society in respect of the cult of the individual, the focus not 
being on the “isolated individual” but the generalised one (É. Durkheim, ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’ in 
R.N. Bellah (ed.), Émile Durkheim: On Morality and Society [1898] (U.Chicago Press, Chicago; 1973), pp.43-
57, pp.48-49) (C. Shilling, ‘Embodiment, Emotions and the Foundations of Social Order: Durkheim’s Enduring 
Contribution’ in J.C. Alexander and P. Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim (CUP, Cambridge; 
2005), pp.211-238,  pp.226-228). 
1510 Barnard, ‘Viking and Laval’ (n.1417), p.492. 
1511 Micklitz, ‘Three Questions’ (n.355), p.6. 
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Furthermore, the impact of the cases can be identified in respect of the institutional dimension 
of European dialogue, and namely, in the relationship between the national, Union and 
international orders, the courts and the legislatures.  This is clear from the abandonment of the 
proposal for a regulation on striking1512, the process and eventual renunciation of which 
highlights the lack of consensus across the Member States, at the Union and international 
levels, and arguably also the weak position of the European political institutions.  Thus, Laval 
– with regard to the 1996 Directive – illustrates that the conflicts arising are also inherently 
political; the directive was drafted for the purposes of resolving issues relating to posted 
workers’ rights and restrictive conditions imposed by host states but did not fully resolve the 
problem, leaving the issue instead to the CJEU and consequently, as noted, creating a basis 
for dialogue between the national courts and the CJEU, via the preliminary reference 
procedure.  In addition, this dialogue can also be said to have an international law dimension; 
the ILO has been engaged with the consequences of Laval.  It has considered that the law 
adopted in Sweden 1513 , following the CJEU’s judgement in Laval and the Swedish 
government’s review1514, violates “fundamental trade union rights”, and in particular, the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No. 87 and the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention No. 981515, (to which, it should be 
noted, the Court made reference in Laval1516).   
 
The case study highlights the scope for conflicts – the divergent characterisations of which 
have been uncovered above – arising as a result of the interaction of the fundamental 
freedoms and the exercise or undertaking of certain acts or omissions on the basis of 
fundamental rights, which reflects one dimension of the constitutionalisation of private law.  
The notion of the multi-level regime of fundamental rights protection is engaged, which is 
highlighted in the relationship between the national courts and the CJEU arising via the 
preliminary reference procedure, and the channels of communication and dialogue that derive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1512 Monti II, abandoned in September 2012 (<http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/ec-drops-regulation-right-
strike-news-514793>; Last Accessed: 16.04.2013). 
1513 The so-called lex laval, 2009/10:48, Svensk Författningssamling (Swedish Official Journal) 2010:228, in 
force since 15.04.2010. 
1514 ‘Action in Response to the Laval Judgment. Summary’ (Swedish Government Official Reports, Stockholm; 
2008); <www.government.se/content/1/c6/11/77/22/fa71ed8c.pdf>; Last Accessed: 02.05.2013). 
1515  ILO Committee of Experts, ‘2013 General Report on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations’, pp.176-180 (<http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/102/reports/reports-
submitted/WCMS_205472/lang--en/index.htm>; Last Accessed: 16.04.2013). 
1516 Laval (n.355), Judgement, paras.89-90. 
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therefrom.  At one level, reference can be made to the CJEU’s recognition of fundamental 
rights as general principles of Union law, bringing to the fore its reference to generality and 
commonality, discussed in more detail below; it also becomes clear that the CJEU does not 
necessarily engage comparison for the purposes of finding similarity, or commonality, above 
all other considerations.  At another level, the balancing of the rights and freedoms – a task 
which the CJEU has attributed to the national courts – highlights the breadth of divergences 
between the national traditions and establishes the margin of appreciation as a 
(methodological) tool which permits the national courts to engage with these political, 
cultural and socio-economic considerations, in the name of public policy and the public 
interest.  The cases bring to the fore the significance attached to national and transnational 
interests, to standards of protection of fundamental rights and further introduce a pertinent 
political dimension to the balancing of fundamental rights and freedoms, in respect of the 
balancing of market interests with individual and group interests.  This line of analysis 
contributes to the idea that the effects of CJEU case law, and indeed national case law – the 
balancing being undertaken therein - diverge between the national traditions (and beyond the 
state), both in respect of the impact on certain political, cultural and socio-economic 
dimensions of the system, and that on national private law.   
  
Case Examples. Concluding Remarks 
 
Brief conclusions have been drawn at the end of each case example.  Herein, more general 
conclusions will be drawn, which forms the basis of the analysis that follows in Part IV.  The 
hypothesis advanced at the beginning of the thesis – that is, as to the putative relevance of 
comparative analysis in the Europeanisation of private law via the courts – is a precursory 
one.  An attempt has been made to develop it through an examination of relevant cases arising 
by virtue of the preliminary reference system; against this background, the interaction of 
national, Union, European and international legal orders can be identified, via the 
intertwinement of national and European courts and the engagement at different levels of 
norms arising from different regimes of regulation.  Moreover, as a result of this interaction 
and its nature, whether hierarchical or non-hierarchical, different mechanisms of 
Europeanisation can be uncovered1517.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1517 M. Kumm, ‘Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold and the New Human Rights Paradigm’ in  M.P. 
Maduro and L. Azoulai, (eds.) The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU  Law Revisited on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart, Oxford; 2010), pp.106-118, p.114.  
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The case examples have illustrated two key aspects of legal development pertinent to the 
Europeanisation of private law: firstly, they have allowed for the identification of the scope 
for the shifting conceptualisations of private law, pertinent to the nature of the 
Europeanisation of law and its multi-level structure within the pluralist European space, 
explored above.  The coherent, technical, and politically-neutral conceptualisations of private 
law and their connections to the nation states have been explored in Chapter 1.  In Chapter 2, 
the functional foundations of private law at the Union level, that is, in facilitating the 
functioning of the internal market, have been set out.  This dominant underlying rationale has 
been used to uncover and explain the nature of the Union legislature’s initial approach to 
Europeanisation, namely, its focus on codification, and subsequently, on the promotion of the 
uniformity of private law across the Member States by virtue of its harmonisation efforts; in 
light of the limits of legislation, the shift in focus of legal development from the legislature to 
the courts has been explored in Chapters 3 and 4.  Moreover, these cases, including but not 
exclusively those concerning fundamental rights, have illustrated that private law is neither 
wholly politically nor normatively neutral but might also have social and political objectives.  
Secondly, the cases have illustrated the divergent manifestations of the sources of 
comparative analysis; they have further provided insights as to the context in which 
comparison is undertaken and as to the rationales underpinning its engagement, namely why 
comparative analysis might be beneficial to the normative development of the 
Europeanisation of private law, as explored in a preliminary manner in the Introduction and 
Chapter 3. 
 
Each of the cases also brings to the fore the multi-level characterisation of private law, and in 
particular the interaction of national, European and international regimes of regulation.  
Against this background, they also highlight the scope for conflict arising therein, and the 
divergent nature of such conflicts, the existence of which permeates the rationale of the 
domestic court to refer to the CJEU.  The exploration of the nature of these conflicts has 
confirmed that private law cannot be understood as coherent, technical or politically or 
ideologically neutral at the Union level; consequently, it can no longer be understood as such 
within the national context, in light of the impact of Union legislation and CJEU 
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interpretations in the national systems1518.  Reference has been made to the notion that the 
changing nature of private law is reflected in its constitutionalisation, materialisation1519 and 
regulation, phenomena that are identifiable in each of the case examples.   
 
For example, reference can be made to the increasingly regulatory character of private law in 
light of its role in consumer protection.  In the context of the regulation of contract terms, 
explored herein, the preliminary rulings rendered on the basis of the CJEU’s interpretative 
jurisdiction, have not only emphasised this regulatory role but they also have a constitutional 
consequence as a result of their attributing to the national courts a role the assessment, ex 
officio, of contract terms.  This “empowering” of national courts is also potentially 
identifiable in the state liability case law (in respect of lower national courts being able to 
“skip” the supreme courts and refer to the CJEU) and the fundamental rights jurisprudence (in 
respect of which the national courts have engaged a role in balancing freedoms and rights).  
As is also clear, this “empowerment” thesis is ambiguous as the national courts have been 
restricted in other ways (for example, in respect of the shift from a power to an obligation of 
ex officio review in the unfair contract terms case example).  The (arguably, as noted above, 
“hidden”) constitutionalisation of private law is identifiable not only, as might be most 
expected, in the fundamental rights example but also in the UCTD jurisprudence, particularly 
in respect of the balancing of party autonomy and ex officio regulation and the engagement of 
effectiveness, enshrined now in Art.47(1) CFR and Art.19(1) TEU.  Micklitz and Reich have 
suggested that against this background, the CJEU also advances the notion of consumer 
empowerment, in light of the financial crisis, in line with a “social 
empowerment…developing hand in hand with the consumers and citizens what has been 
called a ‘European civil society’” 1520 .  These processes of constitutionalisation, also 
identifiable in the fundamental rights cases, and particularly, in the balancing of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, similarly reflect private law’s political dimensions, in respect of which it 
becomes clear that private law, as it is subject increasingly to constitutionalisation, cannot be 
understood to be politically neutral.  Each of the case examples also bring to the fore the 
significance of the social, political and economic contexts – and thus of tradition and culture – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1518 Furthermore, as Caruso has asserted: “integrationist pressures compel national legal actors to make explicit 
the social and economic choices underlying private law rules”; Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral’ 
(n.243) (abstract). 
1519 Materialisation is understood to reflect the drafting of norms for a particular purpose.   
1520 Micklitz and Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty’ (n.1036), p.806, citing Comandé, ‘The Fifth European 
Union Freedom’ in Micklitz, The Constitutionalization of Private Law (n.1217). 
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in which the preliminary references arise, in which Europeanisation occurs and more 
specifically, in which the CJEU has developed, with the national courts, consumer protection.  
 
Furthermore, the case examples illustrate that while elements of comparative analysis are 
identifiable in the CJEU, there exists no rigid theoretical or methodological framework for its 
engagement; indeed, the evidence of comparative analysis is often far from explicit, which is 
to say, one has to engage the critical assessment of comparison in Chapter 3 to understand its 
dimensions and to identify it, even where its use might not be perspicuous.  This is true across 
each of the case examples.  The analysis has therefore aimed to concretise the discourse 
above, appertaining to the relevance of comparative analysis and the nature of comparison 
engaged by the CJEU in light of the criticism advanced against mainstream comparative law 
in Chapter 3 and the interaction of the national and European courts, beyond the state, in 
Chapter 4; that is to say, against the background of the critique of the dominant unit of 
comparative analysis and the context in which the comparison is undertaken, as well as the 
dynamic and shifting character of private law development.  For example, comparison in its 
complex form might help to explain the development of “regulatory space, the confines of 
which are no longer congruent with jurisdictional borders”, where the nature of these areas of 
law also pose problems for comparative analysis as it is traditionally understood, that is, 
having a focus on the national legal order 1521.  Furthermore, the cases establish the 
foundations for the analysis of the implications of comparative analysis in respect of the 
furtherance of European integration via the national and European courts, as these 
institutions are engaged in the interpretation and application of the legislative acquis and 
judicially developed principles of law.  The next chapter engages the manifestations of 
comparative analysis, which have been derived from these case examples amongst others, to 
construct two classifications: one, which aims to illustrate the relevant sources of comparative 
analysis employed by the AG and the Court, and a second, which aims to uncover the diverse 
rationales underpinning the engagement with comparison.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1521 Zumbansen, 'Transnational Comparative Theory and Practice' (n.301), p.5. 
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PART FOUR: THE EVALUATION OF THE CJEU AS A “COMPARATIVE 
LABORATORY”1522 
 
This part builds on the analysis of the case studies on state liability, consumer protection and 
fundamental rights, which illustrate two dimensions of legal development.  On the one hand, 
they confirm the shifting conceptualisations of private law, the scope for which was outlined 
in the introduction and Part I, as well as the emergence of private law within a multi-level 
structure in the context of European integration; this is deemed to further concretise the 
rationale for the engagement with complex comparative analysis outlined in Chapter 3.  
Moreover, the cases illustrate that diverse manifestations of comparison are identifiable in the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence, notwithstanding the absence of a rigid adherence to a theoretical or 
methodological framework.   
 
Chapter 8 has the purpose of extrapolating from the case analyses the building blocks of two 
classifications, both of which establish the epistemological foundations of the use of 
comparative analysis and provide the basis for advancing, in Chapter 9, the relevance of 
comparison to the CJEU’s “meta-mechanisms” of Europeanisation.  The first chapter of this 
part therefore attempts to “map” the different sources of law that the CJEU engages in its 
comparative analysis; at a fundamental level, this attempt at mapping is descriptive and thus 
has no “pure” scientific aim.  Notwithstanding, against this background, the breadth of 
approaches to comparative analysis, identifiable across the case examples and shaped by these 
different sources, is explored.   
 
Thereafter, in light of this initial analysis, the rationales, aims and objectives of comparison - 
the why and for what purpose comparison is engaged – are then set out; reference is made to 
the identification of commonality, the recognition of an absence of commonality, the 
identification of an autonomous interpretation, the identification of a “best solution” and the 
scope for dialogue to which comparison gives rise.  The first chapter provides the basis for the 
examination in the second chapter of the “meta-mechanisms” engaged in the Europeanisation 
of private law – including the identification of principles of Union law, the recognition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1522 Hilf ‘The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’ in De Mestral et al, The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (n.3), 
p.550. 
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“best solutions” and the scope for transfer and dialogue – and the CJEU’s use of comparative 
analysis in their development and utilisation. 
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Chapter 8. Uncovering the Foundations of a Classification of Comparative Analysis 
in the CJEU 
 
This chapter attempts to uncover, in a more categorical fashion, the CJEU’s engagement of 
comparative analysis, with reference to its jurisprudence including but not limited to the case 
examples evaluated above.  The first section categorises the manifestations of the sources of 
comparison in the Opinions of the AG and the judgements of the Court while the second 
builds on these identifying factors, categorising the diverse rationales, aims and objectives 
underpinning the CJEU’s engagement with comparison.  The case examples attest to and 
concretise the need for the recognition of the scope for shifting understandings of private law, 
and its Europeanisation in the context of integration.  On this basis, they substantiate the 
foundations of the engagement of comparative analysis as part of the framework of national 
and European legal development.   
 
Indeed, the case examples illustrate the existence of manifestations of comparison in the 
CJEU’s reasoning; the approach of the CJEU nevertheless appears to lack strict theoretical 
rigour and a consistent methodological framework.  Comparison is often invoked in the 
rendering of opinions and judgements in national, regional and international courts, although 
it is infrequently explicit1523.  The lack of express engagement with comparison suggests that 
judges simply do not think of themselves as comparatists: “[w]e are already 
comparatists…We just don’t think of ourselves that way”1524.  This is not necessarily to 
suggest that the approach is a “shallow” one; indeed, it seems that – albeit, perhaps not 
explicitly – the AG and the Court know something of the dimensions of complex comparison 
advanced in Chapter 3.  That is to say, in the context of the Europeanisation of private law via 
the preliminary reference procedure, the CJEU engages a breadth of legal sources of 
comparative analysis (in terms of what is being compared) and similarly recognises a breadth 
of rationales underpinning its use, allowing for the construction of diverse hypotheses as to 
the purposes served by comparative analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1523 C.N. Kakouris, ‘L’utilisation de la méthode comparative par la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
européennes’, in U. Drobnig & S. van Erp (eds.) Comparative Law and the Courts (Kluwer, The Hague; 1999), 
pp.97–111; M. Kiikeri, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law (Kluwer Academic, The Hague; 
2001); K. Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 
873.  See most, recently, Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (n.601). 
1524 Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in S.S. Abrahamson and M.J. 
Fischer, ‘All the World’s a Courtroom:  Judging in the New Millennium’ (1997) 26 Hofstra.L.Rev. 276, p.285, 
cited in Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.76. 
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The analysis of the case examples further corroborates the suggestion advanced in Part II as to 
the significance of the sociological, cultural perspective, and in particular, of the composition 
and construction of the CJEU, with regard to the analysis of its interpretative jurisdiction and 
the evaluation of its inter-institutional relationships, predominantly with the national courts 
but also with international courts (including the ECtHR), scholars, civil society bodies and 
increasingly, as its role in private law and the regulation of private relationships, evolves, 
private individuals.  That is to say, much of the scope for comparison arises from the diversity 
inherent in the European judiciary itself and the bifurcated analyses of the AG and the Court.  
The scope for its engagement with comparative methodologies was recognised at the birth of 
the CJEU’s remit by the French AG, Maurice Lagrange1525.  As suggested, the judges and 
AGs must necessarily be understood to be at once bound and distinct from their diverse 
national legal cultures and traditions1526.  Thus, it has been asserted that “[c]omparison seems 
to be inevitable in the view of the different legal backgrounds of the judges sitting in the 
court”1527.  The perspective adopted in this thesis – namely, the promotion of the plurality of 
backgrounds, in contrast to the uncritical acceptance of the need for a single and distinct 
European culture or identity – finds supports in the notion that:  
[t]he comparative method is underlying in all cases due to each judge’s different legal 
training, knowledge, approach and reasoning which reflects the legal system of his 
country.  The deliberations are enriched by the diversity of the contributions made by the 
judges.  The Court’s deliberations constitute a living comparative law in action1528.  
 
Moreover, and on a related note, the CJEU is obliged to ensure that the ruling it renders in the 
case before it is one which is acceptable and capable of being applied across the European 
space, that is, in all national jurisdictions and beyond the culture and tradition of the referring 
court, a consideration which gives rise to the scope for spillovers of a cross-order and cross-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1525  M. Lagrange, ‘Une réalité européenne – La Cour de Justice de la CECA’ (1955) 28 
Cah.Chrét.Fonct.Publique 16, p.21.  Translated in Cohen and Vauchez, ‘The Social Construction of Law – The 
European Court of Justice and its Legal Revolution Revisited’ (n.664). 
1526 Slaughter has asserted that “judges see each other not only as servants and representatives of a particular 
polity, but also as fellow professionals in an endeavour that transcends national borders”; A-M. Slaughter, ‘A 
Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harv.Int.L.J. 191, p.193.  This is also true of the researchers in the 
Research and Documentation Centre at the CJEU, which allows for comparative research to be done by the 
various national lawyers engaged in the drafting of Opinions and Judgements.   
1527 Smits, ‘European Private Law and the Comparative Method’ in Twigg-Flessner, The Cambridge Companion 
to European Union Private Law (n.549), p.39. 
1528 C.N. Kakouris, ‘Use of the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ 
(1994) 6 Pace.Int.L.Rev. 267, p.277 (footnote removed). 
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sectoral nature1529.  Fundamentally, the interpretation rendered must also comply with Union 
and international law, including, fundamental rights.  These considerations further reflect the 
multi-level nature of the emerging body of European private law; the nature of the conflicts 
arising in the context of its Europeanisation have been outlined above, and are identified 
concretely in each of the case examples, the exploration of which further reflects the different 
mechanisms that have been identified, developed and advanced by the CJEU in order to deal 
with such conflicts.  These include the recognition of either similarity and divergence, the 
promotion of a balancing exercise and the identification of a division of labour between the 
CJEU and the national courts, as well as the “meta-mechanisms” underpinning the emergence 
of European private law within an increasingly globalised context, namely, the recognition of 
legal principles, transfer and dialogue.  As to the first consideration, for the purposes of the 
analysis that follows, reference is made to the CJEU’s engagement of comparative analysis 
for the identification of commonality, on the one hand, and the identification of diversity (or 
recognition of a lack of commonality, herein conceived of as generality), on the other.  The 
roots of such a distinction will therefore be uncovered in the following paragraphs1530; 
accordingly, at the outset, it is fundamental to note that herein the terms are not used 
interchangeably. 
 
Building on the analysis in Chapter 3, and the outline of the procedure in Chapter 41531, it is 
submitted that at the outset of the hearing, the AG and the Court must each identify the need 
for the comparative analysis in light of the legal issue arising in the case.  At this stage, it is 
necessary that the AG and the Court (normally, the juge rapporteur, at the initial stage) draw 
hypotheses as to the result for which they are searching, that is, the hypotheses as to what they 
might hope to obtain from the comparative analysis; this will depend on the breadth of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1529 For the purposes of this thesis, it is considered that spillover effects within the national order might be 
broader than simply the application of a judgement in the national court (either within or beyond the court 
making the initial preliminary reference).  Reference will be made to spillovers where relevant herein but for an 
overview of the understanding adopted, see A. Johnston, ‘‘Spillovers’ from EU Law into National Law: 
(Un)intended Consequences for Private Law Relationships’ in D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds.), The 
Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart, Oxford; 2013), pp.357-394.  
1530 It is important to note that the notions of convergence and commonality are not used interchangeably yet, it 
is It is further recognised that there might be some overlap between the notions of commonality and generality, 
as well as commonality and convergence (on the different meanings of which, see R. Brownsword, 
‘Convergence: What, Why, and Why Not?’ in H-W. Micklitz and Y. Svetiev (eds.), ‘A Self-sufficient European 
Private Law?’ EUI WP 2012/31, pp.77-82, pp.77-78).  While there is no strict adherence to a formalist 
conception of commonality, it is recognised that commonality and convergence might be used to attribute the 
same meaning, where a formalist understanding is adopted; however, it is recognised that convergence might 
exist where there is a lack of commonality as to the applicable norms, i.e. where the norms possibly diverge but 
the outcome of their application might converge. 
1531 See Chapter 4. 
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rationales explored in the second section of this chapter.  Essentially, Gerber frames the 
question as follows: “where are we going and how do we get there?”1532.  Thereafter, having 
identified the reasons for the engagement of comparative analysis, it is necessary to choose 
what is being compared and how it should be compared, that is, the relevant sources of 
comparative analysis, and its perspective and context.   
 
These determinations must be made in light of the relevant “data” or information on the basis 
of which the comparative analysis can be undertaken.  The parties to the action, encouraged 
by the AG or the Court, might well provide this data.  Thus it might be said that it is rather the 
approach adopted by the parties to the action that largely gives rise to and shapes the scope 
for the engagement with comparative analysis as a dimension of the reasoning of the AG and 
the Court.  The basis and rationale underpinning the proposal of the relevance of comparative 
analysis by the submitting parties and interveners will diverge, depending on their 
understanding of the case and its categorisation by the CJEU.  That is to say, well-prepared 
and well-informed lawyers might, where relevant, make reference to norms including but not 
limited to national norms (which might, it is submitted, be susceptible to a form of 
“methodological nationalism” reflecting rules deriving from their “home” legal systems), 
international law norms, norms from other areas of Union law, and furthermore, privately-
made and non-state norms, as relevant to interpretation.  One of the parties - in particular, the 
Commission - might seek to have a principle, rule or concept recognised as common and with 
this intention, introduce the scope for a comparative analysis in its submissions for the 
purpose of facilitating the recognition of commonality between national cultures and 
traditions, across regimes of Union law, international or transnational law1533.  Furthermore, 
both the General Court and the CJEU can ask the Commission as a party to the case, or as an 
amicus curiae-type party1534, to submit under Art.45 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU; 
this might encompass a comparative law report1535.  The national governments might wish to 
draw attention to the specificities of their own legal cultures and traditions1536.  The right of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1532 D.J. Gerber, ‘Toward a Language of Comparative Law?’ (1998) 46 AJCL 719, p.719. 
1533 For example, C-108/81 Amylum v Council [1982] ECR I-03107. 
1534 G. de Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?  The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator?’ (2013) 2 Maas.J.Eur.Comp.Law 168. 
1535 For example C-155/78 M v Commission [1980] ECR I-1797. 
1536 Thus, the House of Lords recognised the scope for national governments to highlight specific features of 
national traditions, allowing the CJEU to illustrate “substantial deference to the difference in national systems”; 
House of Lords, EU Select Committee, ‘The Impact of the Treaty on the European Institutions’ 10th Report of 
Session 2007-2008 (The Stationery Office, London; 2008), para.6.87 citing Professor Guild’s Evidence to the 
House of Lords, QE130. 
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intervention of the Member States allows national governments to highlight specific features 
of their orders; it affords scope for “substantial deference to the difference in national 
systems” on the part of the CJEU1537.  Both the General Court and the CJEU might similarly 
request that the Member States submit their observations in the case before it1538.  Essentially, 
even where it appears that the AG or the Court has raised the comparative dimension of the 
analysis, it might rather have been engaged on the basis of the submissions of one of the 
parties; it is impossible to concretely determine if and how the submissions inspire the AG or 
the Court, as they generally remain unpublished.  Indeed, this is true of many internal 
documents.   
 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 4, the juge rapporteur might request in the rapport 
préalable that the DRD provide a note de recherche which can be used by the judges, the AG 
and their référendaires.  The note de recherche usually comprises an outline of the relevant 
national provisions and case law on the key legal questions of the case as identified in the 
rapport; it is often of a strictly positivist nature.  Where relevant, it might also include 
reference to the rules and case law of other, non-state orders and of international conventions 
and agreements.  Most of these documents tend to remain internal due to a number of 
considerations, and particularly, the burden of translation.  It is also worth noting that the 
DRD endeavours to make available a breadth of information, both to the CJEU itself and to 
external institutions.  It publishes a bulletin reflet three times per year, which is available in 
French on the CJEU website1539, and which has been published in English by the Association 
des Conseils d'État et des juridictions administratives suprêmes de l'Union européenne since 
20101540.  Its availability in two languages necessarily renders it more accessible to a wider 
body of actors1541.  The content of the bulletin is relatively consistent; some editions have a 
specific focus (for example, the first of 2013 focuses on the CFR) while others are general 
making reference to recent national jurisprudence and legislation relevant to the interests of 
the Union.  It also includes information on pertinent international conventions, the case law of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1537 House of Lords, EU Select Committee, ‘The Impact of the Treaty on the European Institutions’ 10th Report 
of Session 2007-2008 (The Stationery Office, London; 2008), para.6.87 citing Professor Guild’s Evidence to the 
House of Lords, QE130.  The same was also recognised in the evidence of former AG Sir Francis Jacobs. 
1538 For example, in the ‘Moped Trailers’ infringement action, C-270/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-1559. 
1539  Bulletin reflet (<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_9951/jurisprudence-nationale-et-
internationalehttp:/intranet/jcms574/jcms/Jo2_9951/jurisprudence-nationale-et-internationale>; Last Accessed: 
26.09.2013). 
1540 The association also publishes supranational (including from the ECtHR, Benelux and EFTA courts) and 
national jurisprudence (including that of the Member States and Canada), concerning Union law. 
1541 Bulletin reflet in English (<http://www.juradmin.eu/en/reflets/reflets_en.html>; Last Accessed: 26.09.2013); 
Jurisprudence <http://www.juradmin.eu/en/jurisprudence/jurisprudence_en.lasso>; Last Accessed: 26.07.2013. 
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international courts and tribunals, including but not limited to the ECtHR, and guidance on 
the pratique des organisations internationals.  These resources form key parts of the 
processes undertaken in the cabinets of the judges and AGs and necessarily shape the 
approaches to methodology and reasoning adopted by dictating the availability and ease of 
access to materials. 
 
The stages of the comparative analysis are deemed to be twofold, shaped by the hypotheses 
advanced and encompassing the description and explanation of what is identified, which 
might amount to, for example, similarities and differences.  The explanatory dimension 
provides for, as noted above in Chapter 3, the nature of the similarities and the nature of the 
absence of similarity, the determination of those considerations on which the similarities are 
based, the considerations on which lack of similarity are based, and ultimately, what these 
similarities and differences reveal in light of the hypotheses initially developed.  To return to 
the determination by the AG and the Court of the hypotheses as to the result for which they 
are searching, it might be that the initial hypothesis reflects one of commonality, divergence, 
autonomous interpretation or a “best solution” (acknowledging the scope for overlap).  If, for 
example, the search for commonality is taken as a starting point, it is necessary to respond to 
the question: “commonality of what?”.  Prima facie, the AG and the Court might search for 
commonality in respect of the text of the relevant norms; however, in light of the significance 
of the contextualist and culturalist approach as discussed in Chapter 3, this will not 
necessarily lead to a finding of true commonality.  Commonality identified solely on the basis 
of text is likely to be superficial or coincidental; as such, their identification thus undermines 
the scope for plurality (whether as empirical fact or as perspective).  Rather commonality also 
needs to be identified in respect of the context of the norm’s development and application, 
reflected in its judicial interpretation.  It has been recognised that a contextualist and 
culturalist approach to complex comparison is likely to be considerable and time-consuming, 
where the norms relevant to interpretation derive from national sources, from the Union level, 
considering, for example, the process of the directive’s implementation within each Member 
State, or from international or transnational law.  Against this background, the AG and the 
Court can draw preliminary and evaluative conclusions from the comparative analysis, and its 
application in the case before it.  To follow the example hypothesis outlined above, if the case 
and circumstances call for the identification of a principle of Union law, it might be 
characterised as a common one if commonality can be identified.  If commonality cannot be 
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found, the AG and the Court must then revisit their initial hypothesis and draw a second one, 
again in line with the aims and objectives of the Union. 
 
The first section of this chapter sets out the manifestations of the legal sources of comparative 
analysis while the second presents the manifestations of the aims and objectives underpinning 
comparison.  As noted above, it is recognised that it is trite to proclaim that there is a single 
comparative methodology; indeed, they are multiple and diverge depending on the legal 
sources engaged and the aims and objectives of the comparative analysis undertaken by the 
CJEU.   
 
I. The Manifestations of Comparative Analysis in the Opinions of the AG and 
Judgements of the Court  
 
This section categorises the different sources of comparative analysis, identifiable from the 
analysis of CJEU jurisprudence in Part III.  This attempt at taxonomical clarification affords 
scope for the (re)consideration of the identification of what is being compared (and 
fundamentally, the notion that it should not be limited to that arising within the state), and the 
way in which it is compared, reflecting the epistemological foundations of the scope for 
complex comparative analysis outlined in Chapter 3.  For the purposes of the comprehension 
of the analysis that follows, it is necessary to briefly set out the CJEU’s engagement of 
principles of Union law.   
 
The CJEU has engaged a number of judicially-developed norms, and particularly, principles 
of Union law, the latter – some of which will be outlined below – have been conceptualised 
by Tridimas as unwritten judicial norms, that is, a source of law deriving from judicial 
precedent, or as a distinct source of law in their own right1542.  However, there has been little 
explication of the methodology (or methodologies) engaged either by the Court or the AG in 
extracting such normativity; this chapter aims to uncover the sources and rationales 
underpinning this recognition with reference to the comparative analysis undertaken by the 
AG and the Court.  On the one hand, the CJEU appears to understand identification and 
recognition of principles simply as a matter of interpretation, which might be engaged at the 
Union level, where there is no other explicit provision therein.  This was one of the rationales 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1542 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.2. 
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underpinning both the state liability1543 and fundamental rights cases1544.  As will be set out in 
the first section of this chapter, in such an exercise, the CJEU is not limited to national legal 
sources but can engage and evaluative the relevance of European, international and non-state 
law.  In respect of the CJEU’s identification of principles in particular, a distinction between 
common and general principles is advanced.  This distinction is further explored in Chapter 9, 
as is the notion that principles of both characterisations might also be advanced as “best 
solutions”, there being scope for overlap between the categorisations1545.  To the extent that it 
permeates the analysis that follows, it is worth briefly outlining the way in which such 
principles might be derived from comparative analysis.    
 
It is submitted that principles might be identified by virtue of comparative analysis – within a 
particular area of law - either on the basis: 1) that they are understood as pre-existing within 
the national, European or international legal order on the basis of specific legal norms; or 2) 
they are extracted, via induction, from national, European or international sources of law in 
the absence of an existing principle.  The principle is then established at the Union level, it 
being necessary – as Tridimas has advanced – that a “minimum ascertainable legally-binding 
content”1546 can be identified.  Comparative analysis therefore essentially allows for the 
identification of the norms – including their scope and content – existing in the pertinent 
orders and the identification of commonality or a lack thereof; it can therefore be used to draw 
the distinction between common principles and general principles.  With regard to 
commonality, comparative analysis would allow for the identification of the lowest or highest 
common denominator shared across the Member States; it is recognised that while this 
reflects a fairly formalistic understanding, such an analysis should include not only reference 
to the text of the norm1547 but also its context, thereby engaging the scope for commonality in 
interpretation, with regard to the particular area of law in which the norm is applicable1548.  
For example, freedom of contract might be identified as one concept in respect of which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1543 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.24 et seq. 
1544 Stauder (n.682), Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256) and Nold (n.791), Judgement, para.13. 
1545 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), pp.20-21.  At the level of the CJEU, see Case 14/60 
Hoogovens v High Authority [1962] ECR 253, Opinion of AG Lagrange, paras.283-284.  
1546 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.26. 
1547 With regard to the text, issues of language and translation also come to the fore. 
1548 Such commonality might be identifiable, for example, in relation to the application of effective judicial 
protection in a given set of facts, i.e. in a given case; it is recognised that even within national legal systems, its 
understanding might differ, depending on the context.   
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text (notwithstanding problematics of translation) is common but the interpretation is not1549.  
It is worth noting that, in contrast to the distinction between commonality and generality 
advanced herein, Tridimas rejects the notion that the CJEU searches for that which is entirely 
shared1550 and instead engages the identification of “wide acceptance”: “[i]n the absence of 
guidance by Community written law, it must be widely accepted in one way or another by the 
Member States”1551.  Yet it is not clear how “wide” such acceptance must be for Tridimas.  
Rather herein, it is submitted that the basis upon which commonality is identified will depend 
on the sources of law engaged by the CJEU, which will be considered in greater detail below. 
 
On the other hand, principles might be recognised as general where they lack commonality 
(as identified by virtue of the comparative analysis).  In the absence of commonality, the 
approach is, at first glance, more complex.  It is recognised that generality has different 
meanings.  For example, while Tridimas defines a general principle as a “general proposition 
of law of some importance from which concrete rules derive”1552, it is the characterisation of 
general which dictates that it “operates at a level of abstraction that distinguishes it from a 
specific rule” and which requires that it also holds a degree of importance1553; moreover, he 
recognises that generality might have other meanings, engaging those principles which 
“underlie the legal systems as a whole” or “refer[ring] to the degree of recognition or 
acceptance”1554.  For the purposes of this analysis, generality is engaged as reflecting this 
latter consideration.  While the attribution of the characterisation of generality is understood 
to engage the maintenance of diversity, it must also be borne in mind that the “language of 
‘generalisation’ is disturbingly dismissive of diversity, when it is presented…without any 
comparative reflection”1555.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1549 See for example, the recognition of freedom of contract in Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG 
Trstenjak, fn.9 and 12; recognising freedom of contract as common and “unanimous”, but nevertheless 
recognising that its application might diverge; she therefore made indirect reference to the significance of 
comparative analysis without actually undertaking a comprehensive study, engaging predominantly German but 
also French and Spanish scholarship on the legal theory of freedom of contract. 
1550 It is worth noting that Tridimas rejects the notion that the CJEU looks for commonality, arguing that its 
interpretation is not a “mechanical process”: Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), pp.20-21. 
1551 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.26. 
1552 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.1. 
1553 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.1. 
1554 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.1. 
1555 S. Whittaker, ‘The ‘Principles of Civil Law’ as a Basis for Interpreting the Legislative acquis’ (2010) 6 
ERCL 74, p.79. 
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The recognition and characterisation of principles as general might therefore require a 
subjective determination on the part of the AG or the Court, which is to say that evaluative 
comparative analysis – discussed below – might allow for examination of Member States’ 
norms over time and space1556, indicating that no such commonality is (yet) identifiable1557 or 
that a norm might exist in only a minority of states but might still be engaged at the Union 
level1558.  The general principle is therefore not recognised on the basis that it is common or 
shared but rather by virtue of a comparative analysis which highlights its existence (or 
putative existence) 1559 in light of a teleological interpretation, its consistency with and 
facilitation of the aims and objectives of the Union1560 and an evaluation of legal development 
over time1561.  For example, while the principle of state liability might have been identifiable 
at the outset, if not in all, then in a majority of Member States1562, the extension of liability to 
the acts and omissions of the courts seems to follow this approach, whereby there did not 
initially exist support across the national systems for such liability1563.  In these latter cases, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1556 For example, in respect of whether the protection of communications between lawyers, established as a 
fundamental right in Union law on the basis of commonality on the Member States, the CFR and the ECHR, 
should extend to communications between a management body and an in-house lawyer: Akzo (n.691), Opinion 
of AG Kokott, para.94 and Dominguez (n.1502), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.94. 
1557 Consider the recognition of abuse of right.  Generally, it can be identified as a doctrine discernible across the 
continental legal traditions, which is codified in a number of systems and which forms an unwritten principle, 
developed through case law, in others (For example, in the French legal tradition, the prohibition against abuse 
of rights derives from the case law, subsequently recognised in Art.1382 and 1134(3) Code civil, in relation to 
tort and contract, respectively; BGB, Art.226, often combined with Art.242 and the general principle of good 
faith. Also, consider the approaches in the Spanish and Dutch systems: Art.7(2), Codigo civil; Art.3:13, Dutch 
Civil Code) and almost outright rejection in the English system (Mayor of Bradford v Pickles [1895] AC (HL) 
587, p.594 per Lord Halsbury). 
1558 Consider AG Legrand’s explicit comparison of the national laws on misuse of powers, in ASSIDER, even 
though the principle existed in only one national system: C-3/54 ASSIDER [1955] ECR 63. 
1559 For example, Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.94 and Dominguez (n.1502), Opinion of AG 
Trstenjak, para.94, and Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law’ (n.397), p.7. 
1560 For example, with regard to the obligation of the national courts to engage ex officio with contract term 
regulation, an approach which was not recognised in most Member States, and indeed, precluded in some, see 
the UCTD cases, discussed above, and especially, Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.51: “In order to 
safeguard the effectiveness of the consumer protection intended by the European Union legislature, the national 
court must thus, in all cases and whatever the rules of its domestic law, determine whether or not the contested 
term was individually negotiated”. 
1561 This can be identified in respect of the notion of abuse of law; initially, the CJEU rejected it as a principle of 
Union law (C-373/97 Diamandis v Elliniko Domosio [2000] ECR I-1705); thereafter, developing a European 
conception of abuse of rights, with its own conditions for application (C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v 
Hauptzollat Hamburg-Jonas [2000] ECR I-1569, Judgement, paras.51-53, in which the Court derived the “abuse 
test”), and finally recognising a principle in C-321/05 Hans Markus Kofoed [2007] ECR I-5795, Judgement, 
paras.37-38. 
1562 With the diversity reflected particularly in the conditions for liability; see Chapter 5, for a more in-depth 
analysis. 
1563 As discussed above, in relation to the state liability case example, reference was made to comparative 
analysis, looking to national and international norms for an understanding of the “state”, that would allow for 
such an extension; similarly, AG Léger engaged ECtHR case law, against the background of his comparative 
analysis of the lack of commonality amongst the Member States: Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, 
paras.79-80. 
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the recognition of the existence of liability could not have been common, but might rather 
have been better recognised as a finding of generality.  Comparative analysis of this nature 
must be undertaken in the context of the relevant area of law, to the extent that the broad 
teleological objectives might differ, and which suggests that these aims must be attributed 
divergent degrees of significance.  This is another fundamental point at which an approach 
based on complex comparative analysis comes to the fore, potentially giving rise to, as 
Semmelmann notes, a clash between area-specific objectives and the broad overarching 
objective of (predominantly) economic (but also, it is submitted herein, legal, political, social 
and cultural) integration1564. 
 
i. Reference to the travaux préparatoires of EU Legislation and Cross-Referencing 
Within and Between Union Law 
 
The reference to the travaux préparatoires falls broadly within the CJEU’s historical 
interpretative approach; that is to say, it allows for the determination of the intention of the 
Union legislature to afford a contemporary interpretation of the provision, where its text is 
unclear or obscure1565.  The travaux préparatoires cover a broad body of documents, 
including the Reports of the Commission, of the Council and of the Parliament, and more 
specifically, White and Green Papers, Communications, Commission Proposals, Explanatory 
Papers, Parliamentary Resolutions, Parliamentary Debates, and various Declarations and 
Opinions of the Union institutions. 
 
Often such documents include explicit comparative analyses, either of national norms 
pertinent to the putative piece of legislation, or existing Union law.  This is clear from, 
amongst others, the Green Paper on the CSD1566.  As such, the travaux préparatoires allow 
for indirect, vertical or horizontal comparison, facilitating comparative analysis of national or 
international norms and cross-referencing of European law; this can be characterised as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1564 C. Semmelmann, ‘Legal Principles in EU Law as an Expression of a European Legal Culture Between Unity 
and Diversity’ MEPLI Working Paper 2012/12, p.17. 
1565 C-292/00 Davidoff [2003] ECR I-389, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para.34.  Such reference to the travaux 
préparatoires is also provided in VCLT, Art.32; however, it is worth noting that the CJEU rarely applies the 
VCLT to primary law, and has never applied it to secondary law (there is one General Court – then CFI – case in 
which the Court held that the rules of interpretation of secondary Union law were almost identical to those of the 
VCLT: T-45/06 Reliance Industries [2008] ECR II-2399, paras.101-012). 
1566 Within the initial Green Paper, there is a clear comparative analysis of the divergent approaches to consumer 
sales and guarantees in the systems of the twelve Member States, in particular to the remedies available, and 
time limits imposed: Section C.2. ‘The Diversity of the Legal Rules’ and Annex I, European Commission, 
‘Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales’ (1993) COM (93) 509. 
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indirect, to the extent that while reference might not be made to the norms themselves but to 
the preparatory documents within the Opinion or judgement, the influence of comparative 
analysis is nevertheless felt.  The travaux préparatoires also illustrate the way in which the 
original draft of a proposal for EU legislation has been amended through the legislative 
process1567, and consequently, provide for reference to the evolution of national and EU 
norms as well as national and EU policy, the main groups of stakeholders being national and 
Union representatives.  As the legislative process is necessarily one of change and 
compromise, encompassing a number of amendments, instigated by different participants1568, 
the benefit of the travaux préparatoires is also their downfall; its engagement might give rise 
to confusion.     
 
Indeed, the Court has held that it will only refer to the travaux préparatoires where they 
might also be found in the promulgated version of the relevant legislation itself1569.  The 
CJEU seems to be aware of the potential difficulties that might arise from an unrestrained 
approach to the identification of normative sources; thus, on the basis of legitimacy concerns, 
it will generally refrain from making reference to sources of law not ratified by the Member 
States1570.  As a general rule, the AGs and the Court have not made reference to the travaux 
préparatoires in cases concerning the interpretation of primary Union law 1571 .  
Notwithstanding, it seems that more recently the AG and Court have adopted an increased 
willingness to engage a more broad reference to the travaux préparatoires.  This is clear from 
a recent case in which, holding an action to be inadmissible on the basis of a narrow 
interpretation of individual standing per Art.263 TFEU, the Court’s interpretation of the 
notion of “regulatory act” in Art.263(4) TFEU was made with reference to the travaux 
préparatoires, not of the TFEU itself but of the Constitution for Europe, Art.III-365(4) of 
which comprised a provision identical to that of Art.263(4)1572.  The AGs and the Court will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1567  While they might reflect the divergences in legislative drafting, depending on the nature of the legislation 
and illustrate the manner in which the proposals have developed, they do not explicate the rationale 
underpinning the final adopted draft. 
1568 On this basis, the travaux préparatoires should, in any case, only be understood as an aid to interpretation; if 
they add to confusion or lead to a result that is contrary to the provision’s natural understanding, the CJEU will 
not follow the interpretative guidance.   
1569 C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, Judgement, paras.17-18. 
1570 As is clear from Joined Cases C-21-24/72 Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Productschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] 
ECR 1219, and the approach adopted with reference to the GATT. 
1571 L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, Oxford; 2004), pp.374-380. 
1572 C-583/11 P Inuit, nyr, Judgement, para.59. 
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engage the travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of secondary Union law1573; this 
reference reflects not only the significance of cooperation and compromise in Union norm 
formation and interpretation but also recognition of the breadth of diversity across the 
Union1574.  In particular, reference is made to relevant Green Papers, often as a means of 
explicating the aims and objectives of the Union legislature, especially where these might 
converge or diverge with trends in the Member States1575.  Furthermore, the AG and Court 
increasingly make reference to the Explanations of the CFR, as part of the travaux 
préparatoires1576 and to which reference should be made per Art.6(1) TFEU and Art.52(7) 
CFR.  The difficulties of access and verification that might previously have dissuaded the AG 
or Court from referencing such resources are now less obvious, given that the travaux 
préparatoires are being published more widely, and fundamentally, are available online1577.  
This might also explain why one can identify references to the travaux préparatoires of 
Union law in national case law, even where no preliminary reference is made (for example, in 
the English cases on the UCTD, discussed above).   
 
The reference to the travaux préparatoires also brings to light the scope for cross-referencing 
between areas of Union law, which can be deemed to constitute a method of comparison.   
Cross-references can be identified in the Court or AG’s engagement of relevant CJEU 
jurisprudence or Union legislation, either explicitly or by analogy (it is necessary to consider 
that reasoning by analogy extends to references beyond those of a comparative nature1578).  
Reference might be made to “hard” European legislation, to judicially-developed norms, and 
increasingly, to non-binding, “soft” Union law (including guidelines, declarations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1573  Including C-68/94 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-1375, Judgement, para.167; Quelle (n.241), 
Judgement, para.33 (with reference to the meaning of “free of charge” in Directive 1999/44/EC) (followed in C-
65/09 Weber/Putz [1998] ECR I-5257, Judgement, para.46); C-22/11 Finnair nyr, Opinion of AG Bot, paras.33 
and 55. 
1574 F. Jacobs, ‘How to Interpret Legislation Which is Equally As Authentic in Twenty Languages’, Seminar on 
Quality of Legislation; Brussels, 20.10.2003. 
1575 See for example, Banco Español (n.1016), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.15. 
1576 Inuit (n.1572), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.109, where the Explanations are deemed to be “guidance for the 
interpretation of the Charter and to which the European Union Courts and the courts of the Member States must 
have due regard”; Judgement, para.97.  Consider the lack of clarity as to their significance added in Åkerberg 
Fransson (n.1287), Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon, para.25, who refers to the Explanations, “for all that they are 
worth’; Judgement, para.20. 
1577  http://ec.europa.eu/prelex, on which Commission documents can be found; 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu, on which Council documents can be found and 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/home.html for Parliament documents. 
1578 L. Weinrib, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument (CUP, Cambridge; 2005); see also, the 
discussion in the categorisations that follow. 
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opinions)1579 and might involve cross-referencing between regimes at the Union level.  Such 
an approach is clearly identifiable in the state liability case example, in which both the AG 
and the Court cross-reference between the judicially-developed regimes of Union and state 
liability.  Furthermore, the engagement with this type of comparison might arise in in respect 
of the evaluation of similar concepts existing in different directives.  This is identifiable in 
Leitner, for example, in which the AG compared the notions of damage in Directive 85/374 
and Directive 90/3141580, and also in respect of the evolution of the national and European 
concepts of consumer1581.  The rationales underpinning the determination of the source to 
which reference is made might diverge; predominantly, the Court and AG seems to engage in 
this kind of comparative analysis for the purpose of creating greater consistency and thus 
coherence between different areas of Union law, whether legislatively or judicially developed.   
 
ii. Reference to, and Analysis of National Legal Norms, National Case Law, and 
Aspects of National Cultures and Traditions 
 
In those cases in which the issue underpinning the reference concerns the interpretation of EU 
law and its application in the national context, and particularly, the determination of the 
compatibility of national and EU law, the relevant national norms will normally be set out at 
the outset of the AG’s Opinion and the Court’s judgement.  Generally, this amounts to the 
mere “copy and paste” of the pertinent, applicable provisions of national legislation and does 
not encompass reference to other types of norms.  However, there is a relevant comparative 
dimension: notwithstanding that a similar issue of compatibility might putatively arise in 
other national jurisdictions, and that the judgement – and particularly, the interpretation of 
Union law rendered, and potentially any finding of compatibility or incompatibility - will be 
applicable across the Union and not only in the Member State of the referring court, reference 
is normally made only to the norms prevailing in the jurisdiction of the referring court.  An 
approach which does more than make mere reference to national rules but which encompasses 
the identification, examination and evaluation of relevant national norms, is not undertaken in 
every case; rather, the depth of the analysis seemingly depends on the nature of the dispute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1579 For example, in Dominguez (n.1502), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.102-109, with reference to provisions 
of Union law, of public international law and of Member State law, respectively (including reference to soft law, 
for example, Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers).  Notwithstanding, the CJEU 
has shown reluctance to base its recognition of a principle of Union law on non-binding soft law (C-101/08 
Audiolux [2009] ECR I-09823, Judgement, paras.33-34). 
1580 Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras.34 and 35. 
1581 Mak, ‘Harmonisation through 'Directive-Related' and 'Cross-Directive' Interpretation’ (n.313).  
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arising.  A distinction can be drawn between those cases in which reference is made to the 
norms prevailing in the jurisdiction of the referring court and those in which there is scope for 
the relevance of norms applicable in other jurisdictions1582.  
 
Moreover, the Treaty structure might explicitly provide for comparative analysis to be 
adopted by the CJEU.  This is the case per Art.340 TFEU in respect of the non-contractual 
liability of the Union, a foundation that the CJEU has subsequently engaged, transferred and 
adopted in its development of the liability of the Member States1583.  While AG Tesauro notes 
that “the substantive preconditions for liability are more or less the same everywhere”1584, the 
conditions of liability (particularly concerning the availability of compensation, and 
especially for pure economic loss) and the variables delineating liability, necessarily engage 
the diversity of national tort rules.  Indeed, AG Tesauro compared (although perhaps in a 
limited fashion, looking only to identify similarities) national rules, for the purposes of 
“enabling a common definition to be found of the conditions in question”1585.  The state 
liability example reflects one set of cases in which the CJEU found there to exist a general 
principle of Union law, notwithstanding the identification – on the basis of its comparative 
analysis of the pertinent national norms – of an absence of commonality between the Member 
States as to the existence of liability; this was particularly true in respect of the availability of 
a remedy for compensation.  The existence of diversity is therefore recognised but has not 
undermined the scope for the identification of generality; indeed, as noted above, this finding 
is perhaps better characterised as one of generality as opposed to commonality.  This suggests 
that the CJEU did not simply engage comparative analysis for the purposes of identifying 
similarity or repressing difference.  However the AG and Court also looked to draw a 
comparison with other areas of Union law, namely the non-contractual liability of the Union 
(and further, international law), for the purposes of ensuring the coherence of the broader 
regime 1586 ; the approach is teleological, looking to the evolution of Union culture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1582 Consider for example, the comparative reference – via legal scholarship and citation of national legislative 
provisions – in respect of the scope for collective action for unfair terms across the national legal traditions in the 
Opinion of AG Trstenjak and the lack of any comparative analysis – but rather, mere reference to the the impact 
on Hungarian national law - in the judgement of the Court in Invitel: cf. Invitel (n.1016), Opinion of AG 
Trstenjak, fn.10-11. 
1583 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.27. 
1584 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.53. 
1585 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.54. 
1586 Essentially AG Tesauro argues “…I consider that there is no reason for applying different criteria – naturally 
in like situations – depending on whether the infringement of Community law in question is attributable to a 
State or Community institution”; Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.67. 
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underpinning legal development1587.  Indeed, since Brasserie, the conditions on which the 
obligation to make reparation in respect of state and Union liability is founded, have become 
almost identical1588, reflecting the consequences of clear processes of cross-referencing 
between both regimes.  The same notion of coherence underpins the understanding that the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence on state liability was “fully transferable” in respect of the development 
of the liability of the national courts1589. 
 
Returning to the explicit bases of comparison identifiable in the Treaty structure, Art.6(2) 
TEU provides for explicit reference to “[f]undamental rights...as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States...”; however, this provision does not 
provide for the content of rights, or how they should be identified or extrapolated.  In this 
area, the CJEU has therefore recognised the inspiration and guidance provided by national 
law, as well as international law.  Indeed, in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the Court 
highlighted that the constitutional traditions (as well as international human rights treaties) 
could function as an “inspiration” to the protection afforded to fundamental rights, albeit, as 
noted above, in line with the aims and objectives of Union law1590.  Thus, one can identify 
references which include but are not limited to national legal rules but extend, as noted above, 
to international law, and most significantly, the ECHR; moreover, against this background, 
there exists broader consideration of the value considerations that permeate fundamental 
rights protection (and its invocation) at the national and Union levels.   
 
The fundamental rights example further illustrates that the CJEU does not merely engage in 
comparison for the purposes of identifying similarity or difference or for the purpose of 
identifying commonality at the expense (i.e. repression) of the divergences existing between 
legal regimes, whether national, European or international.  Yet this has not always been 
clear.  On the one hand, the CJEU has long recognised fundamental rights as principles of 
Union law, finding their bases in a “philosophical, political and legal substratum” deemed to 
be “common” and shared between the Member States, from which “an unwritten Community 
law emerges”1591.  Moreover AG Roemer when rendering the Opinion in Stauder, accepted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1587 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, paras.30 and 35, respectively. 
1588 Tridimas, ‘Liability for Breaches of Community Law’ (n.920). 
1589 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.36. 
1590 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Judgement, para.4 and Opinion 2/94 (n.1246), para.33, both of 
which are cited in Chapter 7. 
1591 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe, paras.1146-1147. 
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the assertion advanced by “many writers” (of the time) that “general qualitative concepts of 
national constitutional law…which form an unwritten constituent part of Community law” 
must be identified by “a comparative valuation of laws”1592, in the course of the identification 
and recognition of principles of Union law.  It is not clear if AG Roemer understood this as a 
reflection of the need for commonality and unanimity of national norms, as a prerequisite to 
the recognition of such principles.   
 
It now seems to be clear that commonality is not deemed to be a prerequisite for recognition 
of a principle of Union law.  The AG and Court recognised a principle of human dignity per 
Art.6(2) TEU, deemed to be shared between the Member States reflecting the notion that 
“[a]ll in all, human dignity has its roots deep in the origins of a conception of mankind in 
European culture”1593.  Notwithstanding, no express comparative analysis of national norms 
and traditions was undertaken; this, it is asserted, would have actually revealed a lack of 
commonality.  Instead, reference was made to a number of – predominantly German - 
scholars, and “a variety of religious, philosophical and ideological reasoning...”.  Having 
recognised such a broad principle, so conceived as to find some understanding across the 
Member States, the Court in Omega then ultimately rejected a requirement of commonality, 
both in respect of that which underlies the “system of protection” and the development and 
application of the proportionality test1594, with regard to which the AG and the Court 
specifically asserted that there was no need for a common conception underpinning a 
restriction to freedoms1595.  While, on the one hand, Omega seems to reflect an approach of 
the CJEU based on a pluralist, multi-level perspective of fundamental rights protection and 
the balancing of fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, in light of the aims and 
objectives of Union law underpinning the European endeavour, its approach and comparative 
analysis is inconsistent.   
 
Moreover, the existence of divergences, identified via comparative analysis, is also 
particularly relevant in respect of the CJEU’s utilisation of the margin of discretion.  One can 
identify the scope for comparison – not in respect of the undertaking of analysis at the level of 
the CJEU itself but in the recognition that diversities exist between the Member States – not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1592 Stauder (n.682), Opinion of AG Roemer, p.428; Judgement, p.422. 
1593 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, fn.46-48; 51-53, para.78. 
1594 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, paras.37-38. 
1595 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.71. 
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only with regard to the determination of the “status” of fundamental rights but also with 
regard to their substantive role, in respect of the “balancing” exercise set out by the CJEU and 
to be applied by the national courts.  These dimensions are necessarily intertwined, yet it is 
the latter which is predominantly explored in the case example above.  While the balancing of 
fundamental rights and freedoms is undertaken at the national level, the CJEU might provide 
guidance to the national judge, reflecting the notion of division of labour.  Indeed, the CJEU 
recognises that the Member States may exercise a “margin of discretion” in this task, and 
particularly in respect of its proportionality dimension, identified in Schmidberger et al1596.  
This is attributed particular relevance in respect of the public policy foundations of the 
invocation of fundamental rights, and dictates that the national particularities of protection, 
that is, national values, could be taken into consideration.  When it comes to considering the 
way in which reference to legal sources might shape the CJEU’s comparative analysis, 
reference must be made to the CJEU’s utilisation of the margin of appreciation or discretion 
as a mechanism of taking into consideration national specificities via comparative analysis.  
Initially developed within the ECtHR, it has been introduced in light of the fundamental rights 
jurisprudence as a possible means of regulating divergences in their across the European 
space, and comes to the fore particularly in respect of sources of international law.  The 
breadth of the margin of appreciation will depend on the nature of the relevant norm and the 
extent to which the CJEU identifies the existence of commonality or diversity across the 
Member States; at a fundamental level, comparison is necessary to identify such 
characterisations.  In this respect, reference is made to more than national – and strictly legal 
– norms but also to those component parts that constitute national culture and tradition, 
including the values that contribute to the development of national identities, and furthermore, 
the evolution of the nation state.  Indeed, in Sayn-Wittgenstein, the Court referred to Art.4(2) 
TEU and the need to "respect the national identities of its Member States, which include the 
status of the State as a Republic"1597; this essentially brings to the fore the notion that the 
protection of the identities of the Member States should be relevant to the balancing process 
where fundamental rights give rise to a conflict with economic freedoms.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1596 For a comparison between the margin of discretion of the CJEU and the margin of appreciation of the 
ECtHR, and the development of a European understanding of deference, see J. Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference 
and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 ELJ 80. 
1597 Sayn-Wittgenstein (n.1472), Judgement, para.92. 
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While the ECtHR seems to identify the shifting margin of appreciation depending on the 
extent of the commonality or divergence across the Convention States1598, as identified by 
comparative analysis – such that, where the degree of commonality is higher, the margin of 
appreciation will be narrower; where there is little degree of commonality, the margin of 
appreciation will be broader - the CJEU rather looks to commonality in determining the 
margin of discretion, seemingly in light of its need to promote uniformity for the purposes of 
facilitating the internal market.  As such, while Augenstein recognises an attempt on the part 
of the ECtHR to bring national diversities into Convention law, he considers that the CJEU’s 
approach is “antagonistic to accommodating national diversity”1599.  Where diverse standards 
of protection are identifiable, the CJEU will not recognise this diversity as part of Union law 
where, if there is European consensus as to the level of protection to be afforded, it is deemed 
to undermine the uniform interpretation of fundamental rights across the EU space1600, a 
result, he considers, of the significance of the internal market in shaping interpretation, and 
the consequent focus on the need for uniformity for its functioning.  Thus, in respect of the 
recognition of principles of Union law, the CJEU has left little scope for engaging diversities 
at the Union level, either by refusing to recognise a Union principle, as was the case in 
Hoechst1601, or recognising one so broad so that it finds some basis across the Union space, as 
in Omega.  As considered above, the CJEU is still bound to respect national diversities per the 
Treaties and the Charter, and in the absence of commonality, seems to justify exceptions to 
free movement on the basis of national policy considerations and standards of rights 
protection, per Schmidberger; notwithstanding, as noted in Chapter 7, the focus arguably 
remains internal market-orientated - as is also clear from Viking and Laval – as opposed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1598 Which might, it should be noted, be invoked as a means of delineating progressive policy at the European 
level.  This can be identified most explicitly in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in the case of Schalk and Kopf 
(Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010) ECtHR, 24.06.2010, App.No.30141/04).  Art.44 of the Austrian Civil Code 
defined marriage as between two persons of the opposite sex with reference to Art.9 CFR and Art.12 ECHR, 
neither of which explicitly refers to the need for “opposite sex”.  The ECtHR considered that per Art.12 ECHR 
and Art.9 CFR, it should no longer be necessary for persons to be of the “opposite sex” to exercise the right to 
marry (at para.61).  However, recognising the divergences existing between the national systems and 
consequently, the difficulty in identifying a common European approach, the ECtHR deferred to the margin of 
appreciation and as such, held that the ECHR does not oblige contracting states to legislate for or recognise 
same-sex marriages. 
1599 D. Augenstein, ‘Disagreement – Commonality – Autonomy: Fundamental Rights in the Internal Market’, 
p.16 (<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338630>; Last Accessed: 13.04.2014).  
1600 Melloni (n.1287). 
1601 As Augenstein noted (D. Augenstein, ‘Disagreement – Commonality – Autonomy: Fundamental Rights in 
the Internal Market’, p.19), with regard to the initial refusal to recognise Art.8 ECHR protection in respect of 
business premises, wherein the Court provided, “because there are not inconsiderable divergences between the 
legal systems of the Member States in regard to the nature and degree of protection afforded”; Hoechst (n.1265), 
Judgement, para.17.  Subsequently, after the ECtHR identified commonality, the CJEU recognised the extension 
of protection in C-94/00 Roquettes Frères [2002] ECR I-9011. 
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reflecting the recognition of diversity.  Weatherill derives the following conclusion: “the more 
sensitive and the more remote from commercial considerations the matters advanced in the 
context of justification of trade barriers are, the more generous the Court is to the available 
scope for justification and also to the breadth of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the 
regulator”1602.   
 
Thus, it is clear that the CJEU’s use of the margin of discretion differs from that of the 
ECtHR.  One the one hand, the margin of discretion could provide scope for the CJEU’s 
recognition of the plurality, multi-level nature of fundamental rights protection 1603 ; 
furthermore, using comparative analysis for the purpose of identifying the particularities of a 
certain national system and employing the margin of discretion as a mechanism for 
recognising diversity at the Union level, would allow the CJEU to attribute force to its 
judgement by convincing national courts of the acceptability of its interpretation1604.  It is 
clear that the protection of fundamental rights cannot be guaranteed only within the national 
systems but “must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community”1605.  Following Omega, and the subsequent line of cases arising, the CJEU 
illustrates that it will aim to respect national identity in the protection of fundamental rights – 
essentially, evidenced in the application of national rights protection by the domestic courts – 
“provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the 
[CJEU], and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised"1606.  As noted, a distinction can seemingly be identified in respect of the 
approaches to balancing, between a social-protection orientated approach and a “liberal” 
market-orientated approach1607; from these lines of reasoning, it is further evident that the 
economic dimension dominates the CJEU’s decision making, despite its apparent openness to 
and acceptance of a plurality of values permeating the national and Union levels.  Against this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1602 S. Weatherill, ‘From Economic Rights to Fundamental Rights’ in S. de Vries, U. Bernitz and S. Weatherill 
(eds.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon (Hart, Oxford; 2013), pp.11-36, p.24. 
1603 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘Ordering Pluralism’ EUI MWP WP 2009/06, p.7. 
1604 As considered above, in relation to the discussion of the “empowerment” thesis, it should be noted that the 
significance to be attached to such force has been challenged by Alter, who questions whether it can really be 
understood as the reason why national courts accept the decisions of the CJEU; see Alter, ‘Explaining National 
Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence’ in Slaughter et al, The European Court and National 
Courts (n.805), pp.227-252. 
1605 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Judgement, para.4. 
1606 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, paras.60-61. 
1607 Compare Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, ‘Institutional Theories, EU Law and the Role of Courts for Developing a 
European Social Model’ in Neergaard et al, The Role of Courts in Developing a European Social Model (n.61), 
p.336, who discusses considers the scope for the CJEU to deny fundamental rights, and promote freedoms at all 
costs above social policy considerations. 
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background, it is clear that the margin of discretion is to be employed by the CJEU to 
promote the maintenance of divergences only where these divergences do not undermine the 
effectiveness of Union law1608.   
 
For the purposes of comprehensiveness, it is worth noting that is less evidence of the 
engagement of a comprehensive comparative analysis of national norms or traditions in the 
Opinions of the AGs or the judgement of the Courts in the UCTD case examples.  Rather, 
these case examples illustrate the scope for comparison, which, it seems, has not been 
engaged in each case heard before the CJEU.  The significance of the multi-level nature of 
consumer protection is reflected in the "division of labour" between the national courts and 
the CJEU, and the scope for comparative analysis arises in respect of the following 
dimensions permeating the jurisprudence: the rationales underpinning the ex officio 
regulation, and its evolution from a power to an obligation on the part of the national court; 
the consequent shift in the understanding of the role of the national judge (and the character 
of this role, in respect of the notion of judicial passivity versus judicial activity); the reflection 
of the constitutionalisation of private law and particularly, the significance of the national and 
European public policy dimensions arising1609; and the resistance to the Europeanisation of 
procedure, conceived as a putative intrusion into national procedural autonomy.  In light of 
the number of cases referred from the courts in recent years, the UCTD jurisprudence gives 
rise to the scope for comparative analysis to be relevant not only for the purposes of 
identifying commonality or diversity but also to determine whether its existence and breadth 
might be relevant for the courts of other Member States.  It does not seem as if the CJEU has 
consistently given explicit consideration to such spillover effects; this will be discussed in 
more detail in relation to the scope for dialogue.  
 
From the case examples, it seems that one might uncover a distinction which indicates the 
existence of comparative analysis, even if it cannot be explicitly identified in the text of the 
case itself.  This distinction might be identified, on the one hand, between those cases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1608 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, paras.60-61. 
1609 The way in which public policy is engaged in different areas of law and in different national systems might 
diverge; for example, it plays a particularly significant role in private international law and the determination and 
application of applicable law:  Public policy has been described in the sense that “the courts do not close their 
doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good 
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal” (Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York 224 N.Y. 99, 
at 111, 120 N.E. 198 at 202 (1918)).  In the context of, in particular, the fundamental rights cases above, the 
notion of public policy is employed at the national level as a basis for the limitation of fundamental rights, 
understood as fundamental values (which is a concept within which fundamental rights might also fall).   
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involving a substantive analysis of national norms and on the other, those in which there is no 
explicit reference to the rules of the specific Member States but rather to the way in which the 
AG or Court considers legal traditions or legal culture in “classifying” (very broadly 
understood) legal systems.  For example, in Leitner AG Tizzano referenced those systems that 
had extended the scope for compensation to include non-material damage and “the other 
groups of the Member States”1610; among the former are included the legal systems of 
Germany (as referred to by the Austrian Landesgericht in its preliminary reference)1611, 
Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands1612, and among the latter, the English, French and Italian 
systems.  Furthermore, AG Tizzano also made reference to the “open” approach followed in 
some of the US jurisdictions1613.  Another example of such categorisation arises in the UCTD 
jurisprudence, where implicit reference is made to the notion of a substance or procedure-
based culture or tradition in light of the CJEU’s forging of a pathway into national procedural 
autonomy, the close link between national procedural autonomy and legal tradition1614 
enduring in the absence of the Europeanisation of the former. 
 
The above analysis aims to illustrate that the reference to national norms gives rise to a 
vertical, direct or indirect comparative analysis, engaging national legal norms, and in some 
cases, the component parts of national legal culture and tradition, for the purposes of 
identifying commonality and diversity across the European space.  However, the analysis 
similarly confirms the absence of a methodological framework of comparison and the lack of 
theoretical rigour in the CJEU’s approach; for example, there is less evidence of comparative 
analysis in the UCTD case law, notwithstanding the line of cases arising from particular 
courts, and the consequent scope for analysis of (at least) those traditions, while the 
fundamental rights jurisprudence illustrates that the dominance of the internal market focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1610 Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras.40-42. 
1611 Para.651(f), BGB, developed subsequently by case law, as noted above. 
1612 Art.19(4) and (5), Loi de 16.02.1994; Art.11(2), Ley 21/96, 06.07.1995; Art.7:510, Burgerlijk Wetboek, 
respectively (cited at fn.20-22). 
1613 With reference, respectively, in fn.23-25 to Jarvis v Swan Tours [1973] QB 233; Jackson v Horizon 
Holidays [1975] 1 WLR 1468 (it is worth noting that while there has been evolution from the understanding that 
no recover can be made under contract in respect of mental distress – see Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] 
AC 488 - non-material loss does not provide an actionable claim in itself; it is a consideration in the 
determination of damages broadly (Ichard v Frangoulis [1997] 1 WLR 556) – yet the issue has not come before 
a court higher than the Court of Appeal for a number of years); to various French jurisprudence and a number of 
Italian cases. 
1614 Adinolfi, ‘The "Procedural Autonomy" of Member States and the Constraints Stemming from the ECJ’s 
Case Law’ in de Witte and Micklitz, The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States 
(n.1166), p.286. 
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shapes the CJEU’s use of comparative analysis for the purposes of recognising and 
acknowledging diversity across the Union space. 
 
iii. Reference to, and Analysis of International Norms and the Decisions of Courts 
and Tribunals Other than Those of the Member States1615 
 
In respect of the CJEU’s engagement with national and international law norms, a parallel 
might be drawn in respect of, on the one hand, the CJEU’s declaration of the autonomy of the 
Union order1616, and on the other, its unwillingness to sever the connection to its twin origins 
of national and international law.  As de Witte has noted, the understanding of the EU as an 
autonomous, self-referential and closed system1617 depends broadly on the acceptance of such 
an understanding by the national courts1618; this engages the relevance of comparison, for the 
purposes of identifying the reactions in the national orders, and beyond.   
 
On the one hand, the CJEU and other Union institutions are bound by international 
agreements into which the Union has entered1619, necessitating their engagement with 
international law.  The VCLT – especially Arts.31 and 33 – is relevant to the interpretation of 
the Union’s international agreements; these rules facilitate a contextual and purpose-
orientated interpretation, beyond the textual construction of the provision.  The influence of 
international agreements should not be considered on their own as they will also affect the 
CJEU’s interpretation of primary or secondary Union law by virtue of which obligations 
deriving from international law are incorporated into the Union, and consequently, the 
national legal orders.  The manifestations of this effect might encompass reference to 
customary international law, by which the powers exercised by the Union are deemed to be 
limited, or principles of customary international law enshrined in international treaties to 
which the Union is not a party1620.  Notwithstanding, while the primacy principle dictates that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1615 Certainly it should be noted that the references made herein do not reflect all of the references made to, for 
example, fundamental rights courts and tribunals, and international tribunals, in respect of, for example, issues of 
international trade law, international environmental law, international investment law, and so on. 
1616 Van Gend en Loos (n.219), Judgement, para.3. 
1617 As in R. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer, The Hague; 2004), p.259. 
1618 B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P.P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), 
The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford; 2nd edn., 2011), pp.323-362, pp.361-362. 
1619 Per Art.216 TFEU, in respect of which, these agreements are binding; confirmed, inter alia, in C-61/94 
Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, Judgement, para.52. 
1620 C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655, Judgement, para.45, and with respect to the VCLT, at paras.45-46. See 
also, Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, para.39, with reference to the scope (and limits) of compensation 
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international agreements prevail over Union law, they will not undermine the Union’s 
constitutional foundations1621.  Thus, these references, reflecting the influence of international 
law are not automatic but rather engage a process of analysis and reflection on the part of the 
CJEU in respect of the putative interaction between the international, Union and national legal 
orders1622.  On the other hand, the AG and/or Court might engage with the existence or 
substantive meaning of a particular concept of international law.  This might be done for the 
purposes of promoting the consistency and coherence of the international and Union 
regimes1623; this is clear with reference, for example, to the CISG in cases involving sales 
within the European context1624.  The rationale underpinning such an interpretative approach 
falls within broader Union concerns – and can be identified in all of the case examples above 
– reflecting fundamental principles of the Union order, including, for example, the need to 
ensure effective judicial protection (per Art.19 TFEU and Art.47 CFR, and Arts.6 and 13 
ECHR). 
 
Moreover, reference to international norms might provide a basis upon which the CJEU can 
facilitate the transfer of a concept from the international to the Union regime.  This is 
identifiable particularly with regard to the understanding of the state, wherein both AGs in 
Brasserie and Köbler engaged in the systematic interpretation of the concept in international 
law, creating – in the absence of a Union understanding – a connection between the two 
regimes to the extent that liability could be understood as inherent in the Treaties1625; express 
reference has been made to international law, legal scholarship1626, legal doctrine1627 and case 
law1628, including that of the ECtHR, in respect of the development of the liability of national 
courts1629.  Another example concerns the evolution of the concept of human dignity as it 
arose in the Omega case.  The Court, following the AG, recognised that respect for human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in various international conventions (to which the Member States can make reference in limiting compensation, 
per Art.5(2), Directive 90/314) and to which reference is made in recital 18, Directive 90/314. 
1621 Kadi (n.147), Judgement, para.285: “the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the 
effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles”. 
1622 Opinion 1/09 on Art.218(11) TFEU [2011] ECR I-1137, para.84. 
1623 Commission v Germany (n.1619), Judgement, para.5. 
1624 Quelle (n.241), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.28, in respect of the interpretation of Art.3(2) Directive 1999/44 
and Art.46(2) CISG, in the need for the consumer to choose – between repair and replacement – the remedy 
which is possible and proportionate; C-65/09 Weber/Putz [2011] ECR I-5257, Opinion of AG Mazak, para.57, in 
respect of the differing conditions shaping the seller’s liability for more indirect consequences of his non or 
defective performance (in national law and the CISG). 
1625 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.38 et seq; Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.32. 
1626 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.45. 
Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.42-44. 
1628 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, fns.46-47. 
1629 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.49, citing ECHR, Dulaurans v. France of 21.03.2000, (2001) 33 EHRR 45. 
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dignity could constitute a principle of Union law deriving from the understanding of the 
concept in the national legal cultures and traditions (and the protection afforded therein).  
Notwithstanding, neither the AG nor the Court engaged in a comprehensive comparative 
evaluation of the national norms and as such, comparative analysis could not have been used 
to identify commonality between the national systems; thus, on the one hand, while the CJEU 
did not appear to consider commonality between the national orders as a prerequisite for its 
engagement at the Union level, it nevertheless seemed that the principle recognised was so 
broad as to find some common or shared basis across the Union.  Furthermore, the CJEU had 
identified another source of commonality, recognising that provisions of international treaties 
could be understood as “common” to the national cultures and traditions as a result of the 
Member States’ collaboration in their drafting and development, and their role as signatories, 
that is, having given their consent thereto1630.  Thus, in Omega the comparative analysis was 
rather engaged in respect of the understanding of human dignity in the relevant international 
treaties, including the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the case law of the ECtHR (in 
respect of which human dignity is recognised to exist as ”the very essence of the 
Convention”) for the purposes of the recognition of the concept at the Union level1631.  This 
can be explained in two ways.  Comparative analysis that engages international law as a 
source of comparison allows for norms to be identified as enshrined in international law, for 
example, in treaties or conventions.  On the one hand, a formalist approach would dictate that 
it is the enshrinement of norms therein which provides that they might be engaged at the 
Union level, for example, in the CJEU’s recognition of principles, whether deemed to be 
common or general.  Comparative analysis also allows for the identification of norms in the 
national regimes, which reflects the engagement and consent of the Member States.  On the 
other hand, a voluntarist approach would dictate that it is this consent to the norm that dictates 
it can be engaged at the Union level.  This derives not from the fact that it is enshrined in the 
treaty or convention as such, but because it is identifiable by the judge in domestic law, its 
existence therein reflecting the “consent” of the state1632.   
 
In the cases outlined above, a vertical comparative analysis can be identified: in the absence 
of commonality between the Member States (either identified by virtue of a comprehensive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1630 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones (n.1346), Judgement, para.29. 
1631 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.82 et seq, citing Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
1632 J. Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (2011) 22 EJIL 949, pp.953-954. 
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comparative evaluation of national norms, or in its absence, as in Oceano), the CJEU then 
looks to the international level; what is identified there is deemed to be shared by the Member 
States, and is subsequently considered to be transferrable to the Union level.  In this case, the 
comparative analysis can be understood to be vertical but of an indirect nature; that is to say, 
it is of international law, the norms of which constitute a proxy and allow for indirect 
reference to national law.  However, the nature of the comparative analysis is important.  It 
must be thorough and rigorous, in order to avoid the relevant norm being identified as a 
fiction (indeed, thorough comparative analysis itself can alert us to the fiction); furthermore, 
this gives rise to problematics of cherry-picking, whereby the existence of a norm in one or 
more orders is taken for granted across the Union space, ultimately calling into question the 
legitimacy of the interpretation rendered by the CJEU.  
 
Moreover, the CJEU has long highlighted the significance of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR1633 in its judgements, even prior to the EU having acceded to the Convention system, 
attributing “special significance” to the ECHR1634 as “inspiration”, providing “guidelines” 
engendered by international law1635.  Prior to the EU's accession to the ECHR, the ECtHR had 
no jurisdiction in respect of the assessment of the compatibility of Union acts with the 
Convention; this jurisdiction fell solely to the CJEU.  It should be noted that the CJEU’s 
decision might largely follow the substance of the decisions of the ECtHR, notwithstanding 
that it might not explicitly engage its jurisprudence1636.  There nevertheless exists scope for 
conflicting judgements, to the extent that the Strasbourg Court exercises jurisdiction over the 
States (also when acting as Member States) in respect of the compliance with the 
ECHR1637.  There are key examples of the scope for possible conflicts: Bosphorus is of 
course, one1638; Kadi1639 is also of prime relevance.  Many relevant cases have concerned 
Art.6 ECHR and the scope for a fair trial in proceedings arising before the national courts and 
referred to the CJEU.  It seems that the relationship to which the scope for conflict gives rise 
between the ECtHR and CJEU results in one of a kind of dialogue, with each citing the 
jurisprudence of the other court and precluding the potential for a real clash between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1633 C-540/03 Parliament v Council (Family Reunification) [2006] ECR I-5769, Judgement, paras.54-56. 
1634 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, para.34. 
1635 Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, para.71 and the cases cited therein. 
1636 C-283/11 Sky Österreich nyr. 
1637 See S. Douglas-Scott, 'A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human 
Rights Acquis' (2006) 43 CMLR 629. 
1638 Bosphorus v Ireland (2005) ECtHR, 30.06.2005, App.No.45036/98; See also, Matthews v. United Kingdom 
(1999) ECtHR, 18.02.1999, App.No.24833/94. 
1639 Kadi (n.147). 
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regimes1640.  In the case of Vermeulen, heard before the ECtHR, it was argued that the role of 
the procureur du Roi, the lack of opportunity to reply to his statements, and the role of the 
advocate general in national (Belgian) proceedings, infringed Art.6(1) ECHR and the right to 
adversarial proceedings.  The ECtHR upheld this argument, finding a violation of 
Art.6(1)1641.  Subsequently, an attempt was made before the CJEU – in the case of Emesa 
Sugar - to draw an analogy with Vermeulen, in respect of the lack of opportunity to reply to 
the AG before the CJEU.  The CJEU rejected the argument that the lack of opportunity to 
reply violated Art.6(1), on the basis of the "organic and functional" relationship existing 
between the two judicial institutions, namely the AG and the Court1642.  The issue again came 
before the Strasbourg Court, at which instance it rejected the argument - citing CJEU case law 
- that the lack of opportunity for a applicant to review the submissions of the Commissaire du 
Gouvernment before their submission violated Art.6(1); the ECtHR found that there existed 
other satisfactory measures to ensure the protection of the right 1643 .  The continuing 
interaction between the two regimes and the dialogue that both seem to attempt to foster, can 
be further identified in a more recent case 1644 , in which the ECtHR, having taken 
consideration of the proceedings as a whole, held that the refusal of the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation and the Conseil d’État to refer questions to the CJEU, did not amount to a violation 
of Art.6(1) ECHR.  This dialogue results from a cross-citation of jurisprudence and cross-
referencing of reasoning and findings.   
 
The CJEU has similarly made reference to the CFR and did so, even before it became binding 
in the Union regime1645; the CFR must now be understood as primary law, per Art.6(1) TEU.  
It is a matter for consideration whether the drafting of a “Bill of Rights”, that is, the essential 
codification of fundamental rights in the CFR, will affect the methodology, and thus the scope 
for comparison, adopted by the CJEU when rendering a judgement on a case involving the 
rights found in the CFR.  Essentially the question arises as to whether the CJEU will continue 
to refer to and interpret CFR rights and principles with reference to sources of the national 
traditions, the ECHR and other relevant international norms, or instead if rights and principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1640 Reference might also be made to COE, ‘Factsheet on Case-Law Concerning the EU, August 2013’ 
(<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_European_Union_ENG.pdf>; Last Accessed: 29.09.2013). 
1641 Vermeulen v. Belgium (1996) ECtHR, 20.02.1996, App.No.19075/91. 
1642 C-17/98 Emesa Sugar v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-665, Order, para.16. 
1643 Kess v France (2001) ECtHR, 07.06.2001, App.No.39594/98. 
1644 Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium (2011) ECtHR, 20.11.2011, App.Nos.3989/07-38353/07. 
1645 C-540/03 Parliament v Council (Family Reunification) [2006] ECR I-5769, Judgement, para.38. 
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will be understood only in respect of their primary law status attributed via the CFR1646.  This 
question relates to the nature and status of the fundamental right, and whether a distinction 
might be drawn between those identified from the national constitutional traditions and those 
of the CFR; this then brings to light whether such a status might affect the nature of 
comparison.  In a recent case, the referring German court asked if "fundamental rights which 
continue to apply as general principles of Union law under Article 6(3) EU stand 
autonomously and independently alongside the new fundamental rights" of the CFR, per 
Art.6(1) CFR; the Court did not render an answer as no connection could be drawn per Art.51 
CFR1647.   
 
In respect of the nature of comparison, one might assume that a comparative analysis of the 
laws and traditions of the Member States, and of international law, becomes superfluous for 
the purposes of the identification and recognition of fundamental rights as general or common 
principles of Union law.  This assertion seems to find support in an argument made by Rosas, 
writing extra-judicially, who suggests that reference to the CFR  - in the context of a 
discussion of fundamental rights at the national level - removes the need for reference to be 
made to national laws, or national constitutional traditions1648.  On the other hand, Lenaerts, 
also writing extra-judicially, has considered that as the scope of the CFR goes beyond, for 
example, Union principles as currently recognised, it might facilitate their future 
identification1649.  As discussed above, there is a lack of clarity in respect of the nature of the 
relationship between fundamental rights recognised as principles by the CJEU, and those 
found in the CFR, which should be clarified by the CJEU. 
  
Yet recalling the framework of interaction between the CJEU, the CFR, the ECtHR and the 
Convention outlined in Chapter 7, the CFR itself provides for continued reference to national 
legal norms, cultures and traditions (a provision inserted as part of a broader effort to achieve 
political compromise in the drafting and negotiation process) per Art.52 CFR.  The scope for 
the interaction of the various regimes of fundamental rights protection therefore continues, 
beyond the focus on the national systems, extending to the ECtHR, and to other regional and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1646 Editorial, 'The Scope of Application of General Principles of Union Law: An Ever Expanding Union?' 
(2010) 47 CMLR 1589, p.1595. 
1647 C-40/11 Iida, nyr. 
1648 A. Rosas, 'When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at the National Level?' (2012) 19 
Jurisprudence 1269, p.1272. 
1649 K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 ECLR 375, pp.385-
386. 
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supranational (human rights) bodies and organisations (including those of the UN).  This is 
particularly relevant where matters arise in respect of which there exists putative scope for a 
conflict based on legal norms, and/or values.  The ECHR and the ESC also provide for 
reference to national and Union law, which might be particularly relevant in respect of those 
rights which are potentially politically, socially and culturally controversial.  This includes, 
for example, Art.12 ECHR on the right to marry and Art.22 ESC on the right to take part in 
the “determination and improvement of the working conditions and working environment”; 
reference is made to the exercise and protection of such rights "in accordance with national 
legislation and practice".  It is not clear what approach would be adopted by the CJEU if it 
were required to interpret one of these potentially controversial provisions, particularly where 
there exists little consensus, both as to national or European norms and in respect of national 
or European policy, where there has been no clarification, either by the Union legislature or 
by the ECtHR.  Both provisions rather seem to provide for the engagement of an approach 
based on "comparative evaluation", even though it is in these types of cases that reference to 
national law and policy, or that beyond the state, might be of significant relevance.  
  
The multi-level character of fundamental rights protection - of national constitutional laws, 
Union law, the ECHR1650 and international law – has been set out in Chapter 7.  The Court in 
Melloni, dealing with the interaction of national and Union standards of fundamental rights 
protection in relation to criminal justice, has confirmed this characterisation and provided that 
“it is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act calls for national 
implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided 
for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU 
law are not thereby compromised"1651.  However, the CJEU rejected the notion that Art.53 
necessarily gives the Member State the option to go beyond what is provided for in EU law, 
to the extent that, where the Union legislature has harmonised exhaustively the relevant 
applicable norms, such an interpretation would undermine the effectiveness of Union law and 
go against the principle of its primacy1652.  The CJEU thus provides that the Member States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1650  Consider Rottman (n.1319), Judgement, para.55 which recognises a double layer of scrutiny of 
proportionality assessment. 
1651 Melloni (n.1287), Judgement, para.60. 
1652 See the decision of the Spanish to amend its own national provision – in respect of the protection afforded by 
the Spanish Constitution, the right to a fair trial, per Art.24(2) thereof, on which Mr Melloni attempted to rely - 
to fall into line with EU law, in STC 26/2014. 
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can only transcend the regulatory standard established at the Union level where the relevant 
norms have not been so harmonised.  This would allow the legislature or the court within the 
Member State to choose itself the means of fundamental rights protection (where there exists 
a choice) in line with its own national constitutional tradition, and might further facilitate the 
respect of national identities per Art.4(2) TEU1653.  Art.53 therefore potentially reinforces the 
notion of a multi-level system of fundamental rights protection; it is likely to give rise to 
future issues of contention.  While certain national courts – for example, the Tribunal 
Constitucional de España - has endorsed this formulation1654, it has similarly been recognised 
that it is complex, and gives rise to concerns relating to the clarity of the law (and particularly 
the threat to the uniformity of EU law) and the scope for justice to be done.  The problem of 
complexity is recognised as a real one: "it can become a daunting task for a national 
administrator or judge to assess which margin, if any, a norm of Union law may leave for 
applying rights other than those of the Charter, and then to identify the various applicable 
fundamental rights and their meaning pursuant to the case law of the Strasbourg, Luxembourg 
and the national constitutional court"1655.  The difficulty with this multi-level formation of 
rights protection arises in respect of the feasibility of the co-existence, cooperation and 
coordination between the different regimes; while it is submitted that comparative analysis 
could facilitate these interactions, by virtue of the identification of commonalities and 
diversities, as noted above, the approach of the CJEU remains inconsistent, as its 
identification of the margin of discretion focuses on the need for commonality and thus, 
uniformity to the exclusion of diversity, in light of the facilitation of the internal market.   
 
The complex comparison advanced herein would allow for the identification of the relevant 
sources of comparison – of a national, European and international nature – and facilitate the 
scope for the management of diversities and commonalities, particularly where these might 
shift, in light of a determination of the dynamic aims and objectives of Union law.  This 
analysis highlights two dimensions of the engagement with comparison.  It further illustrates 
and solidifies the need for a reflection on the relevant conceptualisation of comparison.  The 
reference to international legal sources and case law allows for vertical and horizontal, direct 
and indirect comparison, and the identification of commonality and diversity, notwithstanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1653 L. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon’ (2010) 6 Utrecht Law Review 
36, p.42. 
1654  Tribunal Supremo, Auto de 13.12.2004 (DTC 1/204). 
1655 C. Ladenburger, ‘EU Institution Report on the Scope of the Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’, 
FIDE 2012, p.25; (<http://www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88>; Last Accessed: 29.09.2013). 
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that the reference to the latter is less explicit, given the predominant focus on the facilitation 
of the internal market.  On the other hand - particularly with regard to fundamental rights but 
similarly in respect of the other case examples – there is evidence of the notion that the multi-
level character of a regime of regulation gives rise to complexity which must be dealt with via 
coordination and cooperation, and which can be facilitated by the dialogue to which the 
comparative methodology potentially gives rise.  This is further explored in Chapter 9. 
 
iv. Reference to “Non-State” Norms and Academic Writing 
 
The CJEU often makes reference to “non-state” norms and academic writing, understood as a 
broad spectrum including but not limited to – the following are of particular relevance to the 
Europeanisation of private law – the PECL and the DCFR; as noted above, reference might be 
made to bodies of norms, which are not of binding force at the relevant time of their 
engagement in the reasoning of the AG or the Court (including, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the 
ECHR and CFR, discussed above).   
 
The Common Frame of Reference, from which the DCFR derives, can be taken as an 
example1656 of the CJEU’s engagement with academically-developed norms.  It has been 
characterised in legal scholarship as a “source of inspiration”1657 and as a potential source of 
law1658, an understanding advanced by the AGs (but less significantly, by the Court).  These 
bodies of norms have been constructed on the basis of (predominantly positivist) comparative 
scholarship, funded by the Commission (the DCFR formed part of the broader CFR of the 
Commission).  To recall, the DCFR derives from the analysis of principles, rules and concepts 
common to the Member States, in the exploration of which the drafters identified the common 
norm, or, in the absence of commonality1659, their “best solution”.  The engagement can 
therefore be understood to reflect an indirect comparison on the part of the AG and the Court.  
This reference to academic writing and scholarship might reveal the “inspiration” underlying 
the Opinion or Judgement rendered.  That is to say, it might be the case that there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1656 From which the DCFR derived, not to be confused with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
1657 Hesselink, ‘A Toolbox for European Judges’ (n.707), p.11, making reference in support of such a proposition 
to Basedow, ‘The Court of Justice and Private Law’ (n.808), and against, to H-W. Micklitz, ‘Failure of 
Ideological Perceptions – Thoughts on Two Grand Projects:  The European Constitution and the European Civil 
Code’ EUI WP 2010/04, p.20. 
1658 Hamilton (n.552), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.24; C-489/07 Pia Messner [2009] ECR I-07315, Opinion of 
AG Trstenjak, para.94. 
1659 It is not suggested that the identification of the “best solution” necessarily constitutes an alternative; this is 
not clear.  
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predominance of a certain type of scholarship, of scholarship from a particular jurisdiction, of 
a particular language or with a particular political “tilt”.  Again, it is in the AG’s Opinion as 
opposed to the Court’s judgement that reference to substantive legal scholarship can be 
identified.  For example, in the UCTD case law, AG Trstenjak engages German, French and 
Spanish scholarship on the legal theory underpinning the evolution of freedom of contract; 
with regard to the justification underpinning interference with such autonomy, the literature 
cited by the AG is predominantly German 1660 .  Notwithstanding the absence of a 
comprehensive comparative analysis (the undertaking of which would not have allowed for 
the identification of a unanimous finding between the Member States, Union law, 
international law and private regulation on the matter), the AG engages particular legal 
scholarship, supporting the reference to previous CJEU jurisprudence for the purposes of 
highlighting the status of freedom of contract as a “unanimous” principle of Union law1661.  
 
It has long been recognised that private parties play a significant role, and often have a 
considerable interest, in legal (as well as political, social and policy-orientated development) 
European integration.  Private regulatory regimes, of different constitutions and structures, 
and with differing aims, have often contributed to integration, either consciously or 
incidentally; often this resonates from the harmonisation of norms (which similarly, may or 
may not explicitly have the purpose of facilitating integration)1662.  As the interests of these 
private parties and private regimes interest might conflict with the objectives of the Union, the 
CJEU has long assessed the compatibility of the norms of private regulatory regimes with 
Union law, particularly with reference to their validity in terms of competition1663, free 
movement and fundamental rights1664.  However, the CJEU rarely seems to engage such 
norms in a comparative analysis; one example can be identified in respect of the protection of 
lawyers’ secrecy and the exception to the obligation to report 1665 , with reference to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1660 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.9 and 12. 
1661 Namely, C-499/04 Werhof [2006] ECR I-2397, Judgement, para.23. 
1662 F. Cafaggi and A. Janczuk, ‘Private Regulation and Legal Integration: The European Example’ (2010) 12 
Business and Politics, Art.6, pp.19 et seq. 
1663 C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, Judgement, paras.73 et seq. 
1664 Mattli and Slaughter, ‘Revisiting the European Court of Justice’ (n.90).  See Walrave (n.1226), holding that 
private organisations and regimes, and not only public regimes are bound by the prohibition on discrimination, 
and Bosman (n.1227), in which the prohibition of discrimination, similarly on nationality grounds (restrictions in 
participation in competition based on nationality), was similarly deemed to apply to private (sporting) 
organisations. 
1665 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones (n.1346), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.37-38. 
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“professional secrecy” as identifiable both in national norms and the Code of Conduct for 
European Lawyers adopted by the CCBE1666. 
 
The CJEU’s engagement with non-state norms and academic writing provides scope for 
vertical comparison, predominantly of an indirect nature, and horizontal comparison. The 
analysis underpinning this categorisation illustrates that the instances of comparison might be 
more clearly identifiable in the Opinions of the AG than in the judgements of the Court1667; as 
above, this observation does not engage a determination as to the normative trend, that is, 
whether the AGs might be more willing than the Court to adopt approaches transcending 
orthodox (comparative) reasoning but might rather be explained in the context of the 
procedure internal to the CJEU.  The AG issues a single, individual Opinion, in the 
preparation of which he must act with “complete impartiality and independence” 1668 ; 
notwithstanding this duty, his Opinion might potentially constitute a reflection of personal 
opinion.  Consequently, the AG’s “complete impartiality and independence” might be limited 
by the absence of other participants in the drafting of the Opinion1669; this means that the AG 
has greater scope to shape his methodology and reasoning processes in light of his individual 
legal background, which would include the assumptions and prejudices deriving from his or 
her education, training and work in a particular legal culture or tradition1670.   
 
In contrast, the collegial nature of the Court’s procedure dictates that while the juge 
rapporteur prepares and disseminates the rapport préalable to the chamber (including the 
AG) before which the case is heard, the deliberation between the judges, on the basis of which 
the final, single judgement - with no dissenting opinion - is drafted, is undertaken in 
secret1671; “[c]ompromise is the name of the game“1672.  These considerations further suggest 
that the AG might be more aware, or appreciative of the potential effect of the particular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1666 Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union. 
1667 B. Markesinis and J. Fedtke, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (2003) 78 Tul.L.Rev. 11, pp.83-84.  In fact, the first 
AG, Legrange made an explicit comparison of the national laws on misuse of powers, in ASSIDER (n.1558). 
1668 Art.252 TFEU. 
1669 Of course, as noted at the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter 4, the AG employs the assistance of the 
DRD of the CJEU. 
1670 See the interview material collected in I. Solanke, ‘Diversity and Independence in the European Court of 
Justice’ (2008-2009) 15 Col.J.Eur.L. 89, pp.98-99. 
1671 The Statute of the CJEU provides that AGs and judges should act “impartially and conscientiously 
and…preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court” per Art.2; Art.35 further provides that deliberations 
should remain secret, Protocol (No.3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, annexed to 
the Treaties, OJ L 228, 23.8.2012. 
1672 K. Schiemann, ‘Should We Come Together? Reflections on Different Styles of Judicial Reasoning’ (2006) 9 
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 1, p.7.  
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judgement, and the nature of the judicial methodology and reasoning underpinning, in the 
Member States’ legal systems.  The determination of the effect of the AG’s opinion on the 
judgement of the Court, and more broadly, its relevance to the implementation of the 
judgement in the national orders is, as a general rule, difficult to gauge; while the Court might 
make explicit reference, either in following or dissenting from the AG, the national judge is 
less likely to do so1673.  
 
For the purposes of drawing this section of the chapter to a close, the following paragraph will 
highlight the way in which the engagement of different sources of analysis appears to shape 
the nature of the CJEU’s comparison.  The travaux préparatoires might give rise to indirect, 
vertical comparison between national and international norms, as well as horizontal 
comparison with Union or international norms; furthermore, the scope for their reference also 
gives rise to cross-referencing between areas of Union law.  The reference to national norms 
continues to constitute the predominant engagement with comparative analysis within the 
CJEU; notwithstanding, explicit reference to national traditions and cultures is less frequent.  
Both give rise to a type of vertical comparison, which has been used not only for the purposes 
of identifying commonality or uniformity in interpretation but also for the acknowledgement 
of diversity across the Union space.  In the fundamental rights case law, the scope for the 
margin of appreciation to be engaged as a mechanism of respect for diversity comes to the 
fore; as noted above, within the CJEU it seems that the margin of discretion is not identified 
on the basis of commonality or diversity but rather on the significance of the need for 
commonality (and thus uniformity) in the particular case for the purposes of facilitating the 
operation of the internal market.  The reference to international legal sources allows for 
vertical and horizontal, direct and indirect comparison.  Concepts, their meaning and their 
interpretation might be engaged directly from the international level, consequent to a direct 
and vertical comparative analysis.  On the other hand, the analysis might be vertical and 
indirect, where the existence and interpretation of a norm at the international level is deemed 
to reflect commonality between the Member States.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1673 Tridimas, for example, has attempted to illustrate, through empirical research, that the nature of the process 
of deliberation and the reporting procedure of the Court renders it is difficult to identify any definitive influence 
that the AG might have on the Court’s decision:  T. Tridimas, ‘The Role of the AG in the Development of 
Community Law:  Some Reflections’ (1997) 34 CMLR 1349, pp.1362-1365. 
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Horizontal comparative analysis arises between the ECtHR and the CJEU, reflecting the 
scope not only for conflict and a lack of compliance between the two regimes but also the 
potential for dialogue and cooperation; furthermore, it has also been noted that the CJEU 
might identify commonality, which it had initially dismissed, on account of the ECtHR’s 
recognition thereof 1674 .  Finally, the engagement with non-state norms and academic 
scholarship illustrates the scope for vertical comparison of an indirect nature, which allows 
for reference to the national norms, legal traditions and cultures, for example via the DCFR, 
which has been constructed on the basis of a comparative analysis of national norms.  It also 
illustrates the scope for horizontal comparison at the Union level; in particular, in respect of 
the sales part of the DCFR, which will soon form part of Union law in the Regulation on a 
CESL.  Finally, there is also scope for the AG and the Court to obtain a solid understanding 
of the theoretical and historical development, as well as the interpretation and practical 
application, of certain norms within the national contexts, by virtue of its reference to legal 
scholarship.   
 
II. The Rationales Underpinning Comparative Analysis in the Opinions of the AG and 
Judgements of the Court 
 
The following section purports to clarify the different rationales underpinning the CJEU’s 
engagement – that is to say, in the Opinion of the AG and judgement of the Court, whether 
explicit or implicit – of comparative analysis, for the purposes of the evaluation that follows 
in Chapter 9.  Each categorisation below aims to set out, with reference to case examples, 
what the CJEU might hope to achieve by engaging in comparison; this focuses on the 
engagement of the particular rationale, its normative dimension and its theoretical 
underpinnings. 
 
i. The Identification of Commonality 
 
The foundations and nature of Union legislative activity has been set out in Part I.  As noted, 
the facilitation of the internal market provides the legitimacy basis, per Art.114 TFEU, for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1674 The CJEU initially rejected the scope for the extension of Art.8 ECHR protection on account of the extent of 
divergence between the Member States in Hoechst (n.1265), Judgement, para.17.  Subsequently, after the 
ECtHR identified commonality in Niemitz v Germany (1992) ECtHR, 16.12.1992, App.No.13710/88, the CJEU 
recognised the extension of protection in C-94/00 Roquettes Frères [2002] ECR I-9011. 
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majority of legislation – of the acquis and PIL norms – underpinning the legislative 
Europeanisation of private law.  Essentially, this legitimacy basis, against the background of 
the internal market, operates to dictate that there should be little scope for the national courts 
to render diverse rulings such that the resolution of disputes should be the same regardless of 
the lex forum.  Thus where the national judge identifies an incompatibility between national 
and Union law, reference should be made to the CJEU, which must per Art.19 TEU, “ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”.   
 
The desire to find commonality, as noted above, is inherently linked to uniformity.  In the 
introduction to this chapter, a distinction has been advanced between the identification of 
principles of Union law which are common and those which lack commonality but might 
rather be characterised as general.  In particular, the lack of coherence that arises from the 
structure of Europeanisation dictates that the identification of commonality and generality is 
especially relevant to the CJEU’s recognition of common or common principles of law.  
Commonality has therefore been linked to the promotion of coherence and the avoidance of 
the fragmentation of law in the pluralist, multi-level context of Union law (and private law, in 
particular), the complexities of which have been outlined above.  Comparative analysis might 
therefore be employed for the purposes of identifying and promoting commonality, and thus, 
ensuring the unity and coherence of Union law.   
 
Furthermore, the CJEU’s engagement of comparative analysis for the purposes of identifying 
commonality, might also be used to fill gaps with reference to that which is common between 
national, Union, international or indeed, transnational law.  This “gap-filling” rationale is 
discussed in more detail below; as it is inherently linked to the identification of commonality, 
it is explored briefly here.  This problematic might arise where the contested issue is one that 
is entirely or relatively original at the EU level; thus where a gap is identified in the rules 
established by the European legislature, the CJEU might seek to fill this lacuna “in the 
absence of any Community case law”1675.  As discussed, legislation as promulgated either 
follows a minimum, maximum or targeted harmonisation approach; its often incomplete 
nature attributes to the CJEU a role in ensuring its effective interpretation and 
implementation.  This requires that the CJEU adopt a significant role in law making, filling 
gaps where necessary to ensure the coherence of the relevant norm, the relevant piece of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1675 C-334/00 Tacconi [2002] ECR I-07357, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para.4. 
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legislation in itself and the legal order as a whole.  Moreover, the CJEU might recognise the 
existence of gaps as deliberate, providing a basis for its intervention; consequently, it might 
not characterise its intervention as activist but rather understand its role to be necessary to 
ensure coherence and ultimately, justice.  The relevance of comparison arises to the extent 
that it is “obliged to solve the problem by reference to the rules acknowledged by the 
legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the Member Countries”1676. 
 
Notwithstanding, the scope for the CJEU to adopt a role in systemising private law has been 
called into question; Schmid notes that there are too few decisions before the CJEU to allow it 
to adopt such a jurisdiction in the same way that the national courts might be able to engage 
in such a task1677.  Not only are there too few cases but the nature of the preliminary reference 
procedure also dictates that the CJEU does not render a decision on the final outcome of the 
case.  This is recognised in practice in the division of labour between the courts, which gives 
strength to the notion that for every right (identifiable at the Union level or in national, 
international or private regimes), there must exist a remedy (which, given the nature of the 
EU, must be established at the national level): ubi jus, ibi remedium.   
 
The CJEU might engage comparison where there exists a gap in the pool of applicable Union 
norms and the need for commonality, which might ultimately lead to an attribution of a 
uniform interpretation of the relevant norm.  One example of can be identified in the 
fundamental rights case study, in respect of which the Treaties were initially silent.  From 
Nold, it became clear that this legislative silence would be filled judicially1678; the CJEU 
referred to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, international law, and 
subsequently, not-yet-binding Union law, to fill relevant gaps in order to ensure the effective 
protection of rights.  Moreover, the principles of access to justice and effective judicial 
protection have been identified, via comparative analysis, in the constitutional traditions of 
the Member States and established as common, overarching fundamental rights at the Union 
level (per Art.19 TEU and Art.47 CFR) and in international law1679.  The Treaties now make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1676 Joined Cases 7/56, 3/57-7/57 Algera [1957] ECR 81, Judgement, p.54. 
1677 Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court’ (n.318), p.14. 
1678 Nold (n.791). 
1679 The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines relating to the Right to a Remedy and Reparation place 
emphasis on the State‘s duty to provide victims with equal and effective access to justice.  It is a fundamental 
human right established in Art.8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “[e]veryone has the right to 
an effective remedy…”. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art.14(1), in respect of which, 
in the European context, the ECHR provides for almost identical wording), the International Convention on the 
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specific reference to “commonality” with regard to the engagement with fundamental rights at 
the Union level1680. 
 
Notwithstanding, the relationship between commonality and generality – and the relevance of 
comparative analysis to their identification – is complex.  This is clear from the state liability 
jurisprudence.  At the beginning of the 1990s, while the Treaty structure made reference to 
“commonality” with regard to the liability of the Union1681, it was not evident that state 
liability could be identified as a principle across all of the Member States; indeed, many 
national governments maintained the principle of immunity of state institutions1682.  At the 
time, an absence of commonality was identifiable via the comparative analysis of the AG’s 
Opinion and the judgement, both in respect of the conditions of liability and the availability of 
a remedy; as these determinations – and particularly the latter – were for the national court 
and shaped by national private law concepts, commonality was not deemed to be necessary.  
Notwithstanding, the scope for a finding of common applicable norms for the purpose of 
promoting their uniform interpretation in the CJEU was advanced1683.  The CJEU held that 
the liability of the state to make reparation for damage was to be established, provided, per 
Francovich, that certain conditions of liability could be satisfied1684.  Subsequently in 
Brasserie – the conditions of liability having been left open in Francovich – the AG 
considered that it was the existence of commonality that engendered the Community 
characterisation of those conditions: “conditions must be common and thus Community 
conditions”1685.  This seems to suggest that while commonality between the national, Union 
and international systems was not deemed to be a prerequisite to the recognition of state 
liability as a principle of Union law, it was nevertheless attributed significance for the 
purposes of facilitating consistency and coherence across Union regimes (particularly in 
respect of Union and state liability), and across the national orders, where the regulation was 
put into practice.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Art.6), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (Art.2(c)) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art.12(2)) all include a provision on 
effective protection and remedies. 
1680 With regard to fundamental rights, the “constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law” per Art.6(3) TEU. 
1681 With regard to the non-contractual liability of the Union, damage should be made good “in accordance with 
the general principles common to the laws of the Member States” per Art.340 TFEU. 
1682 Francovich (n.219), Opinion of AG Mischo, para.47. 
1683 For example, as to commonality of conditions underpinning a claim; Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG 
Tesauro, para.54.  Cf. Omega (n.1331), Judgement, paras.37-38. 
1684 Francovich (n.219), Judgement, paras.35-37; 38-46. 
1685 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.11. 
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ii. The Identification of Diversity or a Lack of Commonality 
 
The distinction advanced above between commonality and generality, wherein generality 
reflects an absence of commonality, is further developed below in respect of the identification 
and recognition of the principles of Union law; it should be reiterated at the outset.  The 
following paragraphs aim to clarify that while the CJEU might aim to facilitate, via negative 
and positive integration, the convergence of norms via harmonisation and ultimately, the 
uniform application of Union norms in national courts, neither the AG nor the Court appears 
to feel bound to derive an outcome that necessarily engenders or facilitates commonality.  
While as noted above, comparative analysis might involve a search for commonality, it might 
also lead the CJEU to accept the diversity existing across the Union space.  This might result 
in the recognition not of a common principle but of a general principle or other “best 
solution”, there existing overlap between these categories of norms.  That is to say, and as 
will be discussed further in Chapter 9, while the CJEU seems to recognise principles that are 
characterised as “common”, it will also recognise principles which cannot be characterised as 
common because of the very absence of commonality.  Commonality and the absence of 
commonality become evident via comparative analysis in the context of the processes of such 
analysis, as outlined hypothetically in Chapter 3.  This distinction purports to avoid confusion 
to the extent that the CJEU has tended to characterise all principles – whether they are indeed, 
found to be common or not – as “general principles”, with intermittent reference to notions of 
commonality.   
 
It therefore seems that the CJEU holds a wide discretion in characterising the norms relevant 
to the rendering of its interpretation; this is particularly true in respect of its identification of 
commonality, divergence, or something in-between: “…[the CJEU] is not obliged to take the 
minimum which the national solutions have in common, or their arithmetic mean or the 
solution produced by a majority of the legal systems as the basis of its decision…”1686.  
Furthermore, while it has been recognised in the context of state liability jurisprudence that 
the Union nature of norms might be based on the existence of commonality, the AG in 
AM&S, has highlighted that “[u]nanimity, as to a subject which is relevant to a Community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1686 C-155/79 AM&S Europe v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, Opinion of AG Slynn, p.1649, citing former 
CJEU Judge Kutscher (citing H. Kutscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation as Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice’ 
(Judicial and Academic Conference – CJEU, Luxembourg; 1976), p. 29). 
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law problem, may well be a strong indication of the existence of a rule of Community law.  
Total unanimity of expression and application is not, however, necessary”1687.   
 
On the one hand, while the CJEU seems to recognise that commonality is not absolutely 
necessary for the recognition of a norm at the Union level, on the other hand, it might refuse 
to adopt a particular interpretation of a norm against the background of clear divergences 
existing between the Member States; it is its engagement with comparative analysis that 
allows for the divergences to be identified.  For example, in the context of the state liability 
jurisprudence, the Court - having undertaken a comparative evaluation of national and Union 
norms – considered that it could not recognise at the Union level the non-contractual liability 
of public authorities to make reparation for damage resulting from their lawful act or 
omission, where there existed a lack of commonality as to the existence of such liability at the 
Union level and between the national orders1688.  
 
Furthermore, the existence of divergence might play a part in the CJEU’s balancing of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, where these divergences are identified on the basis of its 
comparative analysis of national norms and traditions, as well, potentially, of international 
law.  As noted above, there is a lack of clarity – and thus, a proliferation of complexity – 
underpinning the CJEU’s approach.  In respect of the balancing of fundamental rights and 
economic freedoms, the CJEU has understood fundamental rights as a putatively justifiable 
restriction to freedoms1689 to the extent that any derogation is made in line with fundamental 
rights and principles of Union law1690.  Indeed, the Court in Omega recognised a principle of 
human dignity in light of the diverse national constitutional traditions; this principle was 
conceived so broadly as to find some foundation across the Member States.  Thereafter it 
rejected the need for commonality, both in respect of the commonality underpinning the 
“system of protection” and the human dignity dimension of the proportionality test1691.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1687 AM&S (n.1686), Opinion of AG Slynn, p.1650. 
1688 C-120/06 P FIAMM [2008] ECR I-6513, Judgement, paras.170-175. 
1689 Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.71. 
1690 ERT (n.1280), Judgement, para.43.   
1691 Omega (n.1331), Judgement, paras.37-38. 
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Another example illustrating the CJEU’s use of comparative analysis – in respect of the 
recognition of an absence of commonality1692 - arises in the recent case of Akzo; this case also 
advances the notion that commonality itself is not a static idea.  Akzo was an appeal from the 
General Court, in which the question as to whether the protection of communications between 
lawyers, established as a fundamental right in Union law on the basis of commonality on the 
Member States1693 (as well as the norms of the CFR and ECHR1694) should extend to 
communications between the management body of an undertaking and an in-house lawyer 
arose.  Akzo’s second and alternative claim asserted that the General Court had failed to 
engage developments in the “legal landscape” which required it to reconsider AM&S.  AG 
Kokott examined these changes and confirmed, following the General Court, the parties’ 
acceptance that no commonality existed across the Member States in respect of the extension 
of legal privilege to in-house lawyers1695.  The AG engaged the relevance of comparative 
analysis in respect of the recognition of principles of Union law, and particularly, the 
significance of principles deriving from the common constitutional traditions and legal 
principles common to the states1696.  However, she discarded any definitive requirement of 
commonality across the Union as a prerequisite to the recognition of a general principle.  
Instead, on the basis of an “evaluative comparison of the legal systems”, the AG considered 
that relevant national norms must be examined in light of the broader objectives of the Union; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1692 Another example of a case in which comparative analysis is used, and which leads to the identification of a 
lack of commonality – explicitly recognised by the CJEU – is BED.  The case concerned the provision of legal 
aid to legal persons as a reflection of effective judicial protection, which the AG examined as a principle of 
Union law found in Arts.6 and 13 ECHR and Art.47 CFR.  In particular, he assessed – with reference to 
“international practice”, the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence, EU law and the “practices of the Member States” 
(C-279/09 BED [2010] ECR I-3849, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras.60-80) – the “scope of the right to legal aid 
for legal persons” per Art.47(3) CFR which provides that legal aid should be made to everyone, and “those who 
lack sufficient resources”.  The AG did not find, with reference to this “body of evidence” a basis to establish 
that the Member States must provide legal aid to legal persons on the same conditions as natural persons.  The 
scope of protection is essentially a matter of interrelation of the sources.  The AG notes that Art.53(2) CFR 
would allow him to go beyond what is provided for in the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence, allowing for a broad 
interpretation of Art.47(3) CFR, “which would have to be construed as requiring Member States to make legal 
aid available to legal persons” (C-279/09 BED [2010] ECR I-3849, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para.98).  Rather, 
the comparative analysis of the national norms, as well as that of international law, allowed the AG to determine 
that there could be no “commonality” per the CFR preamble.  As such, he found there to be no general principle 
– “as EU law currently stands” – which establishes that Member States must grant legal aid to legal persons on 
the same basis as natural persons.  The Court, not quite to the contrary, found that the principle of effective 
judicial protection, per Art. 47 CFR, “must be interpreted as meaning that it is not impossible for legal persons to 
rely on that principle” (C-279/09 BED [2010] ECR I-3849, Judgement, para.59), the determination being one for 
the national court but nevertheless recognised “the absence of a truly common principle” (para.44).  
1693 Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.47 citing AM&S (n.1686). 
1694 Art.7 and 47(1) CFR; Art.8(1), 6(1) and (3)(c) ECHR. 
1695 Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, paras.89-90; T- Akzo paras.170 and 177. 
1696 Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.90. 
 	  	  	   332 
that is to say, “not only of the aims and tasks of the European Union but also of the special 
nature of European integration and of EU law”1697.   
 
Moreover AG Kokott considered that a principle might be recognised as general even where it 
exists “only in a minority” of national systems.  The absence of commonality would not 
therefore preclude the recognition of generality where – on the basis of AG Maduro’s 
Opinion in FIAMM – the principle is of particular significance1698, or where – a consideration 
explicated by AG Kokott which allows for the evaluation of the dynamic, evolving nature of 
Union law – “it constitutes a growing trend”1699.  The AG explicated this reasoning with 
regard to the controversial recognition in Mangold of the principle of non-discrimination on 
the basis of age as a general principle of Union law, identified not on the basis of 
commonality across the Member States but on the basis that the principle “was consistent 
with a specific task incumbent on the European Union in combating discrimination”1700.  In 
the Akzo case itself, it was the absence of commonality, not in itself but together with other 
considerations that led to the determination on the part of both the AG and the Court that a 
principle of Union law could not be identified.  Thus, the AG found there to be “no 
comparable circumstances” underpinning the aims of Union law which would support such a 
finding in respect of the extension of legal privilege.   
 
The Court came to the same conclusion as AG Kokott, and while it did not itself engage in 
explicit comparison, referred to the “comparative examination” undertaken in the General 
Court1701 and found, on the basis of the lack of “uniformity” in the national systems that “no 
predominant trend towards protection…may be discerned in the legal systems of the 27 
Member States” and that the approach in one Member State – the Netherlands – could not be 
indicative of a “developing trend”1702.  It is worth noting that the Court does not make 
reference to the idea advanced by the AG that a principle might be identified even if only 
recognised in a minority of national systems.  Notwithstanding, its previous case law – for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1697 Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.94. 
1698 As was the case in Mangold, where the general principle was recognised not on the basis of the commonality 
of all the Member States but on the basis that it “was consistent with a specific task incumbent on the European 
Union in combating discrimination”: C‑144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I‑9981, Judgement, para.75; Akzo (n.691), 
Opinion of AG Kokott, para.96. 
1699 Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.95, citing FIAMM (n.1688), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.55-56. 
1700 C‑144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I‑9981, Judgement, para.75; Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.96. 
1701 T-125/03 Akzo [2007] ECR II-3523, paras.153 and 171, with reference to the comparative analysis 
undertaken by one of the observers, the European Company Lawyers Associations. 
1702 Akzo (n.691), Judgement, paras.73-75. 
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example, that on state liability, discussed above – suggests that the Court would not 
necessarily dismiss such a suggestion.  That is to say, it seems that the CJEU might recognise 
a principle as a general one even if the majority of the Member States adopt a different 
approach; this would most likely be the case where, engaging a comparative analysis, which 
as Maduro notes, forms part of a teleological approach, reflects an outcome in line with the 
needs of the Union1703.  On the basis of the distinction advanced in Chapter 9, this principle 
could be correctly characterised as a general but not as a common principle, there being no 
need for commonality in respect of the former.  
 
The Akzo case further evidences the relevance of the comparative analysis which engages an 
assessment not only of legal rules but also of societal developments, reflecting considerable 
divergences across the Union. It seems to follow from the much earlier Reed case, the Court 
recognised that “any interpretation of a legal term on the basis of social developments must 
take into account the situation in the whole Community, not merely in one Member State”1704, 
particularly where the interpretation is a potentially controversial one1705.  Such an approach 
might be particularly relevant where the matter before the CJEU is one which is potentially 
politically, socially or culturally controversial.  This is especially evident in in the Grant case, 
in which the issue of the compatibility of an employer’s decision with the principle of equal 
treatment as regards remuneration per Art.157 TFEU arose; the Court adopted a comparative 
analysis, noting that between the Member States there was a divergence in the treatment of 
cohabitation as an equivalent of marriage.  In light of this divergence, the Court considered 
that “in the present state of the law within the Community, stable relationships between two 
persons of the same sex” could not be regarded as equivalent to marriage, or a stable 
relationship between persons of the opposite sex1706, leaving the political determination to the 
legislature1707. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1703 FIAMM (n.1688), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.55: “In other words, the Court has the task of drawing on the 
legal traditions of the Member States in order to find an answer to similar legal questions arising under 
Community law that both respects those traditions and is appropriate to the context of the Community legal 
order. From that point of view, even a solution adopted by a minority may be preferred if it best meets the 
requirements of the Community system”.  It is submitted that the pluralist perspective – which as noted above, 
allows for the recognition of the scope for diversity, and the understanding that the legal sources which form part 
of the comparative analysis are indeed conceived as foreign – facilitates the identification of principles from the 
bottom up; the EU teleology guides the identification of the sources and the identification of principles at the 
Union level, against the background of the need for uniform interpretation of Union norms and their co-existence 
with the national norms within the national traditions. 
1704 C-59/85 Reed [1986] ECR I-1283, Judgement, para.13. 
1705 The case concerned the interpretation of the notion of “companion”, and rights of residence. 
1706 C-249/96 Grant [1998] ECR I-0621, Judgement, para.35. 
1707 Grant (n.1706), Judgement, para.36. 
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This example, the Akzo case and the FIAMM case concerning the liability of public authorities 
for lawful acts, illustrate that comparative analysis might be engaged to identify diversity, 
either because the AG or Court searches for it or because they search for commonality, and 
find diversity instead.  It seems evident that the case law across sectors lacks consistency and 
as Akzo illustrates, even within the same case the approaches of the AG and the Court might 
not necessarily coincide with regard to the contribution of comparative analysis; for example, 
while it considered the notion of “developing trend”, the Court, unlike the AG, did not 
comment on or delve more deeply into the scope for a principle to be identified even if it 
exists only in a minority of national systems.  While the engagement of comparative analysis 
is necessary to identify either the existence of commonality, or the lack thereof, it seems that 
it is not the comparison as such, but rather its engagement together with the teleological 
approach that is relevant to the determination of whether a principle of Union law is identified 
and how it is characterised.   
 
iii. The Identification of an Autonomous Interpretation of Union Norms  
 
Against the background of the scope for the CJEU’s engagement of comparative analysis for 
the purposes of identifying that which is common across the relevant national, European, 
international and transnational orders, the scope for the use of comparison for the purposes of 
rendering autonomous interpretations of Union law also comes to the fore.  The principle, 
recognised by the CJEU in 1964 in the Hoekstra case1708, dictates that there is one correct 
interpretation of terms employed in EU legislation; these should be derived independently 
from national or international interpretations, except where reference is made expressly or 
impliedly to such sources in the text of the norm itself1709.  Much of the CJEU’s early private 
law jurisprudence arose from private international law and in particular the Brussels 
Convention 1710 , in respect of which the CJEU highlighted the need for autonomous 
interpretation of the Convention in order to ensure the uniform and effective application of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1708 Hoekstra (n.354). 
1709 C-49/71 Hagen OHG [1964] ECR 23, Judgement, para.6: “terms used in Community law must be uniformly 
interpreted and implemented throughout the Community except when an express or implied reference is made to 
national law”. 
1710 C-9/87 Arcado SPRL v Haviland SA [1988] ECR 1539, Judgement, para.1555; U. Magnus and P. 
Mankowskie, Brussels I Regulation (Sellier, München; 2007), pp.31-32. 
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Union law in the national courts1711.  Autonomous interpretation is therefore understood as 
one judicially-developed mechanism1712 facilitating the resolution or management of the 
putative scope for conflicts of interpretation1713 and conflicts of norms arising before the 
national courts.  
 
Two issues arise.  On the one hand, at first glance it might be suggested that the significance 
of autonomous interpretation might seem to preclude comparative analysis1714.  The difficulty 
is that reference to comparison would seem to undermine the notion that the interpretation of 
the norm derives purely from its European origins1715.  On the other hand, autonomous 
interpretations must be capable of being applied in the national courts.  It is submitted that the 
engagement of comparative analysis allows for the identification of the origins of the 
autonomous European interpretation and thus potentially attributes it with legitimacy, to the 
extent that such an interpretation has been recognised or is deemed to be acceptable – in 
perhaps a different form – in (some) of the national orders.   
 
Herein, it is not suggested that an autonomous interpretation of a Union norm will always be 
identified in the absence of a consideration of the interpretation rendered in, for example, the 
national orders.  It is clear from the reasoning of AG Tizzano in Leitner that autonomous 
interpretation does not preclude the scope for comparative analysis; comparison is rather 
understood as an inherent interpretative approach1716.  The problematic arising before the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1711 CILFIT (n.694), Judgement, para.7; C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993] ECR I-4075, 
Judgement, para.10. 
1712 Including the principles of primacy, supremacy and direct effect, and increasingly, the recognition of general 
or common principles of law. 
1713 Leitner (n.728) in respect of the concept of damages in Directive 90/314. 
1714 R. Michaels, ‘Comparative Law’ in J. Basedow et al (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private 
Law (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.297-301.  Michaels suggests that the comparative analysis would be precluded 
where that analysis bears reference only to a single source of comparison, for example, the interpretation of a 
norm in a single Member State. 
1715 Notwithstanding, the scope for the CJEU to maintain such an approach in respect of the pCESL is 
ambiguous, Consideration 29 of which provides that interpretation is to be undertaken without recourse to “any 
other law”.  This would appear to provide for a higher degree of autonomy than that which exists in respect of 
the uniform application of acquis norms in the national courts, in line with its obligation of harmonious 
interpretation  (J.M. Smits, ‘The CESL – Beyond Party Choice’ Maastricht European Private Law Institute 
Working Paper 2012/11, pp.10-12.), and, as Micklitz and Reich have noted, will likely result in a greater number 
of preliminary references to the CJEU where an issue of interpretation of the CESL arises before national courts 
(H-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘Commission Proposal for a ‘Regulation on a Common European Sales Law 
(CESL)’ – Too Broad or Not Broad Enough’, EUI WP 2012/4, p.24). 
1716 Kakouris, ‘Use of the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (n.1528), 
p.269, understanding comparison as a  “method of interpretation”.  See also, generally, P. Pescatore, ‘Le recours, 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, à des normes déduites de la 
comparaison des droits des états membres’ (1980) 32 Revue internationale de droit comparé 337. 
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national court concerned the fact that while the wording of Art.5 of the Package Travel 
Directive1717 left “damage” undefined, compensation for non-material damage – the only 
basis for redress – was not available under Austrian law.  The AG interpreted the concept 
firstly in a textual and literal manner, looking to the wording of the provision1718, and 
subsequently with reference not only to the laws of the Member States, which retained their 
own private law mechanisms for limiting liability1719 and international law but also by cross-
referencing Union rules1720.  It is also clear that the AG’s analysis is teleological, looking - 
against the background of the broader need for coherence between European regimes – to the 
purpose of the directive, the scope for divergent understandings of damage depending on the 
aim and objective of the relevant Union law.  This approach adheres to Maduro’s assertion 
that comparative analysis should be understood as “one more instrument” of the CJEU’s 
teleological approach1721.  Furthermore, AG Tizzano recognised comparative analysis as a 
“reference point” for evolution or development and asserted that “the most interesting 
developments are those provided by the legislation and case-law of the Member States”1722.  It 
seems that he understood the ambiguity in the drafting to be a deliberate undertaking on the 
part of the Union legislature, allowing the CJEU to adopt a role in developing the law over 
time1723.  While the AG’s use of comparative analysis does not highlight commonality across 
the Member States and international law but rather divergence, it is the teleological 
understanding of the directive, together with the comparative analysis, which leads the AG to 
identify the autonomous interpretation most appropriate to Union legal development.  
 
This case also responds to a second consideration; that is to say, while autonomous 
interpretation aims to promote uniformity, it does not seem to preclude the existence of 
diversity across the Union space at the stage of implementation.  While the interpretation of 
the CJEU must be adopted as autonomous in light of the aims and objectives of Union 
law 1724 , it is recognised that autonomous interpretation need not necessarily lead to 
commonality but can be compatible with the existence of divergent interpretations across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1717 Directive 90/314/EEC on Package Travel OJ L158, 23.06.1990. 
1718 Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, para.25-32. 
1719 Indirectly, via the Commission’s Report. 
1720 Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, with reference to autonomous interpretation at para.25, to the 
national laws at para.40, to Union law and Directive 85/374 at paras.34-38 and international law at para.39. 
1721 Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law’ (n.397), p.7. 
1722 Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, para.40. 
1723 Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras.34 and 35. 
1724 L. Pech, The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union' NYU Jean Monnet WP 2009-
04, p.6. 
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Member States, and indeed, beyond the state.  The division of labour outlined above is 
reflected in the understanding that while the national court has the task of implementing and 
applying the norm1725, the task of autonomous interpretation is one for the CJEU to “ensure 
supremacy but at the same time paying due consideration to the existence of different legal 
traditions in Member States”1726; this latter consideration is identifiable in AG Jacob’s 
Opinion in Schmidberger1727.  Notwithstanding, while it seems that the CJEU will recognise 
such diversity to be significant, it is not clear the extent to which it will be protected in light 
of the scope for an autonomous interpretation which is common and which is deemed 
necessary to ensure supremacy, that is, via the promotion of uniformity1728. 
 
Furthermore, the scope for autonomous interpretation gives rise to the question of whether 
national courts can and will cross-reference the interpretations of the courts of other Member 
States.  The relevance of this question is clear in respect of the interpretation of options for 
compulsory service payments (compensation or indemnity) to commercial agents per the 
Commercial Agents Directive 86/653/EEC.  The regime for options has its basis in the French 
and German orders; when it came to be interpreted within the English courts, one judge – 
Lord Hoffman – made reference to the notion that the English court could engage French law 
“for guidance or confirmation”1729.  Arguably, strict adherence to autonomous interpretation 
would call such an approach into question, to the extent that the rule - which is novel to the 
English court – derives from the European level, notwithstanding its foundations in the 
continental orders.  On the one hand, this would suggest – as Twigg-Flesner has asserted – 
that the national courts are not necessarily bound to follow the interpretation of the national 
court “of origin”, which recognises the scope for divergent interpretations across the 
European space1730.  On the other hand, the CJEU has held that the national courts have a 
discretion in determining the option to be made to the agent, which suggests neither that there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1725 Freiburger Kommnalbauten (n.265), Judgement, para.22, in respect of the interpretation and application of 
the unfairness test in respect of the UCTD. 
1726 Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law’ in Cafaggi and Muir Watt, The Making of European 
Private Law (n.59), p.328. 
1727 Schmidberger (n.1265), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para.97 et seq. 
1728 Consider for example, the interpretation of the term “workers” in C-53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035, 
Judgement, para.11 and the particular reference to the notion reference to national meanings as opposed to a 
Community meaning would “frustrate”  the rules on free movement. 
1729 Ultimately, the House of Lords (as it then was) refused to follow the French method of calculating severance 
payments because such a calculation was based on a French market for selling commercial agencies which does 
not exist in England; Lonsdale v Howard and Hallam Ltd [2007] UKHL 32 (per Lord Hoffman at para.18). 
1730 C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanization of Contract Law: Current Controversies in Law (Routledge, 
London; 2nd edn., 2008), p.137. 
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is anything to prohibit such cross-referencing nor that the Member States obliged to engage it 
to avoid divergent interpretations1731.  
 
It is submitted that an autonomous interpretation need not always reflect commonality 
between the Member States; consequently, it need not exclude diversity.  The autonomous 
interpretation rendered might not exist in one single Member State; even if the interpretation 
can be identified in certain legal orders, there is nothing to suggest that it must be identified as 
common to be engaged at the Union level.  Regulation within a multi-level structure should 
not preclude the existence of divergent norms or their interpretations. 
 
iv. The Identification of the “Best Solution” 
 
At the establishment of the CJEU, Lagrange, writing extra-judicially, noted that the CJEU’s 
adoption of comparative analysis could be “very useful; for even if the Court is sovereign and 
must assert for itself what is the ‘law of the Treaty’, it is easy to conceive that the source of 
this law can only be drawn from the legal ‘common roots’ of the six States – which first 
required the knowledge of each of the national laws…[o]ne easily digs out, when going to the 
bottom of the problems; these ‘general principles of the law’, that, in reality, albeit by 
different developments of thought, end up offering the same solution to identical 
problems”1732.  Lagrange clearly considered that even if the Union itself should be understood 
as “autonomous and self-sufficient”, such that it might govern “aux lieu et place” of the 
national legal orders1733, national law must retain its significance.  This is fundamental to the 
understanding of legal development advanced herein.  Yet it is also an approach reflecting the 
functional conceptualisation of comparison outlined above1734; it is also seemingly limited to 
positivist sources of law – the “legal ‘common roots’” of the national legal orders – and the 
identification of similarity or commonality for the purposes of identifying solutions to 
functional problems arising in different national systems.  Notwithstanding, bringing to light 
the notion of solutions, it has the potential to reflect the compatibility of the understanding of 
the Union order as an autonomous one with the continuing existence of divergences.  On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1731 C-465/04 Honeyvem v Mariella [2006] ECR I-2879, Judgement, para.36. 
1732  M. Lagrange, ‘Une réalité européenne – La Cour de Justice de la CECA’ (1955) 28 
Cah.Chrét.Fonct.Publique 16, p.21.  Translated in Cohen and Vauchez, ‘The Social Construction of Law – The 
European Court of Justice and its Legal Revolution Revisited’ (n.664). 
1733 M. Lagrange, ‘L’ordre juridique de la CECA vu à travers la jurisprudence de sa Cour de Justice’ (1958) 84 
Rev.Droit.Public.Sci.Polit.Fr.L’étranger 841, p.843.  
1734 See Chapter 3. 
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one hand, the focus remains on commonality; Konrad Schiemann – the former British judge 
at the CJEU – proclaimed, “I have the feeling that there is a genuine attempt to arrive at the 
best common solution that the brains of the [CJEU] can reach”1735. 
 
It is important to note that neither writer explains how a “best solution” should be identified; 
both seem to focus on commonality.  Lagrange rather seems to suggest that one solution 
would necessarily, and apparently implicitly, arise as the common one, which could thereafter 
be engaged as the “best”.  The characterisation of that which is common as “best” on the basis 
of mere empirical analysis is questionable; it brings to the fore an absence of clarity as to the 
approach to be adopted in the absence of commonality and gives rise to the question of 
whether the notion of best solution constitutes an alternative to commonality.  The notion of 
“best solution” has been introduced above, and the methodology for its identification is 
considered in greater detail below1736.  For the moment, it is submitted that the determination 
of that which is best necessarily engages a normative evaluation and determination; it 
removes the methodology and reasoning – namely, that of comparison - from the apolitical 
sphere.  This assertion derives from the critique of the methodology underpinning the DCFR.  
As noted above, the Commission requested that the drafters identify the “best solutions, 
taking into account national contract laws (both case law and established practice), the EC 
acquis and relevant international instruments”1737; however, the drafters – as academics, and 
not political actors (strictly understood) – seemed to aim to identify the “best solution” while 
simultaneously avoiding any normative determination.  As such, it is suggested that the 
DCFR rather provides “a source of inspiration for the legislature”1738 as opposed to a tome of 
“best solutions”.   
 
Indeed, the CJEU has recognised the scope for the identification of the “best solution” in light 
of the existence of diversity.  In AM&S, a case concerning legal privilege, both the AG and 
the Court recognised the absence of commonality between the national systems; 
understanding the need for an analysis of “the spirit, orientation and general tendency of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1735 K. Schiemann, ‘From Common Law Judge to European Judge’ (2005) 13 Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 741, p.747. 
1736 See Chapters 4 and 9.  
1737 Commission, ‘Communication on European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis’ (n.274), p.11. 
1738 C. von Bar et al (eds.), Principles, Definition and Model Rules of European Private Law:  Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR, Outline Edition) (Sellier, München; 2009), p.7. 
 	  	  	   340 
national laws” and that “the aim of Community law is to find the best solution”1739, it 
explicitly accepted the submission of the CCBE as to the existence of privilege1740.  More 
recently, Werhahn v Council called into question the continuing relevance, post-enlargement, 
of pre-enlargement case law, where a subsequent, post-enlargement, comparative analysis 
would have identified an absence of commonality between the national systems, which had 
existed previously.  The AG’s reasoning followed Zweigert’s “wertende Rechtsvergleichung 
approach, wherein, “what might be highly relevant is to ascertain which legal system emerges 
as the most carefully considered” 1741.  That is to say, the reasoning was not simply based on 
the commonality that may (or rather may not) have been identifiable from a previous or 
contemporary comparative analysis but instead made reference to an evolutionary approach 
and any “tendency to further development”.  The notion of “most carefully considered” 
dictates that what is identified might - but need not be - based solely on commonality but 
rather reflect the identification of the most appropriate rule with regard to the particular case 
at hand. 
 
v. Comparison as a Basis for Dialogue 
 
The thesis takes the potential existence of conflict as a starting point in light of the 
commonality and diversity permeating the European space; the nature of these conflicts has 
been outlined in Part I.  It is considered that the scope for such conflict will necessarily 
continue to emerge as Union enlargement proceeds and as other transnational regimes emerge 
and evolve.  The preliminary reference procedure itself has emerged as a mechanism by 
which conflict can be resolved or at least managed.  It is therefore engaged as a space of 
communication between the national courts and the CJEU; this has been discussed above1742.  
Thus, as a space of communication, it necessarily also has the potential to facilitate dialogue 
to the extent that it brings to the fore the relationship between the national courts and the 
CJEU.   
 
Dialogue can be received in the latter because of its structure and composition, namely of 
lawyers, researchers, AGs and judges from divergent legal cultures, traditions and experiences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1739 AM&S (n.1686), Judgement, pp.1599-1600; Opinion of AG Slynn, pp.1648-1650. 
1740 The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe. 
1741  The idea was introduced to EU law by Zweigert, Zweigert, ‘Der Einfluß des Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Rechtsordnungen der. Mitgliedstaaten’ (n.1272). 
1742 See Chapter 3.   
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who are obliged to work together1743.  Van Gerven thus characterises the relationship existing 
between legal orders – particularly of national and Union law – as one of “dialectical 
interaction between national laws and Community law” 1744 .  Indeed, the preliminary 
reference system has been cemented as a hermeneutic procedure underpinning the EU legal 
order; the CJEU, like the national court, constitutes an interpretative community.  These 
interpretative communities exist within particular cultures, such that the acts of 
communication are also understood as cultural acts; that is to say, from a linguistic 
perspective, law is understood as “acts of communication in a kind of social 
language…[elaborated upon by]…interpretive communities” 1745.  It is submitted that the 
engagement of comparison as a “second-order” device has the potential to amplify this 
characteristic and in particular, facilitate the scope for transfer and dialogue, discussed further 
in Chapter 9.   
 
From a normative perspective, comparison is engaged at the outset as a dimension of 
methodology that provides a means of dealing with and managing conflict, particularly as it 
emerges in the context of the Europeanisation of private law within a pluralist, multi-level 
space.  That is to say, by generating knowledge and facilitating connections, comparison 
should promote communication, and foster the emergence of the values and characteristics 
underpinning and arising from dialogue, including coordination, cooperation and conciliation.  
By promoting these types of values, comparison can work not only to identify but also to 
justify the existence of divergences, to the extent that these values engender a perspective 
which undermines the notion of incompatibility between the understanding of the Union 
regime as an autonomous legal order and the existence of difference across the “other” 
Member States.  On this basis, comparative analysis might also have a legitimising effect, 
generating confidence on the part of the institutional actors of the state but more broadly, in 
respect of the citizens of the Union, to the extent that it allows for recognition of the 
peculiarities of the national traditions and cultures and the determination of what will be 
deemed acceptable therein.  The scope for reconciliation that potentially arises from dialogue, 
and the significance of comparison therein, can further be identified in the CJEU’s attribution 
of the task of balancing to the national courts (predominantly in respect of the balancing of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1743 Markesinis and Fedtke, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (n.1667), p.84. 
1744 van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’ in Cafaggi, The 
Institutional Framework of European Private Law (n.228), pp.37-77, pp.49 and 77. 
1745 Marini, ‘Taking Comparative Law Lightly’ (n.445), p.8 citing S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (HUP, 
Cambridge; 1980), pp.147-174 and R.M. Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 60 Tex.L.Rev. 373. 
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fundamental rights and economic freedoms in fundamental rights cases but also in respect of 
the balancing of the market-integration and consumer protection orientations of the Union in 
consumer contract cases). 
 
Chapter 8. Concluding Remarks  
 
Chapter 8 has aimed to offer an empirical reflection on the sources of analysis referenced by 
the CJEU, and the rationales underpinning its engagement with comparative analysis, by 
constructing two classifications based on the analysis of the three case examples above.  As 
concluded from Part III, the analysis of the case examples therein illustrates the changing 
nature of private law, the shifting dynamics of Europeanisation and integration, and the 
recognition on the part of the CJEU of the significance of the contexts in which 
Europeanisation and integration occur.  Thereafter, employing the analysis of the case 
examples as the empirical foundations, the chapter has aimed to construct two classifications, 
firstly, of the manifestations of comparison – that is, that which is compared – and thereafter, 
of the rationales underpinning the engagement of comparative analysis.  These do not aim to 
be evaluative as such but are rather explicative; nevertheless, they illustrate that the CJEU’s 
engagement with comparison lacks a rigorous theoretical and methodological basis, and very 
often, explicit recognition and acknowledgement. 
 
Indeed, the first exercise in classification has illustrated that the engagement of both the AG 
and Court with comparison seems to transcend the mainstream approaches critiqued in the 
first section of Chapter 3, at least in respect of the different sources of comparative analysis to 
which reference is made.  This is true in at least one key respect: while the CJEU often 
engages components of comparative analysis that arise within the nation state, its analysis is 
by no means so limited; that is to say, the AG and Court also engage, inter alia, norms of 
international institutions, jurisprudence of international courts, privately-made norms and 
norms developed within legal scholarship.  The second classification has, for the purposes of 
explication, illustrated the diverse bases and rationales underpinning the engagement of 
comparison, building on the normative dimensions and theoretical foundations explored in 
Chapter 3.  As noted therein, there exists a lack of clarity as to the potential, putative purposes 
and aims of comparison, an apparent consequence of the fact that much of the analysis has 
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predominantly focused on the use of comparison for harmonisation and unification purposes, 
against the background of the facilitation of the internal market1746.   
 
This evaluation has further aimed to highlight that the CJEU is not bound by the orthodox 
aims of comparison, that is, the rationale of identifying commonality or similarity for the 
purposes of facilitating the construction of a body of common Union norms deemed to be 
applicable across the Member States in a uniform manner.  Notwithstanding this finding does 
not necessarily suggest that comparative analysis is not used as a tool of the harmonisation 
project, i.e. to identify similarities and differences for the promotion of the former and 
suppression of the latter.  Yet in light of the nature of the Europeanisation and the character of 
the European space – that is, its multi-level, plural form, - it is advanced within the scope of 
this thesis that the existence of divergence across the Member States must be compatible with 
harmonisation (as is clear, for example, from the minimum harmonisation approach of the 
Union legislature).  Ultimately, these two classifications aim to clarify that the CJEU does not 
seem to limit itself to a default position whereby comparison is engaged merely as a 
“harmonising handmaiden”1747.   
 
This chapter has therefore advanced two classifications: one reflecting the manifestations of 
the sources of comparative analysis, and a second reflecting the rationales underpinning the 
use of comparison in the case law of the CJEU.  Both illustrate the “first order” engagement 
of comparison by the AG and the Court.  This analysis is intended to provide the foundations 
for the exploration and identification of the use of comparative analysis in a “second order” 
respect, which sheds light on the notion of “comparing how others compare”1748 and which 
allows for the engagement of the discourses on legal development at different levels in a 
multi-level construct, in light of the CJEU’s development of its meta-mechanisms of 
Europeanisation.  Comparative analysis firstly facilitates the identification of these 
mechanisms and their use by the AG and the Court; furthermore, it is advanced that a more 
detailed evaluation might facilitate the understanding of the way in which these mechanisms 
contribute to Europeanisation and integration in a pluralist, multi-level order via the 
Luxembourg Court’s interpretative jurisdiction.  The first section of the following chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1746 For one understanding of the role of the CJEU in unification, see W. van Gerven, 'ECJ Case Law as a Means 
of Unification of Private Law' (1996-97) 20 Fordham.Intl.L.J. 680. 
1747 Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context (n.483), p.46. 
1748 D. Nelken, ‘Comparing Criminal Justice’ in M. Maguire et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 
(OUP, Oxford; 5th edn., 2012), pp.138-157, pp.142-143.  
 	  	  	   344 
builds on the analysis pertinent to that undertaken herein concerning the identification and 
recognition of principles of Union law, and the second aims to uncover the interaction of 
these principles with other mechanisms, including the recognition of “best solutions” and the 
scope for transfer and dialogue.   
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Chapter 9. Advancing the Europeanisation of Private Law via Comparative Analysis: 
Uncovering the Meta-Mechanisms of the CJEU 
 
This chapter explores the meta-mechanisms engaged by the CJEU in its Europeanisation of 
private law; it aims to cultivate the evaluation of the CJEU’s use of comparative analysis in a 
“second order” perspective, firstly in respect of the recognition of principles of Union law, 
and thereafter with regard to other mechanisms of Europeanisation, including the recognition 
of “best solutions” and the scope that arises for transfer and dialogue.  Elaborating upon the 
categorisation of the manifestations of comparison and the rationales underpinning its 
engagement in Chapter 8, the first section explores the following “stories” of comparison: 1) 
the use of comparative analysis for the purposes of identifying, recognising (and frequently, 
constituting) common principles; 2) the use of comparative analysis for the purposes of 
identifying, recognising (and frequently, constituting) general principles; and 3) the use of 
comparative analysis for the purposes of identifying “best solutions” (which might include 
practices rules, principles and values).  Thereafter, this chapter aims to integrate this analysis 
with the development of other meta-mechanisms engaged by the CJEU in its Europeanisation 
of private law; the focus falls initially on the legal transfers discourse introduced in Chapter 3 
and thereafter, on the engagement and evolution of judicial dialogue, as tools of 
Europeanisation and integration. 
 
I. Exploring the Comparative Analysis Underpinning the CJEU’s Recognition of 
Principles of Union Law 
 
At the beginning of Chapter 8, a distinction between commonality and generality has been 
advanced.  Reference has also been made to Tridimas’ definition of a general principle, and 
his recognition of the different conceptualisations thereof1749; it has been noted that for the 
purposes of this analysis, generality is engaged as reflecting the “degree of recognition or 
acceptance” of norms across the relevant legal orders.  This understanding is maintained for 
the purposes of uncovering the comparative analysis underpinning the recognition of a 
common principle on the one hand, and of a general principle on the other.  Thereafter, the 
focus shifts to the engagement of comparative analysis for the purposes of advancing the 
other meta-mechanisms of European private law development, including best solutions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1749 Tridimas defines a general principle as a “general proposition of law of some importance from which 
concrete rules derive”; Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.1. 
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transfer and dialogue.  It is recognised that there exists a degree of overlap between the 
recognition of common principles, of general principles, of best solutions and the scope for 
the recognition of transfers of a vertical and horizontal nature.     
 
This section begins by advancing a working definition of the notion of principle.  This 
definition is engaged as a working one as it is considered that the body of principles emerging 
at the Union level is constantly expanding in line with the contemporaneous expansion of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction in private law matters; furthermore, it is considered that principles are 
attributed, and adopt, an increasingly significant role in legal development following 
Pescatore’s recognition that principles of law constitute a “fertile source” of EU law, 
reflecting “a universal phenomenon of legal ‘civilization’” 1750.  Consequently, the definition 
advanced is one that aims to reflect the normative perspective of the thesis, with reference to 
the evaluation of the case examples; that is to say, fundamentally, the understanding engages 
the emergence of the Europeanisation of private law within the pluralist, multi-level space, 
defined by commonality and diversity.  As such, it is recognised that there is scope for its 
refinement and evolution. 
 
i. Principles of Law in the National and Union Orders 
 
Building on this introduction, it is acknowledged that principles are not fixed but rather it is 
their interpretation in light of a particular set of facts – that is, essentially, a case – that allows 
for their situation within a temporal and geographical space.  As such, it is considered that the 
application, as well as the legitimacy basis and conceptualisation of the notion of principle 
have the potential to differ between national cultures and traditions1751 and also beyond the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1750 Pescatore, The Law of Integration (n.67), p.75.  Obviously, the term “civilized nations” has been criticised, 
not only in respect of the connotation of colonisation, and the Christianisation of Europe and elsewhere but also 
with regard to the lack of understanding as to what civilisation actually means, there rather being a presumption, 
for example, within the UN, that its members are all civilised nations.  Certain authors have made reference to 
the use of the principle as providing a basis upon which a distinction can be made between those systems which 
have maintained their civilised nature, and those which have “moved away” – for diverse reasons – from their 
adherence to civilised approaches to law; see, for example, C. Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to “General 
Principles of International Law“’ (1990) 11 MJIL 768, fn.4. 
1751 Perhaps the most evident example is the rejection of an overarching principle of good faith, and the scope for 
the recognition of such a principle in the continental systems; House of Lords, EU Select Committee ‘European 
Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference’ (The Stationery Office, London; 2008-09), paras.31-38, 
and for example, in French law, the notion of bonne foi, has been recognised, among other contexts, in contract 
performance, in terms of l’obligation de loyauté, l’obligation de résultat and l’obligation de résultat (Cass., 
08.04.1987, Bull., III, n°88, p. 53, RTD civ. 1988, 122; Cass., 05.06.1968, D., 1970, 453). In German law, 
§242BGB provides for treu und glauben generally, while §§138 and 826 provide for further expressions of good 
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state, as principle might be engaged in the development of Union law, international law or 
private regulatory regimes.   
 
The notion of principle has received little consideration in classical positivist conceptions of 
law, in so far as principles are understood neither to be prescriptive nor derivations of directly 
enforceable commands1752.  Thus, from a positivist perspective, it is considered that the 
authority of principle must necessarily be deemed to derive from the rule of recognition; any 
other suggestion as to the basis of authority is rebuked1753.  This assumes that principles, even 
if recognised in courts, must nevertheless be promulgated by the legislature1754.  The 
relevance of Hart’s notion of soft or inclusive positivism follows therefrom; the recognition of 
principle does not necessarily constitute “an alternative to a criterion provided by a rule of 
recognition” but rather “a complex ‘soft-positivist’ form of such a criterion identifying 
principles by their content not by their pedigree”1755.  Dworkin draws a distinction between 
rules and principles, which rests on the different weights that can be attributed to different 
principles and the outcome to which their application gives rise; that is to say, rules require a 
particular outcome while principles do not express the consequences following from their 
invocation1756.  Thus, to the extent that they provide different lines of guidance from rules, 
principles engaged in “hard” cases1757 are therefore understood to offer a higher degree of 
discretion to judges1758.  Unlike rules, principles – defined by their generality – are inherently 
uncertain, “to be sought rather in the Platonic heaven of law than in the law books”1759.  It 
should be noted that the Dworkinian understanding reflects a narrow conception of principle, 
one which focuses on individuals’ rights but does not encompass that which he deems to be 
“policy” orientated, that is, considerations arising in or related to the broader public interest.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
faith, amongst others. For a general overview in European law, see K. Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des 
Europäischen Vertragsrechts (W. De Gruyter Recht, Berlin; 2003), pp.398-414.  
1752 R.M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (CUP, Cambridge; 1977), p.40. 
1753 For example, the arguments of Dworkin, explored below. 
1754 J. Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81 Yale.L.Rev. 823, p.848: “Legal principles, like 
other laws, can be enacted or repealed by legislatures… They can also become legally binding through 
establishment by the courts. Many legal systems recognize that both rules and principles can be made into law or 
lose their status as law through precedent “. 
1755 Hart, The Concept of Law (n.151), p.263. 
1756 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n.1752), pp.24 et seq. 
1757 In particular, Dworkin engages the case of Riggs v. Palmer 115 N.Y. 506 (1889), in Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (n.1752), p.29. 
1758 Unlike a rule, “[a principle] states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular 
decision”, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n.1752), pp.24-25, providing judges act in line with public 
standards, R.M. Dworkin, ‘Judicial Discretion’ (1963) 60 J.of.Phil. 624, p.635. 
1759 C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, Opinion of AG Mazak, para.86; J. Wouters et al, ‘The 
Influence of General Principles of Law’ Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper 2011-70, 
pp.4-5. 
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Dworkin asserts that “I call a ‘principle’ a standard that is to be observed, not because it will 
advance or secure an economic, political or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is 
a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality”1760.  Thus, while he 
recognises that the invocation of principles might be relevant to the reasoning in which the 
judge is engaged in his interpretation of existing legal materials, the considerations to which 
this invocation gives rise must be distinguished from policy, which is understood as “a kind 
of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, 
political or social feature of the community…”1761.   
 
Other conceptualisations of principle engage their legal character, on the one hand, and their 
cultural, socio-economic and political character, on the other; the determinations of these 
characters are relevant not only in relation to the source of principles (to the extent that they 
may not necessarily derive from the legal dimensions of these cultures and traditions but from 
moral or value-based considerations relevant to the development of the legal order), but also 
in respect of their status and role.  From this perspective, it has thus been considered that it is 
the values underpinning principles that allow the latter to be understood as “bridg[ing] the gap 
between positive legal rules and normative legal ideas”1762.  While as noted above, the notion 
of principle might not be fixed in itself, principles might be engaged as a component 
dimension of legal development; thus, as Habermas has highlighted, reasoning based on such 
considerations might be circular in its nature: “argumentation based on values and principles 
is a tool for tying individual cases to a longer line of cases and to make explicit the underlying 
social theory guiding the ECJ legal decision-making process”1763. 
 
The Treaty structure of the Union does not explicitly refer to principles as a means by which 
the Union institutions can exercise their roles and competences; while reference is made to the 
existence and effects of sources of Union law, other than the Treaties, in the TFEU – 
including regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions – no explicit 
reference is made to principles of law.  However, primary Union law is not entirely silent; for 
example, reference can be made to the principle of sincere cooperation in Art.4(3) TEU, of 
conferral in Art.5(1) TEU, and of subsidiarity in Art.5(3) TEU, as well as the principles found 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1760 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n.1752), p.22. 
1761 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n.1752), p.22. 
1762 Wouters et al, ‘The Influence of General Principles of Law’ (n.1759), p.5. 
1763 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms – Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law (Blackwell, Boston; 
1998), pp.194-195. 
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in the CFR.  Perhaps as a result, the conception of principle engaged by the CJEU is 
ambiguous, both with regard to its recognition, status and use1764.  As noted, a distinction 
between commonality and generality is advanced herein, one which is based on, and similarly 
purports to better clarify, the comparative analysis of the CJEU.  This is necessary in light of 
the fact that the engagement with legal principles – both common and general – fall “outside 
the formal sources of Community law”1765.  That assertion derives from the CJEU’s 
recognition of principles, predominantly from national (and international) law; moreover, 
principles might be derived from the Treaties.  In this latter respect, the CJEU initially 
engages a process of induction, providing that a particular Treaty provision constitutes a 
principle of Union law not explicitly set out in the Treaty as such; thereafter, the CJEU 
engages in a process of deduction and applies that provision – understood as a principle of 
law – to provide an interpretation in a particular case1766.   
 
From the perspective of the evaluation of the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg Court in 
respect of its recognition of principles from “beyond the Treaties”, two dimensions of 
analysis are relevant and will be explored in the paragraphs below: on the one hand, the 
CJEU’s use of comparison and therein, its engagement with commonality and generality 
underpinning the recognition of a principle, and on the other, the scope for its engagement 
with principle as a means of engaging the broader context (outlined above) of norms strictly 
conceived as legal rules.   
 
An attempt will be made to identify which, if indeed any, particular conceptualisation of 
principle is adopted by the CJEU, there having been little explication of a rigid understanding.  
This seems to be deliberate: AG Trstenjak, exploring the “concept of a general principle” has 
highlighted the multiple uses of principles – particularly, as an “an aid to interpretation” and a 
means of filling gaps - while acknowledging that “the Court also appears to have opted not to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1764 For example, AG Safjan, writing extra-judicially, makes reference to general principles of EU law having a 
similar status as that attributed to fundamental rights:  M. Safjan and P. Miklaszewicz, ‘Horizontal Effect of the 
General Principles of EU Law to Fundamental Rights’ (2010) 18 ERPL 475, p.480.  With regard to the CFR, it is 
worth noting that it seemingly distinguishes between rights and principles, per Art.52(2), it not necessarily being 
clear what the effects of such a distinction might be in practice (C. Hilson, ‘Rights and Principles in EU Law: A 
Distinction without Foundation?’ (2008) 15 Maas.J.Eur.Comp.L 193; Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (n.407), pp.216-
217). 
1765 F. Jacobs, ‘Preface’ in Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), pr.1. 
1766 For example, this can be identified in respect of the Treaty provision establishing equal pay for equal work, 
regardless of sex, in (now) Art.157 TFEU, and identified as a principle of sex equality in C-20/71 Sabbatini v 
Parliament [1972] ECR 345. 
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undertake a precise classification of general principles in order to retain the flexibility"1767.  
Notwithstanding the reluctance of the CJEU, a number of distinctions might be drawn in the 
exploration of principles.  In contemporary literature, while the terms are usually engaged 
interchangeably, the scope for a distinction between principles of Union law and those of a 
private or civil nature has been advanced1768.  The former category might comprise those 
principles that more blatantly reflect fundamental Treaty provisions1769, that is to say, 
deriving from a national or EU constitutional background1770.  The latter encompass those 
principles which originate in (predominantly, national) private law and include inter alia, the 
notion that “each contracting party is bound to honour the terms of its contract and to perform 
its obligations thereunder”1771, the idea that “full performance of a contract results, as a 
general rule, from discharge of the mutual obligations under the contract or from termination 
of that contract”1772, the right to be heard in competition law proceedings1773, the principle of 
legal privilege and of confidentiality between lawyers and clients1774 and the “clean hands” 
principle1775, principles relating to effective judicial protection1776, in addition to others, 
including the principle against unjust enrichment1777, the principle of good faith1778 and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1767 Dominguez (n.1502), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.91 et seq., para.93 in particular.  The Opinion can be 
compared with the judgement of the Court in which there is almost no consideration of the idea of general 
principle, in the context of the fundamental rights dimension of the case (entitlement to paid annual leave as a 
general principle). 
1768 See K. Purnhagen, ‘Principles of European Private or Civil Law?  A Reminder of the Symbiotic Relationship 
Between the ECJ and the ECFR in a Pluralistic European Private Law’, Centre for the Study of European 
Contract Law, University van Amsterdam, Working Paper 2011/04. 
1769 Although for example, Art.345 TFEU, establishing that EU law shall not affect property rights, has a clear 
private law significance.  The right to property is also well-established: Hauer (n.701). 
1770 For example, see AM&S (n.1686) – concerning obligations of confidentiality arising between solicitor and 
client; the CJEU made explicit requests for comparative material on the rules of the legal systems of the different 
Member States; referenced in T. Koopmans, 'The Birth of European Law - At the Crossroads of Legal Tradition' 
(1991) 39 AJCL 493, pp.498-499 and T. Koopmans, ‘Comparative Law and the Courts’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 545. 
1771 C-277/05 Sociéte thermal d’Eugènie-Les-Bains [2007] ECR I-06415, Opinion of AG Maduro, para.24. 
1772 Hamilton (n.552), Judgement, para.42.   
1773 C-17/74 Transocean Marine Paint v Commission [1974] ECR 1063.  Consider especially, AG Warner’s 
comparative examination of the right to a fair hearing, Opinion of AG Warner, pp.1088-1089. 
1774 AM&S (n.1686), a result arguably much more influenced by the common law, which has traditionally offered 
greater protection than the continental systems in such contexts.  The AG advocated an approach whereby “the 
Court has to weigh up and evaluate the particular problem and search for the best and most appropriate 
solution”, Opinion of AG Slynn, p.1649.  The Court itself undertook a comparative analysis of the laws of the 
Member States, attempting to identify a common approach by employing the two distinct national 
methodologies for the purpose of identifying a solution that would be appropriate within the European context. 
1775 C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2000] ECR I-11179. 
1776 There are a number of cases which emphasise the significance of effective judicial protection, and as a 
related issue, the availability of civil remedies at the national level – for consideration of the connection, see C-
50/00 Uníon de Pequenos Agricultores [2002] ECR I-7289, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para.97.  Consider, in 
particular, Johnston (n.950) (effective judicial protection) and C-253/00 Munoz [2002] ECR I-7289 (right to a 
civil action or remedy based on EU law but available at the national level). 
1777 C-47/07 Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission [2008] ECR I-09761. 
1778 Pia Messner (n.1658). 
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principle prohibiting abuse of right1779.  Notwithstanding the scope for its recognition, it is 
submitted that for the purposes of this thesis, the distinction is one which gives rise to 
unnecessary complexity and confusion to the extent that a great deal of overlap exists between 
the two categories.  As such, no strict distinction of this nature is advanced herein.   
 
Rather - in line with the exploration of the “stories” summarised above - the analysis that 
follows advances a distinction between commonality and generality in the reasoning of the 
CJEU.  The distinction advanced is not a simple one; these characterisations are also 
frequently intertwined.  From the jurisprudence of the CJEU, it is difficult to identify a 
consistent approach to the recognition of common or general principles, or even reference to 
consistent wording.  Rather, the notion of general principle emerges as a broad category into 
which the CJEU seems to “throw” all principles.  Indeed, AG Trstenjak has expressly 
considered that “general principle” is a “thorny issue”; furthermore, she has acknowledged 
that while: 
the terminology is inconsistent both in legal literature and in the case-law…to some 
extent there are differences only in the choice of words, such as where the Court of 
Justice and the Advocates General refer to a generally-accepted rule of law, a principle 
generally accepted, a basic principle of law, a fundamental principle, a principle, a rule, 
or a general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of 
Community law” 1780.   
 
In the following paragraphs, the distinction will be explored, based on the reasoning of the 
AG and Court in the cases evaluated in Part III; it is submitted that the ambiguity of the 
CJEU’s reference offers a space ripe for analysis and for the uncovering of considerations 
relevant to its methodology and reasoning.  Moreover, this distinction might engender clarity, 
particularly as to the facilitation of the understanding and development of the CJEU’s 
reasoning and therein, its use of the comparative methodology.  It is worth recalling – as 
illustrated by the case examples, and as categorised above – that the CJEU will engage 
different sources of comparative analysis; notwithstanding, much of the literature cited below 
is limited to references to comparative analysis which from the nation state; the normative 
perspective adopted within this thesis rejects such a delineated approach to legal development.  
Consequently, for the purposes of the evaluation that follows, the broad notion of “the sources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1779 Hans Markus Kofoed (n.1561). 
1780 Audiolux (n.1579), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.67. 
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being analysed” or “the sources of comparison” is engaged to illustrate that the CJEU’s 
comparative analysis does not appear – while it lacks theoretical and methodological rigour – 
to be so limited.  
 
ii. An Endeavour at Clarifying the CJEU’s Reasoning: A Distinction in the 
Characterisations of Commonality and Generality  
 
While the scope for different categorisations of principles has been considered in the CJEU, 
the distinction advanced herein, namely between commonality and generality, has not been 
recognised.  Thus AG Trstenjak has advocated a distinction based on principles recognised in 
a “narrow sense” (those which derive from the “spirit and system of the Treaties and relate to 
specific points of EU law”) and those which are common to the national systems; only the 
latter are deemed to require “critical or evaluative” comparison” 1781.  Thus, it is submitted 
that where a principle or its interpretation cannot be identified across all relevant legal orders, 
or where “non-negligible” divergences are identified between the sources of comparison, 
including but not limited to those of the Member States1782, it might be more appropriate to 
characterise the principle as the “most common” amongst the Member States1783; herein, it is 
submitted that in order to avoid the term commonality, the principle might be better identified 
as a “general one”.  Comparison therefore not only facilitates the identification of that which 
is common but also in the absence of commonality, that which might be reflected in the 
notion of generality.  It is submitted that the distinction will facilitate the uncovering and 
clarification of the (already ambiguous) comparative methodology of the CJEU.  
 
As to the recognition of commonality, the comparative analysis allows the CJEU to compare 
the text and interpretations of the relevant norms across the Member States1784 and beyond the 
state.  It is clear from the case examples explored above, that while the CJEU might identify 
commonality (which might then be advanced – and diversities repressed – for the purposes of 
promoting uniformity and thus, unification), on the basis of comparative analysis.  
Furthermore, the CJEU’s recognition of commonality might also derive from the 
consolidation of the norms in a single form.  Such an approach is identifiable in light of the 
“almost codification” of fundamental rights (and related principles) in the CFR.  The CJEU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1781 Dominguez (n.1502), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.94. 
1782 N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1978), pp.97-99; pp.100-
128. 
1783  Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (n.691), p.797. 
1784 AM&S (n.1686). 
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has not explicitly characterised its reasoning in this respect but it has recognised that the CFR 
encompasses “those values hav[ing] in common the fact of being unanimously shared by the 
Member States…The Charter has undeniably placed the rights which form its subject-matter 
at the highest level of values common to the Member States”1785.  Furthermore, the CJEU has 
recognised commonality on the basis that the relevant norms have been expressed in 
provisions of international treaties, which form part of “constitutional traditions common” 
across legal orders as a result of the Member States, or the Union, having consented 
thereto1786; this characteristic of commonality is then deemed to be transferable to the Union, 
and subsequently, to the national level1787.  
 
Notwithstanding the CJEU’s characterisation of norms as common, its comparative reasoning 
seems to be much more complex than one based on the identification of similarity; indeed it is 
not so limited.  Moreover, even where it does pursue commonality, it might not always find 
it1788.  The normative rationales underpinning the identification of commonality are broad.  It 
is potentially circular, as well as time and material-dependent; that is to say, the significance 
attached to the “status” of commonality ultimately depends on what the CJEU identifies as 
being common at a particular moment in time and in a particular case.  Moreover – at least 
within the context of the Europeanisation of private law (but not limiting the normative 
sources of legal development to those which are European) – it seems that only the CJEU is in 
a position to identify commonality in a set of given norms. 
 
Yet, the CJEU does not only recognise principles of Union law where commonality is 
identifiable; it will also recognise principles of Union law where divergences exist between 
the sources of comparison.  It seems that the CJEU will recognise norms as principles of 
Union law notwithstanding that diversities in the relevant norms exist across the Member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1785 C-353/99 Council v Hautala [2001] ECR I-09565, Opinion of AG Léger, paras.80-82, citing recitals four 
and five to the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000 C 364/01. 
1786 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones (n.1346), Judgement, para.29. 
1787 See the expression of the voluntarist approach in relation to international law, in the ICJ judgement of S.S. 
Lotus, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 18.  Positivist and voluntarist approaches of law have been understood to be 
strictly intertwined; S.R. Ratner and A-M. Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 AJIL 291, p.293.  Cf. Hart’s positivist conception, which is understood to 
provide for a way to overcome the disadvantages of the voluntarist approach, and the focus on the will of the 
sovereign state - Hart, The Concept of Law (n.151). 
1788 This seems to be the case in Omega, where the understanding of human dignity adopted as a principle of 
Union law is deemed to be so broad as to find some foundation across the Member States: Omega (n.1331), 
Judgement, paras.37-38. 
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States providing the principle is deemed to be of an appropriate degree of significance1789; 
this requires that both the aims and objectives of the Union order, and the national diversities 
must be engaged and intertwined in its analysis.  Where there is an explicit divergence or 
where there is an absence of commonality, such principles cannot, it seems, be classified as 
common, as there is nothing to substantiate the characterisation.  Thus, it is the existence of 
non-negligible divergences between the Member States1790 that provides that not all principles 
of Union law can be understood to be common1791.  These principles should rather, it is 
submitted, subscribe to the characterisation of generality.   
 
Again, comparative analysis brings to light the absence of commonality across the national 
orders, and where relevant, at the international level and beyond the state.  On the one hand, 
the CJEU might hypothesise as to the existence of commonality and its analysis might dictate 
that no such commonality exists; alternatively, the CJEU might recognise that divergence is 
likely, in light of the nature of the relevant issue at state.  As noted, given that the CJEU 
currently makes no distinction between commonality and generality, all principles are 
characterised as general principles; the problematic, that is, the potential confusion, thus 
arises from the inconsistency surrounding the utilisation of “common” in the rhetoric of the 
CJEU.  This, it is submitted, has the potential not only to undermine the clarity of the 
comparative analysis adopted but also, as Weatherill has noted, the Court’s “cavalier and 
scantily explained approach” also undermines the diversity between the legal systems of the 
Member States1792.   
 
The CJEU has also recognised principles of Union law following a single national legal order, 
whereby a norm will be recognised as putatively common where it is deemed likely to be 
accepted in the courts of all of the Member States; this kind of development can be found in 
the CJEU’s adoption of the concept of misuse of power as derived originally from French 
administrative law1793 and the notion of proportionality from German law1794.  These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1789 In considering principles common to the laws of the Member States, the CJEU has made it clear that there is 
no need for a principle to exist in all legal traditions; rather, it is satisfactory that the particular principle is found 
in several systems:  Hoechst (n.1265).   
1790 MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (n.1782), pp.97-99; pp.100-128. 
1791 Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (n.691), p.797. 
1792 S. Weatherill, ‘The ‘Principles of Civil Law’ as a Basis for Interpreting the Legislative Acquis’ (2010) ERCL 
74, p.79. 
1793 P. Pescatore, ‘Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, à des 
normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des états membres’ (1980) 32 Revue internationale de droit 
comparé 337, p.354. 
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examples provide evidence of the scope for overlap in the characterisation of principles and 
transfers; in particular, the notion of proportionality might rather be said to be a vertical 
transfer, from the national to the supranational level.  It is then recognised at the Union level, 
and sent back to all of the national systems as a principle of Union law.  Indeed, in this case, 
the CJEU’s (putative) engagement of comparative analysis would have indicated that there 
was no commonality.  Rather, the Court identified the principle as such, against the 
background of its determination that it would likely be accepted across the courts of the 
Member States.  In this example, the commonality is a fiction and it is the comparative 
analysis that alerts us to this.  Furthermore, as discussed above1795, notwithstanding the 
existence of diversities in the text and interpretation of norms across the Member States, the 
CJEU will recognise a principle that is deemed to be  “internationally accepted” 1796 as a 
principle of Union law; as a general rule, principles of international law must be distinguished 
from those of European law1797, notwithstanding that as a source of international law such 
principles are binding on the EU1798.  Moreover, the CJEU might recognise principles of 
Union law from the legislative acquis1799, where a principle exists at the Union level but 
cannot be deemed to be common in respect of other sources of comparative analysis.  It must 
therefore be considered that generality does not always equal commonality; the problematic 
of the current approach of the CJEU – where no explicit distinction is made between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1794 Verhältnismässigkeit, N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study 
(Kluwer, London; 1996), chp.2. 
1795 See Chapter 8. 
1796 See the reference to “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” in Art.38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ, 26.06.1945, 33 UNTS 993. 
1797 Perhaps the external/international distinction made by can be employed to highlight this distinction; M. Hilf, 
‘Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?’ (2001) Journal of International 
Economic Law 111, as cited in Wouters et al, ‘The Influence of General Principles of Law’ (n.1759), p.5. 
1798 The binding nature of international law in respect of the EU is recognised in the TEU in Arts.3(5) (“In its 
relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the 
protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of 
human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”), 21(1) (“…respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”) and 21(2)(b) (“consolidate and support 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law”) and by the CJEU in Racke 
(n.1620), Judgement, paras.45-46 (“Racke is invoking fundamental rules of customary international law…”).  
The Court considered that Racke was invoking the principle of rebus sic stantibus, as an exception to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda; it has been considered this was a wrong determination, in Wouters et al, ‘The 
Influence of General Principles of Law’ (n.1759), p.17.  Reference must also be made to the Kadi case, in which 
the CJEU, in respect of the hierarchy of general principles, provided that international agreements, binding on 
the EU, must be understood as binding in respect of Union acts of a secondary nature but not over Union 
primary law; to this extent, it must also be understood that general principles have an interpretative purpose.  
Kadi (n.147), Judgement, paras.307-308, 316-17, in which the Court highlighted the distinct character of the EU 
legal order.  See also G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’ 
(2010) 51 Harv.Int.L.J. 1.   
1799 Transocean Marine Paint (n.1773), Judgement, para.15.   
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commonality and generality but both labels are used interchangeably – is that it engenders a 
lack of clarity as to the methodology of the AG and the Court, in addition to the 
understanding of the foundations, status and role of the relevant principle, as well as the 
context in which it has been recognised1800. 
 
Notwithstanding the CJEU’s recognition of a breadth of principles of Union law, it is clear 
that there neither exists a characterisation of such principles – the commonality/generality 
distinction having been advanced in the previous paragraphs – nor an agreed, clear or 
coherent methodology on the basis of which Union principles are identified and 
recognised1801; indeed, the “robustness” of the CJEU’s methodology has been called into 
question1802.  The problematic is not confined to the European sphere; in the international law 
context, the methodology engaged in the recognition of principles of international law - 
understood to be “recognized and accepted in international doctrine and jurisprudence” - has 
been criticised as “a remarkably unsophisticated approach to interactions among legal 
systems”1803.  The analysis that follows aims to determine whether a more consistent 
methodology can be identified, one which engages with the distinction outlined above and 
which might cohere with the manifestations and rationales of comparison set out above. 
 
As a general rule, principles of Union law are derived from norms; notwithstanding, they 
differ from those norms to the extent that they are rather abstractions as opposed to rules of 
specific application.  This suggests that it is not the principle itself which is identifiable within 
a (national, Union, international or private) culture or tradition (existing within or beyond the 
nation state) but rather a set of rules from which a principle can be abstracted1804, and in 
respect of which, an interpretation can be derived in a particular set of facts, situating the 
principle in time and space.  On this basis, it is submitted that arguably, an approach based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1800 For example, this might be said to be the situation in those cases in which the AG and the Court has 
recognised a principle of Union law (reference might be made to the notion that full performance of a contract 
results from the discharge of the mutual obligation under the contract, or the termination of the contract, and the 
notion of good faith and unjust enrichment) and those cases in which the AG and the Court has refused to 
recognise a principle of Union law (reference can be made to the Audiolux case; Audiolux (n.1579)). 
1801 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (n.1632), p.950; In the international law context, the 
methodology for recognising general principles, understood to be “recognized and accepted in international 
doctrine and jurisprudence” has been criticised as “a remarkably unsophisticated approach to interactions among 
legal systems”. 
1802 Editorial Comments, 'The Scope of Application of General Principles of Union Law’ (n.1312), p.1589; the 
main discussion in this commentary concerns what is necessary for the acts of a Member State to “fall within the 
scope of the Treaties” such that general principles of Union law might be invoked. 
1803 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (n.1632), p.950. 
1804 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (n.1632). 
 	  	  	   357 
the mere identification of similarities and differences is not sufficient to identify the relevant 
content, and putative status of the principle.  Generally, the identification of commonality 
from sources of comparison is done via an inductive process.  Where such an approach is 
adopted – regardless of the sources, it seems – it becomes clear, as Semmelmann has 
highlighted, that the task of the CJEU is one that is often tenuous and “time-consuming”1805, 
to the extent that, as noted above, the comparative analysis must be thorough and should 
reflect the complex comparison outlined above, extending beyond the text to the 
interpretation and context of the relevant norms.  To combat this complexity, different 
approaches have been advanced.  To the extent that the problematic of seemingly 
“representative” legal families has been challenged in the introduction and Part I (as a means 
of generating representation without such comprehensive comparative analysis), it brings to 
the fore the problematic posed by the question of resources, which is one that might 
potentially be solved by virtue of better communication on the part of judges, the 
establishment of databases of case law, and the explication of relevant development in 
scholarship accessible to judges.  Furthermore, where commonality is recognised as deriving 
from an international treaty or a codification of norms, it has been suggested that the need for 
comprehensive comparative analysis is potentially undermined1806.  This is neither to suggest 
that the need for comparative analysis disappears entirely, nor that the interpretation will 
necessarily be identical across the Member States simply because the norm has been 
expressed in a common text within a treaty or a codified document.  Rather, it is to suggest 
that prima facie, the need for comparative analysis might fade1807, where the norm is 
enshrined in a common text, at the European or international level, where it did not previously 
exist; in this case, prior to its codification, reference would have been made to the relevant 
national, international or non-state orders to identify even the content of a potential norm.  
Notwithstanding, the need for comprehensive comparative analysis remains1808 as such an 
approach might only be relevant in a limited number of cases; furthermore, it has the potential 
to stifle legal development, rendering it static. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1805 Semmelmann, ‘Legal Principles in EU Law’ (n.1564), p.14, fn.65. 
1806 See the discussion of the interpretation of fundamental rights in light of the CFR in Chapter 7. 
1807 This assertion seems to find support in an argument made by Rosas, writing extra-judicially, which seems to 
suggest that reference to the CFR  - in the context of a discussion of fundamental rights at the national level - 
removes the need for reference to be made to national laws, or national constitutional traditions: Rosas, 'When is 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at the National Level?' (n.1648), p.1272. 
1808 See the discussion in Chapter 8. 
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In respect of the identification of principles of Union law in the absence of commonality, the 
CJEU has made clear that there is no need for its existence across all cultures and 
traditions1809 to be recognised at the Union level; rather, it is satisfactory that the particular 
principle is found in several systems1810 or a “sufficiently large number of domestic legal 
systems”1811.  For Conway, the significance of an analysis of the CJEU jurisprudence relating 
to the engagement of generality derives from the potential to better understand the “levels of 
generality or abstraction” engaged by the CJEU to determine the extent of its discretion in 
relation to the interpretation of EU law.  Of two alternatives, one which engages coherence as 
a guiding principle1812 and another which looks to the most relevant legal culture or 
tradition1813, Conway argues that the approach focusing on the latter is most appropriate 
because it constitutes the “least subjective” alternative1814.  In respect of commonality, he 
identifies two alternative methods: one, which involves deriving a solution to a specific legal 
problem from the principles common to the laws of the Member States and another, which 
involves looking to the principles of public international law.  The extent of the discretion 
exercised by the CJEU has the potential to shape the understanding of its legitimacy, of 
relevance given the specifically constitutional nature of the CJEU’s interpretation or primary 
and secondary law, particularly as it is neither a democratically-elected body nor are its 
decisions easily reversed1815.  The understanding of the way in which the level of abstraction 
affects the utilisation of general principles and their relevance to the development of the legal 
order in which they are engaged, are diverse.  On the one hand, it has been considered that if 
general principles reach such a high level of abstraction, they are rendered of little use to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1809 Hoechst (n.1265).  However, this approach is not as clear as it might appear.  In Mangold, the CJEU 
recognised the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age as a general principle.  The principle has been 
criticised to the extent that it is not a principle, which finds unequivocal support in all Member States.   
1810 Hoechst (n.1265).  A distinction can be made with the situation in international law, where the ICJ has 
asserted that a (relatively high) standard of “representativeness” is required for the recognition of a general 
principle, that is, as existing in most, if not all, national legal systems; see Prosecutor v Kupreskic (Appeal 
Judgement) ICTY-IT-95-16-A (03.10.2001), p.75. 
1811 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (n.1632), p.953. 
1812  Per L.T. Tribe and M.C. Dorf, ‘Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights’ (1990) 57 
Univ.Chic.Law.Rev. 1057 (and also, as Conway notes, finding support in Dworkin’s desire for fit, and an 
integrity-based interpretation of a constitution – R.M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (HUP, Cambridge; 1986), 
pp.228-258.).   
1813 Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (n.691), pp.791-
792.  The notion of looking to the “most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying 
protection to, the asserted right can be identified” follows from Michael H v Gerald D 491 US 110 (1989), fn.6 
of the majority opinion of Judge Scalia.  The reference to the “most specific” dictates that this approach should 
guide the interpretation even if it only to be identified in one national legal system; in the alternative, Conway 
makes reference to the approach most common to the laws of the Member States. 
1814 Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (n.691), p.805. 
1815 Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (n.691), p.789. 
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court1816; on the other hand, the advantage of general principles is identified in their abstract 
character, to the extent that their lack of precision allows for their evolution and renders them 
dynamic and flexible1817 and capable, via their identification, recognition and content, of 
being applied in different ways in the divergent legal cultures and traditions of the Member 
States1818 and also beyond the national context.  An analogy can be drawn with the way in 
which Tribe and Dorf have considered the notion of generality in terms of the protection of 
rights: “…at what level of generality should the Court describe the right previously protected 
and the right currently claimed?  The more abstractly one states the already-protected right, 
the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its protection”1819.  Indeed, 
AG Trstenjak has highlighted that principles “differ from specific rules of law in that they 
claim a certain degree of general validity and are not restricted to a certain area of law”1820, 
suggesting the scope for their facilitating cross-sectoral (as well as cross-border) impact.    In 
this respect, the notion of generality might be extended beyond the reflection of the content 
and status of the principle itself to evaluate a necessarily related consideration, that is, the 
nature of the CJEU’s reasoning in respect of the degree of its judicial discretion.   
 
The CJEU’s approach to legal reasoning in its recognition of Union principles is therefore 
necessarily reflective of the rationales underpinning the engagement of comparative analysis 
not only for the purposes of identifying relevant norms and recognising principles, but also 
for the purposes of uncovering the use to which such principles might be put1821.  The analysis 
above illustrates that the CJEU does not merely look to identify similarities or differences, 
either for the purposes of highlighting the existence of the former or suppressing the latter.  
Rather the CJEU’s identification and recognition of principles of Union law seems to 
illustrate its jurisdiction “in its more creative and expansive part”1822 in interpreting EU 
law1823 and in filling gaps1824, the latter consideration being of particular significance in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1816 P. Weil, ‘Le droit international en quête de son identité. Cours général de droit international public’ (1992) 
237 RCADI 146, pp.146-147. 
1817 R. Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International Law’ (2006) NILR LIII, p.9. 
1818 Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ (n.691), p.793. 
1819 Tribe and Dorf, ‘Levels of Generality’ (n.1812), p.1060. 
1820 Audiolux (n.1579), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.87, citing Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law 
(n.1475), p.1 and his distinction between a rule and general principle.  
1821 O. de Frouville, ‘Les tribunaux pénaux internationaux et les principes de droit: Quelques commentaires’ in 
M. Delmas-Marty et al (eds.), Les sources du droit international pénal: L’expérience des tribunaux 
internationaux et le statut de la Cour pénale internationale (UMR de droit comparé de Paris, Paris; 2004), 
pp.389-393, p.392. 
1822 Hesselink, ‘A Toolbox for European Judges’ (n.707), p.9. 
1823 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU 
Law’ (2010) 47 CMLR 1629, pp.1631 et seq.  Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons make reference to four functions of 
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respect of facilitating the better understanding of the interrelationship of national, European 
and international legal orders1825.   
 
The CJEU’s recognition of principles might be understood to be part and parcel of the 
engagement of its obligations under Art.19 TFEU in ensuring that the law is observed in its 
interpretation and application of European legal provisions, and in promoting greater 
coherence and certainty, ensuring “consistency between its policies and activities” per Art.7 
TEU.  The identification and recognition of Union principles in itself might provide for the 
cultivation of the Europeanisation of private law in an ordered and systematic manner by the 
CJEU1826.  Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction and role of the CJEU and the scope for its 
evolution must be considered in light of the Union legislature and its approach to 
harmonisation; that is to say, the CJEU must ensure it acts within its competence1827.  Yet 
even where the CJEU might not be able to go beyond the recognition of either a general or a 
common principle – that is to say, in terms of clarifying their specific application or the 
relationship with other norms - as Bradgate et al consider, there is scope – via the notions of 
transfer, communication and dialogue – for the recognition of a general or a common 
principle to be “fleshed out” by more specific rules1828 established at the transnational, 
international, European or national level.   
 
Indeed, one key rationale, which cuts across both the reasoning underpinning the recognition 
of the principle and the purpose of the principle itself, is the existence of a gap at either the 
national or European level.  Inherently related to gap-filling is the facilitation of coherence 
and systemisation which, given the scope for fragmentation arising from the interaction of the 
national and European orders and consequent to the “piecemeal” nature of Union legislative 
activity, is particularly prevalent to the Europeanisation of private law.  Gap filling suggests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
general principles, namely, gap-filling, as an interpretative aid, as a basis for judicial review, and in the 
allocation of powers between the EU and Member States; in their analysis, they focus on the latter. 
1824 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ 
(n.1823), pp.1631 et seq.; see also, Palacios de la Villa (n.1759), Opinion of AG Mazak, para.85: “added flesh to 
the bones of Community law”. 
1825 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), pp.31 et seq. 
1826 Mak, ‘Harmonisation through 'Directive-Related' and 'Cross-Directive' Interpretation’ (n.313), p.4. 
1827 Consider the criticism of the Mangold decision and the identification of a general principle of non-
discrimination, particularly in respect of the notion that the CJEU overlooked the non-horizontal effect of 
directives, referring instead to what it deemed to be a general principle. 
1828 R. Bradgate, C. Twigg-Flesner and A. Norhausen, ‘Review of the Eight Consumer Acquis Minimum 
Harmonisation Directives and Their Implementation in the UK and Analysis of the Scope for Simplification’ 
(2005, URN 05/1952) (<http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file27200.pdf>; Last Accessed: 22.02.2012), p.203. 
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that principles of Union law are identified and recognised where the issue at hand can be 
governed neither expressly nor by deduction from existing national or primary or secondary 
Union law.  Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons therefore consider that the rationale of gap filling 
allows for the identification of principles by virtue the CJEU’s exercise of its adjudicatory 
function via the preliminary reference procedure in light of the EU’s sui generis character; in 
respect of the latter, it is the distinct nature of the Union legal order that constitutes the 
specific legitimacy basis for the gap-filling role1829.  The recognition of principles is deemed 
to be legitimate to the extent that these principles lend coherence to what would otherwise be 
an incoherent (and thus, potentially implausible as fully autonomous) legal order1830.  They 
assert however that only those principles which have “grounding” consequences, 
“intrinsically linked to the nature, objectives and functioning of the Union” can be “found” by 
the CJEU, either in the Union itself (in the Treaty structure, namely, Arts.6(3) and 19 TEU 
and Art.340 TFEU) or in international treaties or the cultures and traditions of the Member 
States1831.  In respect of the recognition of principles via the preliminary reference procedure, 
reference has been made to the notion that the engagement of a teleological and functional1832 
comparative analysis also forms part of the CJEU’s methodology; that is to say, the principle 
recognised must fit with the aims and objectives of the Union and it is through this analysis 
that its purpose and function – that is, its essence – can be identified1833.  The notion of 
essence invokes the delineation of the principle, which might amount to its stripping back to 
its strictly legal content.  From the legal-cultural perspective advanced for the purposes of the 
thesis, not only might the notion of the essence of the norm be challenged as attributing too 
little consideration to its non-legal dimensions but it is from the social, and more broadly, 
cultural, perspective that functionalism, and functional comparison, has received its fiercest 
critique.  Thus, Frankenberg has challenged functionalism on the basis that it “negates the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1829 Indeed, a problematic with generality arises from the fact that it might rather be understood to undermine 
legitimacy and the operation of the rule of law, where generality operates within no fixed bounds in the absence 
of a fixed or coherent judicial methodology, which gives rise to its potential to violate principles of legal 
certainty and objectivity; Conway, ‘Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of 
Justice’ (n.691), p.788.  Furthermore, the gap-filling function renders general principles with a “subsidiary” 
character in international law; H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Green, 
London; 1927), p.85. 
1830 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ 
(n.1823), p.1632, citing Van Gend en Loos (n.219), as to the sui generis character of the Union legal system. 
1831 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ 
(n.1823), p.1632. 
1832 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), p.34 – “of functionality…that the legal system 
of every society faces essentially the same problems and solves these problems by quite different means though 
very often with similar results”.  It must be briefly noted that teleology and functionalism cannot be understood 
to be limited by each other.    
1833 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (n.1632), p.960. 
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interaction between legal institutions and provisions by stripping them from their systemic 
context and integrating them in an artificially universal typology of ‘solutions’.  In this way, 
‘function’ is reified…”1834.  Yet, the understanding of principle need not be confined in this 
way; indeed, even the functional approach might facilitate an approach which attributes 
significance to the cultural, political and socio-economic dimensions of the relevant norms.  
Indeed, within the CJEU, Trstenjak has recognised that principles are linked to culture, and 
“embody fundamental legal concepts and values inherent in a legal order”1835.  This 
understanding can also be identified in the fundamental rights case law explored in Chapter 7, 
and particularly in Stauder1836. 
 
As the analysis above illustrates, the CJEU might exercise a wide discretion in following (or 
disregarding) the identification of commonality or generality at the Union level.  While this 
discretion reflects the foundations for a distinction in the characterisation of principles, it 
further suggests that the CJEU might rather adopt a different yet interrelated approach.  This 
might be one based on the identification of “best solutions”, which has been introduced above 
as a rationale underpinning the engagement of comparative analysis in the Europeanisation of 
private law 1837 .  The legitimacy bases of each diverge; both the generality and 
commonality1838 approaches are seemingly legitimised from the principles’ abstraction from 
norms identifiable in the national orders, at the Union or the international levels, in light of a 
finding or absence of commonality.  It has been suggested that the identification of the “best 
solution” also arises from its “frequency” 1839; however, there is little to suggest that 
commonality renders one particular solution “best”.  As noted above, there has been little 
consideration in comparative law scholarship – and particularly in functional theories – of the 
basis upon which a solution is deemed to be best1840.  Indeed, the need for a metric is 
recognised in law and economics scholarship, particularly to the extent that, in the absence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1834 Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison’ (n.490), p.440. 
1835 Audiolux (n.1579), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.87, citing Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law 
(n.1475), p.1 and his distinction between a rule and general principle.  
1836 Stauder (n.682), Nold (n.791), Judgement, para.13, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Judgement, 
paras.1146-7. 
1837 See Chapters 3 and 8. 
1838 Verhoeven asserts that “the Union must respect fundamental principles because they are ‘common to the 
Member States’ and as they are defined by what is common in them”.  A. Verhoeven, The European Union in 
Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory (Kluwer, The Hague; 2002), p.322. 
1839 For example, consider Saleilles, who asserted that the “droit idéal relatif” could be identified from that which 
appears in most systems: Salleilles, ‘Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé’ (n.446). 
1840  See the discussion in Chapter 3.  See also, Michaels, ‘The Functional Method’ in Reimann and 
Zimmermann, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (n.449), p.374: “comparative material gives no guidelines, 
even commonality has no independent normative force”.   
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a metric, legal actors might essentially engage in “herd behaviour”, following the approach of 
a legal system notwithstanding that this approach might not be appropriate1841.  
 
While Zweigert assumed that the identification of “best solutions” was a task that falls within 
the scope of the comparatist’s general task1842 - and as such, offered no guidance as to its 
determination - his understanding does not reflect a neutral character of the determination.  In 
the context of the CJEU’s interpretative jurisdiction, it has long been recognised that the 
determination must reflect a normative one; that is to say, in the absence of distinct criteria, it 
has been suggested that the approach rather depends on the purpose for which the 
comparative analysis is adopted.  AG Lagrange has considered that it is the teleology of the 
Union which guides the AG and the Court: “those solutions which, having regard to the 
objects of the Treaty, appear to it to be the best or, if one may use the expression, the most 
progressive” should be identified1843.  Similarly, Maduro asserts that neither the AG nor the 
Court will look to identify the “best solution” “in abstract” but rather that the determination 
must be made in a particular case, via comparative analysis, in light of the aims and objectives 
of the Union1844.   
 
It is submitted that the engagement of the complex understanding of comparison best 
facilitates the identification of the relevant factors that shape the determination as to the “best 
solution”.  As complex comparison requires that the perspective of the analysis is identified, it 
should also allow for the identification, determination and clarification of the legal, cultural, 
political and socio-economic contexts in which the AG and the Court seek to identify “best 
solutions”, a determination which might be limited or absent in orthodox conceptualisations 
of comparison.  This context also encompasses the identification of the aims of the researcher 
(i.e. the AG or the Court) and his audience (predominantly, the national courts but 
increasingly, international courts, civil society bodies1845 and private individuals) and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1841 F. Gomez, ‘Some Law and Economics of Harmonizing European Private Law’ in A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds.), 
Towards a European Civil Code (Kluwer, The Hague; 4th edn., 2011), pp.401-426, pp.405-406. 
1842 Zweigert and Kötz have argued that “the comparatist uses just the same criteria as any other lawyer who has 
to decide which of two possible solutions is more suitable and just“: Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to 
Comparative Law (n.23), p.47. 
1843 Hoogovens (n.1545), Opinion of AG Lagrange, paras.283-284. 
1844 Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law’ (n.397), p.7: “As a consequence, a comparative law methodology that 
would amount to a simple arithmetic exercise will also ignore the value of constitutional pluralism. It will also 
ignore that such comparative exercise takes place not as an academic exercise but in the context of questions 
arising within the EU legal order and should be mindful of the specificities of this legal order”. 
1845 The limited locus standi for interested parties other than states dictates that those parties must show a direct 
interest (per Art.40 and Art.23-23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union) to advance its 
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limits of such objectives.  This dictates that the “best solution” must be identified with regard 
to the particular issue arising before the CJEU and suggests that its legitimacy basis lies 
largely in the subjective assessment and determination of the judge, legislature or 
academic1846.  Moreover, this understanding necessarily dictates that the evaluation will be a 
political one, the precise evaluative criteria of which will shift, depending on the specific 
nature of the case; as such, like principles, best solutions are not fixed but situated via 
interpretation in light of a given set of facts. 
 
Thus, as noted, the identification of the “best solution” or that which is “most carefully 
considered” must be undertaken in light of the analysis of “the spirit, orientation and general 
tendency of the national laws”1847 but also in light of the structure, aims and objectives of the 
Union1848.  These aims and objectives can be identified by the CJEU by virtue of its 
teleological approach, however this in itself is not enough; these determinations also need to 
be aligned with the nature of the national orders.  Comparative analysis uncover the diverse 
societal and institutional framework of law-making across the Union, including the values and 
policy preferences existing within the Member States, and furthermore, the scope for the 
adaptability of the CJEU’s judgement therein, in light of its potential political, cultural, and 
socio-economic impact; this arguably renders the solution identified more likely to be deemed 
acceptable by the national courts.  This approach engages evaluative comparison, which 
dictates neither the need for a finding of unanimity nor for a majority finding; rather the 
determination of the legal system emerges as the most carefully considered over time, and 
furthermore, what might be the “best solution” in light of developing trends.  That is to say, 
this approach facilitates the uncovering of the scope for impact in the referring legal order and 
across legal orders (both national and beyond the state), and the understanding of legal change 
as political, cultural and social as well as legal and economic; moreover, it would not only go 
beyond mere description but also transcend the limits of methodological nationalism, set out 
in Chapter 2.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
views – albeit new grounds cannot be raised - before the CJEU.  The observations of such parties will normally 
only be transferred to the CJEU in paper form where those parties made observations before the national court; 
this rather exceptional possibility can be identified in the NS case (C-411/10 NS [2011] ECR I-13905).  
1846 R. Schulze, ‘European Private Law:  Political Foundations and Current Challenges’ in R. Brownsword et al 
(eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart, Oxford; 2011), pp.293-307, pp.303-304. 
1847 AM&S (n.1686), Judgement, pp.1599-1600. 
1848 Werhahn (n.1262), Opinion of AG Roemer, 1259-1260. 
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This section has firstly evaluated the reasoning underpinning the CJEU’s recognition of 
principles of Union law and has advanced a distinction of characterisation between those 
which are common and those which are general, based on the CJEU’s engagement of 
comparative analysis.  On this basis, an attempt has been made to clarify the ambiguous 
methodological approach of the CJEU, building on the foundations of the classifications of 
sources of comparative analysis and rationales of comparison, elaborated above.  The 
following section aims to augment this analysis, and specifically engages the scope for a link 
to be drawn between the identification and recognition of principles of Union law, the 
determination of “best solutions” and the scope for transfers, and the relevance of dialogue 
therein.   
 
II. The Integration of Comparative Analysis into the CJEU’s Other Meta-Mechanisms 
of Europeanisation   
 
This section engages with the notion that principles in themselves might also be functional; 
such an assertion is not necessarily new; the relevance of the critique advanced against 
functionalism has been outlined in Chapter 31849.  In particular, principles, and the values 
underpinning, have been engaged as promoting a “continuous flux of ideas and exchange of 
opinion between the ECJ and its national counterparts”1850 and facilitating judicial dialogue in 
general1851.  In light of the significance of function, it must also be recognised that a “court’s 
choice of interpretive methodology will affect more than the outcome of the particular case 
before it.  It will also likely affect the broader constitutional culture of the interpreting court’s 
jurisdiction”1852.  Clearly, while there exists a degree of interrelation between comparative 
analysis, the identification of generality or commonality or “best solutions” and the scope for 
transfer, a “chicken and egg” situation also arises; that is to say, it is not clear which comes 
first.  On the one hand, commonality and generality can be understood as the products of 
processes of transfer.  Indeed, Slaughter notes that “[i]ncreasing cross-fertilization of ideas 
and precedents among constitutional judges around the world is gradually giving rise to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1849 Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison’ (n.490), p.440. 
1850 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ 
(n.1823), p.1630. 
1851 Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice in Context’ (n.890), p.15. 
1852 S. Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (1999) 74 Indiana Law Journal 819, p.841. 
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increasingly visible international consensus on various issues” 1853 .  Yet the CJEU’s 
recognition of principles of Union law via comparison also has the potential to foster lines of 
communication and dialogue, upon which the basis for transfer can be established and 
developed.  However, it should be noted that there exists scope for transfer beyond 
commonality and generality; fundamentally, it is recognised that transfer does not necessarily 
result in commonality.  This is clear from Teubner’s discussion of legal irritants, discussed 
below and can be evidenced in respect of, for example, the different interpretations rendered 
of the concept of good faith1854 across the Union space, notwithstanding the recognition of 
commonality, albeit only in terms of the text of the relevant norms1855.  The context of 
transfer, whether horizontal or a vertical1856, must therefore be considered to be fundamental.  
Analogy has been defined as “reasoning by example” whereby the comparatists looks to 
identify a similar problem to the one faced by the relevant court, and who then, having 
identified the potential analogy with the relevant solution, must establish the scope for its 
transfer1857. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1853 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.78. 
1854 There already exists a vast amount of literature on the development of a doctrine of good faith within the 
European context; see, amongst others: K. Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des Europäischen Vertragsrechts 
(W. De Gruyter Recht, Berlin; 2003), pp.398-414; R. Zimmermann and S. Whittaker, Good Faith in European 
Contract Law (CUP, Cambridge; 2000); T. Wilhelmsson and C. Twigg-Flessner, ‘Pre-Contractual Information 
Duties in the acquis communautaire’ (2006) 2 ERCL 441; O. Lando, ‘Is Good Faith an Over-arching General 
Clause in the Principles of European Contract Law?’ (2007) 15 ERPL 841. 
1855 Thus, this relates not only to the recognition or reluctance to recognise good faith as an overarching principle 
of law but the way in which it has been interpreted.  To engage the trite distinction, the English courts, 
historically, have largely rejected an overarching principle of good faith (House of Lords, EU Select Committee 
‘European Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference’ (The Stationery Office, London; 2008-09), 
paras.31-38; Interfoto Picture Library v. Stiletto [1989] 1 QB 433 at 439 per Bingham LJ: “English law has, 
characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in 
response to demonstrated problems of unfairness”) but have more recently begun to recognise the scope for a 
move towards the recognition of the duty, if not overarching, with regard, most recently, to the scope for an 
implied duty, depending very much on the context of the dispute (Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade 
Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) and Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK 
and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200, and H. Beale, Chitty on Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London; 30th edn., 2008), pp.31 et seq, for an overview of developments).  On the other hand, one might refer to 
the recognition of such an overarching principle in continental and mixed legal systems, and the difference of 
interpretation; see, for example, H.L. MacQueen, ‘Good Faith’ in H.L. MacQueen and R. Zimmermann (eds.), 
European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh; 2006), 
pp.43-73, especially pp.47- 68; in French law, the notion of bonne foi, has been recognised, among other 
contexts, in contract performance, in terms of l’obligation de loyauté, l’obligation de résultat and l’obligation de 
moyen (Cass., 8.4.1987, Bull., III, n°88, p. 53, RTD civ. 1988, 122; Cass., 5.6.1968, D., 1970, 453). In German 
law, §242BGB provides for treu und glauben generally, while §§138 and 826 provide for further expressions of 
good faith, amongst others. 
1856 Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (n.1829), p.85. 
1857 Weinrib, Legal Reason (n.1578), p.4.  
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i. The Use of Legal Transfers as an Instrument of the Europeanisation of Private 
Law 
 
The notion of the transfer (of legal doctrines, principles and concepts) has long been 
considered significant to dynamic legal development and the scope for changes, particularly 
in light of the Europeanisation of private law; indeed, it has been suggested that “[t]he 
tendency to borrow and even copy has been most significant in times of general transition in 
the legal system”1858.  This is an empirical claim which can be verified by analysing the 
occurrence of transfers at various points of transition, within and beyond the boundaries of 
national orders1859.   
 
The transfers discourse, outlined in Chapter 3, has been largely shaped by Watson1860 and 
Legrand1861 and has been augmented by the contribution of Teubner and the integration of the 
systems theory analysis, which is engaged as a means of bridging the discussion between the 
understanding of transfers and dialogue between the courts and other institutions.  At the 
outset, it is worth noting that terminology is important; “legal transplant”, “legal borrowing”, 
“legal migration”1862 and “legal transfer” are used interchangeably yet none seem entirely 
appropriate. Bell distinguishes transplantation and cross-fertilisation1863; “transplantation” is 
used to signify movement to one or more legal systems, and transplantation, the direct 
“transposition of a doctrine from one legal system to another”.  “Borrowing” reflects 
movement from one or more legal systems and “migration”, the wandering or drifting 
between systems, which may not necessarily be purposeful.  Herein, transfer is used as an 
overarching term; the difficulties in employing such a broad term are recognised.  It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1858 D. Barak-Erez, ‘The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law’ (2009) 15 Col.J.Eur.Law. 478, p.480 
(footnotes omitted). 
1859 To the author’s knowledge, no such study has been undertaken.  The term “transition” is an important one.  
On the one hand, it could be said that many legal traditions are in a constant state of transition, while on the 
other, certain periods of change are of particular significance, for example, periods of colonialisation or the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, which threw the legal systems of many of what are now understood as 
Central and Eastern European states into disarray.  See specifically in relation to codification in light of an 
existing European code, Zimmermann, ‘Codification’ (n.166) and more recently, C. Jessel-Holst et al (eds.), 
Private Law in Eastern Europe – Autonomous Developments or Legal Transplants? (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen; 
2010). 
1860 See Watson, Legal Transplants (n.575); A. Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4 
EJCL (<http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html>; Last Accessed:  12.12.2011). 
1861 See Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (n.465); P. Legrand, ‘On the Singularity of Law’ 
(2006) 47 Harv.Int.L.J. 517. 
1862 N. Walker, ‘The Migration of Constitutional Ideas and the Migration of the Constitutional Idea: The Case of 
EU’ EUI WP 2005/04. 
1863 J. Bell, ‘Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe’ in J. Beatson and T. Tridimas 
(eds.), New Directions in European Public Law (Hart, Oxford; 1998), pp.147-168. 
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employed in the same way as Wittgenstein questions the retention, after a period of time – 
that is, when the original situation has developed – of the “ladder that was so helpful to 
reaching the top”1864; in this case, the term transfer is the ladder, critical to the very point of 
analysis.  Thus, it is engaged, not to elude the nuances of the discourse but to facilitate 
analysis without becoming bogged down in terminological and conceptual difficulties. 
 
At the outset, it is worth noting that with regard to the nature of transfers, reference can be 
made to those of a vertical, and those of a horizontal character.  Notwithstanding their 
acceptability as such – which will be discussed in more detail below - both, it seems can be 
identified at and between different levels, that is, at the national, European and international 
levels.  Vertical transfers are understood as those occurring between the national and 
supranational levels (whether EU, international or transnational law) and vice versa.  
Transfers occurring from the supranational to the national levels might be the most common; 
such transfers are identifiable with regard to the imposition of human rights obligations 
directly on a Member State via an international treaty, or Union legislation, for example, the 
ECHR and CFR, respectively.  However, it is also recognised that transfers might occur from 
the national level to the supranational level, where a norm (a rule, principle or practice) is 
identified within one or more national legal orders and adopted, in line with Union aims and 
objectives, at the Union level.  Horizontal transfers might occur between institutions 
operating at one level within a multi-level context of regulation.  In respect of the 
Europeanisation of private law, horizontal transfers, understood broadly as cross-references, 
might be identifiable at the European level; notwithstanding, it is difficult to identify a “pure” 
horizontal transfer between the Member States1865, that is, one which does not find its origins 
in a vertical transfer from the supranational to the national level, reflected, for example, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1864 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Harcourt, London; 1921), s.6.54. 
1865 The scope for horizontal transfer – rather, reflecting the scope for judicial borrowing - which does not find 
its basis in vertical transfer can be identified in the House of Lords case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral 
Services Ltd & others [2002] UKHL 22 concerning the attribution of liability in respect of wrong suffered by an 
individual, where it was not possible to identify which party (all in breach of duty) had caused which harm.  
Lord Bingham, who made reference to “the wider jurisprudence” at para.24 et seq., engaged in a comparative 
analysis, identifying the absence of a solution (or rather, the unsatisfactory nature of the existing rule in light of 
doing justice), and the way in which other solutions has been tried and tested in other contexts.  Recognising the 
social and cultural development across Europe, against the background of harmonisation efforts (citing W. van 
Gerven et al, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law (Kluwer, The 
Hague; 2000) and C. von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (OUP, Oxford; 2000)) Lord Bingham 
considered that while legal development could not rest on a “head count” of applicable norms in itself, it should 
be based on the need to do justice, “…if consideration of international sources suggests that a different and more 
acceptable decision would be given in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, that must prompt 
an anxious review [of the English rule]…In a shrinking world… there must be some virtue in uniformity of 
outcome whatever the diversity of approach in reaching that outcome”, para.32 per Lord Bingham. 
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imposition of a regime by virtue of a Union directive1866.  The existence and nature of 
transfers are perhaps most clear with reference to examples; the following examples are 
extracted from the case studies above to determine the relevance of comparative analysis 
underpinning the CJEU’s engagement with transfer, and whether these manifestations differ 
in their nature across areas of law.  As has been the case throughout the thesis, the focus 
remains on the judiciary. 
 
A transfer of a vertical nature, from the supranational to the national level, can be identified in 
the state liability case law.  The CJEU recognised state liability as a principle of EU law, and 
furthermore, explicated the remedies available against the institution deemed to be liable, 
including compensation, restitution1867 and interim relief1868.  As noted in Chapter 5, this 
dimension of the case law was particularly significant as the CJEU acknowledged, in light of 
a comparative analysis of the rules applicable in the national orders, that the national courts 
might have to recognise new remedies which did not previously exist or were unavailable 
therein1869 (as a result, making inroads into their procedural autonomy).  Another vertical 
transfer, from the international to the national level, is identifiable in respect of the notion of 
“unity of the state”, where reference is made to reference is made to international law, 
including legal scholarship1870, legal doctrine1871 and case law1872, and the approach therein 
subsequently adopted in the Union context, in light of the aims and objectives thereof.  
Furthermore, a horizontal transfer can also be identified in the state liability case law with 
regard to the explication of the conditions of liability; this is identifiable in the horizontal 
cross-referencing between areas of Union law.  Both the AG1873 and the Court1874 in Brasserie 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1866 An example of the scope for a horizontal transfer, which has its origins in a vertical transfer, can be 
identified in respect of the Commercial Agents Directive 86/653/EEC.  The “regime” of options for commercial 
agents is understood to derive from the French and German systems; ultimately, the regime exists in the English 
system by virtue of the directive.  Notwithstanding, the English court – or rather, one English judge - have 
recognised the scope for cross-referencing of interpretations, between the national systems, which could lead to a 
horizontal transfer, even if only of a judicial interpretation, Lonsdale v Howard and Hallam Ltd [2007] UKHL 
32, per Lord Hoffman at para.18. 
1867 C-33/76 Rewe-Zentral [1976] ECR 1989. 
1868 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame (n.902). 
1869 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.14.  In Brasserie, this was true in both the German and 
English orders. 
1870 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.45. 
1871 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, paras.42-44. 
1872 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, fns.46-47. 
1873 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.61 et seq, with reference to “the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States” an considering, “the absence of a uniform set of rules in this field, a useful 
frame of reference for common rules on State liability”; para.61. 
1874 Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, para.42 – “the conditions under which the State may incur liability for damage 
caused to individuals by a breach of Community law cannot, in the absence of particular justification, differ from 
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compared CJEU jurisprudence concerning the non-contractual liability of the Union1875 with 
the norms applicable in the Member States in respect of the liability of public authorities, 
against the background of which AG Tesauro1876 asserted that the criteria for determining the 
obligation to make reparation should diverge depending on the state or EU character of the 
institution in breach; in fact, he stated such divergence was “not acceptable”1877.  Indeed, he 
explicitly used the word “lend” in respect of the reference to the conditions of general civil 
liability and the liability of public authorities1878, against the background of the coherence 
between the regimes; consequently, AG Léger has spoken of “an alignment between the two 
systems” in Köbler1879.   
 
In respect of the basis provided by the UCTD for the amendment of national consumer 
contract legislation, transfers of a vertical nature are identifiable.  Most evidently, in both the 
UK1880 and Germany1881 inter alia, the UCTD provided the basis for the amendment of 
national legislation.  Moreover, the consumer contract case law gives rise to a transfer which 
is not of a substantive nature and does not affect a particular norm but is which broadly 
impacts the role of the national judge.  The shift, from the recognition of a power of the 
national judge, to the imposition of an obligation on his part to examine contract terms ex 
officio, attributes to the judge an activist role, one which is known in certain Member States 
and unknown in others.  In Pannon, the Court delineated the obligation to assess, with 
reference to the need for the national courts to possess the facts “necessary” to make an 
assessment as to unfairness1882, adhering – without consideration of the applicable national 
norms, either in Hungary or elsewhere – to the default of “passivity”.  However, in Pénzügyi 
Lízing, the Court - in contrast to the AG, who deferred to national procedural law1883 - and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
those governing the liability of the Community in like circumstances”.  Van Gerven also makes a broad claim 
for engagement with the non-contractual liability of the Union case law, van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and 
Procedures’ (n.901), p.511. 
1875 In particular, Joined Cases 83, 94/76-4, 15 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL v Council [1978] ECR 1209, at 
Brasserie (n.186), Judgement, paras.28–43. 
1876 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras.61 et seq, with reference to “the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States” an considering, “the absence of a uniform set of rules in this field, a useful 
frame of reference for common rules on State liability”; para.61. 
1877 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.66. 
1878 Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.7. 
1879 Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.127. 
1880 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 SI 1994/3159, amended by the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 SI 1999/2083. 
1881 Arts.305-310 BGB; R. Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (OUP, Oxford, 2005), p.182. 
1882 Pannon (n.1020). 
1883 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.113-115. 
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without clarifying the obligation of the national court, held that in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the consumer protection, it must have a role in investigating the “legal and 
factual elements necessary”1884.  As noted, these considerations are largely policy orientated; 
while the Court undertook no explicit comparison of the cultures or traditions of the national 
orders but rather engaged a broad consumer protection rationale, the AG highlighted the 
significance of party autonomy, her understanding of which was informed by the civilian 
tradition in general1885 and German law, in particular.  The jurisprudence also gives rise to 
scope for horizontal development between directives.  Yet it seems that the CJEU will not 
necessarily engage in such cross-referencing; this is clear from, inter alia, the Oceano case 
and the absence of comparison between Art.6 UCTD, and nullity in (now) Art.101 TFEU in 
competition cases, which has led to criticism of the absence of a conceptual underpinning in 
the CJEU’s reasoning1886.  More recently, comparative cross-referencing is identifiable in 
respect of the extension of the ex officio regulation beyond the UCTD to other directives, 
including the Doorstep Selling Directive1887 and the Consumer Credit Directive1888.  While 
this might not amount to a “transplant”, strictly understood, it certainly falls within the broad 
understanding of transfer adopted herein1889.  What is clear is that the lack of consistency in 
the CJEU’s approach will surely only become more apparent as the reach of legislative 
intervention settles on targeted maximum harmonisation. 
 
The scope for horizontal transfer in relation to fundamental rights protection exists on the 
basis of the cross-referencing engaged by the CJEU and the ECtHR1890; these processes of 
reference have long been recognised and have been outlined in the case example in Chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1884 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.51. 
1885 The notion that it is for the parties to the dispute to “take the initiative” can be found both in French and 
German law. 
1886 Collins, The European Civil Code (n.271), pp.60-61 and Mak, ‘Harmonisation through 'Directive-Related' 
and 'Cross-Directive' Interpretation’ (n.313), p.13. 
1887 Directive 85/577/EEC; Martin Martin (n.1021). 
1888 Directive 2008/48/EC; Volksbank Romania (n.1022) (from Romania) and C Rampion (n.1022) (then 
Directive 87/102/EEC) (from France). 
1889  Such an approach is also identifiable in the CJEU’s explication of the concept of consumer, discussed in 
Chapter 2, and in the analysis of “damage” in Leitner (n.728), at the Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras.34-35.  As 
the relevant directive left damage undefined, he engaged in a comparison of European legislation and Union case 
law, reference to international conventions and the legislation and case law of the Member States.  The 
Landesgericht had made a comparison between the state of the law in Austria and in Germany in its reference, 
and highlighted its understanding of the directive’s purpose of removing divergences between national systems 
to provide a uniform level of protection.  The AG, adopting a systematic interpretation at para.26, and aiming to 
facilitate coherence across the regime, cross-referenced the case law of the general court on non-material damage 
(at para.38) and that of the CJEU, attempting to identify an autonomous interpretation.   
1890 Especially, in respect of those norms of a “constitutional nature”, underpinning fundamental rights 
development in the EU context: Frowein, ‘Fundamental Human Rights as a Vehicle of Legal Integration in 
Europe’ in Weiler et al, Integration through Law (n.1266). 
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71891.  The CJEU recognises the significance of the ECHR and the ECtHR adopts an 
“integrated approach” whereby Convention rights are considered and interpreted with some 
reference to social and economic rights1892; the CJEU’s engagement in a comparison of its 
case law with that of the ECtHR, also reflects clearly the way in which the economic 
dimension nevertheless dominates the CJEU’s decision making, despite its seeming openness 
to a plurality of Union values.  This can be identified in respect of the right to collective 
action at issue in Viking and Laval.  Perhaps the most evident example of a vertical transfer 
arises in respect of fundamental rights protection and the principle of proportionality1893; as 
suggested above, while it has arisen from a particular national system, and has subsequently 
been transferred into another, it arguably cannot be deemed to be horizontal1894.  The principle 
– Verhältnismässigkeit, an unwritten principle of German constitutional law - arose initially 
when the German court in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft considered that Union law 
would undermine national principles – including that of proportionality – protected by the 
constitution. The CJEU, distinguishing the national and Union regimes, made reference to the 
notion that the “protection of such rights [national fundamental rights] whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community”1895.  Essentially, the CJEU 
aimed to highlight that the principles underpinning Union law and Union fundamental rights 
protection were derived from the national systems; in these cases, comparative analysis – 
illuminating the societal and institutional framework of law-making, the values and policy 
existing in the Member States, and the scope for the adaptability of the CJEU’s judgement, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1891 For example, inter alia, in Schmidberger (n.1265), Judgement, paras.77-79 where the Court undertakes a 
comparison of justifications of the limitations of fundamental rights considered by the CJEU and those by the 
ECtHR.  Furthermore, in Laval, in identifying “common ground” underpinning this determination of 
“appropriateness” of the proportionality of Union action, the Court engaged the justifications advanced in the 
ECtHR in respect of union objectives, Viking (n. 355), Judgement, para.68, citing Syndicat national de la police 
belge v Belgium, 27.10.1975, A.19 and Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v United Kingdom of 
02.07.2002, 2002‑V, para.44. 
1892 Consider the speech of the ex-President of the ECtHR, Jean-Paul Costa, who in 2008 highlighted the 
increasing inference of socio-economic rights by the Court, and in particular via the European Social CFR, 1961 
and the CFR, citing in particular, Budina v. Russia, A.45603/05, ECHR, 18.06.2009 (in the end, the Court held 
there was no evidence that pension/social benefits were so low as to give rise to a situation incompatible with 
Art.3, ECHR (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment); Speech of Jean-Paul Costa, La Déclaration 
universelle des droits de l’homme (1948) ; Les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels en question, Strasbourg, 
16.10.2008 (<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/42BD71A1-099A-4B88-B907-
185CFF3B3968/0/2008_Strasbourg_colloque_déclaration_universelle_16_10.pdf>; Last Accessed: 24.04.2013). 
1893 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256); E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of 
Europe (Hart, Oxford; 1999). 
1894 Notwithstanding the impact in national systems including, inter alia, the English law of reasonableness: G. 
de Búrca, ‘Proportionality and Wednesbury Unreasonableness:  The Influence of European Legal Concepts on 
UK Law’ (1997) European Public Law 561. 
1895 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256), Judgement, para.1135. 
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light of its potential political, cultural, and socio-economic impact – was used as a means of 
inspiring the CJEU in respect of the content to be attributed to these principles, and the 
“balancing” undertaken.  The national courts – especially, the German1896 - were initially 
reluctant to engage this approach, then gradually accepted1897.  In its examination of the 
legality of the Union norms – namely, export licenses – the Court, neither making explicit 
reference to German law nor to the potential impact in the other Member States, essentially 
engaged and applied the proportionality test as it existed in German law. 
 
These examples of vertical and horizontal transfers indicate that the CJEU engages 
comparative analysis in its identification of norms and practices that might be deemed ripe for 
transfer, and furthermore that the sources of comparative analysis are not limited to national 
norms and rules but extend beyond that which is national.  Furthermore, it is clear from the 
UCTD, amongst others, that even where there is scope for the CJEU’s decision to impact the 
national order, and in this case, its procedural culture, the CJEU does not necessarily engage 
the significance of the potential impact either in the referring state or across the Member 
States.  Notwithstanding that this appreciation could be gained by virtue of a complex 
comparative analysis, the CJEU does not seem to engaged in such an explicit evaluation in a 
systematic or coherent manner1898.  This problematic reflects - especially in light of the 
diversities existing across the European space – a broader concern with the scope for transfers 
(that is, the lack of consideration of context), which has come to the fore in the 
Watson/Legrand discourse.   
 
Neither the Legrandian nor the Watsonian thesis seems to be wholly satisfactory in respect of 
the relationship that both conceive between law and authority and law and culture.  In 
particular, there has been little consideration of the idea that European (private) law borrows 
from national law or international law1899; the focus of most analyses has been on transfers 
between national legal orders1900.  This necessitates – as proposed in Chapter 3 in relation to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1896 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1972] CMLR 177. 
1897 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
1898 For example, while the CJEU appears to engage comparative analysis – at least in terms of the referring 
system – in the early fundamental rights cases, there is an absence in the UCTD jurisprudence. 
1899 See in relation to international law, J.B. Weiner, ‘Responding to the Global Warming Problem:  Something 
Borrowed for Something Blue:  Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law’ (2001) 27 
Ecology L.R. 1295, p.1297. 
1900 See the Watson pieces, and Barak-Erez, ‘The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law’ (n.1858), focusing 
on the involvement of state actors:  transplantation through constitution-making, through legislation, through 
judicial decision-making, and through the executive. 
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the complex understanding of comparison – that the approach to comparative analysis takes 
account not only of that which exists within the state but also that which transcends a limited 
state-based study.  While Legrand’s theory provides greater scope for consideration of non-
state norms, his analysis nevertheless remains broadly limited to law within the state.  In order 
to subscribe to his view, it is necessary to assume that it is the notion of national legal culture 
or tradition that continues to dominate our understanding of law.  Not only is it questionable 
that this dominance continues to exist but furthermore, the notion that attachment (or 
belonging) to culture or tradition (and that which derives therefrom, including identity) is 
single, is rejected; rather, it is advanced as being multiple and dynamic.  While, as noted 
above, (legal) culture and tradition are inherently connected to the nation state, to the extent 
that their development has been mutual and reciprocal – whether this might have developed 
through the legal profession and a body of legal elites, as in some systems, or whether, as is 
the case in others, there exists a legal culture constituting a mix of political, social and 
economic sources1901 - as a process or perspective, it need not be maintained in such a limited 
form.  Not only are culture and tradition multiple but the trend towards the analysis of the 
emergence of a global legal culture, reflecting values shared by global citizens1902, is pertinent 
as is the scope for emerging cultures of specific sectoral areas of law, which might already be 
understood as cutting across national boundaries (including, for example, fundamental rights 
and consumer protection).  In light of the discussion of the reconceptualisation of private law 
and the understanding of legal development within the context of integration, it must be 
recognised that legal transfer is not a phenomenon which is limited to that which occurs 
within or arises from the context of the state.  Indeed, various actors – public and private in 
nature – are likely to be engaged in the relevant processes1903.  
 
The consequences of complex comparative analysis to the transfers discourse are two-fold.  
On the one hand, it undermines the argument that norms are authoritative only within the 
single sovereign state from which they arise; rather, where legal orders are not recognised as 
closed but as interdependent, this argument maintains little weight to the extent that it is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1901 Gillespie, ‘Towards a Discourse Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia’ (n.568), p.676. 
1902 There has been discussion of the development of a European legal culture for a number of years, driven 
primarily by Zimmerman; R. Zimmermann, ‘Civil Code or Civil Law – Towards a New European Private Law’ 
(1994) 20 Syracuse.J.Int.&.Comp.L. 217. 
1903 See, for example, Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), pp.239-240; and in particular, legal transplants 
through contract:  L. Win, ‘Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting:  Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global 
Supply Chains as an Example’ (2009) 57 AJCL 711.  Consider also Friedman, who has asserted that those 
engaged in cross-border business are the “carriers of transnational law”: L.M. Friedman, ‘Border:  On the 
Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law’ (1994) 32 Stan.J.Int.L. 65, p.75. 
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necessarily the sovereign that expressly mandates legal changes1904.  Furthermore, where the 
determination of what is to be compared and the comparative analysis is undertaken in a 
context in which adequate significance is attributed to the cultural and societal context, both 
in terms of the identification of that to be transferred and the transfer itself – which, it is 
submitted, can be facilitated by the focus on dialogue, explored below – the law and society 
argument against transfer, resulting from the rigid focus on entire or whole cultures, 
traditions, societies and therein, identities, also loses force; in reality, these phenomena are 
increasingly fragmented.  This consideration brings the discourse to a point at which it is 
necessary to consider the pertinence of the systems theory perspective, and the 
epistemological dimension that it adds to, or rather requires of, the transfers analysis1905. 
 
Teubner insists that in order to better understand transfers as phenomena in legal 
development, a conceptually more sophisticated approach than that offered by Watson and 
Legrand is required.  This, he asserts can be identified from the systems theoretical 
perspective.  Systems theory, as developed by Luhmann, provides that various sub-systems, 
each with their own self-referential system of communication, exist within a fragmented 
society1906.  Law is understood as an autopoietic, self-referential system of communication, 
which similar to any other sub-system, is “operationally closed” yet “cognitively open to 
external knowledge...they self-referentially decide how this information is understood and 
integrated into the recipient system”1907.  That is to say, from the systems theory perspective, 
law is autonomous and communicatively limited 1908 , that is, separate from its social 
environment; there need not (but can, should the legal system choose to let the information in) 
be any communication or link or movement in terms of influence between systems.  
Teubner’s analytical exploration of transfers finds commonalities with the positions of both 
Watson and Legrand.  On the one hand, in common with Watson’s support of autonomy, 
systems theory rejects the “mirror theories” of law1909; law does not necessarily mirror 
society, rather what is external is brought within law by means of particular processes which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1904 In contrast to Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law (n.581), p.97. 
1905 G. Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences' 
(1998) 61 MLR 12. 
1906 See generally, Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (n.299). 
1907 Gillespie, ‘Towards a Discourse Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia’ (n.568), p.680. 
1908 For Freidman, the influences of society on law, whether these influences can be characterised as internal to 
the national legal system or external, must be limited; thus, while there is influence and while he argues that the 
legal system cannot be deemed to be closed, the reflexivity to which this gives rise is necessarily limited: L. 
Freidman, ‘The Place of Culture in the Sociology of Law’ in M. Freedman (ed.), Law and Sociology: Current 
Legal Issues, Vol.8 (OUP, Oxford; 2006), pp.185-189. 
1909 Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II)’ (n.572), p.500. 
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occur when particular sets of requirements are satisfied.  In common with Legrand’s 
understanding, while recognising law’s interconnections with culture, systems theory rejects 
the totality of society. Further, as Teubner accepts that there is empirical evidence of legal 
transfers, it is deemed that legal systems are not entirely closed; relative autonomy opens up 
the scope for linking law and society, and more specifically, law and the culture of the 
society1910.  Systems theory recognises the scope for influence of outside systems on the legal 
system; via “structural coupling”, the influence exercised is indirect.  Thus, the illegal and 
legal distinction made in autopoiesis theory could be shaped by sociological discourse; 
“[w]hat Watson sees as the autonomous law-making of legal elites, adherents of autopoiesis 
theory see as the working out of law’s independent destiny as a highly specialized, 
functionally distinctive communication system”1911.  Thus, where certain requirements are 
met – that is, where there is communication between actors (including, it is submitted, legal 
professionals, judges, academics and non-state actors, encompassing, for example, civil 
society organisations, consumer groups and so on) in the exporting and importing of norms, 
through a legal/non-legal code of communication and where there is a repetition of this 
communication – legal transfers may take place.   
 
For Teubner, there is no need to determine that a transfer “fits” in order to establish that it has 
occurred, as law and society theories might dictate; rather, the parties engaged in the 
communication act so as to establish a comprehension and appreciation of what is transferred.  
This might be positive or negative; for Teubner, the effect of legal transfers is irritation, not 
only in respect of the transferred rule, concept or principle itself but also on the broader 
“receiving” system1912.  As such, systems theory rejects the simplicity inherent in Watson’s 
assertion that transfers are “socially easy”.  An analysis of legal transfers requires not only 
consideration of the manner in which transfers are made, that is, whether they are intentional, 
the purpose for which they are made and whether they should be employed in order to bring 
about certain results, but also consideration of the legal, cultural, social and economic drivers 
and ramifications of the change to which they give rise.  Thus, Teubner highlights the difficult 
and unpredictable consequences of transfer, “unleashing an evolutionary dynamic in which 
the external rule's meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1910  G. Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System (Blackwell, Oxford; 1993). 
1911 Cotterrell, ‘Comparatists and Sociology’ in Legrand and Munday, Comparative Legal Studies (n.579), p.145. 
1912 Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants’ (n.1905), p.12. 
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fundamental change”; transfers are characterised as “irritants” because of the changes in 
structural coupling and in the specific social setting, to which they give rise1913.     
 
Teubner’s analysis establishes that the ties of law and society are not comprehensive but 
selective: from loose coupling (where legal norm production is only occasionally related to 
other social process; in this context, transfers may be possible) to a tight interwovenness 
(where formal organisations bind law to one or more sets of discourse; here, transfers are 
difficult due to the influence of other social processes).  Certain areas of private law may be 
loosely coupled with, for example, politics but closely connected with economics or society; 
loose and close coupling explain why there is resistance to transplants in some contexts, and 
less resistance in others.  Thus, the “totality of society” does not dominate but the 
fragmentation of society permeates.  Autopoietic theory is based on the notion of a global, 
and not a national, legal culture.  There is, as noted in the introduction, a need to avoid the 
reification of legal cultures and tradition1914 .  In this context, national legal culture is 
understood to have lost its significance; consequently, the focus should rather fall on the 
identification and analysis of the cultures of supranational or subsystems.  Thus, in 
autopoietic theory, law is understood to relate not to broad notions of culture but to “fractured 
(and frequently transplanted) social elements”; reference should be made to culture (and the 
meaning of culture) in these fractured communities instead of only to culture in orthodox 
national cultures.  As is the case in respect of the determination of the unit of comparative 
analysis above, this is not to suggest that national cultures are irrelevant but rather, that they 
cannot be considered alone.   
 
The systems theory perspective highlights that the “concepts, structure and core matters, 
which are familiar from national laws, cannot simply be transposed into supranational 
law”1915; that is to say, there must be an additional process, or an additional space of analysis.  
This might also be applied to Union law.  The nature of the EU and the emergence of private 
law as autonomous legal orders dictate that norms cannot simply be “lifted” either from the 
national, international or transnational order, and transferred to the Union level.  This 
understanding dictates that the development of European private law must take into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1913 Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants’ (n.1905), p.12. 
1914 Nelken, ‘Beyond the Metaphor of Legal Transplants?’ in Priban and Nelken, Law’s New Boundaries (n.566), 
p.286.  
1915 Schulze, ‘Contours of European Private Law’ in Schulze and Schulte-Nölke, European Private Law: 
Current Status and Perspectives (n. 538), p.6. 
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consideration the nature (political, economic, social and cultural) and the aims and objectives 
of the Union and integration, with the diversity existing across the European space.  In the 
international law context, reference has long been made to the potential to derive principles of 
law from comparative examination of national legal systems1916 (and potentially, one could 
assume, other sources of comparative analysis) and to the scope for their transfer to the 
international level for various purposes, including that of gap-filling, where those gaps arise 
in the formation, interpretation and application of international norms1917.  It has been 
recognised that there can be no “import”, “lock, stock and barrel”1918 of what is identified at 
the national level to a level above; nor is the inverse possible.  The “additional” process, 
which is seemingly required has been characterised as one “d’abstraction-généralisation”1919.  
Against the background of the analysis in Chapter 8, the question arises as to whether there is 
a process through which that recognised as common or general is “purged of its municipal 
taint”1920 in its transfer from the source of comparative analysis to the European level; indeed, 
as noted in the paragraph above, it is likely that a similar kind of process – even if not explicit 
and not necessarily visible – also occurs.  This is recognised by Zweigert and Kötz who make 
reference to the notion that “each of the solutions must be freed from the context of its own 
system”1921.  
 
ii. Building on Transfer: The Shift to Communication and Dialogue in the 
Europeanisation of Private Law  
 
Without placing the breadth of relevant considerations to the side, an attempt is made in this 
section to identify what this additional process might be; herein, particular consideration is 
attributed to the significance of communication and dialogue and the relevance of 
comparative analysis therein.  Dialogue is multi-faceted, with varied objectives, which may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1916 “Law” for the purposes of general principles of law, is understood broadly “to embrace all branches of law, 
including municipal law, public law, constitutional law and administrative law, private law, commercial law, 
substantive and procedural law etc.”; South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1966, pp.294-
295 per Judge Tanaka. 
1917 In addition to Art.38, reference can also be made to Art.7(2) CISG, which provides that “questions 
concerning matters governed by this convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity 
with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law”, leading arguably to a hierarchy of 
general principles. 
1918 International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep.128, Separate Opinion of Lord 
McNair, p.148. 
1919 Weil, ‘Le droit international en quête de son identité’ (n.1816), p.146. 
1920 Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (n.1632), p.959. 
1921 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (n.23), p.44. 
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diverge depending on the perspective adopted1922.  While it occurs predominantly between 
courts, it is not so limited; that is to say, it is inter-institutional and potentially arises between 
courts and legislatures 1923  as well as other institutions, including academia 1924 .  
Notwithstanding, given the analysis above and the scope for the preliminary reference 
procedure to be understood as an analytical space from which dialogue potentially arises, the 
focus falls on dialogue between courts with reference to “inter-institutional” dialogue and the 
relevance of comparative analysis therein.   
 
Broadly, comparative reasoning has been considered to constitute dialogue in itself1925.  
However, this consideration can be developed.  Comparative analysis and dialogue are 
deemed to be complementary, to the extent that dialogue can be understood to constitute a 
mechanism of comparative analysis, while comparison might play a role in dialogue between 
courts. Dialogue in itself lacks a single substantive aim; it might be considered that it 
promotes communication, as a vehicle of cross-referencing and fertilisation, or a means of 
exchange1926 of ideas and knowledge, or as deliberation with the aim of promoting a specific 
outcome through collective agreement1927.  Normatively, dialogue might aim to reduce or 
eliminate the scope for conflicts of authority, which necessarily arise in a multi-level space 
where competences are divided and shared, and where diversities exist.  In general, this has 
been recognised in a macro-level analysis; each order must “find within itself the instruments 
for cooperation with the others”1928 in an environment which, given the scope for regime 
interaction, is characterised by its increasingly fragmented nature1929.  The objectives of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1922 Torres-Perez sets out six prerequisites for dialogue which will be considered herein but not reproduced.  The 
notion of dialogue as a source of legitimacy derives from the work of Habermas and his discourse theory; Torres 
Pérez engages the requirements of rationale discourse for the purposes of explicating her requirements for 
dialogue, each of which, she considers, can be satisfied in the EU context: different understandings of the 
meaning of the law, scope for mutual understanding, an absence of total sovereignty of one court over another, 
an understanding of the courts constituting “part of a common enterprise”, opportunity for participation and 
“dialogue over time”.  See further, A. Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union (OUP, Oxford; 
2009), pp.118-134. 
1923 For example, with regard to the protection of human rights in the UK: A. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review 
Under the UK HRA (CUP, Cambridge; 2009), pp.209 et seq. 
1924 Consider the DCFR expert group, at the Union and national levels and the law commissions at the national 
levels. 
1925 A-M. Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 U.Rich.L.Rev. 99. 
1926 Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights (n.1922), pp.112-113. 
1927 L.B. Tremblay, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures’ (2005) International Journal of Constitutional Law 617.  He identifies the framework for such a 
dialogue – a lack of hierarchy, a process of “rational persuasion” and a common desire to achieve a result. 
1928 S. Cassese, When Legal Orders Collide:  The Role of Courts (Global Law Press, Editorial Derecho Global, 
Seville; 2010), p.15. 
1929  A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Mich.J.Int.Law. 999. 
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dialogue are therefore not merely methodological but also normative and can only be sought 
by virtue of the information gained by comparative analysis.  In the alternative to conflict and 
hierarchy, greater coherence and coordination may arise from dialogue, promoting 
cooperation, reciprocity, recognition and respect1930; in hand with comparative analysis, this 
might attach greater legitimacy to the jurisdiction and role of the CJEU, a consideration 
explored in more detail below. 
 
Slaughter amongst others asks, in respect of the transfer discourse, what is “new” or original 
with the idea of borrowing and sharing between legal orders, given that there exists evidence 
of the occurrence of such activity over a number of decades1931.  The same question might be 
posed of dialogue.  The former Judge of the Canadian Supreme Court, L’Heureux-Dubé, has 
asserted that it is “the process of international influences has changed from reception to 
dialogue”; that is to say, “[j]udges no longer simply receive the cases of other jurisdictions 
and then apply them or modify them for their own jurisdiction”1932.  It is submitted that a shift 
in focus from mere reception to the advocacy of dialogue, coincides with the systems theory 
analysis of transfer, and permits that the actors of the legal order (and beyond) participate in 
determining the manner in which the rule, institution or structure is imported and engaged 
therein.  Slaughter notes that communication is a function of globalisation, suggesting that 
“[t]hey [judges and observers] point to a number of distinctive features: the identity of the 
participants, the interactive dimension of the process, the motives for transnational 
borrowings, and the self-conscious construction of a global judicial community”1933.  In other 
words, there is a need not only for the identification of what can be transferred and of the 
transfer itself, but also for dialogue – which has the potential to be transnational as well as 
local and regional – which allows for consideration of the way in which that transfer might 
be, and subsequently has been, received in the relevant court.  This shift to dialogue can 
perhaps also be reflected in what Kennedy describes as the “dissemination of the discursive 
practices of actors who are producing law”, which arguably leads to the “transnational 
genealogy of legal thought”1934.  It further finds support in the significance of communication 
– albeit of a different nature – that permeates the systems theory perspective; society is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1930 Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice in Context’ (n.890). 
1931 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.71. 
1932 C. L’Heureux-Dubé, ‘The Importance of Dialogue:  Globalization and the International Impact of the 
Rehnquist Court’ (1998) 34 Tul.L.J. 15, p.17. 
1933 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.71. 
1934 D. Kennedy, 'A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law' in R. Brownsword et al (eds.), 
The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart, Oxford; 2011), pp.185-220, p.188-189. 
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understood to be composed of functionally differentiated sets of communication and states are 
understood to be products of development, historically and politically embedded, and capable 
of being conceived in different ways at different times and in different spaces1935. 
 
The “judicial globalisation” which results from but also facilitates “global constitutional 
jurisprudence” - the consideration of which, as noted, has largely focused on constitutional 
law issues1936 - arguably provides the foundations for the emergence of a “global legal 
system”1937.  While the notion of a global legal order tends to give rise to an assumption of a 
hierarchical legal system at the top of which sits a “world court”, adjudicating cases arising 
between national states and pronouncing rules applicable within national and regional 
courts1938, this notion of globalised network need not necessarily give rise to a hierarchical 
construct.  Slaughter, in asking “how best to structure the relations between a supranational 
entity and its domestic counterpart”1939 engages the notion of “community of courts” in which 
the judges acknowledge each other as participants in a community which transcends national 
borders1940, and where “judges see each other not only as servants and representatives of a 
particular polity, but also as fellow professionals in an endeavour that transcends national 
borders”1941.  Indeed, considering the methodology engaged by the CJEU, its increasing 
jurisdiction and role must be considered; its impact is not merely limited to the Member 
States, individually, or collectively or to the Union itself but extends to the globalised sphere 
of legal development.  The notion of community further brings to the fore the significance of 
the considerations raised in Parts I and II, concerning culture, tradition and identity within and 
beyond the state.  Slaughter further characterises these relationships as forming part of an 
international “network”1942.  The idea of network seems apt to characterise the diversity and 
character of the linkages emerging; that is to say, the lines of communication are vertical, 
horizontal1943 and even cross-cutting, and engage not only courts but also other legal actors.  
This is also reflected at the Union level; Kilpatrick considers that it is these diversities which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1935 Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (n.299).  
1936 Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (n.1925). 
1937 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), pp.-65-103. 
1938 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.67. 
1939 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.147. 
1940 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.68. 
1941 Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (n.1526), p.193. 
1942 The notion of network has been engaged in different disciplines - from political and social sciences to 
economics, to law - and used in different ways.  It has been applied in different contexts, to accommodate the 
changing nature of the nation state, to describe the EU and in the context of the emergence of a global legal 
order. 
1943 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.69. 
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further dialogue: “[i]nstead of a European community of courts and law, it is the need to 
mediate differences between European communities of courts and law which produces the 
possibility for dialogue”1944.  There can be no presumption of divergence or similarity; these 
must be identified by virtue of comparative analysis.   
 
There are a number of fundamental considerations that shape the context, scope for dialogue, 
and furthermore, its consequences.  It is therefore necessary to consider the extent to which 
dialogue might be facilitated, to identify the incentives underlying the engagement with 
dialogue and the consequences of such interaction in respect of the Europeanisation of private 
law.  The attitude of legal actors towards communication and dialogue with their counterparts 
in other cultures and traditions is also vital, and thus, the significance of culture and identity 
are again brought to the fore; as Slaughter has noted, this might concern the way in which the 
legal actors understand themselves to be part of a community or network.  These attitudes 
might diverge, from willingness to reluctance, and shift, depending on whether such dialogue 
is horizontal, vertical or diagonal.  The broad attitudes of judges in the highest courts are 
often the most widely articulated.  Normally, these opinions relate to the citation of foreign 
precedent, the mere reference to which should, of course, be distinguished from complex 
comparative analysis of the nature advanced in Chapter 3; notwithstanding, both expressions 
of reluctance and willingness reflect broadly the attitudes of the judges and are therefore 
relevant to the scope for their engagement with comparison.   
 
For example, the Chief Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court, Chief Justice Smith, has 
argued for an approach of open communication: “…it is the duty of national courts – and 
especially of the highest court in a small country – to introduce new legal ideas from the 
outside world into national judicial decisions”1945.  In the UK, a breath of opinion has been 
expressed as to the use of foreign law; its concrete engagement seems to be dependent on the 
nature of the case before the court.  Consider for example, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who 
makes reference to the notion that English judges will “accord persuasive authority to the 
constitutional values of other democratic nations when dealing with ambiguous statutory or 
common law provisions that impact upon civil liberties issues”1946.  The most palpable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1944 C. Kilpatrick, ‘Community or Communities of Courts in European Integration? Sex Equality Dialogues 
Between UK Courts and the ECJ’ (1998) 4 ELJ 121, p.129. 
1945 C. Smith, ‘The Supreme Court in Present-Day Society’ in S. Tschudi-Madsen (ed.), The Supreme Court of 
Norway (H. Aschehoug and Co., Oslo; 1998), p.135 cited in Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.70. 
1946 Cited in Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.71. 
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assertion of reluctance derives not from Europe but from the section of the bench of the 
Supreme Court of the US led by Justice Scalia, an approach that has been called into question 
by the more liberal front led by Justice Breyer.  Both have engaged in public discourse about 
the use of foreign law in US courts, a discourse which is reflected in majority and dissenting 
opinions; it should be noted however that the debate does not concern the use of comparative 
law in specific cases as such, but rather the understanding of the nature of the task with which 
judges are engaged1947.  This relates more to the approach adopted by the judge, and of 
course, legal actors in general and again highlights the significance of the perspective 
adopted, a determination which is relevant to the interpretative methodology employed; that is 
to say, a comparative analysis of the complex nature outlined herein, facilitates the 
engagement with pluralism, and recognition of the diversity of cultures and traditions shaping 
norm-formation, interpretation and enforcement, as well as the rules, principles and values 
underpinning.  It thus provides greater scope for dialogue; the recognition and acceptance of a 
plurality of sources, allows for the emergence of a plurality of solutions to diverse legal 
problems to be envisaged, giving rise to the potential for mutual learning, between and across 
legal traditions and cultures1948.   
 
Attempts to uncover and map dialogue in the EU space have largely been confined to the 
sphere of constitutional law1949; private law has received little consideration.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the preliminary reference system has been engaged as an “analytical 
space” in which the methodological discourse can be resurrected, especially in respect of the 
use of comparative analysis as a tool of integration and of the Europeanisation of private law 
by the CJEU1950, recognised therein as an “instrument of cooperation”1951, “based on a 
dialogue between one court and another”1952.  These understandings, and the scope for 
dialogue, which arguably derives from the duty of judicial cooperation in Art.81 TFEU, are 
reflected in the consumer contract case examples.  In the context of the preliminary references 
analysed above, the cases can be tracked along different courses, establishing a direct vertical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1947 The transcript of this debate, held at the American University Washington College of Law in January 2005, 
and subject to much discussion, can be read here; 
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757F
D01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument (Last Accessed: 17.08.2013).  
1948 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), pp.68-69. 
1949 For the initial consideration of judicial dialogue as a mechanism for legal integration, see generally, A-M. 
Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court and National Courts—Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence (OUP, Oxford; 1998). 
1950 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
1951 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.37.   
1952 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.29. 
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dialogue between the national courts and CJEU, and necessarily cutting across vertical and 
horizontal interactions at the national and European levels.  These different types of dialogue 
can be better explicated with reference to examples.  Vertical dialogue thus arises through the 
request and provision of an authoritative interpretation of EU law, that is, in the ascent, and 
descent of the reference to the CJEU1953.  Horizontal dialogue is identifiable at both the 
supranational and national levels, reflected in the former, for example, in cross-referencing 
between different areas of Union law – i.e. between the Union legislature and the CJEU1954 – 
and similarly between Union law and the ECtHR1955; this interaction is constitutional and 
reciprocal.  Similarly to transfers, “pure” horizontal dialogue between national courts is 
difficult to identify but might rather arise following vertical dialogue.   
 
In respect of vertical dialogue, one might question whether the AG or the Court or both, are 
aware of similar references arising from different orders, reflecting distinct national cultures 
and traditions1956.  To a certain extent, the preliminary reference procedure renders dialogue 
fictional.  That is to say, once the national court requests the ruling, the case does not return to 
the domestic jurisdiction until the CJEU has rendered its interpretation, reducing the scope for 
the identification of dialogue, at least in its orthodox conceptualisation.  With regard to the 
scope for horizontal dialogue thereafter, one must question whether the AG and the Court are 
aware of the potential for spillover effects between orders; that is to say, on receipt of the 
CJEU’s interpretation, whether dialogue might arise between the courts of the other Member 
States, following the erga omnes effects thereof1957.  While the AG and the Court seem to 
recognise the scope for such dialogue and the potential spillover effects of erga omnes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1953 This can be idenitifed in the Solange line of cases between the CJEU and the BverfG. 
1954 Per the cross-referencing between the non-contractual liability of the Union and the non-contractual liability 
of the state, in Francovich and Brasserie, and between state liability for the acts and ommissions of the 
legislature, and acts and ommissions of the courts, and the concept of damage in Leitner. 
1955 Consider, for example, the CJEU’s comparison of justifications of the limitations of fundamental rights 
considered by the CJEU and those by the ECtHR in Schmidberger, and its engagement of the justifications 
advanced in the ECtHR in respect of trade union objectives, in identifying “common ground” underpinning the 
determination of “appropriateness” of the proportionality of Union action, in Laval. 
1956 Given the line of preliminary references that have recently been requested, this question could be considered 
in light of the UCTD case law, not only with reference to vertical dialogue but the scope for cross-cultural 
dialogue.   
1957 Similarly, this could be considered in light of the consumer contract law, and in particular, the consideration 
of the binding effects of injunctions at the national and Union levels, discussed above.  It should be noted that 
the decision in Invitel (n.1016), in which the CJEU held that Art.6(1) and 7(1) of the UCTD, should a declaration 
of invalidity can be made and have effect in respect of all consumers who entered into the contract, including 
those not party to the specific proceedings, led to changes in the Romanian legislation; Law 193/2000, 
per.Art..12(3) and 13, was amended in August 2012, providing national courts with the power to provide for the 
invalidity of a contract term with regard to all consumers who concluded that contract with the seller or supplier, 
including those not party to the case before the court itself. 
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interpretations, it is not clear whether this acknowledgement factors explicitly in their 
reasoning; the same also seems to be true at the national level.  The UCTD case law provides 
a useful example.  Spillovers arise in general in relation to the ex officio assessment of 
contract terms, and in particular from, for example, the scope for collective action.  In respect 
of the former, the Commission has acknowledged that the nature and effect of collective 
action diverge across the Member States1958 and the Parliament has recognised the need for a 
horizontal framework for collective redress1959.  While the AG examines scholarship on the 
different measures and divergent mechanisms in the national systems1960, the CJEU does not 
undertake an explicit comparative analysis neither of the national rules nor of their provision 
of an appropriate and effective remedy per Arts.6 and 7 UCTD; rather, it recognises the need 
for the unfair term to “become ineffective ipso jure”1961 and understands the erga omnes 
impact of the injunction as one way1962 to ensure this effective means1963.  The added value of 
comparative analysis in this context would arise not only in respect of the facilitation of the 
scope for dialogue in what already constitutes a line of case law on the UCTD, but further, in 
respect of the scope for generating a degree of clarity as to the consequences of the non-
binding nature of a term, for the purpose of identifying the potential scope for conflict and 
moreover, the foundations and effect of collective actions 1964.  The ex officio assessment of 
contract terms as to their unfairness also gives rise to the scope for spillover effects in respect 
of the increasingly regulatory function of the national courts.  The judgements generate scope 
for inconsistencies, in respect of the role of the national courts adopted in ex officio 
regulation, not only as a result of the CJEU’s lack of consideration of the diversities 
(interpretations of norms and contexts) existing across the Union but also consequent to the 
lack of guidance offered to the national courts by the CJEU1965.  Comparative analysis would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1958 European Commission, ‘Green Paper: Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer 
Disputes in the Single Market’ COM(1993) 576, 16.11.1993, p. 64. 
1959  European Parliament, ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’ 2011/2089, 
02.02.2012. 
1960 Invitel (n.1016), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.10-11. 
1961 Invitel (n.1016), Judgement, paras.35–36; see also F. Cafaggi and S. Law, ‘Effect of Collective Proceedings’ 
in E. Terryn et al (eds.), Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Protection: Liber Amicorum Jules Stuyck 
(Intersentia, Antwerp; 2013), pp.653-677, pp.646-647. 
1962 One means amongst others, an understanding supported by Directive 2009/22/EC on Injunctions for the 
Protection of Consumers’ Interests, Art.3 and Art.7(2) UCTD. 
1963 The AG and Court rather considered the matter was for the national legal traditions, within the limits of EU 
law, including fundamental rights: Invitel (n.1016), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras.53–54; Judgement, paras.42 
et seq. 
1964 Recognising of course that the UCTD does not have the purpose of standardising collective actions nor of 
harmonising the consequences of the non-binding nature of terms found to be unfair. 
1965 The following references are adopted from Cafaggi and Law, ‘Effect of Collective Proceedings’ in Terryn et 
al, Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Protection (n.1961), pp.656-657. For example, in the English system, the 
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allow for the identification, not only of the (substantive and procedural) norms applicable in 
the national orders but also of the commonality and diversity existing in respect of the 
traditions and cultures (particularly of the judiciary); this would allow for the CJEU, as well 
as the national courts, to envisage potential spillover effects and thus implement the 
judgement so as to facilitate the effectiveness of Union law, where at the moment, these 
divergences may give rise to diverse scope and approaches to ex officio regulation in line with 
the domestic procedural regimes1966.   
 
It is submitted that engagement with dialogue as a mechanism of comparative analysis might 
therefore operate to democratise judicial law-making, where comparison is placed not only in 
the context of discursive judicial reasoning, but can reflect at the same time discursive 
reasoning1967.  The CJEU has recognised that the reference to comparison via dialogue can be 
inherently tied to legitimacy, and further to justice, stating that where no solution can be 
found in Union law, “unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the 
problem by reference to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and the 
case-law of the member countries”1968.  For example, the CJEU often recognises principles of 
Union law, the recognition of which is subsequently sanctioned by the Union legislature and 
the Member States; notwithstanding, this might not always be the case1969.  The CJEU might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
national court’s power to raise issues ex officio is very limited (the English Rules of Civil Procedure 1999 
introduced a degree of “judicial management”, from broad “passivity; generally, however, the changes in rules 
of civil procedure are not thought to have significantly shifted the role of the court: Circuit Systems Ltd. v Zuken-
Redac (UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 482; broadly, public policy considerations arise only in the case of prima 
facie illegal contracts: Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowper 341 per Lord Mansfield at 343).  In the French 
system, the notion of ordre public dominates; the distinction between ordre public de protection, for the 
protection of specific interests, i.e. those of consumers, and ordre public de direction, for the protection of the 
general public interest, has long defined the boundaries between the parties and judges, to the extent that it is the 
latter which is understood to provide a basis for courts to raise issues ex officio (Rampion (n.1022), Opinion of 
AG Mengozzi, para.79).  Traditionally, the power was limited to the second set of cases but the impact of 
consumer protection has broadened the scope of judicial power (See C. Aubert de Vincelles, ‘Élargissement de 
l'office du juge en matière de clauses abusives’ (2011) Revue des contrats 504, p.509).  Germany appears to 
afford judges wider discretion in balancing between judges and parties, on the basis of a broad view of public 
interest (German Code of Civil Procedure, Zivilprocessordnung (ZPO); in general, via the principles of 
Dispositionsgrundsatz, (of party disposition) and Verhandlungsgrunsatz, (of party presentation) dictates that 
issues of fact and evidence are to be brought by the parties; however, it has been recognised that the judge may 
have a greater role to play: H. Kötz, ‘Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States’ (2003) 13 
Duke.J.Int.Comp.Law 61, in order to provide substantive justice, and in line with para.139, ZPO). 
1966 The operation of which must nevertheless occur within the confines of Union law, and particularly, 
fundamental rights. 
1967 H. Muir Watt, ‘La fonction subversive du droit comparé’ (2003) 52 Revue international du droit comparé 
503. 
1968 Algera (n.1676), Judgement, p.55. 
1969 Consider the controversy surrounding Mangold, where the general principle and its effect was recognised by 
the CJEU not on the basis of the commonality of all the Member States but on the basis that it “was consistent 
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use comparative analysis to legitimise its recognition of principles at a preliminary stage, 
where these principles might be subsequently but have not yet been legitimised by the Union 
legislature or the Member States.  This is identifiable, for example, in the cases reflecting, in 
the context of the legislative silence of the Treaties, the foundations of judicial fundamental 
rights protection, following which the Union legislature took steps to enshrine such protection 
in primary law1970.  
 
Furthermore, the significance attached to this legitimacy dimension might also reflect the 
transparency (or lack thereof) in the diverse legal reasoning processes existing across legal 
orders.  Moreover, the judgements rendered by the Court, and less so, the Opinions of the AG, 
have been characterised as “stale” and formalistic; such an approach might well undermine 
the legitimacy of the reasoning, methodology and indeed, the final interpretation rendered.  
On the one hand, while this lack of clarity might dissuade judges in the national courts from 
engaging in dialogue (and in comparison), they might be more encouraged to enter into 
dialogue with the CJEU and to attribute greater consideration to its reasoning, where it is 
more transparent; that is to say, the legitimacy of the CJEU’s judicial reasoning might be 
increased, at least before the national courts, as its transparency is similarly augmented1971.  
Furthermore, the national courts would also be encouraged to engage with the CJEU, 
particularly, if it can identify, on the part of the Luxembourg Court, acknowledgment of 
national commonalities and diversities.  Thus, for Torres Perez, dialogue facilitates 
legitimacy, which derives not only from the existence of uniform interpretation but similarly 
from the scope for the maintenance of diverse interpretations rendered in Member States, 
where the former ensures the effectiveness of Union law and the latter promotes democracy.  
The promotion of dialogue, she argues, rather undermines any strict adherence to a 
hierarchical relationship between Union and national law and purports to ensure that the 
notions of diversity and uniformity are not concretised as rigid dichotomies1972.  By referring 
to the constitutional rights of the Member States, and engaging comparative reasoning, 
dialogue is deemed to promote legitimacy.  It is on this basis that a plea for a more explicit, 
more methodologically rigorous engagement with comparison and in particular, its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with a specific task incumbent on the European Union in combating discrimination”: C‑144/04 Mangold [2005] 
ECR I‑9981, Judgement, para.75; Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.96 
1970 The area in which, according to Tridimas, developments in the recognition of principles of Union law have 
been most significant: Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (n.1475), p.8. 
1971 Semmelmann, ‘Legal Principles in EU Law’ (n.1564), p.18.  See also, Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights 
(n.1922), pp.177-178. 
1972 Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights (n.1922), p.92. 
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mechanisms, is made.  Thus, it is often proclaimed that while the judges of the CJEU engage 
with “the law of the other” in the preparation, hearing and drafting of the judgement, it is 
simply the case that these references are not explicitly cited in the final ruling1973; yet, as is 
clear, this is not to assert that this analysis has had no influence on the reasoning or 
deliberation processes. 
 
The significance of a comprehensive engagement with comparative analysis on dialogue is 
identifiable from a reconsideration of the Viking and Laval cases.  As noted above, the facts 
of the cases themselves and the commentary to which they have given rise highlight the 
significance of the legitimacy of the approach to governance advanced herein.  For Schmid, 
multi-level governance dictates that the legitimacy of governance is “highest” where 
European intervention (understood broadly as the recognition of the status of a particular 
norm, or the attribution of a certain interpretation to it by the CJEU) “compensate[s] ‘nation 
state failures’”; however, such interventions should not affect “democratically-rooted 
legitimate national institutions, social state institutions, in particular, which the EC/EU is not 
realistically able to establish at the European level…but should instead focus on their 
stabilisation and compatibilisation with European basic values…integrating all affected 
interests”1974.  In order to ensure this, Schmid makes reference to the need for the CJEU “to 
enter into a more constructive dialogue with national courts”1975 not only for the purposes of 
uncovering the different social, economic, political and legal traditions but also to identify the 
“different factual consequences of decisions in the various Member States”1976.  This provides 
one example of the way in which comparative analysis not only facilitates dialogue but 
whereby dialogue might also facilitate comparative analysis.  Such a process firstly requires 
the identification of nation states failures, a determination which must be made against the 
background of Union aims and objectives.  Only once these failures have been identified, can 
Union intervention be legitimised; notwithstanding, the intervention must take into account 
the relevant interests within the national orders.  These interests must be identified by virtue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1973 Kakouris, ‘Use of the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (n.1528), 
p.277. 
1974 C. Schmid, ‘From Effet Utile to Effet Neolibéral; A Critique of the New Methodological Expansionism of 
the European Court of Justice’ in R. Nickel (ed.), Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond: 
Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification (Intersentia, Antwerp; 2010), pp.295-314, p.313. 
1975 Schmid, ‘From Effet Utile to Effet Neolibéral; A Critique of the New Methodological Expansionism of the 
European Court of Justice’ in Nickel, Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond, (n.1974), 
p.313. 
1976 Schmid, ‘From Effet Utile to Effet Neolibéral; A Critique of the New Methodological Expansionism of the 
European Court of Justice’ in Nickel, Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond, (n.1974), 
p.314. 
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of evaluative comparative analysis, which allows for consideration of the developing nature 
of the national traditions as well as the aims and objectives of the Union; this comparison also 
allows for the scope for their scope for convergence and divergence across the Union space to 
be understood.  On this basis, the CJEU can hypothesise as to how the intervention might 
operate in the relevant national contexts, for the purposes of determining its potential 
effectiveness; this forms the beginning of a dialogue, which can be continued if there is a 
need for an amendment of the intervention1977.   
 
This example also illustrates that the CJEU might be criticised for failing to attribute 
satisfactory consideration to how its decisions will be engaged in the national context.  Yet 
this consideration – and especially, the scope for dialogue – is also one shaped by the national 
court.  National judges are obliged to ensure that they interpret national private law in 
conformity with European law, by virtue of national mechanisms of interpretation1978; the 
national court’s interpretation of national law “as far as possible, in the light of the wording 
and purpose of the directive” is intended to reduce the scope for conflict between European 
and domestic law1979.  This obligation is inherent to the scope for judicial dialogue, 
particularly as it might be understood as legitimising the request for a preliminary ruling, and 
the interpretation rendered; thus where the national court is unsure of the appropriate 
interpretation, it is – as noted above1980 - obliged to make a reference to the CJEU under 
Article 267 TFEU.  This duty becomes particularly pertinent where the European norm 
applies across the entire national order, in which case, the interpretation in line with European 
law cannot lead to a contra legem interpretation of national law1981.  As noted above, there is 
a lack of clarity as to whether all national courts actually consider themselves to be obliged to 
make a reference in such a context.   
 
Moreover, there necessarily exists a political dimension to comparison and dialogue, which is 
becoming increasingly important; it has been envisaged that cooperation and communication 
will benefit developing democracies (for example, as they existed in Central and Eastern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1977 This reflects Torres Perez ‘s idea of “dialogue over time”. 
1978 Joined Cases C-397-401/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835, Judgement, para.116. 
1979 Marleasing (n.393), Judgement, para.8, developing Von Colson (n.778), Judgement, para.28. 
1980 See Chapter 4. 
1981 C-212/04 Adeneler [2006] ECR I-6057, Judgement, para.110. 
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European states following the disintegration of the Soviet Union1982) as well as “established” 
legal orders.  Orders of the former nature come together – that is, they must necessarily 
interact – in the EU context; in particular, the increasing and expanding EU and the 
contemporaneous development of the jurisdiction of the CJEU post-Lisbon, particularly in 
relation to private law, dictates that there is an increasing body of national, Union, 
international and transnational sources of norms to which the AG and Court can refer.  It must 
be borne in mind that in spite of the “invaluable services” of comparison, the difficulty of the 
task necessarily increases, particularly in the context of enlargement; thus, it has previously 
been questioned “whether this approach [comparative analysis] can be upheld after the 
enlargement of the Communities”1983.   
 
The analysis of the normative underpinnings of communication and dialogue are largely 
shaped by the concept of law engaged and the attitude of the legal actor as to the context in 
which legal development occurs.  The scope for dialogue might also play on the attitudes of 
the institutions, and particularly of the courts, in respect of their self-perception of their own 
legitimacy and power, in relation to that of other actors.  Furthermore, it might shape their 
determination to exercise self-restraint or not, the exercise of which might reflect the 
significance of balancing that power 1984 .  Tensions between national and European 
institutions – for example, where national courts become wary of the power of the European 
courts – might render the courts “much more aware of each other and more wary about 
treading too much on each other’s toes”1985.  In this context, it is clear that the institutions 
have the potential to become aware of putative conflict1986; comparative analysis allows for 
this knowledge to be disseminated and facilitates the values underpinning communication 
between the courts to either to ensure conflict does not arise or that it does not become 
problematic.  Thus, Slaughter suggests there is evidence that the national courts engage with 
the CJEU “as a co-equal rather than a superior court”1987.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1982 Z. Kühn, ‘Worlds Apart, Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of the European 
Enlargement’ (2004) 52 AJCL 531, p.549. 
1983 Pescatore, The Law of Integration (n.67), p.76, fn.14. 
1984 Tontti undertakes a critique of dialectical accounts; he asserts that interpretation is about power and conflict 
and authority: J. Tontti, Right and Prejudice – Prolegomena to a Hermeneutical Philosophy of Law (Ashgate, 
Aldershot; 2004), pp.125 et seq. 
1985 Slaughter, A New World Order (n.803), p.147. 
1986 The hermeneutic understanding of dialogue dictates that interpretation must necessarily engage with notions 
of conflict. 
1987  Noting that this is particularly true of the attitude adopted by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.  For 
example, Brunner v The European Union Treaty, in which the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht was 
 	  	  	   391 
 
Chapter 9. Concluding Remarks  
 
The classifications advanced in Chapter 8 were developed for explanatory purposes in their 
own right but have also provided the foundations for the analysis of the evolution of the meta-
mechanisms of Europeanisation and integration that has been undertaken in Chapter 9.  With 
reference to these categorisations, three stories of comparison have been uncovered, 
concerning firstly, the use of comparative analysis in the identification of either common or 
general principles of Union law, and the recognition of “best solutions”, and thereafter, the 
uncovering of the “second order” engagement with comparison, in respect of the evolution of 
the transfer and dialogue discourses. 
 
The first section of the chapter has aimed to examine the way in which the CJEU identifies 
and recognises common and general principles of Union law.  Fundamentally, it has become 
clear that the AG and the Court engage with comparative analysis in the reasoning processes 
from which principles are derived; moreover, the sources of comparison engaged are not only 
national norms but include norms of international law, Union law, private regimes and 
scholarship.  Furthermore, it has been advanced that a distinction should be drawn in respect 
of the characterisation of principles, between the recognition of common principles on the one 
hand and general principles on the other; given that both the AG and the Court seem to 
“throw” all principles into the same basket of “general principles”, these terms are currently 
used interchangeably.  It has been submitted that this distinction not only facilitates the 
identification of the nature of the comparative methodology engaged within the CJEU but 
further illustrates the use of comparison for the purposes of either identifying commonality 
between sources of comparative analysis, identifying difference, or perhaps, for the purposes 
of accepting an absence of commonality; fundamentally, this evaluation has confirmed that 
the CJEU does not merely use comparative analysis to identify similarities and repress 
differences but also to acknowledge divergence, to fill gaps, to generate coherence and to 
trigger dialogue, that is, more broadly as a mechanism of Europeanisation1988.  This analysis 
has therefore corroborated the conclusion advanced above in Chapter 8. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
challenged, and in which the BvG called for a “cooperative relationship” between the national courts and the 
CJEU; Maastricht Treaty Decision, BvG 2. Senat 12 Oct. 1993, reported in [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
1988 Principles are engaged as mechanisms of Europeanisation, for example, most predominantly, in filling gaps, 
where there might be more of a reluctance, per Lenaerts, to use general, as opposed to common, principles for 
such a purpose; Lenaerts and Guitiérrez-Fons have suggested that where there is an absence of commonality 
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Moreover, the distinction between commonality and generality and the acknowledgement that 
the CJEU exercises a wide discretion in respect of its identification thereof, has allowed for 
the analysis of the CJEU’s engagement of comparison, for the identification of “best 
solutions”, a concept also introduced in Chapter 3.  It has been acknowledged that 
comparative analysis, as it is currently conceived, does not provide a basis upon which a 
determination as to that which is “best” can be made.  It has been submitted that a solution 
cannot be identified as “best” on the basis of an empirical comparative analysis.  Rather, the 
determination must be conceived as a normative one, shaped by the subjective assessment of 
the AG or judge; this determination is necessarily made against the background of the 
teleological approach of the CJEU, in line with the aims and objectives of the Union.  It is 
further accepted that the developed understanding of complex comparison advanced in 
Chapter 3 - a complex theoretical and methodological approach based on socio-legal 
comparison has been advanced, acknowledging the socio-economic, political and cultural, as 
well as legal, dimensions of Europeanisation and integration, and which thus allows for the 
engagement of the dynamic nature of private law development - does not in itself provide a 
metric by which such solutions can be identified and ranked.  However, it does advance a 
perspective of legal development, and thus of comparative analysis, which will likely 
facilitate the identification of this aforementioned normative determination, by clarifying the 
context in which, and the purposes for which, the comparative analysis is undertaken.   
 
Finally, the focus of this chapter has shifted to the comparative analysis underpinning the 
other meta-mechanisms of the CJEU’s reasoning, primarily, in respect of legal transfers and 
thereafter, with regard to the increasing significance of dialogue and communication, for the 
purposes of explaining interactions in a pluralist, multi-level context.  The transfer discourse - 
introduced in Chapter 3 – has been reconsidered in light of systems theory, which illustrates 
that rules, principles, practices, values and so on cannot simply be transposed; rather, the 
analysis gives rise to the notion that there must be “something else” that facilitates transfer.  
This has led to the consideration of the scope for a potential shift from the mere reception of 
transfer to the engagement of communication and dialogue as a means, not only of promoting 
the scope for transfer, but more broadly, for promoting the understanding of the interrelations 
between legal orders and the relevant participants thereof.  Dialogue has therefore been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
between the Member States, the CJEU will not adopt a norm as a general principle of Union law: Lenaerts and 
Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ (n.1823), p.1633. 
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advanced as a mechanism of Europeanisation facilitated by comparative analysis, but also as a 
mechanism of comparison in itself, which occurs not only (although perhaps predominantly) 
between courts but potentially also between a broad range of institutions, which are legal, 
political, social and cultural in their nature; dialogue becomes increasingly significant as the 
scope for interaction between legal orders emerges in a progressively globalised and – within 
the European context - enlarged space.  Moreover, it has been submitted that the perspective 
adopted of comparison shapes the understanding and attitude of legal (and other) actors to 
dialogue; in particular, the assertion that private law is understood to develop in a pluralist, 
multi-level space arguably promotes the scope for dialogue, in respect of the emergence of the 
values underpinning, including coordination and cooperation.  On this basis, it has been 
considered that dialogue – as a dimension of comparison – might lend legitimacy to judicial 
law-making, and more specifically, the jurisdiction and role of the Luxembourg Court in 
Europeanisation and integration, beyond its interpretative role; it is submitted that 
comparative analysis might be engaged in a “second order” perspective – that is to say, 
beyond interpretation – for the purposes of the evolution of these meta-mechanisms of 
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CONCLUDING PART: THE CJEU AND ITS USE OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
AS TOOLS OF THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW AND 
INTEGRATION 
 
The thesis has aimed to identify the relevance of comparative analysis to the CJEU’s 
Europeanisation of private law; where comparison has been engaged by the AG and/or the 
Court, the thesis has further purported to identify the nature of comparative analysis 
employed and its “added value”, both as an interpretative tool and as a “second-order” device, 
that is, as a means of advancing the meta-mechanisms of European legal development.  The 
foundations of the thesis derive from the preliminary analysis in Parts I and II; thereafter, 
three case examples have been explored, providing the basis for the evaluation of the CJEU as 
a “comparative laboratory” in Part IV.  This concluding part firstly restates the fundamental 
dimensions of the thesis and thereafter reiterates the key findings of the analysis undertaken 
herein, drawing conclusions as to the understanding of the evolving jurisdiction and role of 
the CJEU, and the relevance of comparative analysis, as tools of Europeanisation and 
integration.  
 
I. An Overview of the Analysis Undertaken 
 
At the outset of this final part, the structure of the thesis, and its specific dimensions, should 
be briefly reiterated.  The engagement of both theoretical and case-based analyses for the 
purposes of facilitating this investigation explains its structure.  In light of the preliminary 
evaluation, which establishes the embeddedness of private law in the nation states, 
comparative analysis has been advanced at an initial stage as a potential theoretical, 
methodological and normative tool of European legal development; notwithstanding, the 
appropriateness of comparative analysis, as it is currently conceived, has not been taken as a 
given.  On the basis of an initial critical assessment of comparison – undertaken in Chapter 3 
– it is considered that it is lacking in its prevailing conceptualisation as a tool for the 
Europeanisation of private law and European integration.  In light of this critical evaluation, a 
reconceptualised understanding of complex comparison has been advanced, one which is 
aligned to the socio-legal context and conceptualisation of these dynamic European 
endeavours; against the background of the limits of legislative activities, the focus of the 
analysis throughout has fallen on judicial development, especially legal via the national and 
European courts.  The case-based analysis that has followed has attempted to concretise the 
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discourse - as to whether, and if so, how, comparative analysis forms part of the 
methodological framework of Europeanisation - via the analysis of three case examples 
examined against the background of a socio-legal assessment of the evolving constitution and 
jurisdiction of the CJEU.  The preliminary conclusions drawn therefrom have allowed for a 
second round of analysis, wherein the CJEU has been evaluated as a “comparative 
laboratory”.   
 
At the outset, the nature of the processes of integration and Europeanisation has been 
uncovered, and the interrelation of the two endeavours has been set out; this foundational 
analysis, which explicates the legal, political, cultural and socio-economic dynamics thereof, 
has allowed for both endeavours to be located in the dynamic and evolving context that 
constitutes the European space.  The thesis began by outlining the relevant international 
relations theories of European integration, which has allowed for the articulation of its 
interrelation with the Europeanisation of national private law.  The emphasis on the nation 
state foundations of private law, including PIL, has illustrated the synergies in the 
development of (national) private law, the emergence of the nation state, and the evolution of 
national culture and tradition (and therein, identity); against this background, it is clear that 
these relationships have been and continue to be reciprocal.  Consequently, the European 
space has been emphasised as one of commonality and diversity, a determination which is 
deemed to shape the Europeanisation of private law, and which has necessarily permeated the 
investigation undertaken herein. 
 
The analysis of the foundations and processes of European legislative development and of the 
role of the Union legislature has therefore aimed to highlight two interrelated lines of 
discourse.  It has brought to the fore the interdependence of the national and Union orders, 
particularly, in light of the legislature’s focus on the harmonisation of national private law 
norms via the Union acquis and PIL rules and the obligations of the Member States arising 
therefrom; this legal development finds its legitimacy basis in the facilitation of the internal 
market.  Notwithstanding this focus on economic integration, this analysis has also has 
brought into consideration the more recent assertion that the existence of a single and distinct 
European culture (and therein, identity) constitutes a prerequisite to the Europeanisation of 
private law, to the extent that the component parts of culture and tradition are relevant to the 
Europeanisation of private law just as they have been relevant to the emergence and 
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consolidation of national private laws.  It has been acknowledged that the characterisation of 
the commonality and diversity of the European space extends beyond culture and tradition to 
the applicable substantive norms, and that the scope for fragmentation and conflict1989 to 
which it gives rise, is reflected in the desire of the Union legislature to promote coherence via 
legislative harmonisation, the CJEU’s autonomous interpretation of Union norms and 
ultimately, the uniform application thereof in the courts of the Member States.  
 
It is in this context that the nature of private law, as it continues to evolve within the nation 
states and as it emerges from processes of Europeanisation, has been explored in Chapter 2.  
The dynamic character of private law is deemed to derive from two interrelated 
considerations.  The analysis in Chapter 1 has illustrated that private law has been inherently 
tied to the development of the nation state, and therein, to national culture and tradition; in 
this context, private law has long been considered as technical and apolitical.  It was initially 
similarly conceived in respect of its role in European integration, that is to say, in its 
facilitation of the functioning of the internal market.  Yet it has been submitted that private 
law must be understood as a dynamic construct; its evolution must therefore be considered to 
be intertwined with that of the Union legal order, the specific dimensions of which have been 
illustrated by the case examples in Part III.  For the purposes of this recap, it is sufficient to 
consider this to mean that the role of private law in both the Union and national contexts 
extends beyond the facilitation of the internal market and the regulation of strictly private 
relationships; as a consequence of its constitutionalisation and materialisation, it has been 
engaged in an increasingly regulatory function1990.  Furthermore, it is necessary that the 
appreciation of this dynamic conceptualisation of private law be made in light of the 
understanding that the role of the state is also shifting in the national, European and 
(emerging) global law contexts.  This perspective dictates that the dangers of methodological 
nationalism are acknowledged; it must be considered that the nation state no longer, if it ever 
did, constitutes nor reflects the sole analytical focus point of legal evolution, which is to say 
that the analysis of private law development must avoid becoming stagnated, in terms of 
being conceived in light of its rigid ties to the state.  Rather, it has been submitted that the 
conceptualisation of private law engaged must be sufficiently flexible and dynamic so as to 
account for the evolutions in the context of Europeanisation and integration, understood as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1989 The different types of conflict are set out in Chapter 1.  
1990 See Chapter 2.   
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“transformative process[es]”1991.  This assertion also underpins the comparative complex 
analysis advanced.   
 
Building on the interdependencies of the national and Union orders, it has been submitted that 
the European construct should be conceived as a multi-level space of legal development 
characterised on the one hand, by the multiplicity of sources of norms and dispute resolution 
bodies existing at divergent levels – from the national to the transnational – of normativity, 
and on the other, by the engagement of the pluralist perspective and the recognition of the 
scope for interlegality to which this gives rise1992.  Indeed, as it emerges at the European level, 
private law also continues to exist and develop within the Member States; European private 
law must be applicable within the national context and existing national private law is 
therefore necessarily relevant to European legal development.  Furthermore, as integration 
occurs in a globalised context – opening the European up to the transnational – account must 
also be taken of private law development at the international level and in private law making.  
The explication of this perspective in Part II has therefore aimed to reinforce the 
understanding that European private law specifically, as well as Union law in general, must be 
understood to emerge within a pluralist, multi-level structure, in which – as noted above – 
there exists a diversity of sources of private law and a multiplicity of dispute resolution bodies 
with jurisdiction to interpret and apply the relevant norms to resolve the conflicts putatively 
arising therefrom1993.   
 
It is from this perspective, in light of the dynamic and shifting character of the 
Europeanisation of private law, that the need for a developed understanding of the 
methodological discourse – or lack thereof – has come to the fore1994; it was neither intended 
nor anticipated that this analysis would or could provided the entire framework.  The 
“resurrection” of one dimension of the methodological discourse in European legal 
development rather aims to permit an understanding of Europeanisation which better 
explicates the nature of its development, against the background of the recognition of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1991 Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law (n.259), p.3.  
1992 de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense (n.422) and B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Law:  A Map of 
Misreading: Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law’ (1987) 14 J.Law&Soc. 279, esp.280-281. 
1993 Albeit, as to the latter, predominantly in respect of the national courts and the CJEU. 
1994 The framework is lacking; as Miller considers, “[m]ulti-level Europe demands a framework for contract law 
which can capture the plurality of normative sites and the heterarchical relationships that exist between them”:  
Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law (n.259), p.154. 
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interdependence of the national and European legal orders 1995  within an increasingly 
globalised legal, cultural, political and socio-economic context.  The significance of the multi-
level structure of private law has been outlined in Chapter 2; it is relevant to the actors 
engaged in legal development and the composition of law-making institutions (the focus 
herein being on judicial development), the nature of their law-making role, and the 
consequences thereof including the impact of the decisions of national courts to refer and of 
the CJEU’s preliminary ruling, both within the referring system and beyond.  Furthermore, it 
is this consideration that underpins the rejection herein of the need for a single and distinct 
European culture and identity as a prerequisite of legal development.  Rather, as private law is 
understood to emerge within a multi-level space, it is asserted that the plurality of cultures 
and traditions should be accepted as a fundamental dimension of this construct and not as a 
hurdle to its development1996.  Predominantly, within a multi-level system, there is, as 
Hesselink recognises, no Grundnorm providing for how regulation, or more broadly, legal 
development, should occur1997; the existence of different regulatory regimes at diverse levels, 
within which there is a plurality of legal sources and actors, dictates, it is submitted, that it is 
necessary to identify a methodology of legal development, which allows for the engagement 
of commonalities and the maintenance of diversities. 
 
The analysis undertaken has fallen not on the European legislature but rather as the 
Europeanisation of private law is understood as “a stipulative not a legislative definition”1998, 
it has been acknowledged that account must be taken of the multiplicity of legal (and other) 
institutions engaged in law-making (broadly understood as interpretation, application and 
enforcement).  This necessarily engages the CJEU and national courts as well as private 
individuals, civil society bodies and legal scholars, in the interpretation and application of the 
legislative acquis.  It is on this basis that the focus of the analysis has shifted to the CJEU and 
its relationship with the national courts; the role and jurisdiction of the CJEU has been set out 
in Chapter 4, and the pertinent socio-legal dimensions thereof, including its constitution and 
structure, are highlighted, providing the foundations for its conceptualisation as a space for 
comparison.  The preliminary reference procedure has been conceived as an epistemological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1995 The legal orders are understood to be interdependent, where interdependency does not necessary necessitate 
unification: Delmas-Marty, ‘Comparative Law and International Law’ (n.4). 
1996 See Chapter 2.  
1997 Hesselink, 'A European Legal Method?' (n.147), p.43. 
1998 Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law’ in Cafaggi and Muir Watt, The Making of European 
Private Law (n.59), p.289. 
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lens through which European private law development can be evaluated and consolidated1999, 
one from which the interactions between the national, Union, international and (increasingly 
transnational) orders within a multi-level space can be explored.  Against the background of 
the socio-legal assessment of its composition and structure (highlighting in particular, the 
diversity of the backgrounds – national, educational, professional - of the AGs and judges) 
and in respect of its jurisdiction – per the preliminary reference procedure, in particular – it 
has been submitted that the CJEU has the potential to be understood as a “comparative 
laboratory”. 
 
Prior to this analysis, it has been advanced that comparative analysis might potentially reflect 
one methodological dimension of the framework of the Europeanisation of private law, in 
respect of which its dynamic nature can be understood and its evolution facilitated from the 
pluralist perspective in light of which the interdependence of legal orders is acknowledged 
(and putatively managed) within an increasingly globalised, multi-level context.  While it is 
generally assumed that private law and comparative law share an intimate connection, one 
which derives from the role played by the state, in respect of which there are, as discussed 
above, historical and cultural interdependencies, the appropriateness of comparative analysis 
in its current conceptualisation has not been taken for granted.  This is clear from the 
understanding, outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, of private law scholarship developing alongside 
comparative law at a time when private law was intended, and thus largely understood, as 
apolitical within the territorial confines of the state; comparative law was consequently 
conceived – in its doctrinal and functional understandings - as apolitical.  While it is 
recognised that there is a need to move away from these characterisations, they nevertheless 
continue to permeate the prevailing theoretical and methodological conceptualisations of 
comparative analysis.  In practice however, by virtue of its jurisprudence – and in particular, 
its development as a “driver of integration” beyond the removal of technical barriers to trade 
– the CJEU has itself, by implication, acknowledged that neither private law nor comparative 
law remains technical or apolitical2000.  Comparative analysis is therefore advanced not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1999 Zimmermann, ‘Europeanization of Private Law’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (n.62), p.545 
2000  Broadly, these shifts can be identified across private law development: Study Group, ‘Social Justice in 
European Contract Law’ (n.341).  This might be identified for example, in the shifting understanding of the 
consumer, and the rationale underpinning the ex officio regulation of contract terms, explored in Chapter 6, 
namely the need for the protection of the consumer as a weaker group (of course, it is recognised this is not the 
only rationale).  Furthermore, reference can be made to the multi-level nature of fundamental rights protection, 
in Chapter 7, and confirmed in Melloni – Melloni, (n.1287), Judgement, para.60 – in respect of the scope, in 
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as an interpretative tool of legal development but also as a mechanism of identifying, within a 
multi-level context, shared and diverse values underpinning the evolution of private law, 
which contributes to the development of the CJEU’s meta-mechanisms of Europeanisation. 
 
A critical evaluation of “mainstream” comparative analysis has therefore been undertaken in 
Chapter 3.  It has been submitted, on the basis of this preliminary critique, that, as it is 
currently conceived, comparative analysis is lacking – theoretically and methodologically, for 
the reasons set out immediately below – as a tool of Europeanisation.  It has neither been 
suggested that the orthodox conceptualisations of comparison have not been subject to 
critique nor that they have failed to evolve from an apolitical, technical understanding.  
Indeed, this evolution has been recognised in Chapter 3; comparative legal scholarship has 
been subject to considerable development, in general and also in respect of the evolution of 
those particular approaches potentially pertinent to the emergence of European law2001.  
Notwithstanding, the critical evaluation in Chapters 3 and 4 has illustrated that comparison 
retains fundamental problematics, which undermine the potential for its engagement as a tool 
of the CJEU and as a tool of Europeanisation and integration.  As the limitations of these 
understandings of comparison have been considered in detail in Chapter 3, they will be 
outlined only briefly. 
 
The problematics are theoretical and methodological and relate to the identification and 
determination of what is being compared by the CJEU:   
 
a. The understanding of the unit of comparative analysis is predominantly 
territorially defined; that is to say, it largely limits the comparative analysis to 
legal rules arising from the national legal order.  It has been submitted that it 
would undermine the entire discussion to make reference to a multi-level order but 
simultaneously neglect sources of comparison arising from other – possibly 
“postnational” – normative orders in favour of a strict adherence to a positivistic, 
state-based understanding of what is compared. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particular, for the national authorities and courts to apply their own standards of protection; in this example, as 
the Tribunal Constitucional de España has explicated (Tribunal Supremo, Auto de 13.12.2004 (DTC 1/204)), the 
difficulty lies in the co-existence, cooperation and coordination of the different regimes.  It has been submitted 
above that the engagement by the CJEU of the complex understanding of comparison, would facilitate the 
understanding – at least at the outset, which can evolve with “evaluative comparison” – of the scope for these 
interactions and the potential for conflict. 
2001 See Chapter 3.   
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b. This narrow conceptualisation leads to a limited understanding of the significance 
of legal culture and tradition; that is to say, the comparative analysis is limited to 
the extent that even where culture and tradition are engaged in the analysis 
(relatively rare in itself), the understanding of culture or tradition generally reflects 
the broad adherence to the national system and is therefore often conceived as 
static, lacking the dynamism required to deal with the Europeanisation of private 
law and integration2002. 
 
The problematics also concern the manner in which comparison is undertaken by the CJEU 
(considerations which necessarily relate to the determination of what is being compared): 
 
c. There exists a lack of consensus as to the purposes for which comparison is 
engaged.  The breadth of potential uses of comparative analysis has been outlined 
in Chapter 3 and explored in more detail in Chapter 8 (including comparison as an 
aggregation of knowledge, as a means of identifying similarity/difference, 
commonality/lack of commonality, as a means of identifying principles of Union 
law – whether characterised as common or general – as a means of identifying 
“best solutions” and as a driver of dialogue).   
d. There further exists a lack of understanding and appreciation of the context in 
which comparison is undertaken, that is, the absence of a law-in-context approach 
to the analysis; consequently, there is little scope to consider the emergence and 
operation of private law within a pluralist, multi-level space and as such, a lack of 
understanding of the way in which the orders existing therein interact.  
 
On the basis of the analysis undertaken in Chapter 3, an understanding of complex 
comparison has been advanced, which is to say that the thesis does not go so far as to propose 
a model of comparative analysis.  The key dimensions of this understanding are reflected in 
the following considerations: it is necessary to adopt an approach which attributes adequate 
significance to and takes account of the socio-economic, political and cultural, as well as 
legal, dimensions of Europeanisation and integration, and which thus allows for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002 For example, the development of the CJEU’s perspective can be identified in relation to its inerpretation of 
consumer: initially, the “weak consumer” derived from the historical, socio-economically and culturally 
embedded understanding of protection within the nation state; thereafter, the understanding of the consumer as 
“average”, “circumspect” and “rational” emerged, understood as a participant in the processes of 
Europeanisation and integration.  A deeper analysis – with case examples - has been undertaken in Chapter 2.  
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engagement of the dynamic nature of private law development, the shifting understanding of 
which has been confirmed by virtue of the case law.  This thesis has therefore aimed to build 
on the understanding of comparative analysis as “the study of transnational law as a process 
of normative engagement through which distinct legal systems increasingly encounter the law 
and legal culture of other systems”2003.  It has had the intention to free comparative analysis 
from its methodological nationalism, and its boundedness to the nation state so as to facilitate 
its engagement in a multi-level, pluralist context like that of the Europeanisation of private 
law; comparative analysis might then be engaged not only as a tool of interpretation but also 
as underpinning the meta-mechanisms of transfer and dialogue explored in Chapter 9.   
 
Against the background of the conclusions drawn from the preliminary part of the analysis, 
the case-based exploration of the judicial development of Europeanisation has been engaged, 
in respect of which it has been possible not only to evaluate the relevance of mainstream 
comparative analysis and the scope for the engagement of the complex understanding of 
comparison in a concrete setting but also to draw conclusions in light of the particularities of 
the subject matter of the thesis.  This has aimed to facilitate an in-depth evaluation of CJEU 
jurisprudence arising via the preliminary reference procedure in three areas pertinent to 
private law development, namely, state liability, consumer contract and fundamental 
rights2004.  This evaluation has been undertaken in light of the socio-legal dimensions of 
enquiry developed in Chapter 4, that is, the constitution of the CJEU and the bifurcated 
analyses underpinning the Opinions of the AG and the judgements of the Court.  Three 
preliminary determinations are identifiable from the analysis, and have been outlined in more 
detail in Part III: 1) the case examples illustrate the shifting nature of private law and the need 
for a dynamic, flexible conceptualisation thereof; 2) the case examples further illustrate that 
while there exists evidence of comparative analysis in the CJEU’s efforts at the 
Europeanisation of private law, there does not exist a rigorous methodological framework 
underpinning; and 3) the case examples confirm, as anticipated in Chapter 3, that while the 
CJEU does seem to “know” of the ideas of complex comparative analysis advanced in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2003 R.A. Miller and P. Zumbansen, ‘Introduction’ in R.A. Miller and P. Zumbansen (eds.), Comparative Law as 
Transnational Law: A Decade of the German Law Journal (OUP, Oxford; 2012), pp.1-13. 
2004 It should be noted that the legal issues arising from the cases examined in Part III derive from divergent 
areas of law which cannot necessarily be strictly categorised; that is to say, while the Union does not have 
express competence in respect of private law, it is clear that private law disputes arise increasingly in areas of 
law extending beyond those with which private law might conventionally be associated (including, at the 
national and the Union levels, conflicts directly related to the regulation of private relationships and/or the 
facilitation of the internal market).  Reference can also be made to the “justification” of the choice of case 
examples; see the beginning of Part III.   
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Chapter 3 – its constitution and construction, as advanced, providing a space for comparative 
analysis via the preliminary reference procedure – the current conceptualisation of 
comparison about which it is knowledgeable, is lacking as it does not find in itself a 
developed framework.  As a result, the comparative analysis, rather circularly, remains 
limited.  An example can be engaged for clarification purposes.  Reference has been made 
above to AG Trstenjak’s recognition of freedom of contract as a principle characterised in the 
Opinion as one unanimous to the Member States2005.  Trstenjak engaged in a direct – although 
not explicit – comparative analysis, with reference to the theory of freedom of contract in 
different Member States, including that of Germany, France and Spain; notwithstanding that 
her analysis evidently extends beyond a consideration of the text of the norms in each order, 
and the identification of commonalities or differences therein to the theoretical and historical 
context and underpinnings of the rule, it is evidently confined by a tilt in favour of the 
German approach, seemingly reflecting the (educational) background of the AG.  While, in 
light of the socio-legal analysis of the constitution of the CJEU - which, it has been submitted 
gives rise to the scope for complex comparative analysis - it has been recognised that such 
“tilts” are potentially unavoidable, one cannot help but consider whether its scope – 
identifiable across the case examples 2006  – is due to the absence of a framework of 
comparative analysis.   
 
The case examples have subsequently been employed as the foundations of the evaluation of 
the CJEU as a “comparative laboratory” in Chapters 8 and 9.  Chapter 8 has encompassed an 
outline of the different sources of comparative analysis and an exploration of the putative 
rationales underpinning the AG and Court’s engagement with comparison.  These outlines are 
explicative and have been further employed in Chapter 9 in the evaluation of the use of 
comparative analysis in the CJEU’s interpretative jurisdiction, and in its development of the 
meta-mechanisms of Europeanisation, namely, the identification of principles of Union law 
(in respect of which, it is submitted that for clarification purposes a distinction should be 
drawn between common and general principles) and “best solutions”, the development of 
transfer and the facilitation of judicial dialogue.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2005 Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.9 and 12. 
2006 For example, in respect of AG Léger’s reference to French scholarship in particular, reflecting his own 
tradition, in respect of the “already implied” recognition of state liability for the acts and omissions of the 
judiciary: Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.51 and 52. 
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II. Conclusions as to the Evolution of the Jurisdiction and Role of the CJEU and the 
Engagement of Comparative Analysis Therein, as Tools of Europeanisation and 
Integration 
 
Against the background of this brief overview, the following paragraphs aim to draw 
conclusions as to the contribution that this thesis – that is, the analysis of the CJEU’s 
engagement with comparison, and the evaluation of the relevance of a developed 
understanding of complex comparative analysis - might afford to the Europeanisation of 
private law and European integration.  The conclusions have two dimensions, both of which 
(there existing a degree of overlap) illustrate that comparative analysis in itself and its 
engagement in the CJEU potentially constitute tools of the Europeanisation of private law and 
more broadly, of integration: 1) facilitating a better understanding of the theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of comparison in general; and 2) advancing the understanding of 
the role of the CJEU, via its engagement with comparative analysis in the Europeanisation of 
private law and integration.  These conclusions should therefore be read in light of the scope 
for the engagement of the developed understanding of complex comparison advanced in 
Chapter 32007, and outlined in the following paragraphs.  These conclusions are advanced in 
light of the understanding that the CJEU does indeed engage comparison, and moreover – 
particularly on the basis that this engagement transcends a descriptive focus on the 
identification of similarity and difference for the purposes of promoting the former and 
repressing the latter, that is, for unification purposes – that it is knowledgeable about the 
breadth and potential of comparative analysis.  It has been recognised that the CJEU’s 
engagement of comparative analysis lacks a methodological and theoretical framework, either 
as it is employed in its mainstream or complex conceptualisation.  Notwithstanding, as 
asserted in Chapter 3, comparative analysis as it is currently conceived is, in itself, lacking; 
indeed, one might therefore assert that the approach adopted in the CJEU is lacking because 
of an absence of a satisfactory or convincing approach advanced in legal scholarship.   
 
Broadly, comparison is conceived as a means of generating knowledge, which together with 
its dissemination, promotes academic research and legal scholarship and thus facilitates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2007 It is necessary to adopt an approach which attributes adequate significance to and takes account of the socio-
economic, political and cultural, as well as legal, dimensions of Europeanisation and integration, and which thus 
allows for the engagement of the dynamic nature of private law development. 
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better understanding of law2008.  The breadth of uses of comparison is evident from existing 
scholarship; notwithstanding, these are often overlooked in the context of private law as a 
result of the predominant focus on the use of comparison for harmonisation, and ultimately, 
unification purposes against the background of the facilitation of the internal market.  This 
approach has almost been institutionalised in the Union legislature2009.  Moreover, it is 
reflected in the CJEU’s use of comparison in its interpretative role, particularly where it might 
aim to identify similarity or difference, predominantly for the purposes of the promotion of 
the former and repression of the latter in respect of rendering an interpretation of a norm 
putatively applicable across the Member States in a uniform manner2010.  This thesis rather 
aims to consider a complex comparative analysis as a means of engaging the difference that 
permeates the European space, outlined in the introduction and Part I.  While it does not go so 
far as to suggest that comparison can achieve the “total understanding of the law”2011, it is 
submitted, from the epistemological perspective adopted – namely, the preliminary reference 
procedure – that it has the potential to permeate all areas of normativity.  Against this 
background, it is advanced that from the pluralist perspective, comparative analysis and the 
values of coordination, cooperation and compromise inherent therein2012, can also facilitate 
the better comprehension of the interdependence of legal orders in a multi-level context, 
substantiating the ties between comparison and the Europeanisation of private law in the 
context of European integration.   
 
As Union law is understood as a construct of transnational law, it has been recognised that the 
approach to comparative analysis must allow for the engagement with the nature and demands 
of legal development in the context of Union integration "beyond the nation state"2013.  It is 
evident from the outline of the manifestations of legal sources advanced in Chapter 8 that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2008 Patrick Glenn, 'Aims of Comparative Law' Smits, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (n.441), p.59; 
although it has been argued that the generation of knowledge is not sufficient in itself to justify comparative law 
as a discipline 
2009 See Chapters 1 and 2, particularly in respect of the Commission’s understanding of the use of comparison in 
the development of the DCFR.   
2010 Indeed, it must be noted that one of the most fundamental contributions of comparative law has been to 
establish, in respect of the promotion of uniformity, that “certain differences among legal systems are merely 
apparent”, comparison having the role of “measuring the extent of difference”, Sacco, ‘Legal Formants 
(Instalment I of II)’ (n.475), pp.3 and 7, respectively, and ‘Il circolo di Trento; Second Thesis’ (Universita degli 
studi di Trento, Trento; 1987). 
2011 E. Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law:  Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First Century (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden; 2004), p.11. 
2012 Including cooperation and cooperation as opposed to hierarchy, and plurality as opposed to commonality or 
uniformity. 
2013  R. Michaels and N. Jansen, 'Private Law and the State: Comparative Perceptions and Historical 
Observations' (2007) 71 RabelsZ 345 and Michaels and Jansen, 'Private Law Beyond the State?’ (n.157). 
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while the CJEU predominantly engages in a comparative analysis founded on national legal 
norms, its reasoning is not so rigidly limited.  Rather, it engages a breadth of references 
including the following (the examples are identifiable from the case examples but should not 













































































  Factortame  Hamilton 
Table 1  
At a fundamental level, the thesis illustrates that comparative law is not “ending”2015.  The 
case examples illustrate that the CJEU does engage comparative analysis.  In respect of the 
sources of comparative analysis, the evaluation of the case examples seems to allow for the 
conclusion that while these sources might predominantly reflect national legal norms2016, the 
CJEU’s comparative analysis is not so limited.  While the CJEU’s reference to culture and 
tradition (whether national or transnational) is narrow and rarely explicit, the potential sources 
of analysis include national legal norms and national case law as well as aspects of national 
culture and tradition and might also extend beyond the strictly national components of law.  
As is evident from the analysis of the case examples, these sources encompass the travaux 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2014 This also explains why not all boxes are filled. 
2015 In contrast to M. Siems, ‘The End of Comparative Law’ (2007) 2 JCL 133. 
2016 Strictly understood as norms deriving from the national legislature or courts, not including, for example, 
norms of international or European law. 
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préparatoires of EU legislation2017, Union norms (reflected in cross-referencing between 
areas of Union law)2018, decisions of the courts and tribunals other than those of the Member 
States 2019, international law norms 2020, “non-state” norms2021 and legal scholarship 2022.  
Fundamentally, it seems that this provides support for the assertion made in Chapter 3, 
namely the rejection of the “totality” of any single source of comparative analysis.  Rather it 
has been submitted that the conceptualisation of what is compared must be an open one, 
which while rendering it more complex (to the extent that such openness gives rise to a lack 
of certainty), also provides the foundations for the engagement of the developed 
understanding of the rationales underpinning as well as the context in which comparison is 
undertaken.  
 
Indeed, the evaluation of the current understanding of comparison in Chapter 3 and the 
developed conceptualisation advanced therein, have further illustrated – evident from the case 
examples – that comparative analysis can be dynamic and flexible and consequently, that it 
can evolve, in its theoretical and methodological dimensions, to deal with the evolution of 
substantive law, including private law2023.  Indeed, the analysis has reiterated – as evidenced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2017 Which allows for, as noted in Chapter 8, indirect comparative analysis, arising in cases such as Quelle 
(n.241), Judgement, para.33, with reference to the meaning of “free of charge” in Directive 1999/44/EC, or to 
the Explanations of the CFR, as part of the travaux préparatoires, as in Inuit (n.1572), Opinion of AG Kokott, 
para.109, where the Explanations are deemed to be “guidance for the interpretation of the Charter and to which 
the European Union Courts and the courts of the Member States must have due regard”, in respect of the scope 
for the extension of direct legal remedies against European legislative acts for the purposes of ensuring the 
protection of the right to an effective remedy. 
2018 See for example, the cross-referencing between the judicially-developed regimes of Union and state liability, 
in Brasserie (n.186), Opinion of AG Tesauro, para.7 and 66, with express use of the word “lend” by the AG, and 
the subsequent recognition of “an alignment between the two systems” in Köbler; Köbler (n.184), Opinion of 
AG Léger, para.127. 
2019 Köbler (n.184), Judgement, para.49, citing ECHR, Dulaurans v. France of 21.03.2000, (2001) 33 EHRR 45, 
with regard to Art.41 ECHR which allows a court (including a supreme court) to order a state which has 
infringed a fundamental right to compensate the damage arising from that breach.  
2020 In respect of the evolution of the content of the concept of legal dignity, consider the reference to the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the case law of the ECtHR, Omega (n.1331), Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para.82 et seq, 
citing Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
2021 For example, in respect of the protection of lawyers’ secrecy and the exception to their obligation to 
report2021, with reference to “professional secrecy” as identifiable both in national norms and the Code of 
Conduct for European Lawyers adopted by the CCBE (Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones 
(n.1346), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.37-38). 
2022 The most significant example is the DCFR, advanced as a “source of inspiration” and even further, as a 
potential “source of law” for the CJEU: Pia Messner (n.1658), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.94; Hamilton 
(n.552), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.24, in respect of the understanding of good faith and the idea that “full 
performance of a contract results, as a general rule, from discharge of the mutual obligations under the contract 
or from termination of that contract”, respectively. 
2023 That is to say, for example, greater use of comparative analysis could have been used in respect of the 
evolution of the ex officio regulation of unfair contract terms, particularly in respect of the role of the national 
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in the examination of the breadth of approaches in Chapter 3 - that it can take different forms, 
depending on the sources engaged, and can serve different aims, both where it is engaged by 
the CJEU in its interpretation of Union law, and as a second-order device, facilitating the 
meta-mechanisms of Europeanisation.   
 
 Case Study 



























































































































Notwithstanding that the CJEU neither limits itself to engaging national legal norms as a 
source of comparative analysis nor to a focus on identifying commonality for the purposes of 
facilitating unification via harmonisation, it is nevertheless clear that the CJEU’s comparative 
analysis, if at all engaged, does not always amount to the complex approach advanced in 
Chapter 3 and set out in the paragraphs above and below.  In order to clarify this assertion, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
judge; as noted above, there has been little consideration of the nature of the judge in his task of identifying the 
facts necessary to make the assessment, from Pannon to Pénzügyi Lízing. 
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reference will be made to case examples indicating where the CJEU seems to engage the 
complex approach and where it is lacking. 
 
The complex understanding of comparison explicitly brings to the fore the relevance of a 
socio-legal approach to comparative analysis, one which allows for account not only of legal 
norms (of a national, international or non-state nature) but also culture and tradition, with 
regard both to the determination of what is being compared and also in respect of the 
identification of the context in which the analysis is undertaken.  As to the former, it has been 
submitted that the relevant dimensions of (legal) culture and tradition, either as these exist 
within the national orders, or at the regional or international level, should engage the cultural, 
socio-economic and political commonalities and divergences that shape the context of 
integration.  As to the latter, it is evident that the deliberation as to the pertinent historical 
context, the political and economic commonalities and divergences, the cultural and social 
similarities and differences, and value judgements must be (explicitly) undertaken.  The 
acknowledgement of the significance of context arises in two ways.  As to the first, one must 
now surmise that comparison must be done “in context”, reflecting a shift from the 
predominant, positivist understanding of (private) law as technical and apolitical; that is to 
say, it is necessary to transcend the examination of that which is provided for in the rulebooks 
and identify and evaluate the contexts - both legal and non-legal – in which these rules 
develop2024 and are applied in practice.  The “context” of the case itself is also significant.  On 
the one hand, reference must be made to its position in the line of pre-existing jurisprudence 
(at the national and CJEU levels) and on the other, to the broader socio-economic, cultural 
and political context of the area of law in which it arises; both must be engaged in light of the 
pluralist, multi-level space in which European private law emerges. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis of the CJEU’s use of comparison confirms that there is indeed value 
in studying the composition and structure of the CJEU, a determination that might further 
shape the perspective from which the comparative analysis itself is undertaken2025.  The scope 
for the influence of the constitution and structure of the CJEU in legal development allows for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2024  Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of 
Comparative Law (n.7), p.167. 
2025 This can be identified in particular in those cases in which it is clear that – predominantly – the AG engages 
sources of comparative analysis reflecting his or her own national or education legal tradition and culture.  
Reference can be made to Caja de Ahorros (n.268), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.9 and 12, with reference to 
predominantly German legal scholarship and Köbler (n.184), Opinion of AG Léger, para.51 and 52, with 
reference to predominantly French legal scholarship. 
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the positioning of the “self” in comparative analysis.  The Court or the AG can identify his 
own position, in relation to what is being compared; this might prima facie appear to be a 
theoretical determination but it is understood to be relevant to the judge and AG as they are 
necessarily conceived as nationally-trained legal actors who must nevertheless identify 
themselves as European, with responsibility, for example, for rendering autonomous 
interpretations of Union law.  The CJEU should intrinsically provide a putative space in 
which comparative analysis, which identifies and engages assumptions and presuppositions, 
can be undertaken thereby overcoming the difficulty of “insurmountability of context”2026.  In 
this sense, the engagement of an approach to complex comparative analysis should ensure that 
both the AG and the Court avoid “cherry-picking” in respect of the determination of what is 
compared, i.e. the unit of comparative analysis and the context or perspective adopted for the 
comparative analysis 2027 , in light of the rationales underpinning its engagement of 
comparison.  The notion that comparative reasoning simply has the purpose of confirming a 
decision made on another basis comes to the fore in the absence of a theoretical or 
methodological framework of comparison, with the result that comparative analysis is 
engaged merely for “show” supporting the scope for cherry-picking on the part of the CJEU.   
 
The perspective from which comparison is undertaken shapes the significance attributed to 
the various rationales underpinning the CJEU’s engagement with comparative analysis, 
reflecting its reasoning and determination of relevant interpretative approaches (which, as is 
clear from the evaluation above, are not predominantly limited to but often encompass a 
teleological dimension2028).  The nature of its task – in line with its Art.19 TEU obligation to 
ensure that “in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”, it must 
provide an interpretation of Union law which allows the national court to render a decision – 
dictates that the CJEU is not bound by any such conceptualisation of comparison.  Rather, 
both the AG and Court seem to engage with a breadth of interpretative approaches, which are 
often interrelated and appear to be indistinct and overlapping.  The CJEU might purposively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2026 Peters and Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism’ (n.480), p.811. 
2027 Cases in which “cherry-picking” was not avoided, can be identified where, for example, the AG, makes 
predominant reference to his or her own legal background, whether “natural” or “educational”; reference can be 
made to AG Trstenjak’s recognition of freedom of contract as a principle she characterises as unanimous to the 
Member States and her predominant engagement of German norms and scholarship: Caja de Ahorros (n.268), 
Opinion of AG Trstenjak, fn.9 and 12. 
2028 Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.95, citing FIAMM (n.1688), Opinion of AG Maduro, para.55-56; 
by using comparative analysis to identify responses to legal issues, which respect national legal traditions on the 
one hand, but which also fall in line with Union aims and objectives, via a teleological approach to the 
understanding of the scope, not only for the development of Union law but also the development, via 
consideration of the “trends” of national norms.   
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seek to identify difference, or indeed, difference might be identifiable from the lack of 
commonality.  For this purpose, it is submitted that the “positioning” of the AG or the judge is 
similarly important.  That is to say, it is the “positioning of the self” that allows for 
engagement with the “other” and which facilitates the CJEU’s engagement with comparison 
beyond the mere identification of similarity as empirical fact for the unification purposes (it 
being recognised that harmonisation affords scope for divergence).   
 
That is to say, the adoption of an approach to comparative analysis which engages a breadth 
of legal sources allows for evaluation of the “other” from which the comparatist derives 
knowledge of “new” substantive information; this information might be used to construct a 
developed perspective, which affects not only the way in which the “other” is understood but 
also the way in which the comparatist understands his own legal system, the culture from 
which he originates and the background assumptions that he carries2029.  Comparative analysis 
therefore has the potential to facilitate the “opening up” of legal systems (in the sense that it 
makes the actors in the legal order more aware of what is happening in “other” orders, 
cultures and traditions, the conceptualisation of which is broadly understood and not limited 
to the confines of the state).  Thus, it has a “subversive role” by forcing engagement with 
critique of the “home” legal order, whether this is national, European or international, in order 
to identify unsatisfactory aspects therein2030; it compels the reconsideration of this order from 
the perspective of an outsider and is thus said to “liberate[…] one from the narrow confines of 
the individual systems”2031.   
 
The need for the determination of this context is of inherent relation to the perspective 
adopted by the CJEU, in respect of its interpretative role broadly.  To the extent that 
comparison allows for a study not only of the rules of the different national orders and the 
cultures and traditions from which they derive2032 but also for the examination and evaluation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2029 Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison’ (n.490). 
2030  See for example, G.P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline’ (1998) 46 AJCL 683. 
2031  W.J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law:  A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 ICLQ 485, p.492. 
2032 Indeed, it is recognised that the contextual approach to European legal integration – and the notion of 
unpinning the historical development, and interaction of norms with political, socio-economic and cultural 
institutions and practices - in itself is not novel but formed part of the “integration through law” project of 
Cappelletti et al; in light of the shifting aims of integration, and particularly, the shifting understanding of 
convergence, from its understanding as a descriptive and normative desire of integration, to be achieved, 
alongside the elimination of differences, via the development of uniform legal rules in the integration through 
law project (Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler, Integration Through Law (n.101), pr.vi)), it is rather the 
engagement of the contextual approach to the Europeanisation of law as a perspective, in light of the 
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of relevant international and privately-made norms and scholarship that necessarily shapes the 
way in which these are understood within the European and national courts, it is asserted that 
comparative analysis constitutes one conceivable means of reconciling the conflicts arising 
from the efforts at integration (as socio-economic, cultural and social, beyond a mere focus on 
its legal and economic dimensions) and the Europeanisation of private law (the nature of these 
conflicts have been outlined in theory in Chapter 1 and are identifiable from the analysis of 
the case examples2033).  This complex perspective can be identified in the characterisation of 
comparative analysis as “evaluative”, in light of which the aims and tasks of the Union legal 
order are intertwined with the acknowledgement of the scope for development in the national, 
international and transnational orders, against the background of their relevant cultures and 
traditions; indeed, such evaluative comparison can be identified in recent jurisprudence of the 
CJEU2034. 
 
In this task, it is clear that the CJEU cannot engage only with the European law dimension of 
the case2035- to the extent that this gives rise to what Schmid describes as conceptual conflicts 
arising from the “one-sided teleology of European instruments” 2036 , reflected in the 
integrationist interest underlying private law2037 - but must respond to all national courts by 
rendering an interpretation applicable across the Member States in any equivalent case, 
reflecting “the right balance between the interests of Community law and the acceptability of 
their ruling to the national legal orders”2038.  Both the CJEU and the national courts must be 
able to accept and apply this interpretation; to this extent, the CJEU operates from a position 
whereby it acknowledges that the national courts will have to implement EU law as a “middle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Europeanisation of private law, and against the background of an understanding of the pluralist, multi-level 
construct in which private law emerges, which is advanced herein.   
2033 M. Darmon, ‘La Prise en compte des droits fondamentaux par la Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes’ (1995) Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 29. 
2034 For example, Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott, para.94. 
2035 Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court’ (n.318), p.17.  Schmid asserts that if the 
CJEU is to take on a role which allows it to engage in “system-building”, it would be necessary that it engages 
not only in the interpretation of European law but also takes into account the national law surroundings relevant 
to the case.   
2036 Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court’ (n.318), p.11.  Comparing the concepts 
which are dominant in European and national private law, Schmid makes reference to freedom, equality and 
justice (communitative not distributive) in the national dimension (such that the key interest in private law 
adjudication is the balancing of interests between parties). 
2037 Schmid, ‘The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court’ (n.318), pp.11-12.  Schmid challenges the 
notion that this supposedly “collective interest” provides an appropriate basis for the balancing of the interests of 
private parties 
2038 Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders’ (n.1523), p.883. 
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line”2039 and as such it might attempt to identify, as the most palatable, a “mixed” solution 
which satisfies the national courts2040.  While the CJEU rarely makes explicit reference to 
such a rationale underpinning its engagement with comparison, or to the impact in the 
national system, it does seem to recognise the potential consequences of a particular 
judgement on the orders, cultures and traditions of the Member States.  Notwithstanding this 
is rarely explicit.  However, there seems to be some evidence not only in respect of the 
interpretations rendered by the CJEU but also in respect of its recognition and explication of 
either common or general principles, and the scope for transfer and dialogue2041, an approach 
which arguably “reflects the Court’s concern in respecting cultural differences” 2042 .  
However, the reference to the impact within and across cultures and traditions is often 
lacking, which undermines the scope for the engagement of comparative analysis to 
potentially legitimise the interpretation rendered and to be applied in the national court.  This 
is clear from the Viking and Laval cases2043.   
 
In this context, comparison has been characterised as “‘an exercise in ‘psycho-
diplomacy’…in the interests of ‘acceptability’ of Community law in the domestic legal 
orders”, ensuring on the one hand, the satisfactory interpretation, application and thus 
effectiveness of EU law and on the other, respect for the “richness” of the national, 
international and transnational cultures and traditions2044.  Thus, comparative analysis can be 
engaged as a means by which the cultural perspective of legal development can be brought to 
the fore, allowing for the uncovering of the relevant dimensions of the national and 
transnational cultures and traditions, as well as the scope for an understanding of a (not 
necessarily single or common) European culture which embraces plurality2045. 
 
However, comparative analysis might indeed be engaged to identify both (or indeed, either) 
commonality and a lack of commonality as political, socio-economic and cultural constructs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2039 Hilf ‘The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’ in De Mestral et al, The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (n.3), 
pp.563-564. 
2040 Reid, ‘The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems’ (n.571), p.38, fn.148:  the idea of “civil and common law lite:  law 
made more palatable by the act of mixture”. 
2041 See, for example, C-21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace 1976 ECR 1735, Judgement, para.23. 
2042 Kakouris, ‘Use of the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ (n.1528), 
p.276. 
2043 See Chapter 7 and the discussion of the legitimacy of EU intervention in Chapter 9. 
2044 K. Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders or the European Union of E Pluribus Unum’ in G. Canivet et al 
(eds.), Comparative Law Before the Courts (BIICL, London; 2004), pp.99-134, pp.133-134, for all quotes. 
2045 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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of the national and Union orders, beyond the identification of the commonality or diversity of 
legal rules2046.  Furthermore, the significance of the perspective adopted is also clear where 
the CJEU looks to identify similarity or divergence and thus engages comparative analysis for 
a functional purpose.  For example, comparison might be engaged in a gap-filling role, to 
facilitate coherence and avoid fragmentation; furthermore, it might be engaged as a means of 
supporting the autonomous interpretation of a Union norm2047.  In both manifestations, the 
engagement of comparative analysis can legitimise the expanding jurisdiction and role of the 
CJEU, the legitimisation being reflected, for example, in the scope to do justice via 
comparative analysis in the absence of a Union norm2048. 
 
Not only does comparative analysis have the potential to facilitate this kind of critique but it 
might also allow for the identification of that which is best.  As noted above, the functional 
engagement of comparison is also identifiable in the CJEU’s recognition of principles of 
Union law and of “best solutions”.  Three “stories” have been outlined, in respect of which a 
distinction between common and general principles has been advanced: 1) the use of 
comparative analysis for the purposes of identifying, recognising (and frequently, 
constituting) common principles; 2) the use of comparative analysis for the purposes of 
identifying, recognising (and frequently, constituting) general principles; and 3) the use of 
comparative analysis for the purposes of identifying the “best solution” (which might include 
rules, principles, values and practices)2049.  In particular, a distinction has been advanced as to 
the recognition of principles as common and the recognition of principles as general.  This 
distinction would not only have the purpose of clarifying the reasoning of the CJEU in 
general2050 but would also clarify the nature of the comparative reasoning adopted, that is to 
say, the use of comparative analysis for the purposes of the identification of commonality 
between legal sources on the one hand, and the acknowledgement of divergence, i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2046 Evidence of this approach can be identified in respect of the jurisprudence on the conceptualisation of 
marriage, whereby the CJEU has held that given the absence of commonality (otherwise frames as the existence 
of diversity), a same-sex relationship cannot be interpreted as marriage.  For example, Grant (n.1706), 
Judgement, para.35.   
2047 For example, these considerations overlap in the CJEU’s understanding of the notion of damage in the 
Leitner case, particularly in respect of AG Tizzano’s analysis: Leitner (n.728), Opinion of AG Tizzano, 
paras.34-35. 
2048 See for example, Algera (n.1676), Judgement, p.54.   
2049 The methodologies and metrics have been outlined in Chapter 8 and 9, above. 
2050 For example, AG Trstenjak has recognised the potential for a categorisation of different principles however, 
it is not one based on the way in which comparison shapes the identification of the principles: Dominguez 
(n.1502), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.94. 
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generality, on the other2051.  However, as is clear from the analysis in Chapter 3, the 
comparative methodology does not in itself provide the criteria for the identification of the 
“best solution”2052.  It is submitted that the determination of that which is best is neither 
empirical – that is, it cannot be identified on the basis of commonality or generality alone – 
nor based on economic efficiency to the exclusion of political considerations2053 but rather 
encompasses a set of normative determinations, identifiable via comparative analysis, in light 
of the commonalities and diversities of the national, international and transnational traditions 
and cultures (albeit the latter two being limited2054) – and not merely the rules therein – 
against the background of the aims and objectives of the Union2055.   
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the complex understanding of comparative analysis shapes 
those mechanisms that delineate the interaction between the diverse legal orders, and 
particularly those of transfer and dialogue, which are deemed to provide a means of dealing 
with the increasing interdependence that arises from the deconstruction of hierarchical, closed 
(predominantly, national) systems in the European (and increasingly, transnational) space.  In 
the context of the Europeanisation of private law and the interpretative role of the CJEU, 
these interdependences arise as a result of and are reflected in the preliminary reference 
procedure.  That is to say, it is submitted that the values – predominantly of coordination and 
cooperation - underpinning comparison are relevant to the understanding of the scope for 
transfer and the promotion of dialogue, which necessarily promotes the interaction between, 
and the interdependence of the diverse legal orders existing within the multi-level European 
space.  Comparison, especially in its complex conceptualisation, facilitates the explication of 
the means by which different norms (broadly understood) are identified but also shared and 
potentially adopted within and between different legal orders.  Such transfers are identifiable 
within the context of the Europeanisation of private law, for example, in respect of the 
development of state liability, from the national to the Union order2056 and from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2051 Notwithstanding the scope for the distinction, it is clear that the CJEU continues to use the terms 
interchangeably.  For example, principles found in several systems - Hoechst (n.1265); principles identified in 
international law - Racke (n.1620), Judgement, paras.45-46. 
2052 See Chapters 3, 8 and 9.  
2053 Per the discussion of the approaches of the World Bank and legal origins methodologies in Chapter 3. 
2054 For example, Akzo (n.691), Opinion of AG Kokott. 
2055 This paragraph aims only to clarify; see the discussion at the end of the first section of Chapter 9.  The fact 
that it might not provide a complete metric is acknowledged as one key failing of the approach proposed.   
2056 Consider the recognition of the principles of proportionality (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.1256)) 
and legitimate expectations (Joined Cases C-205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor [1983] ECR I-02633). 
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international to the Union, and thereafter, to the national orders2057.  It is further recognised 
that in light of the difficulties underpinning transfer and their acceptance in context (in 
particular, in respect of the systems theory analysis), there might be scope for a greater role 
for dialogue in these processes.  That is to say, scope for a shift from reception of transfer to 
dialogue; it is submitted that this approach reflects the prevailing trends in the 
Europeanisation of private law2058.  To the extent that it has been asserted that it is the 
“linkage between legal systems previously conceived as completely different that has created 
the transnational European law”2059, its development is arguably facilitated by effective 
“dialectical interaction between national laws and Community law”2060 via the transmigration 
of legal ideas and knowledge.  The acknowledgment of these interactions and of the multi-
level nature of the Union, and the need for interaction between the courts is identifiable in the 
“division of labour” between courts in the fundamental rights cases, which arguably also 
allows for the development of the national, European and increasingly transnational, 
identities2061.  Thus, for example, while the balancing of fundamental rights and freedoms2062 
is for the national court in the light of national, regional and international diversities, the 
CJEU should provide criteria of interpretation for the national judge, building on the 
emergence of and necessitating a discursive relationship between both2063.  Comparative 
analysis in itself constitutes a mechanism of dialogue, providing the foundational knowledge 
of commonalities and diversities across the Union space; moreover, dialogue also facilitates 
comparative analysis.  However, as is clear from the cases, the scope for this “opening” up 
and for the consideration of difference and thus, of “otherness”, is limited because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2057 See for example, Racke (n.1620), Judgement, paras.45-46 and Ordre des barreaux francophones et 
germanophones (n.1346), Opinion of AG Maduro, paras.37-38, in respect of the “professional secrecy” norms in 
the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers. 
2058 These understandings, it is submitted, require reconsiderations about the understanding of law within the 
CJEU; it requires an understanding of law, not just as rules, but as encompassing cultures and traditions, within 
and beyond the state, and of law as dynamic, engaging the scope for the development of trends and ideas; 
Consider Ewald and his “comparative law as jurisprudence”, and further, C. Valcke, ‘Comparative Law as 
Comparative Jurisprudence: The Comparability of Legal Systems’ (2004) 52 AJCL 713, p.731. 
2059 D. von Daniels, The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective (Ashgate, Farnham; 2010), p.61. 
2060 van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’ in Cafaggi, The 
Institutional Framework of European Private Law (n.228), pp.37-77, p.49. 
2061 For example, in the “guidance” of the CJEU in the national courts’ balancing of fundamental rights and 
economic freedoms, respect should be maintained for the identities of the Member States - Sayn-Wittgenstein 
(n.1472), Judgement, para.92. 
2062 NS (n.1249), Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para.85. 
2063 C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] ECR I-10369, Judgement, paras.34-35. 
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comparative analysis continues to focus on norms, while the reference to tradition and culture 
– whether national or transnational – remains limited2064. 
 
This kind of interaction between the legal orders appertains to the Europeanisation of private 
law and integration as “part of an ongoing process”2065, or rather processes, suggesting that 
the component dimensions of these processes are dynamic and changeable.  From this 
perspective, the CJEU and national courts can promote the emergence of a network, fostering 
a discursive rapport between the European and national orders, within a broader globalised 
context2066.  While the CJEU has afforded little express consideration to this shift to dialogue, 
it does recognise the preliminary reference procedure as a space of communication, 
potentially giving rise to cooperative relationships between legal orders and the actors 
therein2067.  Comparative analysis is therefore ultimately engaged as it facilitates a shift in 
perspective from the autonomy of the national and Union legal orders, to interdependence, 
even if this interaction is predominantly understood as interdependence between the national 
and European orders in the European context, it has the potential to stretch beyond the 
national and European space.  This autonomy relates not only to the relationship between 
legal orders but also to relations within orders, allowing for the socio-economic, cultural and 
political dimensions of integration to be absorbed in the CJEU’s development of private law.   
 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the relevance of the comparative methodology – 
particularly as it has been engaged by the CJEU in its interpretative jurisdiction and role – in 
the Europeanisation of private law.  It has advanced the critique of the theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of comparison and the plea for the reconceptualisation of the 
perspective adopted, particularly as the scope for its engagement arises vis-à-vis the CJEU's 
interpretative role and also in a “second order” respect, with regard to the development of the 
CJEU’s meta-mechanisms of Europeanisation.  It has therefore aimed to facilitate the 
resurrection of the methodological discourse and explore the implications of this evaluation in 
respect of the evolution of the Europeanisation of private law, as it occurs in the context of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2064  This, it is submitted, is clear in respect of the UCTD cases and the Court’s lack of comparative analysis and 
engagement with dialogue, particularly in respect of the clarification of the ex officio regulation of contract 
terms, notwithstanding the arguably “already existing” framework for dialogue existing as a result of the 
preliminary references from diverse national traditions.   
2065 van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’ in Cafaggi, The 
Institutional Framework of European Private Law (n.228), pp.37-77, p.49. 
2066 Perju, 'Reason and Authority in the ECJ' (n.666), pp.338-344. 
2067 Pénzügyi Lízing (n.1033), Judgement, para.37 and in the national court, Maastricht Treaty Decision, BvG 2. 
Senat 12 Oct. 1993, reported in [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
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European integration via the judiciary.  That is to say, it has purported to illustrate that the 
explication and reconceptualisation of the methodological and theoretical dimensions of 
comparative analysis allows for the evolution of the Europeanisation of private law driven by 
judicial activity, and the understanding of integration in its entirety, namely as socio-
economic, cultural and social, beyond a mere focus on its legal and economic dimensions; 
this abstracted dimension is placed in a concrete context of potential conflict arising at 
different levels of Union regulation (national, European and even transnational) via the case 
studies2068.  This final chapter has intended to focus on the theoretical and methodological 
conclusions that can be drawn from the theoretical and case-based analysis that constitutes the 
core of the thesis.  Two fundamental deductions are identifiable. The thesis has attempted to 
advance the assertion that a developed understanding of complex comparative analysis (while 
not going so far as to promote a model or a framework of methodology) can be engaged: 1) to 
facilitate the better understanding of comparative analysis as a tool to enhance the 
Europeanisation of private law and European legal integration in context; and 2) to facilitate, 
via an evaluation of its engagement with comparison, the better understanding of the 
jurisdiction and role of the CJEU as it arises especially from the preliminary reference 
procedure in the Europeanisation of private law and integration.  The breadth of conclusions 
that can be drawn are diverse and overlapping and concern the context in which 
Europeanisation and integration occur, the conceptualisation of private law engaged at the 
outset in light of its emergence in a pluralist, multi-level order and the understanding of the 
comparative methodology, both with regard to the identification of what is compared by the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2068 Joerges,  ‘The Impact of European Integration’ (n.654). 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
This thesis has sought to determine whether, and if so, in what form, comparative analysis 
forms part of the methodological framework of the Europeanisation of private law.  In light of 
the preliminary evaluation, which uncovered the nature of Europeanisation and integration 
and highlighted the significance of the legal, political, cultural and socio-economic contexts 
in which these processes occur, it was submitted that European private law must be 
understood to emerge within a pluralist, multi-level space.  On this basis, the need for a shift 
in the perspective of European legal development was advanced.  In light of the exploration of 
the foundations of the Union legislature’s task and the reach of its competences, the limits of 
the legislative development of European law – in particular, the focus on harmonisation via 
legislation, and ultimately unification, given the recognition of the unlikely scope for the 
codification of private law – have been recognised at the outset.  In light of the preliminary 
conclusions, the focus of the analysis has fallen on the CJEU's interpretative role as it arises 
predominantly via the preliminary reference procedure.  Against this background, the thesis 
has argued that comparative analysis might provide one means by which this alternative 
perspective – one which acknowledges the dynamic nature of private law, its emergence 
within a multi-level construct, and the pluralism shaping the European space - might be 
developed via the courts. 
 
However, the appropriateness of comparative analysis has not been taken as a given; by virtue 
of the subsequent evaluation and critique of the comparative methodology as it is currently 
conceived, the thesis has considered the need for the resurrection of the comparative 
discourse.  It has engaged and advanced a developed understanding of complex comparison, 
one which facilitates the evolution of the Europeanisation of private law and the appreciation 
of integration in its entirety, namely as socio-economic, cultural and social, beyond a mere 
focus on its legal and economic dimensions.  That is to say, this complex comparative 
analysis advocates the engagement of sources of comparative study, which transcend those 
arising from the nation state, and the undertaking of comparison from a perspective which 
allows for a “law in context” evaluation.  The thesis has focused on the relevance of 
comparative analysis to European private law development as the processes of 
Europeanisation and integration occur via the CJEU, and necessarily, the national courts.  
This evaluation has therefore been undertaken via an analysis of three case examples arising 
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before the Luxembourg Court by virtue of the preliminary reference procedure and against the 
background of a socio-legal assessment of the constitution and jurisdiction of the CJEU (in 
light of which the CJEU has been engaged as a potential space for comparison).  This abstract 
proposal of complex comparison has therefore subsequently been placed in a concrete context 
of jurisprudence-based analysis (that is, one of potential conflict arising at different levels of 
Union regulation, namely national, European and even transnational)2069.  
 
The case-based analyses have provided the foundations for the evaluation of the CJEU as a 
“comparative laboratory”.  Fundamentally, they have confirmed the preliminary conclusions 
that have shaped the foundations of this study, that is, the emergence of private law within a 
multi-level construct of regulation and the significance of the pluralism as a defining 
characteristic of the European space.  Furthermore, the case examples have provided evidence 
of the engagement of comparative analysis within the CJEU; indeed, such reasoning is 
identifiable, albeit often not explicitly, in the judgements of the Court and the Opinions of the 
AGs.  Moreover, it becomes clear that the reference to comparative analysis is not necessarily 
limited to those understandings critically assessed as “orthodox” in Chapter 3; while it might 
not be evident that the CJEU has the potential to fully and unequivocally subscribe to the 
developed notion of complex comparison advanced in Chapter 3, it does not seem to have 
been so limited.   Against this background, it has been possible to construct two outlines 
elucidating the CJEU’s use of comparative analysis, in respect of its engagement of: 1) the 
relevant sources of comparative analysis; and 2) the rationales underpinning its reference to 
comparison.  These classificatory exercises have also provided the basis for the evaluation of 
the CJEU’s use of comparative analysis as a tool of interpretation and for a “second order” 
purpose.  That is to say, the second round of evaluation has allowed for the analysis of 
comparison in the CJEU’s development of its meta-mechanisms – namely, principles of 
Union law, “best solutions”, transfer and dialogue – of the Europeanisation of private law.  
The final chapter has not only aimed to provide an outline of the thesis and to reiterate the 
fundamental dimensions of the investigation but to further illustrate the contribution that this 
thesis has made to Europeanisation and legal integration, by advancing the understanding of 
comparative analysis, and its use by the CJEU, as tools thereof.  	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2069 Joerges,  ‘The Impact of European Integration’ (n.654). 
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